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(4) Jurisdiction:
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78 -2a-3
(2) (h).
(5)Issues for Review and Standards of Review: Matters of Definition
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General Statement of Standards of Review:

Definition of an Issue ofFact:
Review of Questions of Fact to determine abuse of discretion by the Trial Court is given
by Lysenko vs Sawaya. 7 P. 3d 783 (Utah 2000), where a Question of Fact is "generally
regarded as entailing the empirical such as things, events, actions, or conditions
happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind". An
abuse of discretion is present when there is either an erroneous conclusion of law or no
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling \Hales v Oldrovd 999 P. 2d 588 (Utah 2000),
cert denied 4 P. 3d 1289].
Definition of an Issue of Law:
Questions of Law for purposes of determining the appropriate standards of review are
defined as " those which are not of fact but are essentially rules or principles uniformly
applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances"( Lysenko vs
Sawaya, op. cit). Questions of Law, including interpretation of statutes, are reviewed for
"correctness" without regard to the trial court's determinations [ Green v Turner 4 P. 3d
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789 (Utah 2000); also Morse v Packer 973 P. 2d 422 (Utah 1999)]
Mixed Issues of Law and Fact:
In issues involving a mixture of law and fact, the reviewing court is free to make an
independent determination of the legal portion of the issue, and the Factual Findings may
also be Reviewed under corrected legal standards of proof. [ Russell v Thomson
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P. 2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992) and State Department of Human
Services ex. rel Parker v Irizarry 945 P. 2d 676 (Utah, 1997) ]
II. Issues for Review and Standards of Review:
(i) Failure to defer to extant Federal Court Hague Convention proceedings and Stay
State Court proceedings when requested by the Appellant initially on 9/30/99,
under Convention Protocols [Article 16 of the Hague Convention against
International Child Abduction (ADDENDUM D) ratified by the US Congress as
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA: ADDENDUM E ) , 42
USC 11601 et. seq., Sec. 2 (b) 4], denied a total of 4 times during the pendency of
the Case , until the final denial by Court on June 4, 2001 , despite the Appellant's
pleading that any such participation in substantive proceedings, including
discovery, would render him in default of his Federal Hague case (under the
'acquiescence' doctrine , Article 13 a of the Convention) thereby placing the
Appellant finally in the intolerable legal situation of involuntary default in the
Trial Court. Court did not heed these Arguments even when directly apprised of
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their validity by the US Department of State, the implementing agency for the
Hague Convention, in direct communication with the Court (11/06/00 and
11/08/00: ADDENDUM K) .In effect, the questions posed are : a) Did
Commissioner Arnett and Judge Stirba err, initially, in interpreting the Hague
Convention to be inapplicable to temporary orders b) did Judge Lubeck ,
subsequently, err (on June 4, 01) in interpreting the Hague Convention as being
inoperative during the pendency of Appellant's US Supreme Court Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari (ADDENDUM Q) in the Hague Convention Case?
Standard of Review: The legal question is reviewedfor correctness without any
deference to the trial court's determination of law [Lysenko vs Sawava 7P. 3d 783
(Utah 2000); also Green v Turner 4 P. 3d 789 (Utah 2000), and Morse v. Packer,
973P. 2d422 (Utah 1999), andKellev vsKellev. 9P3dl71 (Utah CtApp. 2000)]
(2) Failure to Stay Proceedings under UCCJA (ADDENDUM F) Section 6 (c)
demanding such action when given notification of Prior proceedings in another
State and also failure to follow mandated Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
procedures (in particular the Full Faith and Credit Doctrine as it applies to
determinations by Foreign Courts) with regard to the Prior and Pending
Australian Court Action when requested to do so [ICARA, Sec. 4. (g); Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Section 6. (a); under the UCCJEA , Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (ADDENDUM G) , Sections. 105 (a),
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and 105. (b)], despite Appellee being served with the Australian Custody Orders
(ADDENDUM J ) , and despite a clear declaration from the Supreme Court of
New South Wales, Australia, acting on behalf of the Community Services
Department of Local Government, as to the Wrongful Removal under applicable
Australian Family Law (ADDENDUM H). Question posed is whether Court erred
in determining that the UCCJA , the ICARA and the UCCJEA were not applicable
to Appellant's legitimate claim that the Australian Custody Filing took priority
precedence over the Utah Court's deliberations.
Standard of Review: As in Lvsenko v Sawava, op. cit, the legal question is
reviewedfor correctness without any deference to the trial court's determination
of the law.
(3) Failure to Communicate with the Australian Court , which was considering the
same custody issue independently and prior to the Utah proceedings , upon proper
notification of the matters pending there, as required by the UCCJA [Section 6 (c)]
Standard of Review: The legal question is reviewedfor correctness without
deference to the trial court's determination of the lew [Lvsenko v Sawava, et. al.y
op. cit.]
(4) Failure to Refuse Jurisdiction

to Appellee , under the so-called 'Clean

Doctrine of the U C C J A , given her cruel and forcible international

Hands'

abduction

of the

Appellant's minor children [ ICARA, Section 2. (a). 2; and the U C C J A , Sections
1. (a) 5, and Section 8. (a) ]. Court's initial duty is to conduct a comprehensive
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inquiry to establish whether it has jurisdiction, under Otteson v State Dept. of
Human Services 945 P. 2d 170, 171, Utah Ct. App. 1997, (per curiam), especially
given the circumstances of Possession being what they were; but no such
informed inquiry was conducted with respect to the provisions of the ICARA and
the UCCJA. The question posed is whether the trial Court erred in believing that,
contrary to Appellant's claims under the ICARA and the UCCJA , Court could
grant subject matter jurisdiction to the Appellee even when the minor children had
been , clearly and unmistakably, abducted from their Australian residence..
Standard of Review: The Legal question is reviewedfor correctness with no
deference to the trial court's determination of the law [Lvsenko v Sawaya, op. cit]
(5) Failure to allow and facilitate appropriate and meaningful Visitation of Appellant
with minor children , under Utah Family Law Parent Time Statute 30-3-32 (a),
during the entire pendency of the Case , even within the ambit of the unnatural
restrictions imposed by Court, despite repeated notice to the Court by the
Appellant that continuous visitational exclusion by the Appellee was the unlawful
norm [a matter deemed fit for citation of contempt as in Khan v Khan, 921 P. 2d
466, 468 (Utah Ct.App. 1996)]. Failure also to assign a Mediator given the several
Complaints of the Appellant as to Visitation denial or truncation, as required under
Utah Code Section 30-3-38 (3a), Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation
Enforcement. Question posed is whether the Trial Court erred in not following
Utah Statutes as regards the visitational rights of a natural father.
5

Standard of Review: The Legal question is reviewedfor correctness without
deference to the Trial Court fs determination of the law, fLvsenko v, Sawava, op.
cit. ].
Grant of Temporary and sole Custody to the Appellee , in Contested proceedings,
solely based on Appellee's representations , notwithstanding the foreign residency
and inability to attend proceedings on the part of the Appellant, without the due
legal process of an Evidentiary Hearing [UCCJEA, Section 108. (a)], a
requirement that the Utah Appellate Court has supported in various decisions
\Fullmerv Fullmer, 761 P. 2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Hambv v Jacobson 769
P. 2d 273, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Montano v. Third District Court Utah
Ct. of Appeals , 1997]..Question posed is whether the Trial Court erred in its grant
of temporary, sole custody to the appellant's abducted minor children, without the
requisite , evidentiary due process.
Standard of Review: The legal question is reviewedfor correctness without
deference to the Trial Court's determination of the law[ Lvsenko v Sawava, Op.
cit]
Failure to Order a Mandatory Investigation by the Department of Family Services
, as required by Utah Family Law Statute 30-3-5.2 .prior to any custody
determination, given the Child Abuse Complaint, and Affidavit, filed by
Appellant, against Appellee and also made known directly, on several occasions,
to the Guardian Ad Litem. Question posed is whether the Trial Court erred in its

refusal to act according to the Statute given the duly Filed charges of child abuse.
ndard of Review: The legal question is reviewed for correctness
deference to the Trial Court }s determination

without

of the law FLy senko v St n vt m i, oj.

- xl
«^ Allowing severe restrictions on Visitation to be entered against the Appellant, on
August

}

• -!. amounting to a de facto abrogation of all meaningful visitation

relevant evidentiary

basis or due process

abuse of discretion.

Question posed is whether the Trial Court erred a) in -K

acceptance of the

Ex 1 }arte , unsworn, and unexamined

the restrictio

- i. *

'

for such restrictions., constituting an

• *l

i_\ idenuan <:>a>\> u-r

•

*r ,r, 'ered

-•

( A D D E N D U M R) , prima facie, justified the nature of the actual limitations
conferred upon the Appellant's,, and his minor children's, due and requisite
v isitational rights constituting an abuse of discretion.
Standard <; Review

/ i s. si les im >oh nn g c i mixture q f fact and It i t t; the re vie\ vii ig

r 7 " *ra\ make an .naependent

determination] ../ inc legal portion ojthe

issue,

md the Factual Findings may be reviewed under corrected standards of proof [
Russell v Thomson Newspapers,
Dept of Human Services

Inc., H42 P J\/* ,( y* We / 7.7/7. J°92 aiut Siaii

ex. reL Parker \ in^a/rx

-

..••*'

* ,•,;/;. ;

/V

~;7

(9) Failure to take note of, or review, repeated reminders w C purt and the Guardian
id Litem concern ing Appellee' 's histoi y of instability and abusive beha\ lor as,
prima facie, already evidenced in. her abducfum

nfhapiww

muu*t 1 hildren
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across international borders, a crime if committed within the United States (under
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act), on March 25, 1999 prior to the grant of
sole custody.
Standard of Review: Issues involving a mixture of law andfact may be reviewed
for correctness on matters of law, whilst the purely factual findings may be
reviewed under the corrected standards of proof f Russell v Thomson Newspapers,
Inc, 842 P. 2d896, 905 (Utah 1992) and State Dept. of Human Services ex. re.
Parker v Irizarrv, 945 P. 2d 676 (Utah 1997]
(io) Failure to allow the legitimate right to Telephonic participation injudicial
proceedings [UCCJEA Section 111 (b)], on 2/01/01 when so requested, despite
the location of the Appellant, a foreign resident of Singapore, more than 10, 000
miles away (having first disregarded a prior Appellant motion to continue Filed on
1/01/01, with a Notice to Submit filed in 1/16/01) whilst simultaneously certifying
to 'default' on the part of Appellant. As affirmed in Logan v Zimmerman Brush
Co. 455 US 422 (1982), due process requires that' a meaningful opportunity to
be heard is granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner' .Question
posed is whether Court erred in denying the opportunity for representation by
telephone and then certifying a default for absentia.
Standard of Review: Questions of Law are reviewed with respect to correctness
without deference to the Trial Court's determination of the law [ Lysenko, v
Sawaya, op. cit]
8

(ii) Failure M -.Tint Continuance (denied 3 times during the proceedings) when
reasonabi} requested despite Appellant's overseas residence and overseas
employment j iiotorook v Master Protection Corp, 883 P. 2d 295 ( Utah App.

whether the Court erred. Abusing its discretion, in all its Denials of Continuance,
but especially on June 4 when Appellant pleadedfor hut a slum respite so as to be
apprised of an imminent US Supreme Court ux. /.»<.••. . ^; /*. w Jaguc Appeal.
ui an Jura ijjievie]}

I

*

'

correctness vis a vis their legal content whilst factual findings may be reviewed
under the i directed standards of proof [ Russell v Thomson Newspapers, Inc, 842
../«^ Mate Department oj human Services ex rel
f\vkc}

\ imam

*'

'

'

.

(12) Failure to allowir reasonable time to Appellant to seek and find Counsel despite the
fact that it was a Judge who had made that suggestion to the Appellant (in a
telephone heai ing on December 6, 00) in the midst of the Xmas season, to do just
that, thereby confirming the 'indecent haste' that cha racterized the Com f s
apparent will to move forward regardless of the law; facts, or reason. Question
posed is ^ iiuiki <_ uurt abused its discretion in disallowing due time to find

herself, thereby conferring gratuitous prejudice upon his legal interest.
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Standard of Review: An issue of fact is reviewedfor abuse of discretion with
respect to its evidentiary basis and any erroneous legal conclusions flowing from
that contra factuality. Unless 'clearly erroneous' a trial court's factual findings
are not overturned [Lysenko v Sawava, op. cit., and Hales v Oldrovd, 999 P. 2d
588 (Utah 2000)].
(i3) Entry of Default against Appellant on June 18, 01, without proper Factual or
Legal foundation for such an action, and despite Appellant's advance Notice of a
Principled Abstention (ADDENDUM P) constituting an abuse of discretion as
under State Dept. of Trans, v Osguthorpe, 892 P. 2d at 7 and Darrington v Wade
812 P. 2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).. Question posed is whether Judge
Lubeck erred in ruling Appellant to be in default on June 18th despite Appellant's
advance notice of his principled abstention (containing an implicit Request for a
Stay) based on Article 13 a of the Hague Convention pertaining to 'acquiescence'.
Standard of Review: The issue of law is to be reviewedfor 'correctness' without
deference to the trial court's determination of the law [Lysenko v Sawaya, op. cit].
(i4) Inappropriate Grant of Temporary Restraining Order to the Appellee (who, in
effect, obtained it - given her anxieties - under false pretences) breaking up a
peaceful, on-going legal visitation with minor children ,whilst swimming in a
hotel pool with their father whom they had been restrained from visiting with for
some two years owing to their forcible abduction, without any due cause, legal or
factual. TRO's are governed by Utah R. Civ. Proc. Rule 65 A (e), and Federal
rulings as in Otero Savings & Loan Ass 'n v Federal Reserve Bank 665 F. 2d 275,
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278 (10 n Cir. 1981) which require that stringent conditions have to be met prior to
grant of such restraining orders inclusive of: irreparable harm,, the presumption
that the moving party w ill prevail on merits, that the damage to moving party
uiilweioh^ il<imajL»e to I In - parh untrained

and Ili.il il \> nut

.HIUIM !U

Hit \m\Aw

interest / see Utah Medical Products Inc. vsjlearcv 958 P 2d 228 (Utah 1998)].
Not one of these conditions was met by the facts and yet Court went ahead to issi le
such an order against Appelant uunnging Uic iio^i i\ vu Doin the Appellant and his

Standard of Review: In issues involving a mix of fact and law, the review ^-v: court
may examine the legal portion of the issue for correctness whilst factual findings
may be review CJ ai^h/ Me corrected standards ojproai
Newspaper,. ,,-... •

x

; s if

-

]

•'•

-V-J^I

, Kussetlv Thomson
iKpi. <*; uuman

.nririces

ex.rel. Parker vIrizarry 945 P. 2d 67o (Utah 199 "
(is) Allowing to let stand the contents of an adverse ruling against Appellant by
.)UA$S

.w. . \.i.^i: wj^pnc piuiici of proof of a conflict of"interest with one

ofthepartio

am ,ii..;..-._ ,-i j^aiiwwiionw/ui ,.;. A r i)^Huu.

. • •- f

Commissioner. Question posed is whether Court erred ;i. ijtung stand the Contents
°i . • . * * i

* Commissioner Arnett, against the Appellant, given that he had a

Standard of Review; An ;vv//e <v 't;
iicjerenci. it- //.''• ;/-; -

./».' \Lvsenko v. &7w<?va, op. citj.
U

(i6) Failure to make any attempt to abide by the serious and explicit public policy
intent of the Family Court Act as given by Utah Family Law Statute 30-3-11.1,
given the important emotional interests in familial stability of the abducted minor
children . Question posed is whether Court should have recommended mandatory
counseling or some such mediation, under the Statute, given the interests of minor
children victimised first by an international abduction, next by a divorce suit, then
by a sudden withdrawal of all contact with their father, and then their subsequent
on-and-off manipulative abuse at the hands of the Appellee and her kin.
Standard of Review: An issue of law is examinedfor correctness without deference
to the determination of law by the trial court [Lysenko v Sawayay op. cit, and
KellevvKellev 9 P 3d 171 (Utah Ct App. 2000)]
(n) Failure to abide by the caveats of the Utah Parent Time' Statute 30-3-32.b by
Court's stipulation of Restrictions , both during the pendency of the Case (for
some two and a half years) and especially in its Ex Parte final judgment virtually
cancelling all meaningful filial contact already attenuated by the foreign
permanent residency of the Appellant, thereby inflicting severe emotional distress
on both Appellant and his minor children [ Rankin v Howard, 633 F. 2d 844
(1980); and Geisin2er v Vose. 352 F. Supp. 104 (1972)] where Ex Parte Orders
denying such rights are held to be Unconstitutional; also Lloyd v. Loefflei\ 518 F.
Supp. 720, where Federal Courts awarded money damages for such inflictions of
emotional distress] and as such violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
12

Rights of both Appellant and his minor children. Question posed is whether the
Court abused its discretion in imposing draconian Restrictions on Visitation,
. ...

. ::videntiar>; basis, in its final, Ex Parte default judgment.

Stancuru * . lievL-v *

^

•

'

,.*.'>>

examines for correctness with no deference to the interpretation of the trial court
[Lysenko v Sawaya, op, citj.
(i* * n-dVA v>i :* . \ u .^r..: .. ^pwi.w^. a; . .v ...... ..

.,. ;he unusual circumstances
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• .s • .

vppeiian:. - guaranteed parental

a

custodial rights. As the I S has ruled p- f nrilloin v Walcott 434 l.T S. 246 C^S S. O
549, 5J 1 ; a M 5 i • • i *T X) and in 7>>c r /mv/? -^ ; F. Supp. 1247 US I "
iaa ? ! ^io led i>\ ihe First, Fifth, tagnth. Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the US.
Standard of Review: In a matter of h n v, the i *e vie\ i ing Court need i tot defer to the
legal conclusions of the trial court / 'Lysenko v Sawava, <//>. c ///
(19) Grant of Financial judgments to Appellee on basis of Appellant's income alone,
•*: a* aiaa by mean*, .-i a \\\K reckoning of
./../'..//.,' U A J '.

•-. -

a.

-

v.1:, * .,.

Mi.-iu- arai • Jong \ears o: Iiagwe v v invention

ai; d abduction litigation against the Appellee, the perpetrator of the abduction
: u. in; Respondent in the Federal case,, aa<J - true assessment of Appellee's
needs given tiei residence inher pai en

-a

.

'conunuea empio> rneiit.

Courts are obliged to do more than restate Moving Party's testimony, and must
show that all financial claims and assessments are supposed K factual findings.
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\Bakery Baker. 866 P. 2d at 540, 546, Utah Ct. App. 1993; and RehnvRehn. Utah
Ct. App., 1999; also Childs v Childs 967 P. 2d 942 Utah Ct.App 1998, and
especially Stevens v Stevens 754 P. 2d 952, 958-59 Utah Ct. App. 1988 where a
failure to consider such factors was deemed an 'abuse of discretion'.]. Further,
under Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56 (1) (1996) Attorney's fees are only awarded if the
defense was either meritless or asserted in bad faith. Court is obliged to make
specific and requisite findings in this regard, which it did not \Chipman v Miller
934 P 2d 1158, 1161, Utah Ct. App. 1997 and Watkiss & Campbell v Foa and Son
808 P. 2d 1061, 1068, Utah 1991].
Standard of Review: In issues involving mixtures of fact and law, the reviewing
court may examine the legal portion for correctness whilst factual findings may
be reviewed under corrected standards of proof [Russell v Thomson Newspapers,
Inc 842 P. 2d 896, 905 (Utah, 1992); and State Department of Human Resources
ex. rel Parker v Irizarrv 945 P. 2d 676 (Utah 1997]
(20) Failure to take notice of Appellant's Pro Se Representations: Motions, Objections
and Requests for Rulings: Court repeatedly ignored Appellant's duly Filed
representations in violation of constitutionally guaranteed Sixth Amendment due
process rights.[Appellant's Protests in this regard , Filed with the Court
Functionaries , including a Complaint against Commissioner Bradford, are
available in ADDENDUM T]
Standard of Review: In Issues involving mixtures of fact and law, the reviewing
court may examine the legal portion for correctness whilst factual findings may be
reviewed under corrected standards of proof fRussell v Thomson Newspapers, Inc
842 P. 2d 896, 905 (Utah, 1992)]
(5) A: Issues Preserved in Trial Court:
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Appellant. v\hii>i appearing specially* throughout. Objected.
•

J
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•. . -•" - -iv /
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and or Opposed, every ^ w

r . '

"

Record : n ^ v H

preserving au m.-. r.gii;^.
Appellant's various Objections, and Oppositions, as Recorded in the Case Docket are
-*\

ni < lironological Order, as follows:
" : '. )();

6/19/ OC ;

7/ 06 '00;

' / /18/00; ? ' c?

Jy

" c ' I/J »' »* *' , c " li' " *' 28 00; 9 ""26 < 00;

9/29/oO:;0 i 1/00; 11/06/00; 11 /14 00; 11 '22/00; 1 2 o O L t ^ ) ' u l . 2 6 0 1 .
2/12/01,5/2/01 /and 6/12/01.
(6) Determinative Law:
This Appeal is based on relevant Statutes in all four tiers of the law: Constitutional,
International, Federal, and. State, as outlined below.
At issue are:
i v ention \gainst International Child Vbdi iction
which reads as follows:
After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article
3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has
been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of
custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this
Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a
reasonable time following receipt of the notice.

Simil.ir !-• the Hague Convention's Enabling I ,egisiau<-:

; * *ruv S* •;-.-

;,
ICAR A, wbi<">
> stRte* « li Section 2 (b) (4):

onvention and this Act empower courts in the United States to determine only rights
•» v> r\vrj,-«r.t;.M-, :!? ^ n o t the merits of any underlying custody claims
Relevance
Cttwn

*.•;,•• //"•<: . * A //.*

JV'I/';/

and the LS Suprenn

Children:

v,i 4ppelLv:t

much like *hc Jci: r

"

^•'•-

- *• •'.

r

< -L>r.i.

Coun couui haw resulted m an Order lo lit turn u.i
(liven fhar ihcvcwitnn

' .'«//- ^

K

>

custodial rulings of
. '

* •

Court,

Decree were inappropriate, impropery and prejudicial to the Appellant's rights
under US Federal Law.
b) Section 2. (a). 2 of the ICARA , which states the following:
Persons should not be permitted to obtain custody of children by virtue of their
wrongful removal or retention.

Relevance: The Appellee was Certified, by the Government (Department of
Community Services ) of the State of New South Wales of Australia, and the
Federal Government of Australia, as having Wrongfully Removed the children ,
under Australian Family Law, with a pending Custody action in the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia. Given that fact, and the pendency of concurrent
Federal actions within the US, it was inappropriate, under the ICARA statute
cited above, of the Third District Court to have granted custody to the Appellee,
temporary or permanent.
c) Section 1. (a) 5. of the UCCJA reiterates the point:
The general purposes of this Act are to: deter abductions and other unilateral removals to
children undertaken to obtain custody awards.

Section 8 (a) of the UCCJA reaffirms it as follows:
If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or
has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction
if this is just and proper under the circumstance

Relevance'. Court was in full possession of the Facts pertaining to the abduction
on the part of the Appellee as a 'unilateral and wrongful removal of childreny and
yet failed to take cognizance of it by its grant of jurisdiction to the Appellee.
rCase Law: See Crocker vs Crocker. 122 Colo. 49, 219 P. 2d 311 (1950); and
Leathers vs Leathers. 182 Cal. App. 2d 768, 328 P. 2d 853 (1958)., et. al.].
d) Section 6 (a) of the UCCJA , with respect to 'Simultaneous Proceedings in
Other States'which states:
A Court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if at the time of filing the
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petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another
state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act, unless the proceeding is
stayed by the court of the other state because this State is a more appropriate forum or for other
reasons.
Relevance: Court had been informed that a prior Custody action was pending in
Australian Family Court in Sydney, lodged before Appellee's similar, but
subsequent, filing in Utah yet disregarded it in violation of the above Statute.
e) Section 6 (c) of the UCCJA which states, with respect to 'Simultaneous
Proceedings in Other States';
If the court is informed during the course of the proceedings that a proceeding concerning the
custody of the child was pending in another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall
stay the proceedings and communicate with the Court in which the other proceeding is
pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that
information be exchanged in accordance with sections 19 through 22. If a court of this State
has made a custody decree before being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of
another state it shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the court is informed that a
proceeding was commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise
inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more appropriate
forum.
Relevance: Court had been duly informed of the Prior Custody Proceedings in
Sydney, Australia, yet chose not to Stay proceedings nor Communicate with the
Australian Court in this matter, and instead went ahead to not only assume
jurisdiction but also to rule on custodial matters.
(f) Section 105 (a) of the UCCJEA which states:
A Court of this State shall treat a foreign country as if it were a State of the United States
for the purpose of applying Articles 1 and 2.
And Section 4 (g) of the ICARA, which states:
Full faith and credit shall be accorded to the Courts of the States and the Courts of the
United states, to the judgment of any other such court ordering or denying the return of a
child, pursuant to the Convention, in an action brought under this Act.
Relevance: In effect, as per the Statutes cited above, the Commissioners erred in
denying the legal priority of the Australian Family Court in this matter and
should not have proceeded with the Case as they actually did.
(g) Section 108 (a) UCCJEA which states:
Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outside this State may be
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given in a manner prescribed by the law of this State for service of process or by the law
of the State in which the service is made. Notice must be given in a manner reasonably
calculated to give actual notice but may be by publication if other means are not effective.

Also, UCCJEA, Section 111 (b), which states:
A Court of this State may permit an individual residing in another State to be deposed or
to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means before a designated
court or at another location in that state. A court of this State shall cooperate with courts of
other States in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.

Relevance: The import of the above statutes is clear: Court needs to be eminently
reasonable, i.e. accommodating, in its demands for the presentation and
representation of an Appellant who is resident overseas, in its proceedings. The
repeated denials of Requests for Continuance, and Telephonic participation,
despite the Appellant's foreign residency and employment, and especially given
his Pro Se constraints, were in violation of this simple precept of legal propriety.
Not only did the Court not grant Appellant this accommodation, it actually turned
his physical absence as a grave liability against him.
(h)Article 13 a of the Hague Convention against International Child Abduction
which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative
authority of the requested State is not bound to orders the return of the child if the person,
institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that—
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not
actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented
to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.

Relevance: The so-called ' Acquiescence' doctrine, within Hague Convention
statutes, is one of the 3 possible defenses against the operation of the Convention
and the Mandatory Duty to Return children abducted internationally. Any
recognition by the Appellant of Jurisdiction , implicit or explicit, over the
abductees by a domestic Court is grounds enough for a Hague Case to be
dismissed. It was this hazard that prevented this Appellant from participating in
the Case; and the charge of 'acquiescence' was actually raised by the Appellee in
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the Federal Proceedings,
Case Law: In 1996 the UK Court of Appeals, in Hvs.H [1996 2 FLR 570 at 574]
held that an Israeli father's decision to resolve matrimonial differences through
local religious courts in Israel constituted 'acquiescence', thereby rejecting his
Hague Convention Petition on that basis alone.
(i) Utah Family Law Statute 30-3-5.2 which states the following:
When in any divorce proceeding or upon request for modification of a divorce decree, an
allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court,
after making an inquiry, may order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of
Child and family Services within the Department of Human Services in accordance with
Title 62 A, Chapter 4 a. A final award of custody or parent-time may not be rendered until
a report on that investigation, consistent with Section 62A-4a-412 is received by the
Court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and Family Services
within 30 days of the Court's notice and request for an investigation. In reviewing this
report, the court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.

Relevance: Appellant raised charges of itinerant child abuse, and emotional
cruelty, extant within the Appellee's family, including the forcible emotional
debonding of the abductees from their close ties to their father, which were
disregarded by Court and the Guardian Ad Litem despite the clear provision
enunciated in the statute cited above.
(j) Utah Family Law Statute 30-3-11.1 which states:
It is the public policy of the state of Utah to strengthen the family life foundation of our
society and reduce the social and economic costs of the state resulting from broken homes
and to take reasonable measures to preserve marriages, particularly where minor children
are involved. The purposes of this act are to protect the rights of children and to promote
the public welfare by preserving and protecting family life and the institution of
matrimony by providing courts with further assistance for family counseling, the
reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family
controversies.

Relevance: Court had been notified that the Appellee had a history of instability
leading to frequent, departures from reasonedjudgment. Contrary to the Public
policy resolve outlined in the Statute, which should inform its decisions, Court at
no point recommended appropriate counseling so as to help find an amicable
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solution, inclusive of a less adversarial divorce, that would not distress the minor
children (who were brutalized by the severity of the restrictions imposed by the
Court itself which exacerbated the original and invidious separation from their
father, inflicted upon the children by the Appellee, by the heinous act of child
abduction). In effect, no regard was shown to the tender interest of the minor
children in the conduct of the Court vis a vis the divorce granted. Given references
to the chronic instability of the Appellee in the record alluded to by the Appellant,
the default is all the more pointed.
(k)Utah 'Parent Time' Statute 30-3-32 (a) which states:
It is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced or adjudicated parents to have
frequent, meaningful and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce.

Relevance: Court and the Guardian Ad Litem, the latter especially, were
repeatedly petitioned by the Appellant as to the wanton curtailment of all normal
visitationalpossibilities - already non-existent given Appellant's foreign
permanent residency - by the Appellee: yet failed to take any interest in the
matter ( As stated in Santoskv v Kramer [102 S. Ct. 1388, 455 US. 745 (1982)],,
"Parental Rights may not be terminated without (clear and convincing evidence').
As such, injury was conferred both upon the Appellant and his minor children
who should also be the de facto Appellants in this matter. As ruled in Cohen v
Chesterfield County School Board 94 S Ct. 791, 414 US 632 (1974), ' neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for Adults alone \ As such, the
minor children also suffered violation of their guaranteed liberties.
(1) Utah Family Law Statute 30-3-35.5 'Minimum Time Schedule' for
visitation with respect to children under 5 years of age:
e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age:
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the
noncustodial parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside his
regular place of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial
parent, pick up the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial
parent by 8:30 p.m.;
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(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6
p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year;
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i);
(iv) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be:
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the
noncustodial parent;
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent;
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent
consistent with these guidelines; and
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time for
vacation; and
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week.
(3) A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended parenttime or vacation weeks.
(4) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration.

Relevance: The younger child in this marriage was less that 5 years old during
most of the proceedings and Court as much as the Guardian Ad Litem ,
unconscionably, paid no heed to her statutory needs for minimum filial contact,
all the more poignant given Appellant's distal overseas residence enabling only
two visits per year to Utah.
(m)Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56 (1) requiring Court make requisite findings that
defense was undertaken without merit or in bad faith prior to awarding attorney's
fees to prevailing party.
Relevance: Appellant was fighting a case of Wrongful Removal and Wrongful
Retention in Federal courts and as such his actions in the case were both meritorious
and in good faith. Given those considerations,

the award of attorney fsfees

is

gratuitous and does not satisfy the requisite evidentiary, or legal, criteria.
Case Law: (Chivman v Miller 934 P. 2d 1158, 1161, Utah Ct. App. 1997 }
(n)Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 b (6) which states, with respect to
Grounds for Relief from Judgment or Order:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
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mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

Relevance: The principal, if not the sole, reason Appellant was unable to participate
in the State Court proceedings was the operation of the exclusionary provisions of the
Hague Convention, prohibiting 'acquiescing' to local jurisdiction, under Article 13 a,
op. cit. Given that recourse under that Treaty is only now foreclosed by the US
Supreme Court denial of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing (on Aug. 27, 01) it would
be appropriate to _set aside the Ex Parte judgment in its entirety so that Appellant may
be restored his due process rights to participate in this Case, involving his interests,
now as may be appropriate.
(o) Utah Rules of Civ. Procedure 65 (A) (e) which states the necessary
requirements prior to issuance of a Restraining Order:
(e)Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing by the
applicant that: (1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or
injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; (3) The order or injunction, if issued, would
not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits
which should be the subject of further litigation.

Relevance: On June 14, 2000, Court granted a TRO to Appellee, breaking up a lawful,
peaceful visitation, the first in over 2 years, whilst the children relaxed in a local Salt
Lake hotel swimming pool, without ANYjust cause, legal or evidentiary.
(p)The Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution: in particular, the Equal
Protection Clause. Section 1, which states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United states, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce
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any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty. Or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Relevance: As ruled in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 S Ct. 356 (1886) Laws and Court
procedures that are fair on their faces' but administered 'with an evil eye or a heavy
handf are discriminatoiy and violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Final Ex Parte
Judgment Decree imposing severe, cruel and unusual, visitational restrictions on a
blameless parent, in favor of a child abductor, is an instance precisely of such unlawful
high handedness violative of the immunities of both the Appellant and his minor
children; the latter, by virtue of that, are significant, if voiceless, Co-Appellants in this
Case. As per the judgment in Cohen v Chesterfield County School Board 94 S Ct 791,
414 US 632 (1974), the Bill of Rights is not merely for adults.
(q) The Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution which states that:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
Punishments inflicted.

Relevance: The Visitational strictures imposed by Court, in the Final Decree, were
punitive with respect to the rights of both Appellant and his children, involving posting
of $50 K cash bonds (made necessary on account of Appellant's foreign residency)
AND Commercial 'supervision' costing upwards of $40 an hr (amongst other
restrictions) for the privilege only of normal familial relations. As such they are cruel
and unusual in their unambiguously intended, de facto, intent: to prevent normal
familial intercourse between a blameless parent and his minor children, and as such
plainly unconstitutional and a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the US
Constitution.
(r) The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution which states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Relevance: Implicitly, the Sixth Amendment defends the self representational rights of a
Respondent. Court disregarded these rights in its arbitrary refusal to countenance his
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various Pro Se Motions.
(s) The First Amendment to the US Constitution which states that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

(t) The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution which states that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation

(u) The Ninth Amendment to the US Constitution which states that:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Relevance: The abridgement of Appellant's custodial and visitational rights,
without any verified evidentiary cause, was an infringement of the guaranteed
civil and natural liberties of both the Appellant and his abducted children, as
evidenced in these several Amendments to the US Constitution.
(v) Section 61 B of the Australian Family Law Act (1975), as amended, States
that:
"In this part 'parental responsibility' in relation to a child, means all the
duties, powers, responsibilities and authority, which by law, parents have in relation to
children"

(w)Section 61 C of the same Act states that:
"(1)

Each of the Parents of a child who is not 18 has parental responsibility for the
child.
" (2) Subsection (1) has effect despite any changes in the nature of the relationships of
the child's parents. It is not affected, for example, by the parents becoming
separated or both of them marrying or re-marrying
(3) Subsection (1) has effect subject to any order of a Court for the
Time being in force (whether or not made under this Act or whether made before
or after commencement of this section.

Relevance: Under Australian Family Law, on March 25th of 1999, when the
Appellee brutally abducted the minor children, against their will, Appellant had
lt
rights of custody" which were wrongfully terminated by the Appellee. That much
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has also been certified by the Commonwealth Government of Australia in Affidavit
form.
(7) Statement of the Case:
a)Appellee , with an unhappy history of emotional instability (whilst the disabilities of
the Appellee are not the issue in this Appeal, they do have a bearing on the nature of
some of the oddities of the proceedings, casting light upon the extraordinary
circumstances of the ghoulish international child abduction that preceded the divorce
trial, the tenuous factuality of the Complaint against the Appellant, and much of
Appellee's variable conduct afterwards) suspected , at the tentative suggestion of an
Australian psychologist who was known to both litigants, to be a rare form of hifunctioning autism called Asperger's Syndrome (ADDENDUM L), forcibly, and
brutally, abducted Appellant's terrified minor children from their home in Sydney,
Australia (where they had resided since June of 1997) on March 25, 1999, Wrongfully
Removing them, under Australian Family Law, and bringing them to her parental home
(the whole act planned and orchestrated, over a three month period of pro-active
deception, by Appellee's mother - the shadow governor of the highly tractable will of
the Appellee - who disliked the Appellant and wished to have her daughter and
grandchildren closer home) in Salt Lake City where they have been Wrongfully Retained
since [ indeed this original abduction is the proverbial 'dog that did not bark} in the
deliberations of this Case]. As a matter of fact, Appellee's paternal grandmother appears
to have been institutionalised, in Salt Lake City, for behavioral disorders and, just
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possibly, Appellee may suffer from the same, or a similar, unexamined condition.
b) Appellee's statements to Court in this Case , charging Appellant with this or that
impropriety, in keeping with the propensities of the syndrome (ADDENDUM L: the key
features of the syndrome appear to be: an overdeveloped intellect, virtually non-existent
emotions except for irrationally induced fear and anxiety, and radically immature social
skills), are, stated succinctly, delusory imaginings without zmy recorded or witnessed
evidentiary basis. Whilst Appellant is possessed of a host of similar Affidavits compiled
originally for his International Hague Convention Case, just three sets of documents [
One Set, but in Two Parts, both authored by Appellee herself (ADDENDUM M), the
first of which indicates her own immaturity, imaginary fears of being 'dumped', and
sole reliance on Appellant, and the second of which, within which one Birthday card note
was scribed a mere 3 weeks before her abduction and disappearance , states her undying
respect and eternal love for Appellant; a Second Set, authored by a family friend and
frequent visitor in Australia, Ms. Tracy Lee (ADDENDUM O), testifies to the complete
and benign tranquillity of the Kanth household whilst in Sydney; and a Third Set by
Prof. Janeen Costa of the University of Utah Business School makes a passing reference
to Appellee's variability of temper (ADDENDUM N)] are possibly sufficient to
gainsay, or at least cast reasonable doubt on. Appellee's entire testimony in this respect.
Even were these , and other similar, documents not to exist, or were indeed wholly
insincere and/or fictional, if any further dispositive proof were required as to the

gratuitous nature of all such charges against Appellant, the Divorce proceedings
putatively inspired by them, and the tenor of Appellee fs mercurial disposition, Court has
to merely note the fact that in May of 2000, a full Year into the trial court deliberations,
Appellee freely accompanied Appellant to Disneyland with the children spending 4
nights in a hotel room with Appellant in San Diego (and yet this same Trial Court,
notwithstanding such glaring counter-evidence, went ahead to prescribe severe
restrictions on visitation as if Appellant harbored nefarious, if unspecified, intentions).
All this is suggestive of the real possibility that the legitimate right to Divorce was being
carefully suborned , by Appellee, to obtain sole possession of the children, whilst
gaining instant enrichment as an added bonus.
c)For 48 long hrs after the abduction, Appellant remained in the dark as to their
whereabouts and welfare with Appellee's family (her mother) feigning ignorance - a
simple index of their moral development ~ as to their disappearance when contacted by
a distraught Appellant thereby, quite gratuitously, magnifying his distress,
d) After a hurried mid-semester visit to Utah, to inquire as to the forcibly relocated
family's welfare, and after a short period of grace hoping for a voluntary restoration of
the status quo ante (which was not to be forthcoming, despite Appellee's suggestion to
Appellant that she herself wished to return but was being restrained by her parents:
: Appellee, instead, took out a Protective Order, which was served on the Appellant, who
was unaware of its issuance, only a full week after its issuance during which interim
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Appellant and Appellee both spent social time together, in mockery of the rationale used
to obtain the Restraining Order , once again based on inventive transgressions of truth:
Appellee suggesting to the Appellant, yet again, that so much had been demanded of her
by her then attorney). Appellant reluctantly filed for Return of the Abductees under the
Hague Convention with the Commonwealth Government of Australia on May 14, 99
(ADDENDUM H) and for Custody in Australian Family Court (ADDENDUM J)) on
June 3, 1999.
e)Appellee was served Notice of the Two Actions on June 21, 1999 (ADDENDUM I)
and June 9, 1999 (ADDENDUM J. op. cit) , respectively in Salt Lake City.
f)None deterred, Appellee separately, but a posteriori, in turn, herself filed for divorce
and custody in Utah on July 2, 99, [ Indeed well calculated 'forum-shoppingy, for a
sympathetic forum, is the explicit rationale for most international child abductions: there
was no marital problem, real or imaginary, that could not have been sorted out by
Australian Courts] after the due time of 3 months for reacquisition of lost residency had
elapsed, whilst engaging in every, near phobic, stratagem since, legal and otherwise, and
assisted in this resolve by a compliant Court (in keeping with the Appellee's expected
calculation of a helpful forum in Utah Courts: it is indeed now up to Court to either
sustain such unethical and unlawful expectations or deny them) to prevent lawful and
meaningful contact between Appellant and his children, again possibly under her parental
direction and oversight.
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g)Appellanfs Pro Se Hague Convention Child Abduction Case was heard in Utah
Federal Court and summarily dismissed, without benefit of a Hearing, in December of
1999 by a Judge with no prior Hague Convention experience; his Appeal taken to the
Tenth Circuit was similarly disposed of on Nov 2, 2000, with a Rehearing Petition also
denied on Nov 22, 00. This does not imply the lack of validity of Appellant's original
Hague Petition , supported as it was by the Commonwealth Government of Australia and
factual data, since the Convention, given its highly emotive subject matter, is honored,
unfortunately, largely, in the breach by most Signatory Nations (ADDENDUM S). In
fact, the Utah Federal Court went against the grain of all canonical US Circuit Court
judgments in its understanding - or rather, the want of it - of the Hague Convention
(See ADDENDUM Q for more elaborate detail).
h)Appellant next took his case, still Pro Se, to the US Supreme Court, filing for a Writ of
Certiorari on Feb 19, 01; this was denied on June 25, 01; finally, Appellant filed for a
Rehearing on July 20 ,01, which was denied on August 27 , 0 1 . Yet again, this implies
no prejudice to the merits of Appellant's petition since the Supreme Court selects Cases
on the basis of its own public policy agenda. It is critically important for Court to note
that no US Court either could, or did, deny the abhorrent fact of the child abduction,
punishable under the Laws of most nations including the US, ruling instead only on the
issue of where the jurisdiction might lie (i.e. whether in the US or Australia) in relation to
it
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i)In effect, his Hague Convention Child Abduction Case, commenced on May 14 , 99 ,
supported and brought forward to the United States, by the Commonwealth Government
of Australia, and in full conformity with the Articles of the Hague Convention, was
finally laid to rest, denied the benefit of even a single Hearing, and against all Hague
Convention Case Law precedent, in the US Supreme Court on August 27th, 01.
j)Throughout this arduous, and two year long, Federal legal traverse - during most of
which Appellant, operating Pro Se, remained resident overseas, first in Australia and
then later in Singapore - the Utah Third Judicial District Court disregarded all Relevant
and Applicable Provisions of the Hague Convention Against International Child
Abduction, the ICARA, the UCCJA and the UCCJEA in denying the Appellant, at various
times in the process, a Stay of Proceedings, Requests for Continuance, Requests for
Rulings on Appellant's Motions and Objections, and Requests for a Refusal to grant
Appellee (given her abduction of the terrified minor children from their residence in
Sydney Australia, in March of 1999) Jurisdictional legitimacy (despite the clear priority
of Appellant's Australian Family Court Filings for Custody) in custodial matters
pertaining to their minor children, in its apparent haste to see matters to a quick
conclusion.
k)In consequence, Appellant, concurrently engaged in litigation against Appellee in
Federal Courts , was unable to participate, substantively, in Utah State Court
proceedings (owing to Article 13 a of the Hague Convention that holds such
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participation , and the implicit deference to the jurisdiction of the local Court it implies,
to be a dispositive act of acquiescence to the abduction) and was eventually held to be,
without legal or proper evidentiary foundation for the assessment, in Default on June 18,
01 (ADDENDUM A), despite having duly Filed an Advance Notice of a Principled
Abstention (ADDENDUM P: had the Court, on June 4th, agreed to Stay proceedings ,
while Appellant's Petition was pending with the US Supreme Court, for a mere 8 weeks ,
Appellant would not have been in a situation of legal Default) on the basis of Federal
and International Laws, eventually losing custody of his children , all normal visitation
rights, and being held liable, in further Orwellian manner, for backdated financial
payments [ all on the basis of Appellee's testimony alone (See ADDENDUM B ) ,
without any requisite evidential scrutiny of either Appellee's or Appellant-obligor's real
situation of finances, expenses, or needs] including, support, alimony and attorneys' fees .
1) Additionally and importantly, and apart from the Errors and omissions described above,
during the course of proceedings, Court failed to observe Utah and Federal Statutory
guidelines: with respect to ordinary evidentiary procedures prior to grant of temporary
custody, charges of child abuse, denials of all normal visitational access, opportunity for
telephonic participation in Court proceedings, and in the final assessments of support
and attorney's fees.
In effect, it is Appellant's contention that Court conducted the Case, from start to
finish, on the basis of continuous and manifest legal error inflicting, in process, severe
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prejudice to the civil rights of both the Appellant, and his abducted, minor children,
whilst rewarding, as an addendum, a proclaimed Wrong-doer (howsoever misled she
was by her misguided parent) to the fullest extent of the law.
(7: A) Statement of Facts:
Rather than provide a barren, monotonic, chronology of events (already available in the
Filed Docketing Statement), this Section pools the Operative Facts of the Case that merit
evaluation into various Classes of Common Error and/ or Oversight on the part of Court
so that the Appellant's Case for Relief shows up graphically.
A. The Requests for a Stay of Proceedings:
1. Requests for a Stay of Proceedings, to the Third Judicial District Court, under
applicable Federal Statutes, were made a total of 4 times in the Case on 9/30/99,
1/14/2000, 5/2/2001 and 6/12/01. The first Request was ignored; the last three
were each denied [by Commissioner Arnett at the OSC hearing on 1/20/00; by
Judge Lubeck on 6/4/01 at the Oral Argument Hearing , and the last Request, yet
again, but implicitly, by Judge Lubeck in the Trial on 6/18].
B. The Requests for Continuance given Appellant's Overseas Employ and Residence:
2. Requests for Continuance were made on 7/31/00, 9/21/00, 10/10,00,1/3/01, and
2/7/01. They were successful only in two of the 5 Filed Applications(suggesting
that the Court had disregarded Appellant's Pro Se requests, duly, as a matter of
form).: the Request filed on 2/7/01 (ruled on, in the hearing, on 2/8/01) when
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Appellant retained a new attorney who needed time to prepare and the Request
filed on 9/21/00 (ruled on , in the Hearing, on 10/4/00) when the continuance
was made necessary, not because ofAppellant's application, but because the
officiating Commissioner was Recused and reassigned. Explicit Denials of
Continuance were recorded by Court on 8/1/00 (Commissioner Bradford),
11/06/00 (Commissioner Evans) and 2/1/01 (Commissioner Evans).
These Denials are all the more invidious given the fact that the Appellant was a)
residing overseas and b) was proceeding Pro Se in the matter, unable either to be
in the US and/or, to have the degree of preparedness neededfor effective
representation at the dates scheduled unilaterally by Court deferring to
Appellee's Counsel's timetable.
C The Requests to Refuse Jurisdiction to Appellee:
3. Requests for Disallowing Jurisdiction to the Appellee, under appropriate and
applicable guidelines of the Federal UCCJA, UCJEA, et al, were made ad
nauseam throughout the proceedings of some 2 odd years but were either ignored
or rejected, generally more often implicitly than explicitly. Explicit refusals were
registered by Court, in the record, on 1/20/00 (Commissioner Arnett), and on
12/6/00 by Judge Stirba in an Telephonic Oral Argument Hearing.
D. The Requests Not to Grant Sole Custody to Appellee:
4. Requests to Court to not award temporary or permanent sole custody to the
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Appellee given her wrongful abduction and retention, as per applicable UCCJA
and UCCJEA guidelines , were also disregarded with Temporary (sole) Custody
Orders issued by Court on January 20, 00.
Additionally, and contrary to prior Appellate Court rulings in such Cases, this
Temporary Custody was granted to Appellee without benefit to Appellant of a
prior, and legally requisite, Evidentiary Hearing.
E. The Condoning of a Conflict of Interest Ruling Against Appellant:
5. This 1/20/00 ruling against the Appellant was by a Commissioner (Commissioner
Arnett) who had a conflict of interest in this Case (There had been a prior history
of a falling out between Mr. Arnett, Appellant's previous Counsel in another
matter, and the Appellant.). This was brought to light in several urgent
communications to Court addressed by the Appellant on 2/1/00, and 3/25/00 and
3/30/00. Eventually on June 12, 00 , but only after the spate of communications
just referred to, the Commissioner recused himself; yet the ruling, against the
Appellant, was allowed to stand thereby rendering the post factum Recusal
devoid of meaning.
F. The Readiness to find Appellant in Default without sound Factual or Legal basis.
6. On June 18 , 01, Appellant was held in Default, without establishment of either
badfaith or lack of merit to his pleadings, despite his advance notification of his
principled legal abstention given his Federal proceedings. Court, throughout much
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of the case, had also engaged in the Alice in Wonderlandpractice of first denying
duly Filed Motions for Continuance and then recording or recommending Entry
of Default against Appellant for non-participation.. This happened on 11/06/00 in
a Pre-Trial Conference (Appellant had already filed for a Continuance on 10/10/00
and 10/12/00); and again on 2/01/01 in a Petitioner's Order to Show Cause
Hearing despite Filed motions for Continuance, (1/3/01 and 1/16/01)
G. The Refusal to Recognise Apellant fs Pro Se Filings:
7. Court often refused to recognize legitimate Filings of the Appellant. On 1/31/00
Appellant Filed an Objection to Commissioner's Recommendations in the OSC
held on 1/20/00. Yet, without any Hearing on the Objection, the Order was signed
by the Commissioner on 3/17/00 and by Judge Stirba on March 22, 00.
Similarly, Appellant Filed an Objection (8/8/00, and 8/9/00) to the
Commissioner's Recommendations made in an Order To Show Cause Hearing
held on 8/1/00.
On 8/22, in a Law and Motion Hearing (that Appellant could not attend given his
overseas location) the same Commissioner stated for the record that "the
Respondent had not made any specific Objections to the order' and went on to sign
the Order.
Yet again, on 10/23/00, Appellant Filed a Petition to Bifurcate. This was an
important Motion given that Court's grant of Bifurcation (of Divorce from
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Custody) might have allowed Appellant to participate in proceedings thereby
avoiding the eventual Default outcome and protecting his Hague Convention and
ICARA Rights. This Filing also indicates, unmistakably, that no 'bad faith' could
be imputed to Appellant's principled and reasoned abstention fro proceedings. Yet,
despite a Request for a Ruling Filed on 11/14/00 Court did not offer judgment,
thereby itselffacilitating the continued, involuntary, non-participation on the part
of the Appellant.
On 2/5/01, Appellant Filed a Request to Strike the Late Filing of Petitioner's
Objection. Court ignored the request.
On 2/12/00 Appellant Objected to the Recommendations of Commissioner dated
2/1/01; yet on 2/26/01 Judge Brian signed the Order with no reference to the
Objections.
The above is far from being an exhaustive list of elisions in this matter, since
Court similarly ignored ALL of Appellant's Complaints on Visitational
Interference and Abuse alongside for some 2 odd years. ADDENDUM T bears
witness to Appellant's Protests in this regard Filed with Court Functionaries (on
Sept. 5, 00; and October 2, 00) including a Complaint against Commissioner
Bradford.
Self-representation is a right implicit in the Sixth Amendment \(Faretta v State of
California 95 S Ct. 2525, 2532 (1975)] and merits the serious notice of Court,
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additional to being held to lower technical standards than by representations by
attorneys [ Haines v Kerner. 92 S. Ct. 594 ,(1972)].
H: The Refusal to take Cognisance of Extant Abuse Charges
8. Appellant gave repeated Notice to Court, and to the Guardian Ad Litem
particularly, of extant, casual, on-and-off abuse (principally emotional cruelty,
and much more infrequently physical intimidation) of the minor children - on
7/18/00,11/22/00,12/04/00, 12/21/00, and on 1/26/01 - during the pendency of
the litigation, ranging from infrequent physical chastisement (e.g., shaking and
slapping of the older child in particular with whom Appellee has had enduring
difficulties almost from birth), to frequent deprival and denial of toys and foods
and favors to secure ideological compliance, andjnadequate and irregular
attention to their health needs , leading to chronic illness of both children (which
can be evidenced through their medical records) throughout the early postabduction period between 1999 and 2000, and quite regular psychic abuse
(stemming originally from sundry members of the Appellee's ethnically
challenged extended family) involving disparagement of their father, and his
culture - in effect, an ill-disguised campaign of ethnic cleansing - and , more
egregiously, their affections for him. Indeed, Appellee went to the inordinate
length of trying to get the older child baptized into her new-found faith without
either the knowledge or consent of the Appellant (ironically contrary to all
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teachings of the Church in question) hoping possibly to set up a newly invented
cultural distance between the children and their father: a quite impossible
objective given that the children, even at their tender ages, are - through
providential grace - far more subtle than their captors, Appellant also pointed out
the possibility (in particular, given the very high level of stress of the Appellee,
and her disturbed state of mind, during the much of the course of Trial Court
litigation) of an everpresent, if underlying , threat to the children's welfare given
the history of demonstrated behavioral instability of the Appellee. No notice was
taken of these urgent, topical, filings despite Statutory, mandated , procedures for
routine Investigation that should have been followed as a matter of course.
I The Refusal to Interfere with Continuing and Chronic Visitation Denial
9. Appellant gave repeated Notice to Court also of chronic and unremitting visitation
denials and/or truncations for almost 2 and a half years since the children's
abduction, especially poignant given that Appellant resides abroad and has no
normal opportunities to see his children. On Record are notices given, often in
Affidavit form, on 6/16/00, 6/23/00, 6/28/00, 12/14/00, 12/18/00, and 1/26/01 but
to no avail despite Legislative provisions under Utah Family Law for Order of
mandatory mediation in such matters, and non-Custodial Visitation rights insisted
upon in Family Law Statutes. Instead, Court went out of its way to set up even
further obstacles to visitation thereby impinging upon both Appellant's and his
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children's rights in this regard.
On 6/14/00 an ongoing peaceful visitation , the first in 2 and a half years, in
progress in a Hotel in Salt Lake City was broken up by Appellee (teams of her
father's workers patrolled the hotel, keeping Appellant and his children under
direct surveillance, in pick-up trucks, until ordered off by Hotel security)
obtaining, under false pretenses, a Temporary Restraining Order. Appellant filed
Affidavits on 6/16/00, 6/23/00 and 6/28/00 protesting the unlawful action but to
no avail.
In another instance, Appellant, having just arrived from Singapore, on a very short
stay to see his children, requested the Judge, on 11/22/00, for an immediate
telephonic Hearing so as to the address the issue of visitation denials; but this
request was also denied by the Judge on 11/27/00.
J

The Visitational Ruling against Appellant with no Evidentiary Basis:
10. On 8/01/00, on the inappropriate basis of an Unsworn letter (ADDENDUM R),
duly challenged by Respondent on 7/18/00 and 7/31/00 , not subject to cross
examination, and addressed only to Counsel for Petitioner by a local psychologist
retained by the Appellee , Dr. Denise Goldsmith, and asking simply for more
advance notice for Visitations, Commissioner Bradford burdened Appellant with a
'Supervised Visitation' order which virtually assured that there would be no more
contact between Appellant and his children (this was to be further compounded by
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the Final Decree that placed unconscionable obstacles to normal visitation without
any Evidentiary claims against Appellant). Stated simply, there was neither factual
nor legal basis for the order (as with the Default Ruling of June 18,01 and the
grant of temporary custody to Appellee without an evidentiary Hearing on January
20, 00) indicating , among other things, the real animus shown toward Appellant,
conscious or unconscious, on the part of Court.
K. The Refusal to Allow legitimate Request for Telephonic Participation in Hearing
Given Appellant's Overseas Residence:
11. On February 1,01, Court held a Petitioner's OSC Hearing; Appellant had
previously contacted Court asking for telephonic participation ( and faxed to
Commissioner on 2/01/01) given his employ and residence in Singapore, but this
was summarily disallowed (as was his request for Continuance). Hours before the
Hearing , Appellant called yet once again to secure access to the Hearing but was
denied, scornfully, by the Commissioner's Clerk. Insult compounded injury when
the Commissioner then went on to 'certify' Appellant to be in default for nonparticipation.
(8) Summary of Arguments:
Briefly, it is Appellant's Contention, solidly based on the Operative Clauses of
Determinative Federal and State Law as already identified, that Appellant's Utah State
Court Case (much like his International Hague Convention case which was dismissed by
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US Courts against the grain of Hague Convention Statutes and Case Law) went,
involuntarily by Default as it did owing to Legal and Factual Errors and Omissions on
part of the Third Judicial District Court, mainly pertaining to Court's disregard for
Federal Legislations inclusive of, but not restricted to, the ICARA, the UCCJA, and the
UCCJEA (in its disallowal of: Stays, Continuances, Legitimate access to long distance
participation in proceedings, and Requests to deny Custodial and Jurisdictional rights to
Appellee) thereby inflicting severe prejudice to his legal interest, in the following
respects:
a) With respect to loss of custodial rights over his abducted minor children, a loss
originating in their abduction by Appellee on March 25, 1999, now placed in
permanent jeopardy by the sole custody given to Appellee (a person with a
history of unmeditated departures from reason), without due and proper
evidentiary process, and without regard to the prior proceedings brought by
Appellant in the Family Court of Australia, under whose laws Appellee remains
charged with Wrongful Removal and, thereby, with continuing Wrongful
Retention. In Beaber v Beaber, 322 NE 2d 910, it was ruled that custody could be
awarded to a father when the mother is guilty of' perjury or [is] otherwise
immoral'; Given Appellee's unsubstantiated and non-corroborated testimony, not
subject to cross examination, and given Appellee's surreptitious and brutish
abduction of the minor children, an established and incontrovertible fact, and
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given that such abductions are seen, within US Laws, as the newest form of form
of child abuse carrying both civil and criminal culpability, Court should have
shown far more circumspection than it did in this regard in readily granting
Appellee's version of events credence, and sole custody to the Appellee, over the
prerogatives of the Appellant. Indeed, in the necessary Post-abduction effort to
whitewash her unsavory action (inclusive of a tendentious, and hasty, overnight
membership in the local faith - by both Appellee and her mother who had never
attended church prior to the abduction - apparently to obtain the requisite
Community support, including possible welfare assistance, for her cause),
Appellee has regrettably engaged in a predictable pattern of defensive
misrepresentations. In effect, it is quite credible to argue that the concocted
nature of the Divorce Complaint points only to the skilful and entrepreneurial,
use of Divorce as a Legal means only of obtaining sole monopoly over the minor
children, blessed with the added prospect of enduring financial gain.
b) In regard to the draconian and entirely punitive visitational limitations, in the final
judgment decree, inclusive of geographic restriction, posting of bonds, surrender
of passport, and mandatory recourse to the prohibitive costs of commercially
supervised visitations, all without any requisite, verified, evidentiary basis, or
even pretext, virtually guaranteeing a total lack of even the possibility of
meaningful relationship between father and children. As ruled in Stanley v Illinois,
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405 US 645, 651, 92 S Ct 1208 (1972), " a parent's interest in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children rises to a
constitutionally secured right...". Further, given the Ex Parte nature of the final
judgment, as per Rankin v Howard, 633 F. 2d 844 (1980), such orders are simply
unconstitutional; and, as in Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 S Ct. 356_(1886), Orders that
are 'fair on their faces' but administered ' with an evil eye or a heavy hand' are
discriminatory and unlawful and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, custody can be changed , upon Petition, if the
custodial parent is 'disrespectful of visitation orders' (Muraskin v Muraskin 283
NW 2d 140 (N. Dakota 1979); in relation to the Appellee's bizarre conduct in this
regard for the two and a half years since the abduction, the term 'disrespect'
would be the understatement of the year,
c) With respect to the financialjudgments, inclusive of attorneys' fees, yet again
ordered without elementary evidentiary circumspection [ as required by law: see
Chivmanv Miller 934 P. 2d 1158, 1161 Utah Ct. App. 1997; and Watkiss
&Campbell v Foa and Son 808 P. 2d 1061, 1068 Utah 1991] and careful scrutiny
of the historical context of child abduction, i. e the Two Years of Federal
.litigation it occasioned, preceding , and concurrent with, the divorce suit brought
by Appellee, and obligor's consequent verifiable condition of radically attenuated
situation of needs, financial health, and ability to pay.
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(9) Rationale for Grant of Petition
It is Appellant's contention that his Case went, in substantive regards, unheard on Merits,
through no fault of his own, with the final judgment, delivered in the absence of the
Appellant, and holding Appellant in Default, equivalent to an Ex Parte Order, on
Appellee's briefs alone., without appropriate judicial evidentiary scrutiny and, as such,
both prejudicial to, and violative of, his elementary rights of due process.
Principally, it was Court's errors, and omissions, both Factual and Legal, that placed him
in the situation of involuntary Default for not recognizing, even when directly reminded
of Federal Law, by the US Department of State, (the Federal Executor of International
Treaties) the determinative, even dispositive, operation of the ICARA, the UCCJA and
the UCCJEA in the matters before it with respect to a Stay of proceedings when
requested.
The very fact that Appellee had to wait for the due period of three months for
Reacquisition of lost residency in Utah, after arriving there with the abductees , before
Filing for custody, establishes the clear priority that the Australian Filings , on account of
the unmistakably prior Australian residency of the family, must take in this matter.
Stated simply, the Kanth family were incontrovertibly resident in Australia (which is
why Appellee had to mark time in Utah for 3 months in order to file for divorce) at the
time of the wrongful abduction (whilst the dismissal of Appellant's Hague Convention
Petition in US Courts has no bearing on this Appeal it must be noted, en passant, that
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the Convention is honored more in the breach than in the observance of its protocols as
the Resolution authored by the US Congress itself- ADDENDUM S - makes
abundantly clear) that unilaterally terminated the childrens5 residence there, and as such
remained governed, under Federal Laws previously identified, by the jurisdiction of
Australian Courts in all pertinent matters. The original abduction of the children , an act
of emotional terrorism, was a violation of the custodial rights of the Appellant (and
Certified as such by the Government of Australia, under Australian Family Law, indeed
as it would be even within the United States had the misdeed occurred within the US ,
and across State Lines, under the auspices of the US Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act) and an abuse of minor children as clearly understood , and recognized, now by legal
scholars [ as in Dr. Dorothy S. Huntington Paper entitled Parental Kidnapping: A New
Form of Child Abuse ', March, 1984, herein attached as ADDENDUM U ] , US Federal
Laws [ICARA, UCCJA, UCCJEA, the PKPA, and the IPKPA] and International Law
[The Hague Convention Against International Child Abduction]. As such, Court should
never have granted Appellee jurisdiction to begin with . In effect\ Appellee won final
custody, and other judgments, sanctifying both her abduction and wrongful possession,
solely because of being able to take advantage of the legal disability preventing Appellant
from substantively participating in Trial Court proceedings. It appears to be a reasonable
induction , given the absence of any evidentiary basis to Appellee's Complaint against
the Appellant, that the divorce itself was but the simple ruse to legally capture the minor

children, and keep them from their father, whilst obtaining financial ransom , in an
Orwellian twist, for the misdeed.
Additionally, the on-going Visitational Interference and obstruction, since the abduction,
whilst matters were subjudice, as sanctified by various inappropriately and carelessly
issued Court orders, especially by the Final Decree and Judgment, were both unnatural
and unlawful (violative both of operative Utah Family Law Statutes and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States), an infringement of the
civil liberties of both Appellant and his children, lacking in Constitutionality, and
imposing severe and unconscionable emotional distress on Appellant and his minor
children.
The Final grant of sole custody to an obviously unstable parent (stable individuals do not
abduct and terrify children and keep them from the other parent) in an uncontested Trial,
violating the prerogatives of a blameless Appellant is an arbitrary, and willful truncation
of Appellant's and his children's fundamental liberty rights as guaranteed in various
Amendments to the US Constitution identified elsewhere in this brief. As affirmed in
Cohen v Chesterfield County School Board 94 S Ct. 791,414 US 632 (1974), the Bill of
Rights is not merely for adults but applies to Minors as well.
Aside from the foregoing points of basic, raw legality, which form the real indefectible
legal crux of this Appeal as an important, digressive apercus involving the welfare of
the minor children it is Appellant's educated, and enduring, apprehension that the
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children remain at some (if unknowable) risk to the extent that they remain within the
sole, unmonitored, stewardship of Appellee (mitigated only for the time-being by her
residence in her parental home with her parents) given her variable psychological
propensities, especially her inability to engage in emotional parenting, over which she
has little direct control ( as such, no reference here to the Appellee, a victim of a
probable disorder, is an assignation of blame, merely a statement of observed fact: nor
is it the legal intent of this Appellant to raise this issue as a ploy to seek a divestiture
of the minor children from their mother such as sought, and attained, by the Appellee
against Appellant: Appellant is not so crass, craven or irresponsible as to seek to
deprive children of normal and legitimate access rights to a natural parent).
Regardless of the validity of Appellee's putative disabilities, it is a fact that both
children have been systematically terrorized by both Appellee and her mother into
believing - another apparent delusion of the Appellee - that the Appellant was visiting
Utah merely with a desire to kidnap them; in effect imputing to the Appellant, without
any cause, the kind of ill-conceived behavior that Appellee herself had engaged in.
.Indeed, the extraordinary measures taken in denying all visitation to the Appellant,
even on Christmas day, 3 years running ( even the Grinch, it might be recalled stole
Xmas only once), despite the latter-day protestation of faith in the teachings of the
church, by the Appellee , including instructing the children's public school not to let the
Appellant observe them in the classroom; and, subject to whim, often trying to prevent
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or truncate ordinary telephone visitation on any pretext conceivable , is , prima facie,
compelling evidence of Appellee's continuing thoughtlessness vis a vis the interest of
the minor children, bearing all the hallmarks - it would seem, on any rational appraisal of a less than mature parent, irrationally and cruelly blind (no matter how moved by
irrational fears) to the children's most basic emotional needs. Court might well reflect
upon this: fathers have rights, too; and so do children, in relation to their fathers.
Appellant, despite manifest disquiet, remained legally disabled (and morally even more
so, for not wishing to go public against the Appellee for whom he has maintained a
continuing , solicitous, and even protective,, regard and affection , and whom he
continues to view as victimized by disabilities beyond her control despite the trauma of
his long legal odyssey occasioned by her) from raising these issues since he was
constrained by his Hague Convention Case from involving himself substantively in these
matters. Yet, throughout the process, in which he appeared specially, he let it be known ,
ad nauseam, that there was much here that merited serious examination, once the legal
opportunity presented itself: It never did, since Court closed all proceedings before his
Hague Case was laid to rest by the US Supreme Court .The Petition for Certiorari was
denied on June 25th, 01, just a week after the June 19th Trial, whilst the Petition for a
Rehearing was denied on August 27th' , 0 1 , allowing him scope , finally, for legal
intervention but regrettably after the Trial Court had closed the case.
.All in all, a Pro Se Litigant was victimized by a Court which refused to recognize the
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legitimacy of his Federal Legal struggles , and his State Court pleadings, holding him
accountable for impossible appearances before it despite the constraints of his overseas
residency and employment, and his International Child Abduction Case against
Appellee., and finally burdening him , in his involuntary absentia, with severely
iniquitous financial judgments, whilst simultaneously depriving him, a blameless parent,
of all normal_custodial and Visitational rights and prerogatives , and ignoring witnessed
threats to the well being of the abducted children in the Appellee's household at a time of
great tension therein.
(10) Conclusion: Relief Sought:
Appellant respectfully, on the basis of the foregoing Facts and Arguments, reflecting his
best (if fallible) judgment of issues, inclusive of all operative UCCJA, UCCJEA and
ICARA guidelines - in the interest of substantive, and quite overdue, justice - seeks to
have All Judgments in the Case Set Aside: a) in recognition of the legal priority and
precedence that the Australian Family Court proceedings must take under Federal Laws
already identified , b) in respect of the unlawful Trial Court Denials of Requests for a
Stay of proceedings whilst the Hague Convention was in force thereby virtually enforcing
an Ex Parte trial in absentia, and, finally c) in taking into account the inherently abusive,
unethical and illegal nature of the process and means that gave Appellee Unlawful and
Wrongful possession to begin with: i.e. child abduction across international frontiers (to
say nothing of her itinerant, abusive, and irresponsible behavior since, inclusive of her
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painstaking efforts to deny minor children, affectionate little girls who bear no rancor
against either parent, their normal, filial, visitational rights with the Appellant for 3
endlessly long years).
Dated: February

, 2002
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FN TH^ DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
rH AND FbR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

i

CORY LEIGH K^NTH,
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE AND WRIT
OF ASSISTANCE AND ORDER
SEALING FILE

vs

RAJANI KANNE^ALLI &ANTH
Respondent.

Civil No. 994904256DA
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

The above entitled nfatter came on regularly as scheduled and pursuant to notice for
trial before the Honbrable Bhice C Lubeck on the 18* day of June 2001 at the hour of 9:30
a m The Petitioner! was orefcent and represented by her counsel Frederick N Green The
Respondent failed t$ appear Akiko ICawaxnura appeared as Guardian Ad Litem for the
children. The Respondent requested through counsel permission to address the Court and
read a u statement" if the Rejspondent and then for leave for Respondents counsel to be
excused from the proceedings. This Motion was granted based upon the Court's advice to
counsel that it intenjled to gtant a Motion by the Petitioner to enter the Respondent's default
if he did not wish to) appear $nd participate in the proceedings The Respondent's counsel
was excused, did nc(t continue in any representation of the Respondent on the day of the trial,
eraser/ »ci«r»

Oh/ore* Decree ® J
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and the Petitioner^ Motio(i tor the entry of the Respondent's default was granted The
Petitioner was swdm andtestifiedand the Court received the Petitioner's evidence as well as
the argument of cdunsel add based thereon, and the Court having made and entered it's
Findings of Fact aild Conclusions of Law and good cause otherwise appearing it is, hereby,
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows*
I.

Th<^ Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce the same to become final upon

signing and entry,
2

Thd default bf the Respondent is entered pursuant to Rule 55, U R.C P

3

Thd Petitiorier is awarded the sole custody of the minor children

4

Sale) Lake County, State of Utah is the domicile and residence of the

Petitioner and the parties cliildren and junsdiction over matters pcnaining to the children
shall not change urfess reliifrquished by this Court.
5.

The|Respondent should enjoy limited and restricted visitation as follows.
a

The Respondent's visitation shall be "reasonable" in light of the

overall circumstances of this case including the parties residence in different
jurisdiction^ ana countries.
b

The Respondent's visitation shall be supervised by a mutually

agreeable sijpervisof or WiilWin or some similar agency.
c.
to revisit

Shoi^ld an evaluation take place a the Respondent's expense in order
issue of his visitation that evaluation shall include a complete

psychological assessment of the Respondent
d.

*t*u<n.r.jt\r
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All of the costs of the supervised visitation is born by the Respondent.

e.

The (Respondent is ordered to cooperate with the supervisor and not

contradict the supervisor's request.
f.

The Respondent's visitation shall take place within the state of Utah,

g

The KesDondent shall give reasonable notice as far in advance as

possible of his intention to visit the children including specifics of the visit such as
his arrival time, departure time and any itinerary during visitation periods This
notice and <he itinerary should be given in writing. The Respondent's work calendar
is sufficiently predictable that he shall give, at a minimum, one month notice of
visitation a^ described above.
h.

Pnoil to the exercise of visitation the Respondent shall surrender his

passport wliile he visits in the United States for the duration of his visitation which
will be returned to tjie Respondent by the Clerk of the Coun upon Court Order or an
acknowledgment signed by the Petitioner that the children have been returned and
the Respondent has been compliant with the Court's Order.
i.

The Respondent shall be required to post a S50,000 bond with sureties

agreeable tcj the Petitioner (or the Coun if necessary) calling for payment of that sum
to the Petitibner should the Respondent be found in violation of the terms of the
Court's visitation Ofder. Proof of this bond shall be furnished prior to the exercise of
visitation.
j.

The Respondent is, hereby, restrained from seeking a duplicate

passport fori the children and the Respondent is restrained from taking physical
possession cjf the children's passports.
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o

i nej t^esponncm snaii enjoy reasonable telephone conversation rights with the

children, at his expanse.
7

The|telephoh* calls should be of a reasonable duration and frequency

Telephone communication thouid not exceed one hour per phone call and should occur at a
maximum of three fanes pej" week and if at ail possible during periods of time previously
designated or agretjd upon J>y the parties. Should the Court determine at a later date the
Respondent is in vitiation df the terms of this Order then the Court may consider remedies
which would more severely limit the Respondent'srightsto communicate with the children
telephonically or provide fo{* monitoring of those phone calls if the same appears to be in the
best interests of thelchildrerj and necessitated because of the Respondent's behavior,
8

ThislDecree t>f Divorce constitutes a "Writ of Assistance" directing all law

enforcement officer* and agencies to enforce the terms of the Decree and the Custody and
Visitation Order an<J specifically authorizing and instructing such agencies and officers to
immediately take physical edstody of the children and return them to the Petitioner subject to
a subsequent hearing by the (Court if the Respondent is in violation of the terms of the
Decree as it relates <o the children.
9.

Thefcespondfentis restrained from disparaging the children, the Petitioner or

the children's material grandparents or permitting the children to be in any circumstances
where such disparagement talkes place and the Respondent shall not undermine the
relationship between the chiltlren and the Petitioner, Furthermore, the Respondent shall not
discuss this case or tfiese proceedings with the children or in the presence of the children.
4

Under no circumstances should the Respondent say or do anything which would suggest he
is going to rcmovejthe chilcjren from the custody of their mother and relocate them
somewhere else
10

Maljni shall tontinue in psychotherapy with Dr. Goldsmith. Thjs matter shall

continue under the (direction of the custodial parent.
11

The] Respondent should pay the Petitioner as and for child support the sum of

S 1,045 per month in accordance with the Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act
commencing July I 2001 aid continuing until the children reach the age of 18 or graduate
with their graduating class which ever occurs later.
12.

The [Respondent shall pay the Petitioner as and for alimony the sum of S2,239

per month commencing JuW I, 2001 and continuing for a period of 11 years and 3 months,
the duration of the manriagei to terminate prior to that time upon the cohabitation or
remarriage of the Petitioner lor the death of either party.
13

The Petitioner shall arrange for health and medical insurance coverage for the

children and the Respondent shall be liable to the Petitioner for one half of the out of pocket
expense therefore, as well ai one half of the non covered medical expenses
14

The Respondent shall be liable to the Petitioner for one-half of the work

related day care costs in connection with the care of the children.
15

This Decree Jwd the parties right shall be governed by the Utah Uniform Civil

Liability for Support Act
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16,

17.

The! Petitioner is awarded judgement against the Respondent as follows:
D est option I

Amount

Chilli support

$10,834.

Temporary ajlimony

531,070.

Graid total

$41,904.

TheJ Respondent is required to provide an accounting for the use and

disposition of his earnings during the pendency of this action and since the separation of the
parties which accounting shiuld provide for evidence and proof of the deposit of his
earnings, the use of pis earnings and the current balance on any accounts or funds held by the
Respondent or on h s behalf]Iregardless of their location. The Decree shall be modified at
such time as the accounting s provided to award the Petitioner one half of such funds
18.

The Petitioner is awarded judgement against the Respondent for attorney's

fees and costs incunjed in th^se proceedings (including the Federal Court action) in the
amount $68,540.38
19.

The Asycholojgical evaluation conducted by Dr. Malovich is, and is hereby,

sealed and shall not pe disclosed to any party or individual except upon Order of the Court
and except for the parties counsel of record. Under no circumstances is the report to be
revealed to the partifes except for the recommendations of Dr. Malovich.
20.

This lie shouId be sealed in accord with the Rules of Judicial Administration

allowing for access 4nly to tl|e parties, their duly appointed counsel of record or pursuant to
order of the Court.
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DATED TffIS / 4 / j day of^rfy. 2001

^ K x

THE COURT- ^ f i ^ 5 &

IONORABLE
DISTRICT COURT
DATED THIS

day of July, 2001.
BY THE COURT

HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER
Approved as to Fumi.

@A.

FREDERICKRGH
FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Petitioner
Approved as to Forrp

£S>

^

AKJKO KAWAMUfA,
AMU^IA, ESC).
ESQ
Guardian Ad Litem
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify tbati a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
DECREE OF DIVORCE and also placed in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah,
with first-class postage theneon fully prepaid, on the 1 1

day of July. 2001 addressed as

follows'

H. Russell Hettinger
261 East Broadway, Sune 175
PO Box 2258
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
AJciko Kawamura, Esq
Hobbs, Adondakis & Olson
Felt Building, Suite 208
341 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM " B

FREDERICK N. GREEN
JEN (i2^o)
Attorney for Petitioned
622 Newhouse Buildir^g
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*111
Telephone. (801)363-5650

FIUD0ISTB5CT COURT
Third Judicial District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN KND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORY LEIGH KANfU
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VS.

Civil No, 994904256DA
RAJANI KANNEPAJLLl KA^TH
Respondent.

Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

The above entitled matter came on regularly as scheduled and pursuant to notice for trial
before the Honorable Aruce C Lubeck on the 18th day of June 2001 at the hour of 9:30 a.m. The
Petitioner was present pnd repifesented by her counsel Frederick N Green. The Respondent failed
to appear. Akiko KavJamura aptpeared as Guardian Ad Litem for the children. The Respondent
requested through counsel permission to address the Court and read a "statement" of the
Respondent and then fpr leave (for Respondent's counsel to be excused from the proceedings,
This Motion was granted based upon the Court's advice to counsel that it intended to grant a
Motion by the Petitioner to enter the Respondent's default if he did not wish to appear and
participate in the proceedings The Respondent's counsel was excused, did not continue in any
representation of the ffespondqnt on the day of the triaL and the Petitioner's Motion for the entry
of the Respondent's d fault was granted. The Petitioner was sworn and testified and the Court
. \w»««*nw\»x,:j> w w r o w CCNCLVUCM: **

received the Petitioner's evidence as well as the argument of counsel and based thereon and good
cause otherwise appearing dops, hereby, enter its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties are) wife and husband having been married on the 16 day of March

1990 in Salt Lake City, Utah
2.

The Petitioner as and was a resident of Salt Lake County for a period of more than

three months prior t o p e commencement of this action.
3.

The pdrties ard parents of and have had born as issue of this marriage the

following children: MpJini Amjstel Kanth, bora April L 1993 and Anjana Kesari Kanth, born
February 20, 1996.
4.

The CAurt has Jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this case. The

Respondent was personally served with process while in this jurisdiction. The parties have
resided in this jurisdiction as hbsband and wife. The Court has earlier ruled on the Respondent's
Motion to Stay the Proceedings because of his Petition before the United States Supreme Court
for a Writ of Certiorari in the Federal Hague Petition commenced by the Respondent herein,
Kanth v. Kanth case liimber 2|:99cv532c.
5.

The Cciurt incdrporates herein by this reference its Findings and Order relative to

that Motion to Stay tnese Proceedings and because it is pertinent to the Respondent's Motion or
"statement" read at commencement of these trial proceedings.
In sum| the Cojirt has personal jurisdiction over the Respondent The Court has
jurisdiction over the slbjecr matter of this action and the Respondent does not dispute that the
Court has jurisdiction (over the) issue of the dissolution of the marriage, the division of assets and
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liabilities, any alimony obligation one to the other and so forth. The Respondent has sought and
was refused a Stay oflExecutipn as to the dismissal of his Hague Convention Petition in the
Federal Court, This motion was made before the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, and that Court
denied the Petition. Tjherefori> there is no basis upon which to invoice any protection offered by
the Hague Convention, if any J so as to suspend or abate these proceedings. It is important for
these parties to have some resolution to these issues which is what the trial was designed to
accomplish. Additionally, the Petitioner has stipulated with the Respondent and his prior
counsel, Lisa A. Jonej, and renewed the offer to stipulate and the Court has accepted the
Petitioner's offer not :o argue an affirmative defense of "acquiescence" based upon these
proceedings if these proceedings continue with the participation of the Respondent. Under those
circumstances it appeirs that tpe Respondent's reluctance to participate in these proceedings is
disingenuous and meant only lo delay these proceedings and frustrate the regular prosecution of
the Petition and the fiiality of p e divorce.
7.

Based (upon th* Respondent's failure to appear and his instructions to his attorney

to absent himself fronithese proceedings as well as the other reasons set forth hereafter the Court
finds that it is proper jo enterthe default of the Respondent and grants the Petitioner's Motion
therefore. Based therpon, the Respondent's responsive pleadings herein are removed from the
record herein and the Court will proceed to adjudicate issues raised by the Petition in the absence
of the Respondent.
8.

The Ciurt takds this step in entering the Respondent's default for the reasons set

forth above bur also because tne Respondent has failed to honor the Court's other Pre-Trial
Orders regarding the irosecution of this matter as set forth below:
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a.

[The Respondent failed to comply with Pre-Trial settlement filings or his

attendance at me Pre-Tlrial settlement hearing before the Court Commissioner even after
that hearing was postponed to accommodate the Respondent's travel scheduled.
b.

[The Respondent has failed to appear for his deposition even after that

deposition has been postponed in order to accommodate the Respondents schedule.
c.

[The Respondent has failed to comply wiih the other discovery propounded

by the Petitioner.
d.

The Respondent has failed to cooperate with the custody evaluation

ordered by the Court and based upon the Stipulation of the parties through their counsel.
e.

[The Respondent has failed to cooperate with the independent

psychological examination ordered by the Court and stipulated to by the parties through
their counsel.
9.

As indicated abbve, at times the Respondent has invoked the doctrine of

"acquiescence" as hefcjelievesA pertains to the Hague Convention proceedings. The Court
disregards that defense for the treasons set forth above and, additionally, because the use of that
defense has been incorisistent <jn the part of the Respondent. This case has been scheduled for
Trial and discovery anil has been scheduled by Stipulation of the parties and the Order of the
Court in the absence of any such "acquiescence" claim or defense.

I.

FINDINGS REGARDING THE CHILDREN AND CUSTODY

10.

The Petitioner Aas had primary physical custody of the children, Anjana, age 5 and

Malini, age 8, since M^rch of 999 when she returned from Australia with the children to reside
in the United States.

11.

The Cduri notes that in approximately June 1999 the Respondent commenced his

Federal Court Hague Convention Petition which was ultimately dismissed. Therefore, this Court
has jurisdiction over tie children and specifically the issue of their custody under the laws of the
United States which implement the Hague Convention.
12.

Prior ti the return to the United States in March 1999 the Petitioner was the

primary caretaker for the children. The Petitioner was employed only on a limited basis if at all
during the period of time the darties had children. The Respondent was employed and was often
away or apart from thfe family (for purposes of employment. The day to day care fell upon the
Petitioner almost entirely.
13.

It is not essential for the Court's decision regarding the children's best interest to

revisit the circumstances surrounding the Petitioner's return to the United States with the
children. Just the sanie, the Petitioner has testified and the Court adopts her testimony as to the
reasons for their return. The Petitioner was the subject of physical and emotional abuse at the
hands of the Respondent. The Respondent effectively controlled the comings and goings of the
Petitioner as a practiced mattes and by use offinancialconstraints. The Respondent was
dictatorial and contro|ing in tie manner in which he limited the Petitioner and the parties'
children in their behavior, assqiciations, travel, socialization and almost every aspect of their
behavior. The Petitioner became very alarmed by this as the abusive and controlling behavior
increased and as she discovered that she was substantially limited in her international travel
while visiting Australia becausje of the Respondent's physical possession of the children's
passports.
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14

The aljove recitation also states the grounds for the divorce herein and the Court

specifically finds that (the parties have experienced differences which are irreconcilable and
warrant the dissolutidn of the (marriage.
15

Excepj for the (disruption caused by the Respondent the children's lives since their

return to the United States ha^ been productive, appropriate and has resulted in their flourishing
and positive behavior
16.

The children aie both doing well in school and their scholastic and social behavior

is commendable as tol each of fthem.
17.

The children hpe established friendships and associations. In almost every

respect the children afe well aBjusted and happy children. There is no indication that the
Petitioner has been anything liss than a competent, able and appropriate parent who should be
awarded the sole custody of these children.
18.

The Court relies heavily upon its own observation of the Petitioner, the

documentary evidence provided by the Petitionee and the "Psychological Evaluation and
Interactive Assessment" prepared by Dr. Natalie Malovich, a licensed psychologist.
19.

Dr. Mklovich was appointed by the Court as the Petitioner's expert to conduct an

independent medical Examination of the Respondent and would have but for his failure to
cooperate and appear]for that examination. The Petitioner went forward with her own
examination and that bf the children so as to provide the Court with a sufficient or the best
possible factual basis to determine the best interest of the children.
20.

Dr Milovich's report is dated June 13, 2001, and is incorporated herein by this

reference as Exhibit"K" and tpe Court adopts herfindingsand view of the circumstances
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regarding custody as informed and objective Dr Malovich found that Anjana is a well adjusted
child with little indication of psychological difficulties who appears to be adjusting to her
environment in spue o f the fad that she is aware of the conflicts between her parents.
21.

Dr. Malovich fdund that Malini is an extremely bright child who performs

significantly above average in gchool and is described as being socially well-adjusted and having
no emotional or behavjoral difficulties. However, Malini is a very emotionally sensitive child
who tends to take a ca|-etaking|stance toward others. Based upon the concerns that the Petitioner
has for Malini's emotidnal adjustment, Dr Denice Goldsmith, psychologist, has provided
psychotherapy to Malihi since june 1999.
22.

Dr. Malovich found that the Petitioner is a loving mother who appears to function

effectively in her role as a singlp mother. The Petitioner relates to the children in an attentive,
nurturent manner and input frob collateral sources confirm that she is very involved in their
activities at home and fchool [There was no indication that Ms. Kanth was unduly strict or harsh
in her discipline and if knythind she is likely to err on the side of leniency.
23.

The ability of Dt. Malovich to offer insight as to the Respondent's character or

psychological functionjng or parenting was limited because he did not participate in the
proceedings. Howeven based ijpon conversations with the children the indication is that the
children care about their fathers a great deal and enjoy their visits with them It appears that he
relates to them in a loving, nurjurent manner The children's input suggests that the Respondent
may be somewhat oveily indulient and seldom sets limits with them. However, there are some
concerns. Specifically pie children are worried about visitation and express worry that he might
not return the children fto theirpnother unless the visitation was supervised They also expressed

:
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concern about ongoing Court {proceedings with their parents, stating that their father frequently
discusses these issues [with thdm,
24.

Dr. IVtylovich provides for recommendations for custody and visitation which

appear reasonable.
25.

Thefiijdingsof Dr. Malovich "dove tails" with the testimony of the Petitioner.

Based upon the Petitioner's testimony the Respondent frequently discusses the case with the
children and specifically promises the children that they will live with them before Jong and that
he will buy a house OD build a nouse and he will take them away from their mother. The
Petitioner reports thai the Respondentfrequentlydisparages her in conversations with the
children, that the Respondent disparages the children's maternal grandparents, the children's
religious involvement and the phildren's intellect. The Respondent often refers to the Petitioner
as "low class" and "Avon lad>| and so forth. The Respondent calls at least one child, Malini,
"dumb" if she disagrees with Him
26.

Malini in partiquiar has reacted negatively to the telephone visits with the

Respondent as well d the pergonal visits. While much of what the Respondent does is
appropriate and well meaning] discussing the case with the children, disparaging the Petitioner
and her parents, disparaging tie children, and making promises regarding custody and such have
resulted in anxiety and physical symptomology on the part of Malini including headaches and
noticeable withdrawn pehavior. That is why the Petitioner sought psychotherapy for Malini.
27

It should be noted that as early as June 2000 when the Court imposed limitations

on visitation the Respondent Has had the opportunity to cooperate in and participate in a
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visitation evaluation vfhich mibht have relieved the Court of some of its concerns in this case
The Respondent has failed to lake any steps whatsoever which might have helped in that regard.
28.

Based }jpon alljthe foregoing it would appear reasonable that the Respondent's

visitation continue to be supervised. If an evaluation ever takes place the evaluation should
include a complete ps|chologi|pal assessment, as well as observation of Dr. Kanth's interaction
with his children. It should ba provided by WillWin services or a similar agency,
29.

Supervt sion shiuld have no requirement that Ms. Kanth provide the supervision

inasmuch as that has r]^suited in a poor psychological dynamic to the detriment of the children
when the parties are ufciable to get along and Ms. Kanth's presence results in behavior on the part
of Professor Kanth wHich is ndt helpful to the children.
30,

All visits shoula be limited to visits in the state of Utah. It should be noted that

Dr. Malovich obtained input ftbm the staff at WillWin services to report that it is often difficult
to set limits with Professor Kapth that he is non-cooperative with the supervisor's request.
Therefore, out of stat^ travel e|ven if supervised would not be appropriate.
31,

A mora formal krisitation schedule should be developed during periods of time

when Professor Kanth is in the) Salt Lake area. This schedule should include a clear delineation
of his arrival time and pis depahure time which will decrease the children's anxiety around when
these events will occuf . At a minimum Professor Kanth should provide at least a weekly
schedule, in advance ot his anticipated or intended visits. Professor Kanth should provide
advance notice of his intended
i
[visits as far in advance as possible. Inasmuch as Dr Kanth is a
college level economicb Profeskox, there should be readily available a calendar, well in advance.
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showing Professor Kjinth's vacation time or periods when he might take a leave of absence or
such.
32.

Malinl should [continue in psychotherapy with Dr Goldsmith in order to provide

continued support anp assistance in dealing with her high level of anxiety.
33.

The uourt is cpncerned about the possibility of the children being abducted by the

Respondent. The Petitioner'* behavior, statements and well as other circumstances beyond the
parties control, give aise to some serious concerns.
34.

Not only has Professor Kanth repeatedly talked to the children about taking them

away from their motner, living abroad, and the like, he has aiso threatened the Petitioner with
that very behavior.
35.

The Rjespondejnt has in the past, prior to the Petitioner's departure from Australia,

made plans to visit Iqdia whe; e he has relatives and friends. India is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention and if he (were permitted to take the children there, their return would be
problematic. The Resjpondentj cunently teaches in Singapore. The Respondent's residence there
also lacks the benefit! ofthe Hague Convention.
36.

The Petitioned describes her concern over the inadvertent delivery to her by the

Respondent a passport belonging to an unknown woman during the Respondent's June 1999
visit. It was made this visit \Mhich resulted in the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
calling for the return pf the cnildren when the Respondent violated the parties understanding
regarding supervised Visits and so forth.
37.

All ofthe above taken together with the Respondent's failure to abide by the

orders of this Coun Heretofore create significant concern about the Respondent's willingness to
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honor this Court's O^der regarding custody and visitation. As will appear hereafter, the
Respondent is seriously in arrears under the Court's support order without any justification
therefore In all of the hearings this Court has scheduled (and reportedly as to all of the hearings
scheduled before the ederal Court in the Hague Convention proceedings) Professor Kanth has
appeared in Court on lonly two occasions, when Motions were argued, and has failed to appear at
any other time when lis appearance would normally be anticipated or necessary.
38.

Therefore, it Would be reasonable for the Respondent to surrender his passport

while he visits the United States and intends to exercise his rights to visitation as set forth above.
The passport should qe surrendered to the Clerk of the above Court and returned to the
Respondents only upon Court Order and the acknowledgment by the Petitioner that the children
have been returned arid the Respondent has been compliant with the Court's Order
39

The Respondent should be required to post a $50,000 bond with sureties agreeable

to the Petitioner or th b Court [if necessary) which call for the payment of that amount to the
Petitioner should the Respondent be found in violation of the terms of the visitation Order which
will be included in thd Decree Not only will this fund guarantee the Respondent's compliance
with the terms of the Court's Order but, additionally, the funds will provide much needed
financial assistance to[the Petitioner should she be required to seek the enforcement of the
Court's Order regarding custqdy and in the event of international flight with the children on the
part of the Respondent.
40.

The Respondent shall, by order of this Court contained in the Decree, be

prohibited from seekirjg a dupjicate passport on behalf of the children. Under no circumstances
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without further order jof the Qoi
>urt should the Respondent be provided with the children's
passports.
41.

The Cimrt intehds to include in its Decree a "Writ of Assistance" directing any

law enforcement agerjcy, State or Federal, to enforce the terms of the Decree as to custody and
visitation and if such lpw enforcement agency finds that the Respondent is in violation of the
terms of the Decree td immed ately take physical custody of the children and return the children
to the Petitioner subjefct to subsequent hearing and order of the Court.
42,

The Ciurt has reviewed the records on file herein as well as the evidence provided

by the Petitioner regarding historical visitation. It appears that the Petitioner has been more than
reasonable and in fact generous in accommodating visitation, supervising visitation,
accompanying the children and the Respondent during visitation, all to her inconvenience and
often to her emotiona detriment.
43.

It is reisonablelfor the Respondent to enjoy telephone conversation and

communication with tie childrbn. However, the Respondent will be under strict admonition and
the order of this Courj not to discuss these proceedings with the children, not to disparage the
children or the Petitioner or har parents in conversation with the children, and to act
appropriately and not |indermine the relationship between the children and the Petitioner. The
Respondent should kej p the frequency and duration of those phone calls to a reasonable period
of time. Under no circumstances should the Respondent say or do anything which would suggest
that he is going to reiqove the Children from the custody of their mother or relocate with them
somewhere else. Shodld the Respondent be found in violation of the terms of this order, the
Court will consider ot|er remedies which will more severely limit the Respondent's rights to
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communicate with the children telephonically or provide for the monitoring of those phone calls
if the same appears to be in the best interest of the children and necessitated because the
Respondent's behavioi is in violation of the Decree.
44.

It would be reasonable for the parties to agree upon periodic telephone

communication and thfc telephone communication should not exceed one hour per phone call
with the children. Telephone calls should occur at a maximum three times per week and, if at all
possible, during perioas of timis that have been previously designated or agreed upon by the
parties so the parties db not ge|frustratedwhen the children are not available or when phone calls
come and nobody is hdme.
11.

FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES

45.

The Court has r ceived recentfinancialrecords including tax returns on the part of

the party. The Petitioner earned $9,600 in 2000 and appears that it would be a reasonable
expectation for her income this! year.
46.

The Responded has been employed in vanous institutions of higher education.

The last available tax return fon the Respondent shows earnings of $44,923. He has earned as
much as $53,941 in onfc year times in the last three years.
47,

Additionally the) employers provide perquisites and benefits above and beyond the

Respondent's income |The Court notes that the "National University of Singapore" the current
employer of the Respondent, mjade an offer to the Respondent on January 29, 1999. These
benefits include:
a.

Some travel benefits,

b.

Relocation benefits.

; "urmtfSWNKx : >* »*WOM*WU TO*-iwe*T«r4
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48.

c

A partiilly furnished University rental.

d.

"Settlinjg-in allowance/'

e.

Medicaj benefits,

f

Holiday) leave,

Failing] other evidence it appears that the true rate of income for the Respondent at

his current place of enji;ployment is approximately $71,000 per year,
49.

Based jipon tha foregoing child support should enter in the sum of $1,046,63

payable by the Respondent to the Petitioner effective July 1, 2001.
50.

The Cdun hasreviewedthe information provided by the Petitioner in regards to

her living expenses finps that Her gross monthly living expenses to maintain a standard of living
that she has enjoyed djiring the marriage in the sum of $3,529,50 is reasonable.
51.

When mat sum $3,529.50 is reduced by the amount of net monthly earnings

available to the Petitioner as well as the child support herein the resulting deficit in monthly
expenses verses incoiqe is $1,8(50.87 as follows:

52.

Description

Amount

Total njonthly deeds

$3,529.50

Less child suppbrt

$1,046.63

Less nek earnings

$632.00 (800/21% tax)

Net monthly de- Kit

$1,850.87

Based upon the anticipation that the Petitioner will be in the lowest tax bracket

(15% Federal and 7% [State) al| mony should be awarded to the Petitioner in the sum of $2,239.37
per month commencing July 1, 2001
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53.

The R^spondept is currently in arrears under the Temporary Order of the Court as

follows:
Description

Amount

Child jupport

SI0,834

Temporary alirhony

$31,070

Judgement shiuld entar in the Decree for those amounts which are amounts current
through the month ofMay 2001.
III.

MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY AND flNANCIAL ISSUES

54.

The parties have previously divided their personal property and it would be

reasonable for the Court to award each according to that which they posses as of the Trial hereof
55.

The pajrties have no marital or joint debts and each should be ordered to pay and

assume their own deb s and obligations incurred since their separation in March 1999.
56.

Based bpon t y evidence consisting of the Petitioner's testimony and the fact that

the Respondent has nit accounted in any way for the use of his funds accumulated during the
marriage it would berfeasonabe for the Respondent to be required to account for any financial
savings or accumulation of funds whether in a banking institution or otherwise The Petitioner
has testified that the Wespondant has actually applied for a loan to acquire a residence in Utah or
the United States and pas suggested in his loan application that there may be as much as $50,000
in cash available to him for a djown payment. The Petitioner has further testified that the
Respondent often keefcs his cash on him and not in a banking institution. Therefore, not only
should the Respondent be required to account for any funds on hand, he should account also for
the use of earnings dupng the pendency of these proceedings so the Court can ascertain any
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accumulation of cashl from earnings or other maritaJ sources which should be divided equally
between the parties, [Any sucji ftmds on the part of the Respondent should be divided equally
between the parties after a fill] accounting has been provided.
57.

The Petitioner pas incurred fees not only in this action but also in the Hague

Convention proceeding. The Court considers all such fees and costs of those proceedings as part
of the circumstances i f these parties. To some degree these costs and expenses were unnecessary
or were incurred becajuse of tile behavior which was under the control of the Respondent. For
instance, in the Haguq proceedings, an agreement was initially reached which was later
repudiated by the Respondent However, the agreement was reached based upon the
representation of his tlvo attoijneys in that proceeding that they had authority on behalf of
Professor Kanth to enter into I settlement. Because Professor Kanth failed to appear at that time
the agreement was received aijd adopted by the Court. The Courx has enumerated the lack of
cooperation and the actions oij the Respondent which have made 'the prosecution of this case all
the more difficult. Therefore, (and furthermore based upon thefindingof the parties' respected
incomes, the Court w^l grant Judgement in favor of the Petitioner for her costs and fees incurred
herein as follows:

CVOMMAMOUNUW

a.

Attorney's fees for Frederick N. Green and staff $31,975.00.

b.

Attorneys fees for Snow Christansen & Martineu $20,617.00.

c.

Costs incurred by Petitionees counsel $3,323.38

d.

Costs pjud by the Petitioner $4,750.00.

e.

Attorney's fees to defend the Australia divorce action $3,165.00

ifVUVvivoKummia**
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Attorney's fees payable to attorney Phillip Schwartz $4,710 00
Grand Total of 568,540 38

g.
53.

It apaears reaionable for the Court to seal these proceedings and, in particular, the

Dr. Natalie MalovicH psychological evaluation and interactive assessment such that counsel in
this case are restrained from disclosing the report to the parties except for the recommendations
of Dr. Malovich and [his actiin shall be deemed sealed pursuant to The Rules of Judicial
Administration and atcess onjy to the parties or their duly appointed counsel of record or
pursuant to Court Orper.
BASED UPON, the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters its,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court has hurisdiction over the parties and subject matter herein.
The difault of the Respondent should be entered.

3.

The Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded sole custody of the minor

children and it would |pe in thq best interest of the children that their custody be awarded to the
Petitioner
4.

Salt Like Couiity, State of Utah is the domicile and residence of the Petitioner and

the parties children.
5.

The Rispondeilt should enjoy limited visitation as follows:
a.

. The Respondent's visitation should be supervised by a mu jally agreeable

supervisor or ^ViHWin pr some similar agency.
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b.

Should an evaluation take place a the Respondent's expense in order to

revisit the issue of his visitation that evaluation should include a complete psychological
assessment of the Respondent
c

AJ1 of the costs of the supervised visitation should be born by the

Respondent.
The Respondent should be ordered to cooperate with the supervisor and
not contradict p e supervisor's request
e.

The Respondent's visitation should take place within the state of Utah

f.

The Respondent should give reasonable notice as far in advance as

possible of his pntentioi to visit the children including specifics of the visit such as his
arrival time, departure time and any itinerary during visitation periods This notice and
the itinerary should be given in writing. The Respondent' 5 work calendar is sufficiently
predictable that he should give, at a minimum, one month notice of visitation as described
above.

ft

(Prior to the exercise of visitation the Respondent should surrender his

passport while |he visits in the United States for the duration of his visitation which will
be returned to he Respondent by the Clerk of the Court upon Court Order or an
acknowledgment signed by the Petitioner that the children have been returned and the
Respondent hat been compliant with the Courts Order
h.

[The Respondent shall be required to post a $50,000 bond with sureties

agreeable to thl Petitioner (or the Court if necessary) calling for payment of that sum to

tamfW*
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the Petitioner thould tlie Respondent be found in violation of the terms of the Court's
visitation Ordqr. Proof of this bond shall be furnished prior to the exercise of visitation.
L

The Respondent is, hereby, restrained from seeking a duplicate passport

for the children and xh4 Respondent is restrained from taking physical possession of the
children's passports
6.

The Docree of Divorce contemplated herein shall constitute a "Writ of

Assistance" directing all federal and state law enforcement officers and agencies to. enforce the
terms of the Decree and the Custody and Visitation Order and specifically authorizing and
instructing such agencies and officers to immediately take physical custody of the children and
return them to the Petitioner subject to a subsequent hearing by the Coun if the Respondent is in
violation of the terms i f the Decree as it relates to the children.
7.

The Respondent shall enjoy reasonable telephone conversationrightswith the

children, at his expensi The Respondent is admonished in regards to a Restraining Order which
will be contained in thd Decree! restraining himfromdisparaging the children, the Petitioner or
the children's maternafl grandpa^rents or permitting the children to be m any circumstances where
such disparagement ta^es plac and to not undermine the relationship between the children and
the Petitioner. Furthermore, tHe Respondent shall not discuss this case or these proceedings with
the children or in the presence ^f the children. Under no circumstances should the Respondent
say or do anything whifch woulfl suggest he is going to remove the children from the custody of
their mother and relocate them [somewhere else. The telephone calls should be of a reasonable
duration and frequency! Telepiljione communication should not exceed one hour per phone call
and should occur at a qiaximunji of three times per week and if at all possible during periods of
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time previously designated or agreed upon by the parties. Should the Court determine at a later
date the Respondent is in violation of the terms of this Order then the Court may consider
remedies which woul<} more severely limit the Respondent's rights to communicate with the
children telephonicallj or provide for monitoring of those phone calls if the same appears to be
in the best interests on the children and necessitated because of the Respondent's behavior.
8.

Providbd the children are domicile will reside in the state of Utah or either the

parties reside in the suite of Utah then the state of Utah shall retain jurisdiction over matters
pertaining to the children.
9.

Malini bhall continue in psychotherapy with Dr. Goldsmith. This matter shall

continue under the direction 01 the custodial parent.
10.

The Rdsponderit should pay the Petitioner as and for child support the sum of

$1,045 per month in accordance with the Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.
11.

The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner as and for alimony the sum of $2,239 per

month commencing July 1, 2001 and continuing for a period of 11 years and 3 months, the
duration of the marriaie, to terminate prior to that time upon the cohabitation or remarriage of
the Petitioner or the diath of either party.
12.

The Petitioner shall arrange for health and medical insurance coverage for the

children and the Respondent stjall be liable to the Petitioner for one half of the out of pocket
expense therefore.
13.

The Reipondeni shall be liable to the Petitioner for one-half of the work related

day care costs in connection wih the care of the children.
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14.

15.

The ijetitioneJ- is awarded judgement against the Respondent as follows:
Description

Amount

Child lupport

$10,834.

Temporary alirjnony

$31,070.

Grand kotai

541,904.

The Rtspondeit is required to provide an accounting for the use and disposition of

his earnings during thf pendency of this action and since the separation of the parties which
accounting should provide for] evidence and proof of the deposit of his earnings, the use of his
earnings and the currdnt balance on any accounts or funds held by the Respondent or on his behalf
regardless of their locition. Tpe Decree shall be modified at such time as the accounting is
provided to award tha Petitioner one half of such funds.
16,

The Petitioner Is awarded judgement against the Respondent for attorney's fees

incurred in these proceedingsflincludingthe Federal Court) action in the amount $68,540,38.
17

The psychologi ;al evaluation conducted by Dr. Malovich is, and is hereby, sealed

and shall not be disclolbed to aiy party or individual except upon Order of the Court and except for
the parties counsel of tecord. under no circumstances is the report to be revealed to the parties
except for the recomdendatioiis of Dr. Malovich.
18,

This fill should be sealed in accord with the Rules of Judicial Administration

allowing for access only to the parties, their duly appointed counsel of record or pursuant to order
of the Court.
19.

The Petitioner if and has been a bona fide resident of the state of Utah prior to the

filing of this action.

21

20

As set forth in the Findings the parties have experienced differences which are

irreconcilable and wanant the dissolution of the marriage.
DATED THIS f-fl" day of

AeriCxm.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE BR
DISTRICT COURT
DATED THIS 1

dky of April, 2001.
BY THE COURT.

HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER
Approved as to Form

Attorney for!
Approved as to Form:

^, f< t, ^ &M/I/1 4 ^

10 KAWAMURAi ESQ.
Guardian Ad Litem
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that afikll,true and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and also placed in the United States mail at Salt
Lake City, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the

[ \ day of July, 2001

addressed as follows:
H. Russell Hettinger
261 East Broadway, Suite 175
PO Box 2258
Salt Lake City, Utah 84U0
Akiko Kawamura, Esq.
Hobbs, Adondakls & Olson
Felt Building, Suite 208
341 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Professor Rajani Kannepalli Kanth
The National Unjiversityjof Singapore
1 Arts Link
Singapore 1175^0
Telephone: 01 !-f5-775-£666
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Respondent and }\ppellaht> Fro Se

IN THE T|HIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

C0RYL|KANTft

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioner 4nd Appellee,
Civil No. 994904256 DA
vs.

Judge Anne M. Stirba
RAJANI ^ANNI^PALLI
KANTH,

Commissioner Michael S. Evans

Re^ponderjt and Appellant.

NOTICE Is herebV given that respondent and appellant, Rajani Kannepalli Kanth,
appearing speciafy, hereby appeals to (he Utah Court of Appeals the Decree of Divorce
and Writ of Ass Stance and Order Sealing File of the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, entered
in this matter on August I, 2001. This appeal is taken from the entire judgment and all
proceedings and fulings (n this matter.

Dated: ^Jugust pf

%

2001.

fit* ^
Rajani Kannepalli Kanth
Respondent and Appellant, fro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herel|y certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 31 day of August, 2001, to the following:
Frederick N Green
Green & Berry
AttorneysforPetitioner
622 Ncwhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt LalteCitv. Utah 84111
Akilco ftawoznura
Hobbs, kdondakis & Olson
Attorney for the Office of the Guardian ad Litem
Felt Bu tiding, Suite 208
341 Soith Main Streei
Salt L 4 c City, Utah 84U1

^

^

^

Rajani Kannepolli Kanth
Respondent and Appellant, Pro Se

ADDENDUM " C "

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; FEBRUARY 8, 2001
HONORABLE JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO
PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: This is the case of Kanth vs. Kanth and
this is an evidentiary hearing and pretrial.
MR. GREEN: Fred Green appearing for the
Petitioner, Your Honor.
MR. HETTINGER: Russ Hettinger appearing for the
Respondent.
MS. KAWAMURA: Akiko Kawamura, Guardian Ad Litem.
MR. GREEN: You are correct, Your Honor, that is
the purpose of the hearing today, an evidentiary hearing at
the behest of the respondent, Professor Kanth. The Court
also ordered a scheduling conference today at the same time
because of the length of time this case has been pending. By
way of procedure, it may be appropriate to consider
Professor's Kanth motion to continue this hearing. He had
earlier made that motion and I responded. I understood that
his motion to continue pro se, was denied. If I'm not
mistaken he has now retained counsel who is here renewing
that motion.
MR. HETTINGER: Yes, Your Honor. May I speak to
that? It is my understanding that Professor Kanth who
resides in Singapore has been proceeding in this case since
the early stages as a pro se litigant and it is also my
understanding that he did file a motion for a continuance of
this hearing based on his unavailability and based on the
custody evaluation which apparently was discussed at a
previous hearing, having not been initiated and/or completed.
I believe it has not even been initiated at this point.
He contacted me first about this particular case in
December while he as here. He asked me in a consultation to
explain to him a couple of rules of procedure and we
exchanged some telephone calls and communications on that but
at that point in time he did not retain me to act as his
counsel. He again attempted to contact me on January 31 with
regard to appearing on his behalf in a hearing that was
scheduled in this case on an Order to Show Cause. I was in a
trial in Davis County on the 31st of January and February 1,
was unavailable and then immediately after that left the
state for a brief family trip to Nevada from which I returned
on the 5th. So on the 6th we had an exchange of communication
and I was retained to represent him in this matter. So the
motion that was filed yesterday and I hope the courtesy
copies of my motion and my affidavit made it to you. I
delivered them for Judge Stirba and in that I simply set
forth, based on having just been retained, I'm not in a
position to present any kind of evidence, witnesses,
documents, whatever, or meaningfully cross examine any
witnesses in an evidentiary hearing and ask that based on
that, the evidentiary hearing be continued.
Now, I'm not coming into the case nor is Dr. Kanth
at this point in time seeking any undo delays in the case, so
in terms of setting up a schedule for hopefully a rescheduled date for an evidentiary hearing, and a final trial
date, discovery cutoff and all of those types of things, I'm

happy to participate in that process today and get that set
and I have some information from Dr. Kanth with regard to
when he would be available to travel back to the United
States from Singapore.
So my request to you is that the evidentiary
hearing that's scheduled for today, be continued to another
date. That the pretrial portion of today's proceeding go
forward and dates be set for this matter to be moved to final
resolution.
I believe the posture of the case also is that
there is a request for appointment of a custody evaluator and
in the process of the pretrial, I think it would be
appropriate for that to be resolved and for that to be able
to move forward so the matter can be concluded. So that's
what we would request from the Court today.
MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to
ask for a little indulgence, Your Honor, because the matter
is a little more complicated than Mr. Hettinger has
indicated, maybe due to Mr. Hettinger's recent involvement in
this aspect of the case. There are actually two components
to this case. The divorce coincides with a Hague Convention
proceeding which has been pending until recently in the
federal courts. That matter was initiated by Professor Kanth
and it was determined some 14 or so months ago, that his
petition to establish Australia as the home state of the
children, was denied. He appealed that case to the Tenth
Circuit and Tina Campbell, Judge Campbell's order was
sustained, his appeal was denied. He has appealed it to the
Supreme Court but due to procedural errors, his petition for
a writ of certiorari was sent back to him so it was never
lodged or logged into the docket by the court and I believe
that case is finally done.
I know the Court has had the file and perhaps has
got a little flavor of what the Professor's position is in
this case but it generally relates to his complaints about
separation and the fact that he felt that the Australian
Courts should be the courts of home state jurisdiction for
purposes of custody and it's more or less an extension of his
position in that federal court case and on appeal. I believe
that matter is done.
In June, 1999 this action was filed in the District
Court for divorce. Approximately one year ago, February or
late January of last year, 2000, while Professor Kanth was
represented by counsel, Lisa Jones, a very competent counsel
in her own right, the matter came to court and it was
resolved, the temporary order was resolved at a temporary
hearing before the commissioner, including partial
stipulations and some rulings by the commissioner. Shortly
after that ruling, the counsel for the respondent withdrew.
Since that time, Professor Kanth of his own choice has been
pro se and representing himself.
I need to back up just a minute and explain that
what is happening in this case is the exact same thing and
the exact behaviors that Professor Kanth attempted in the
Federal Court. In the Federal Court case at the time first
set for the trial of the Hague Petition, Professor Kanth

hired two lawyers, a Salt Lake attorney and a California
expert in the Hague Convention proceedings. He did not,
Professor Kanth, did not show up for the trial in front of
Judge Campbell. Rather the matter was settled on authority
conveyed to his attorneys. Not two weeks had passed before
Professor Kanth had fired his two attorneys, reported them to
their respective bar associations, rescinded the settlement
agreement and commenced to represent himself pro se in that
case. The same thing proceeded there. We would set
deposition dates and he would not appear. We would set
deposition dates, he would ask for relief. We would set
trial dates, subsequent trial dates after Judge Campbell
allowed him to rescind the settlement agreement.
Parenthetically I want to add that settlement agreement would
have resolved all of the issues in this divorce case as well,
not only the Hague Convention proceedings. And ultimately a
trial was scheduled in that case only to have Professor Kanth
at the eleventh hour, move the court to continue that trial
for what, lack of counsel and because he could not appear.
As it turned out he was in Salt Lake and he formally and in
writing waived his right to appearance at the trial so Judge
Campbell ruled on the record as it was before her at the
time.
In all of the hearings we've had in this case and I
won't even try to put a number to them, Professor Kanth has
appeared at one hearing in the Federal Court at a motion that
he had to appear on to rescind his settlement agreement.
Every other hearing, every other procedure except that
hearing in front of Judge Campbell, and Professor Kanth's
deposition in that case, he has not appeared. That includes
a pretrial in this case, the divorce case that we scheduled
and re-scheduled at the request of Professor Kanth. He did
not appear at that either and that is why before you is a
motion to enter Professor's Kanth's default as to this
divorce case so that the matter might become final.
In any case, moving back to this matter, he was
represented by Lisa Jones up until a year ago. He's been pro
se ever since that time but in candor, counsel appearing
today on behalf of Professor Kanth has acknowledged to me
that he has been in contact with Professor Kanth I believe
since last June on this matter procedurally and on the
appellate matter before the Federal Court. Counsel can
correct me if I'm wrong. And we know this is the case at
least as of December because my client happened to be at
Professor's Kanth's residence in Salt Lake in order to
facilitate visitation when she overheard a telephone call
from counsel to Professor Kanth in December saying I got your
call, I'm returning your call, so we know that there was
contact. Everything counsel is saying may indeed be true.
He may have been retained just several weeks ago or last week
or Monday or whatever it was but all it took for him to be
retained in this case was a simple request by Professor Kanth
for representation. Apparently that request was never made
and apparently counsel has been advising him as to certain
matters in this case on a basis that did not require his
appearance of record.

The inference that can be drawn from that is that
Professor Kanth is doing the same thing in this case that he
did in the Federal Court case. He is playing this out right
up until the eleventh hour on the dates of hearings when he
knows that true prejudice could be worked on him and at the
very last minute he is saying, go in there, throw up this
defense, delay these proceedings and my goal, Professor
Kanth's goal will be accomplished which is further delay and
further expense.
In this divorce case, I first tried to take
Professor Kanth's deposition by way of a notice filed in June
or July of last year. He did not appear for his deposition
which was scheduled for July. We had a hearing to compel
that. We scheduled a pretrial and at that time we agreed to
postpone the pretrial before the commissioner in order to
accommodate Professor Kanth's schedule. He told us when he
would be in town or could be available and that was October
as I recall. We'd had an earlier date. We put it off, pure
concession, pure courtesy extended to Professor Kanth. At
that pretrial Professor Kanth did not appear. It goes
without saying he didn't appear at his deposition.
Furthermore, he has not answered the discovery which is
outstanding in the case.
After the failure to appear at the commissioner's
pretrial in October, Commissioner Evans, I believe it was at
that time, we're down to one commissioner in this case. One
commissioner I think recused himself because of the conflict.
Commissioner Bradford heard this matter only to find that
Professor Kanth has lodged a commissioner's conduct complaint
against her so she removed herself and we're now down to
Commissioner Evans. He did not enter his default but reserved
that issue for later determination and now we have raised
that issue and the hearing was held last week and
Commissioner Evans has referred that issue to this court, the
issue of Professor Kanth's default in those proceedings and
the remedy of striking his pleading so that this matter might
be brought to a conclusion. He didn't show up at the
pretrial. We've attempted to take his deposition again and
he did not appear, but in December when we sent out the most
recent notice of deposition he called me to tell me, or
wrote, to say that he could not appear on the date scheduled
because he was working on his Supreme Court petition. I
agreed with him to continue the deposition date once again.
This would have been early January of this year. He did not
appear, instead he sent me a communication saying, I can't
appear after all and I don't have an attorney. This was more
than a month ago.
And so we have the unusual experience of a party
whose saying that this matter should be continued because he
doesn't have an attorney that he's been talking to for more
than half of a year and he's had more than a year to find
successor counsel. By all rights, Your Honor, this matter
ought to be concluded today once and for all because
Professor Kanth isn't here, all be it, he is represented by
counsel today, not because of today's default but because of
his default at the pretrial hearing before Commissioner

Evans. His default should be entered and his responsive
pleadings removed from the record and default judgment
entered in favor of my client and we so move the Court.
Now, it's always a balance in these cases between
due process and expediency but we have a case now that is
coming on 20 months before the Court and 20 months into this
case Professor Kanth now comes before the Court and says one
more delay and this isn't a delay of any final proceeding.
This evidentiary hearing was scheduled before the Court
today, was scheduled at the request of Professor Kanth. I
still don't know what he wants to do at an evidentiary
hearing because there are no pleadings whatsoever which would
frame any issues for this Court.
Procedurally, a year ago, a stipulation was reached
to confer temporary physical custody on my client provided
that Professor Kanth had the opportunity to raise any
objections he had and the court would entertain those
objections. Now, I would submit, Your Honor, that he has not
raised any objections. He did object to the several orders
of the commissioners and Judge Stirba denied those objections
during a telephone hearing, I believe early in January.
Since then there has been no new objections filed by
Professor Kanth, rather there was some vague request that he
made during that telephone conference to have an evidentiary
hearing today, apparently to address whatever remaining
objections he might have to the temporary orders of this
court. I would submit, Your Honor, that we all are here
today because of that vague request. Professor Kanth
scheduled this. He was in the telephone conference, I was a
party, the Guardian Ad Litem was a party. We scheduled this
today at his convenience with the assurance that he would be
here. There was never any mention of any delay necessitated
because of his fruitless search for counsel. In fact there
was no mention that he had been talking to counsel for six
months or more in the divorce case.
If the Court is disinclined to enter Professor
Kanth's default today, and I would understand that although I
truly think this is a case where it ought to be done and my
motion remains, I would ask the Court to consider not only
the facts that I have indicated but these as well, Professor
Kanth does not appear here through counsel with clean hands.
He is more than $30,000 in arrears, child support and alimony
under the temporary order of the court. He has defaulted in
every procedural step of these proceedings including
discovery and the commissioner's pretrial. He has had a year
to secure counsel and has been talking to counsel who appears
here today and could have retained counsel to represent him
in this matter.
The commissioner has reserved contempt sanctions on
two separate occasions now against Professor Kanth.
Professor Kanth has been the subject of a restraining order
when he unilaterally violated the temporary order of the
court and took physical custody of the children beyond the
parties agreement. This occurred in June of last year.
Perhaps most important is the fact that the children in this
case are paying the highest price. I will leave that to the

Guardian to explain in greater detail but the lack of
finality in this case has not been lost on the children
although they are not exposed directly to the case by my
client, they are by Professor Kanth, hence the more recent
order in this case restraining the parties and that is simply
a nice way of restraining Professor Kanth from any further
behavior like he has engaged in exposing the children to
these proceedings. They are exposed. They know it's not
done. They know that daddy keeps calling them and saying
you'll be in my custody soon. When I have you we'll go to
Singapore, we'll go to India and so forth. This is a case
that cries out for some finality.
Therefore, again, if the Court is disinclined to
enter the default of Professor Kanth today, I would ask that
we have a scheduling order cutting off all discovery by May
15th, that would be all written discovery and all
depositions. I would ask that the Court set a one, and at
the outside, two-day trial for some time in June of this year
which is more than sufficient time for this case to be
prepared for trial.
I would ask that the Court appoint a custody
evaluator today. I have been in touch with four custody
evaluators not in this case, but in another case, all of whom
as of three weeks ago, could have commenced an evaluation
within a week, three psychologists and one very well known
social worker. I'd ask that the evaluator be appointed
today, that counsel elect one of those four, that Professor
Kanth be ordered to pay for that evaluation because of his
delinquency under the temporary order and because the court
has previously ordered Professor Kanth to pay for a
visitation evaluation which he has not done. We haven't
agreed on anybody so there's nobody to pay yet.
First of all I would recommend Dr. Quackenbush and
I believe it is Susan Quackenbush. She is a psychologist, a
child psychologist who has been conducting evaluations now
for about six months, highly recommended by Dr. Valerie Hale
among others. Second, Heather Walker, Dr. Heather Walker,
psychologist, more experience than Dr. Quakenbush, an
associate of Valerie Hale whom I'm very certain we're well
acquainted with here. Kim Peterson is a social worker, again
with 25 to 30 years experience in doing custody evaluations
who could begin on this case and would be done by June and
I'm forgetting the fourth name, I forgot it yesterday and I
remembered it on my way to work today and I will remember it
before we're done here. It's another psychologist who could
begin with some dispatch again and be done by June.
I'm asking that the respondent make contact with
the evaluators, make arrangements or pay the evaluators
according to their demands within 14 days or have his
responsive pleadings removed from the record and enter his
default. The Professor has 47 days of official leave from
his teaching duties in Singapore. Last year, at least up
until the Fall, he would visit the states about once a month.
There's no reason be can't do that now. He has always been
able to come here at his whim, either because of the official
leave of absence rules that they have or because of hardship

applications that he makes with the various teaching
institutions that he's been involved with in the last two
years and there are three of them. At any given time,
Professor Kanth has been employed at one and maybe two
institutions. The left hand doesn't know what the right hand
is doing because he claims hardship due to the divorce and
the Federal Court proceedings, so there should be no reason
that Professor Kanth can't accomplish what he needs to do
between now and June and the discovery cutoff by May 15
because he has the opportunity to come here and take care of
that.
I would ask the Court to declare that the
respondent has forfeited his rights to an evidentiary hearing
today. If the respondent feels that he must address any
latent objections to the commissioner's recommendations that
have not already been overruled by Judge Stirba, then I would
ask that he bring them anew and do this in the proper way.
Let us know what his issues are, frame the issues with an
appropriate objection and affidavits and a memorandum and if
these matters are new matters, then I would ask that they be
heard by the commissioner as they should have been in the
first place. Today is the day for this hearing and the fact
that he is not here and the fact that he has acted
irresponsibly in retaining counsel should not be visited upon
me, my client, the Guardian and her clients.
So, again we as for a default ruling and barring
that, a very definitive scheduling order as I have outlined and that name almost came to me for the evaluator but I'll
think of it - and some finality and some light at the end of
the tunnel for this case which I can only stress one more
time is something desperately needed by my client.
Thank you Your Honor.
I believe the Guardian may have something to say.
MS. KAWAMURA: I do have some testimony to proffer
regarding custody and the children if Your Honor will allow
it (inaudible).
MR. GREEN: I assume that would go to the
evidentiary part of the hearing of that.
MS. KAWAMURA: To some extent.
MR. GREEN: I simply observed that as a matter of a
courtesy because she is here representing the parties and if
she had anything to say on the motion to continue it was
simply my suggestion that that invitation be extended to her.
MR. HETTINGER: That is why I look to her to defer
for her opportunity, Your Honor. She indicated that I should
go ahead so let me respond to the statements by Mr. Green.
First of all, let me repeat and clarify for the
Court with regard to my participation. Mr. Green's statement
about that is inconsistent with the facts and inconsistent
with what I told him before the hearing. It is true that in
June I was contacted by Dr. Kanth who is an individual that I
represented several years ago in a prior divorce proceeding.
His contact with me at that time was exclusively with
reference to the Federal Court appeals which were proceeding
relating to the Federal Court proceeding which Mr. Green
described and my involvement was simply to consult on

procedure and formatting for briefs and in content of briefs
rather than the substantive side of the case although there
was discussion with me with regard to the substantive side of
the Federal Court case.
In connection with his consultations which were
fairly brief, I did not ever even go to the Federal Court and
look at the file which I would have done if I was involved in
a substitive way. It was simply to assist him in
understanding the rules of appellate procedure and what his
options would be with regard to possible rulings that may be
made by the Tenth Circuit and then once a ruling was entered,
what his options were after that, and I have also consulted
with him with regard to procedure and format for his writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. It may be true as Mr. Green
indicates that that has been finally denied and over. I'm
not aware of that because I've never made an appearance in
the case and Dr. Kanth has not indicated that to me, but in
any event, my understanding is that he is still attempting to
have a writ of certiorari considered by the Supreme Court.
With regard to this proceeding, I did not have any
discussion with him other than that there was a state ourt
case until December of this year. In December, while he was
here, he did call me and on one occasion came to my office
and again, that consultation was procedural rather than
substantive to help him understand the Utah Rules of
Procedure and what alternatives might exist in light of
rulings that had been made or might be made by the court.
Again, because I was not consulted with regard to substantive
issues, I did not even come to the court and look at the file
except for one occasion and that was for the limited purpose
of indicating to him whether or not a ruling had been made of
record with the court as of that point in time.
So as far as my involvement goes, I am obviously at
a disadvantage to Mr. Green with regard to what he has
indicated about the events that have occurred in both cases.
I have not been involved as counsel. I have not been
involved in any substantive way in discussions with Dr. Kanth
about the case until this week. As a result, I can't, you
know, say whether or not Mr. Green's recitation of the course
of those cases is accurate or not.
What I do know is that this hearing today to the
best of my knowledge was not set or noticed for consideration
of the entry of a default judgment against Dr. Kanth. It's
my understanding that there was an Order to Show Cause
hearing before Commissioner Evans last week and that there
was a recommendation, although after reviewing the minutes,
I'm a little uncertain as to exactly those proceedings but
apparently there was a recommendation that the issue of Dr.
Kanth's default for the entire case be considered by the
trial judge. However, Dr. Kanth, under the Utah Rules of
Judicial Procedure has ten days from the date of that hearing
within which to file an objection and to have a hearing today
on the entry of his default as recommended by Commissioner
Evans would eliminate that right under the Rules of Procedure
to object to that recommendation and have the Court consider
it within that framework. And so it would be completely

inappropriate Your Honor that a default judgment be entered
against Dr. Kanth today.
Now, I would just note that this is obviously a
case that has a lengthy history and although I'm not
completely sure what the issues are as I stand before you
today, I do know that the law in the State of Utah does not
favor the entry of final judgments based on default and I
know that's particularly true in a custody case and so I
think it's appropriate that the Court not consider a default
judgment against Dr. Kanth today; that he be given his right
to file an objection if that's his choice and that that be
done as Mr. Greene says, according to the rule implemented
procedures and that we consider the entry of his default, if
that's the way the case is going to be, under those rules and
in a way that accords him appropriate due process which I
think considering it today would not, given the fact that the
recommendation was made just seven days ago.
With regard to the rest of what Mr. Green has
indicated, again, I don't have facts in my knowledge to say
whether it's accurate one way or the other. He went through
a litany of things which he argued suggest that there's no
clean hands on the part of Dr. Kanth and I don't know whether
that's accurate or not. But with regard to his proposal that
in the event there is a continuance of matters today,
basically his proposal is in accord with what Dr. Kanth has
indicated he would want to and be willing and able to do. We
would request that the discovery cutoff be made the 31st
rather than May 15th as proposed by Mr. Green. I don't know
that I can indicate to the Court whether or not a two-day
trial would be adequate but I'll defer to Mr. Green on that.
He has a great amount of experience and a good sense for
those kinds of things, and so I assume a two-day trial would
be sufficient. For Dr. Kanth's schedule with his teaching
responsibilities in Singapore, he's a professor at a
university there, it would be best if the trial could be
scheduled toward the end of June.
And with regard to the custody evaluators I'm not
familiar with the first two identified by Mr. Green. I am
familiar with Kim Peterson and have had excellent experience
with him. However, there may be some benefit from having a
licensed psychologist to help in this matter and I guess what
I would request is that I be given through Friday to submit
three names on behalf of Dr. Kanth, and then the Court choose
from among those six names. If we don't submit any then
obviously one of the names identified by Mr. Green would be
selected. I think under all the circumstances that that
would be, it would be appropriate to appoint an evaluator,
the identify of which should be made or determined after we
have an opportunity to submit some names ourselves.
With regard to payment arrangements with regard to
the evaluator I believe it would be appropriate for Dr. Kanth
to simply have the responsibility of making payment to the
evaluator as required under the terms of any agreement he may
enter into for payment with the evaluator and I'm not sure
what that requirement would be. Some of them require the
entire fee up front, some of them require it to be paid in

stages and so whatever that requirement is by the appointed
evaluator, I think the order ought to require him to pay in
accord with that agreement.
And so we basically are very close in terms of what
we would like to see in terms of the scheduling order and
there are some limitations on Dr. Kanth's availability to
return to the United States due to his teaching
responsibilities but I believe, based on my conversation with
him on the 6th, he has the ability to be here once in April
when his deposition could be taken and once again in June for
a trial and so we would request that that structure be
implemented as part of the pretrial order.
Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. GREEN: Brief response Your Honor. I hope
counsel has not taken offense at anything I've said. It's
not intended to be that way but what we know is Professor
Kanth contacted this attorney in June. He at least talked to
him about this case, the divorce case in December and all he
had to do was say, will you be my attorney? What does it
take? Mr. Hettinger was more than happy to represent him,
I'm sure, just like he is now. So any disadvantage or any
problem that we have today became of the late appearance of
counsel, is a problem of Professor Kanth's own making. Now
it's not Mr. Hettinger's job to volunteer but it was
Professor Kanth's job to get an attorney and not wait until
the last minute because I don't believe that he is being
genuine and sincere when he suggests that he did all he could
to get an attorney and this matter today and this whole case
should be delayed because he did not.
As to the default, the matter was reserved based
upon the failure of Dr. Kanth to appear at the pretrial. I
brought that up by way of motion in order to show cause which
was heard last week. What is Professor Kanth going to do by
way of objection to the recommendation of Commissioner Evans
that that issue be deferred to this court for consideration?
Is he going to object to that? Is he going to object to the
matter and say that it shouldn't have been referred to this
court? It should have been decided by Commissioner Evans?
He has no remedy. And additionally the Rules of Judicial
Administration clearly state that an order of a commissioner
is the order until it is changed, if it is changed by the
court. Otherwise, nobody would pay any support in the
meantime when there's an objection pending.
I suppose that it's entirely within the discretion
of the Court to reserve that issue. To say we'll leave it
pending until we see if Professor Kanth complies with the
order of this court and say if he doesn't then his default
will be entered and that might be one rational response to
this problem although the Court can sense the outrage that my
client and frankly I share, having been run around in this
case for almost two years. I don't believe that Professor
Kanth is in any position to ask for any further delay of this
matter. You'll notice that counsel has not suggested there
is any reason to believe that Professor Kanth is not more
than $30,000 in arrears. You know that hearing last week,
raised all those issues, they were properly framed and

presented to the court and Professor Kanth responded to the
Order to Show Cause in writing but he never at any time
disputed that claim that he was that far in arrears, that he
had the ability to pay it. He is earning more than $5,000 a
month in Singapore. I have asked for the detail. I've asked
for the evidence. I've asked to depose Professor Kanth. He
won't give me any of that. We alleged that he had the ability
to pay. We alleged he was in arrears and he didn't dispute
any of that so a judgment was entered last week.
In the face of that, in the face of the kind of
delay we have suffered through here, I would ask the Court
not to extend the cutoff to May 31st. If we're looking for a
trial in June that does not give us enough time to deal with
any problems that come up and still hold onto that trial date
in June. Professor Kanth can be here more or less when he
wishes. He has 47 days. He has claimed hardship in the
past. He will have extend himself a little bit. He might
inconvenience himself a little bit, for a change, rather than
the court and the other parties and I would ask that the
Court abide by those cutoffs that I have suggested, the
cutoff of May 16th as to - and that means answer to
interrogatories and requests for production.
The last name that I was thinking of is Natalie
Malovich, a psychologist. What I don't want to get here,
Your Honor, a situation where Professor Kanth comes up with
names that nobody has ever heard of and are not available to
start and finish in time. There are a lot of evaluators that
I might pick that would be four or more months out before
they could start and that will not work in this case. These
people can start. These people can finish in time for a June
date and if counsel needs a day or two to investigate and
select one of them, surely he can select one from the four
and if the Court does allow Professor Kanth yet another delay
to nominate names, I would ask that they be limited to those
that are certified as ready to start and ready to finish in
time to accommodate our expectations in this case.
My experience with Kim Peterson, is even though
he's a social worker, he performs an excellent evaluation and
the fact that he cannot administer some psychological tests
is no limitation. He hires others that do. They evaluate to
the extent they need and he takes their evaluations. It's a
common procedure and I would suggest that while we're here
today, the way to expedite this is select one of those names,
if its Kim Peterson, that's fine, let's get going and I'm
asking also that when I prepare the order, if the Court
permits that, that I be instructed to include language that
indicates that any further delay default, any further
disobedience on the part of Professor Kanth be considered a
default and that the court will, at least on motion, not only
consider but award the remedy of default.
Does the Court have any questions for me?
THE COURT: Not at this time. I think I'll hear
form the Guardian Ad Litem.
MS. KAWAMURA: I don't have anything to say that
goes directly to the Motion to Continue but to the extent of
the custody of the girls is at issue and is part of the

request for a default, I think I might have (inaudible) that
will help the Court. I was appointed to this case in about
August or September or last year, I believe, at the behest of
the respondent, correct me if I'm wrong and there were some
allegations of abuse made by the respondent at that time.
There are two little girls, they are living with their mother
at the maternal grandparents home. They have been there
since about March of'99.
Is that correct?
Almost two years. I have found no evidence of
abuse and have visited the girls at their home twice. My
first visit I was there for about an hour and a half and also
spoke to their mother and the maternal grandmother. The
second time I was there for about two hours and just spent
time with the girls. It appears to me to be a stable and
happy home. They have a good relationship with their family,
their immediate family as well as their extended family.
They have cousins that they speak of often.
Although I'm not an expert in that regard, I have
also spoken to their teachers, both of their teachers who say
that they're doing well in school. The younger daughter is
at Challenger. Both of her teachers say that she's bright
and intelligent and is doing well and is ahead of her age
ability in some respects. The older daughter is also
excelling in school. She's ahead of her grade level in math
and in some reading. It appears that they both have a good
group of friends and have established a peer group there.
The pediatrician whose name is Dr. Metcalf, Tom
Metcalf, I spoke to him and asked him about the allegations
of abuse and if you'd allow me to proffer his testimony, he
has represented that there is absolutely no evidence of
physical abuse. He does think that the girls, particularly
the older daughter, I think he's only been seeing the older
daughter, but she does have some symptoms of stress and some
emotional problems that he thinks are attributed to the
stress of having this divorce go on for so long. He did
indicate that the pendency of this has caused her to have
some headaches and some stomach problems and other physical
symptoms that he thinks are stress related.
And there's also a therapist who is treating the
older daughter. Her name is Denise Goldsmith, and I have not
been able to speak to her recently. She has told me she's
reluctant to have me proffer anything that she has to say at
this time based on her concerns about patient confidentiality
but she did confirm that she doesn't think there's any abuse
going on.
So, basically I have no reason to believe that
there's a problem with the status quo. I think that the two
years that the girls have been here, they seem to be doing
well.
As far as, just very briefly, the custody
evaluators that have been suggested by petitioner's
respondent, I'm familiar with Deborah, I think it's Deborah
Quackenbush and Heather Walker by name and I have no
objection to any of the names that he's suggested.
And I would also like to briefly, I think there is

an issue about whether there is a problem with visitation
over the holidays when the Professor was here from Singapore.
I don't think there's any evidence that visitation was being
withheld. The petitioner herself has given me her records of
telephonic visitation and it appears - and I also requested
those from respondent and did not receive any - it appears
the girls have been able to speak to their father almost
daily on the telephone and the girls also indicated that to
me themselves. They may be a little young to be able to
understand what it means to be able to talk to their father
every day. It appears that the respondent has not been
denied telephonic visitation.
And as far as supervised visitation over the
holidays, there was an order for supervised visitation. I
believe that both parties suggested supervisors, petitioner
supervised some of the visits herself and when that turned
out not to be working, there was some names suggested. The
last thing that happened was petitioner's counsel suggested
Willwin supervise and I think that the respondent did follow
up on that based on my conversation with the clinical
director over at Willwin whose name is Margaret. She told me
she did speak to the respondent. She did say that Willwin
was available to supervise those visits. The respondent
indicated that he would follow up and set those visits up and
he never did. So I also have no evidence that visitation has
been withheld.
Is there anything else Your Honor would like to
know.
THE COURT: Not unless counsel have any questions.
MR. GREEN: I would simply again renew my request
that this evidentiary hearing not be continued, that it be
declared forfeited and any rights to a forfeited unless
respondent commences anew, some new objection. Today was his
day to do this and there is no evidence to support any vague
claim that he might have had.
MR. HETTINGER: Your Honor, the only comment I have
with regard to the representation of the Guardian Ad Litem is
it is my understanding that the petitioner did supervise
personally the visits that were agreed upon to take place
during the Christmas break while he was here and I assume
that was the reason why there was no contact with Willwin,
was basically the visits that were outlined between Mr. Green
and the respondent were supervised by the petitioner.
MR. GREEN: That is incorrect, Your Honor. My
client has supervised most of the visitations even to the
point of going to Disneyland last year in June of something
like that. It became apparent in December of this year that
her continued supervision was inappropriate. The respondent,
Professor Kanth, acted inappropriately. The dynamic of their
relationship in front of the children was not healthy and it
was simply too hard for my client. They're getting divorced.
It's an acrimonious divorce. She accommodated him almost
daily in supervision. It came to the point where I wrote
Professor Kanth a letter saying this can't continue and it
won't continue, that Cory will supervise this much but only
this much. He complained. I suggested Willwin. He

contacted Willwin in order to facilitate more visitation. He
simply never followed through. He suggested some third party
that again, nobody except him knew about who could perform
the supervisory function. Nobody knew who this person was so
we rejected that name in favor of an institution that is
competent not only to supervise visitations but to observe
any inappropriate or untoward behavior, namely Willwin. He
could have taken advantage of it. He did not.
MR. HETTINGER: Well, Your Honor, I apologize for
my lack of information with regard to what's gone on that has
led to this representation. That was my understanding of it
so I apologize.
THE COURT: That's one of the problems there's
failure upon the party to contact the Court timely, counsel
timely and, you know, retain counsel timely and creates a
problem both for the Guardian Ad Litem, for the petitioner
and often for counsel that is representing him.
At this time I think as far as a motion for
continuance of evidentiary hearing, the Court is going to
grant that but I'm going to set a scheduling order as
suggested and a very firm scheduling order. If he fails to
meet it and doesn't respond in a timely manner and doesn't
communicate with his counsel so counsel is unable to
represent him properly, it's going to be his fault. So at
any time during those proceedings, he should be made aware of
that, you know, default may entered against him for his
failure to appear.
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, can we get some specific
THE COURT: I think this has been going on for
quite some length of time. There's a lot of different
proceedings that have sort of been brought in the interim on
this divorce proceeding which has kind of delayed actually
having this matter heard on its merits but I think that June
is not too far away for this to be heard and that we should
frame everything within that June period of time as far as
discovery cutoffs and motion cutoffs and so forth.
COURT CLERK: We're looking for two days? We could
it the 18th and 19th.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HETTINGER: Let me just double check, Your
Honor, my schedule.
(Discussion of other cases and dates)
COURT CLERK: Other than a discovery cutoff, do you
need any other cutoff dates?
MR. GREEN: I don't think there's any -1 think
there will only be motion cutoffs we might want to consider
and I would suggest that those track with the discovery as of
May 15th. By that time we'll have our discovery in and if
there's any further motions.
COURT CLERK: So discovery and motion cutoffs will
be May 15th?
MR. GREEN: That is what I would propose.
MR. HETTINGER: We would prefer the 31 st but if
it's the 15th then
COURT CLERK: If you're going to keep your trial
date on the 18th, you've got to have time to have your

motions heard.
THE COURT: That's right.
MR. HETTINGER: All right. The 15th then Your
Honor.
COURT CLERK: Is there anything else?
MR. GREEN: The custody evaluator again Your Honor
and I don't want to get in a situation where we get one that
can't get it done and then we're back in here in May saying
no evaluation, no trial. The four names I've provided are
competent, good, experienced, they can start and they can
finish. I would simply ask that counsel make an election
today and inform me who he would like. I'll put that in the
order and then it'll be incumbent upon Professor Kanth to
make contact and arrangements to pay and so forth so we can
get it done. Even a two or three day delay is going to
jeopardize our calendar here.
MR. HETTINGER: Well, I would like the opportunity
to discuss it with my client and may contact with these
people that I don't know and there may be people who have the
same ability to begin immediately that Mr. Green has
represented these four individuals have and I think if we
have other names to present and we present them to the Court
by Friday that should fulfill the need to move expediently on
this, Your Honor.
MR. GREEN: Yeah, except it never works that way.
COURT CLERK: This Friday, tomorrow?
MR. GREEN: Yes, tomorrow. I don't mind doing that
if we can have a telephone conference with Your Honor
tomorrow at some point where we all know where we're going to
be and we're all not waiting for one thing to get hand
delivered or mailed. I know how this works.
THE COURT: Yeah. If I don't hear anything by
Friday we'll pick one of the four that you've recommended.
MR. GREEN: Can we, if there are other names that
the respondent wishes, can we, I don't know if Your Honor is
going to be here tomorrow or if we could schedule a time so
that we all are on the same page and get this done.
(Inaudible conversation)
COURT CLERK: We do have a criminal calendar that
will go from probably 10:00 until through the noon hour.
THE COURT: Can Brandee do something with that?
COURT CLERK: No. She's here with me.
THE COURT: We'll try to work something out for
tomorrow, a telephone conference.
COURT CLERK: We could do it in the afternoon.
MR. GREEN: Could be do it in the afternoon?
COURT CLERK: What time is convenient?
MR. GREEN: Could we say 1:30, 2:00? That would
work for me.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HETTINGER: That would be fine.
MS.KAWAMURA: That's good for me Judge. 1:30
tomorrow?
MR. GREEN: 1:30.
MR. HETTINGER: In the interest of expediency
perhaps I could suggest that rather than trying to file

something with the court that includes those names, I will
fax any names that I have to Mr. Green and to the Guardian Ad
Litem and then we can just discuss them with Your Honor
during the telephone conference. Is that acceptable?
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GREEN: Marci, can I give you a number where I
willbeatl:30?
COURT CLERK: Yes.
MR. GREEN: 641-3955.
Is that a first place setting, by the way, in June?
COURT CLERK: Usually domestic custody is a first
place. The only thing that usually bumps it is a felony
trial.
MR. GREEN: And I assume that Professor Kanth,
consistent with the Court's earlier order, will be liable for
the immediate cost of the evaluation. The ultimate cost can
be reserved as a trial issue. I'm going to ask the Court, I
did not raise this earlier but I'd asked the Court for an
order that does not require any other further commissioner
pretrial in as much as we had one in October.
MR. HETTINGER: That's agreeable.
THE COURT: I don't think that's necessary.
MR. GREEN: I'm just trying to anticipate
everything that could go wrong here. I'm sure I haven't
figured everything out but I'm trying to anticipate what I
can. Thank you Your Honor.
COURT CLERK: And it's Judge Stirba's practice to
ask for proposed findings and conclusions one week prior.
MR. GREEN: One week prior, okay.
THE COURT: Can you prepare the order on this?
MR. GREEN: I can, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Any other matter that we should
consider at this time?
MR. GREEN: I believe that does it. Oh, one other
thing Your Honor. As I understand the Court is continued the
evidentiary hearing. I'm still a little lost to know what
we're here to consider.
THE COURT: If there had been a need for an
evidentiary hearing we ought to probably set a date for that
but I don't think there is because you're going to have a
trial on this.
MR. GREEN: That's my thinking. I would ask that
if the respondent is intent on doing this that he file
something that frames the issues.
THE COURT: Right. I don't think there's really
any necessity for any evidentiary hearing since we've set
trial date on this.
MR. HETTINGER: To be candidTHE COURT: If he feels that there is then he ought
to file a motion.
MR. HETTINGER: To be candid with you, Your Honor,
that's my thinking as well but if there is a need for that,
we will file a pleading in response to Mr. Green's concern.
THE COURT: File it in a timely way so it's not
going to delay the trial.
MR. HETTINGER: Absolutely.

MR. GREEN: Your Honor, thank you very much for
your time.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
(C)
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PROCEEDINGS

4
THE COURT: Let the record show we're in session on
5 Cory L. Kanth vs. Rajani Kanth. Did I get that right? Am I
6 pronouncing your client's name right Mr. Hettinger.
7
MR. HETTINGER: Rajani.
8
THE COURT: Rajani. I can get the number right.
9 It's #994902116, it's on the Court's calendar for a hearing on
10 Temporary Restraining Order previously issue. And also there's
11a motion for mental examination that has been filed by the
12 Petitioner. May I have your appearances please Counsel?
13
MR. GREEN: Rick Green appearing for the Petitioner
14 Your Honor.
15
MR. HETTINGER: Russ Hettinger appearing for the
16 Respondent.
17
MS. KAWAMURA: Akiko Kawamura, Guardian Ad Litem.
18
THE COURT: Thank you. I've been advised there's a
19 resolution in this matter, counsel?
20
MR. GREEN: May I, Your Honor?
21
THE COURT: Please.
22
MR. GREEN: The petitioner concurs in the reported
23 recommendation of the Guardian Ad Litem as to the question
24 regarding the Temporary Restraining Order or Restraining Order.
25
THE COURT: I don't know that I've seen it.
1

1
MR. GREEN: The recommendation is that the baptism be
2 deferred until the time of trial, considered at that time.
3
THE COURT: Considered at the time of trial?
4
MR. GREEN: Correct.
5
THE COURT: Okay. What say your client? I assume he
6 has no objection to that.
7
MR. HETTINGER: No. It's my understanding that that
8 would mean that the current Temporary Restraining Order would
9 become a Preliminary Injunction that would continue until there
10 is a resolution of the issue at trial so then we certainly
11 agree with that stipulation.
12
MR. GREEN: We are counting on a trial on June 15th
13 and 16th in this case as I recall.
14
THE COURT: I can't guarantee that.
15
MR. GREEN: I understand but that is part of our
16 assumption in entering into this stipulation. If the trial
17 doesn't occur then I would expect it to be subject to review.
18
THE COURT: If that doesn't happen, then obviously
19 this Preliminary Injunction now is subject to review at that
20 point in time upon application of either party, if a case
21 doesn't go as scheduled.
22
And that is the Guardian Ad Litem's recommendation?
23
MS. KAWAMURA: That's correct Your Honor.
24
THE COURT: Okay. And I think that's an appropriate
25 recommendation and appropriate stipulation for the parties to
2
1 enter into pending resolution of this case hopefully as
2 scheduled on the 18th and 19th of June.

3
What about this other matter Mr. Green?
4
MR. GREEN: We have stipulated that the order may be
5 entered as prayed in our motion. The respondent will chose one
6 of the four psychologists in addition to the three in the
7 motion. I was reminded yesterday that Dr. Natalie Malivich is
8 willing to participate as described in the motion. The
9 respondent may pick any one of those four and let me know on
10 Monday and then they will schedule an appointment with that
11 psychologist during the week of May 7 at their leisure and the
12 scope of employment will be defined by that motion.
13
THE COURT: Mr. Hettinger?
14
MR. HETTINGER: We have no objection to that being
15 granted.
16
THE COURT: How is all this going to play into the 17 it's not my case but I'm concerned about whoever does try the
18 case, maybe it will be me. Maybe Judge Stirba will be here to
19 do it. But in any event regardless of who may take care of
20 this case on the 18th and 19th of June, it sounds to me like
21 there's not going to be a custody evaluation.
22
MR. HETTINGER: There may be but this I think is an
23 appropriate proposal by Mr. Green to insure that there is some
24 assistance to the Court in terms of, at least the background
25 information on the parties, or on my client.
3

1
THE COURT: As far as Ms. Kanth is concerned. That
2 will help the trial judge as far as the respondent is
3 concerned.
4
MR. HETTINGER: That's correct. We intend Your
5 Honor, as part of our reason for not objecting is we intend to
6 file a similar motion with regard to the petitioner but simply
7 was not able to file it so it could be dealt with today.
8
THE COURT: Wasn't Mr. Peterson on board to do this
9 assuming he
10
MR. GREEN: Mr. Peterson had been appointed by the
11 court under an order which required very prompt response on the
12 part of the respondent and Mr. Peterson has informed me that he
13 cannot comply with the current scheduling order because of a
14 failure of that response.
15
THE COURT: But could he get it done sometime before
16 trial if he got started right away?
17
MR. GREEN: I haven't asked him that. His letter was
18 couched in terms of the discovery cutoff. I would be very
19 doubtful that he could conclude it by the time of trial; hence
20 this motion. The court, Judge Uno who entered that order
21 was very concerned that this matter be brought to some
22 finality. Very candidly, we've done everything we can to
23 secure an evaluation. If there is no evaluation due to the
24 respondent's recalcitrance, one of the remedies reserved
25 specifically in that order is his default. It's also been
4

1 reserved by Commissioner Evans. That may or may not happen.
2 My hope was simply to generate some evidence that the Court
3 could rely upon in determining best interests.
4
THE COURT: Okay. Well I just know if I was trying
5 this case a custody evaluation, although I have not reviewed
6 the entire file, a custody evaluation would be very helpful. I
7 have made custody decisions and so have my colleagues without
8 custody evaluations but we're concerned about - there's two
9 minor children, isn't there?
10
MR. GREEN: Correct.
11
THE COURT: Those are where I'm sure the trial
12 judge's primary interest will lie and all the information one
13 can get is that much better but if we don't have it, we don't
14 have it but I'm a little distressed that respondent hasn't
15 followed through on this, Mr. Hettinger.
16
MR. HETTINGER: Well, he has had some communication
17 with Mr. Peterson and he is in Singapore and that has become
18 problematic. He's coming to the United States beginning May 8.
19 My indication from Kim Peterson is that there is still a
20 possibility that that could be completed in time for trial,
21 certainly not by May 15th, the discover cutoff. There's no
22 question about that but
23
THE COURT: Well, on my own motion I'm extending the
24 discovery cutoff in this matter to accommodate Mr. Peterson if
25 he can do it. Even an abbreviated report would be better than
5

1 no report and even if we got it two days before trial. He's a
2 court appointed evaluator?
3
MR. GREEN: He is.
4
MR. HETTINGER: That's correct.
5
THE COURT: So it's not like anybody has to get a
6 rebuttal evaluator. I just think you'd both be well served to
7 have that.
8
MR. GREEN: Oh, Your Honor, there's no question about
9 that. We would welcome that order. In that regard, the
10 independent psychological evaluation may save Mr. Peterson some
11 work. He would have to do something of that sort in any case I
12 would think in this case.
13
THE COURT: Maybe that will work. But in any event
14 as far as the custody evaluation is concerned, the discovery
15 date is vacated on that single issue and if that can be
16 prepared in any fashion, if Mr. Peterson can do something that
17 would be available for the trial judge on the 18th and 19th, I
18 would encourage him to do what he can and counsel please convey
19 that to him.
20
MR. GREEN: Along those lines, Your Honor, while the
21 respondent's proximity is lacking, he has shown the ability to
22 respond very promptly to issues that he feels are important, to
23 whit this restraining order. He hasn't paid Mr. Peterson. My
24 client cannot even visit with Mr. Peterson to begin this
25 evaluation until that happens. I don't know what kind of order
6
1 we can fashion more than the one we have which puts at issue
2 his standing in this case, but any help the Court could offer

3 would be appreciated.
4
THE COURT: How come your client hasn't paid in
5 accordance with the prior order to get this thing going, Mr.
6 Hettinger?
7
MR. HETTINGER: He's been paying as much support to
8 Mr. Green's client as possible priority and when he returned,
9 he was here during December, he's a professor who teaches at a
10 university in Singapore, he was there during their off-school
11 period thinking that that was paid leave. When he returned he
12 was informed that that was not paid leave and he was docked two
13 months pay for not being in Singapore during that period of
14 time. As a result, his overall financial situation has been
15 very difficult. He is aware of this obligation and is trying
16 to take care of it.
17
THE COURT: I understand that but it's not like he
18 has asked for any relief from the Court. He's known about that
19 for a long time and it's his obligation to pay for this and if
20 it doesn't happen because he didn't pay for it, that could work
21 to his disadvantage. I don't know. It would concern me if I
22 was trying this case.
23
Does the Guardian Ad Litem have anything to add?
24
MS. KAWAMURA: No, I have nothing to add to that.
25
THE COURT: Okay. I won't require any additional 7

1 well, I will require an order extending the, well, making the
2 Temporary Restraining Order a permanent injunction. It will be
3 effective through June 18th and then subject to either an
4 extension or modification or revocation whatever at that point
5 in time, depending on the status of the trial and those matters
6 we've discussed. The mental examination, we need an order on
7 that. I encourage you to stipulate to a responsive one if
8 that, just to give Mr. Peterson perhaps a leg up on trying to
9 get this report done. The minute entry will reflect that the
10 discovery as to the child custody evaluation is extended
11 through the trial date.
12
MR. GREEN: May I raise one other suggestion Your
13 Honor and ask Counsel to consider this. Should Mr. Kanth not
14 feel that he can stipulate to one of the four names we have
15 discussed in writing by 5:00 Monday, may the petitioner then
16 chose one as contemplated in the order?
17
THE COURT: If he hasn't chosen, she does.
18
MR. GREEN: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
19
THE COURT: And what's the time?
20
MR. GREEN: Five p.m. Monday and arriving by fax
21 would be fine.
22
THE COURT: All right. You'll convey that obviously
23 Mr. Hettinger to your client?
24
MR. HETTINGER: I will.
25
THE COURT: Give him your advice on who he'd have to
8

1 choose. I'm sure he doesn't know any of these folks. Okay.
2
Anything else, counsel?
3
MR. GREEN: Thank you for your time.
4
MR. HETTINGER: Who should prepare the order, Your
5 Honor?
6
THE COURT: The order turning the Temporary
7 Restraining Order into preliminary injunction ought to be
8 prepared by you, Mr. Hettinger, and the order ordering the
9 mental examination ought to be prepared by Mr. Green.
10
MR. GREEN: I will.
11
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel. We'll be in
12 recess.
13
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(C)
9

1
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JUNE 18, 2001
2
HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK PRESIDING
3
COURT CLERK: Third District Court now in session,
4 the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding. Please be seated.
5
THE COURT: Good morning. We're here today in the
6 matter of Cory Kanth, K-A-N-T-H, vs. Rajani Kanth, case
7 number 994904256. Counsel state their appearances, please.
8
MR. GREEN: Fred Green appearing for the petitioner
9 who is present.
10
MR. HETTINGER: H. Russell Hettinger appearing
11 specially for Dr. Rajani Kanth in order to preserve his
12 rights under the Hague Convention.
13
THE COURT: All right.
14
MS. KAWAMURA: Akiko Kawamura, guardian ad litem.
15
THE COURT: Good morning. Thank you. Let me kind
16 of make a record here. Of course, as Mr. Hettinger indicated
17 - and 111 give him a chance to make another statement in a
18 moment - the respondent is not present. In this matter this
19 was commenced back in July of 1999 and shortly thereafter, at
20 least as I can tell, at least as early as September 30th,
21 1999 the respondent filed a notice that he filed an action
22 under the Hague Convention and under the International Child
23 Abduction Remedy Act and sought a stay of these proceedings.
24 He'd filed a petition in the United States District Court and
25 in December, specifically on December 14 of 1999, Judge Tena
1
1 Campbell issued a ruling finding that the children in this
2 matter were not wrongfully removed from Australia and that
3 Utah was the habitual residence of the children, as that term
4 is used under the Hague Convention. And on January 20th,
5 2000 temporary orders were issued in this matter and the
6 respondent's request to stay the proceedings was denied. On
7 March 22nd of 2000 Judge Stirba upheld the commissioner's
8 ruling and denied the stay. On November 2nd, 2000 the Tenth
9 Circuit Court of Appeals, having entertained the respondent's
10 petition from - or appeal from Judge Campbell's ruling upheld
11 Judge Campbell and again held that the children had not been
12 wrongfully removed from Australia and that Utah was their
13 habitual residence. He evidentially sought a petition for
14 rehearing, although I didn't see that in the file because on
15 November 22nd the Court of Appeals issued an order denying
16 rehearing. Then there were objections to various matters
17 before the commissioner on December 6th, 2000. Judge Stirba
18 specifically ruled that Third District Court had jurisdiction
19 over this matter and his objections were overruled to the
20 commissioner's recommendations, but she specifically ruled
21 that this court had jurisdiction. So even if I was inclined
22 to believe she was wrong, I don't think I can overrule that.
23
Then evidentially the respondent sought temporary relief
24 in front of the Tenth Circuit and on January 19 of 2001 the
25 Tenth Circuit issue another order denying his request of a
2
1 stay of these proceedings in Third District Court. Then on

2 February 8, Mr. Hettinger appeared although the respondent
3 was not present. Again he appeared at a special appearance.
4 And this trial date of June 18 was scheduled.
5
There were various matters occurring between
6 February and now, but specifically two weeks ago on June 4
7 the respondent was here present in open court with Mr.
8 Hettinger. On that occasion and throughout the respondent
9 asserting that the court did not have jurisdiction again he
10 requested a stay and that was denied and this trial date was
11 maintained. The respondent indicated that he did not want to
12 acquiesce in these proceedings for fear it would jeopardize
13 any remedies he might have under the Hague Convention.
14
On June 12, just last week, the respondent filed 15 he styled a notice of abstention which was his affidavit in
16 essence again restating his position that he stated in the
17 federal proceedings and here that this court doesn't have
18 jurisdiction and that if he participated, he would acquiesce
19 in these proceedings and thereby defeat any remedy he might
20 have under the Hague Convention. His notice of abstention as
21 he styled it was not a hundred percent clear that he wouldn't
22 be here, but I kind of assumed that from reading it and he
23 is not here today. Mr. Hettinger and Mr. Green and the
24 guardian ad litem met for just a moment with the court before
25 proceeding today, and I was advised by Mr. Hettinger that
3
1 respondent would not be present.
2
I think that fairly summarizes the proceedings, at
3 least as far as that issue is concerned, at least historical
4 in my mind.
5
Mr. Hettinger, you indicated you wanted to make a
6 brief statement before we proceeded with this matter.
7
MR. HETTINGER: Thank you, your Honor. H. Russell
8 Hettinger appearing especially for Dr. Kanth as previously
9 indicated on the record.
10
One clarification with regard to the history that
11 you gave, your Honor, which I believe is correct is that it's
12 my understanding that Judge Campbell - neither Judge Campbell
13 nor the Tenth Circuit has ruled on the issue of whether the
14 children were wrongfully removed. They did not need to rule
15 on that issue because the finding that their habitual
16 residence was not in Australia was a condition necessary for
17 that to be an issue, and therefore, they did not need to
18 reach that issue and it's my understanding from reading the
19 opinion of Judge Campbell that she did not go on to make a
20 ruling on that point. So I don't know if it's a point of
21 significance, but that clarification I thought is
22 appropriate. The finding and clear ruling that she did make
23 that Australia was not the habitual residence resolved the
24 matter.
25
THE COURT: Mr. Hettinger, Mr. Green had a comment.
4

1
MR. GREEN: May I clarify that perhaps, your Honor?
2 Wrongful removal and habitual residence are linked. If the
3 United States is the state of habitual residence, then there
4 cannot be a wrongful removal. So they are one in the same.
5 By ruling that the United States is the state of habitual
6 residence, then it follows that there cannot be a wrongful
7 removal from Australia and to suggest that by ruling one way
8 and then omitting the other would be erroneous. The term
9 wrongful removal is a term of art in the Hague Convention.
10
MR. HETTINGER: Yeah, and I think we're saying the
11 same thing, your Honor, that that - any kind of
12 consideration, determination of the merits of whether the
13 removal was proper or improper was not reached because of the
14 - and not necessary to be reached because they are linked
15 because the finding of habitual residence not being in
16 Australia eliminated any further consideration. There could
17 be no determination of wrongful removal.
18
THE COURT: I understand what you're saying, Mr.
19 Hettinger. Judge Campbell's order says what it says and it's
20 part of this record.
21
MR. HETTINGER: I understand.
22
THE COURT: But I believe it does touch the issue
23 that there was no wrongful removal, but whether that's so or
24 not I understand your position.
25
MR. HETTINGER: Briefly, I would simply like to say
5
1 to the Court on behalf of Dr. Kanth that first of all his
2 failure to appear today is not intended as any disrespect to
3 your Honor or to the court, and he has asked me to
4 communicate that to you so that that is clear. His filing of
5 the notice of abstention which he placed with the court last
6 week was intended to give the court as much notice as he
7 could after he made a final decision that he would not be
8 participating in the proceedings out of his convictions which
9 are reflected in there rather than any animosity toward this
10 court.
11
He has stated there and we previously stated in the
12 arguments before the Court and in the papers that have been
13 filed that he believes that the Hague Convention is
14 proceeding as the preeminent proceeding in this matter, that
15 this Court should defer and grant a stay of these proceedings
16 until there has been a final ruling on his Hague Convention
17 proceeding. We've indicated to the Court that there is a
18 petition of a writ of certiorari pending before the Supreme
19 Court of the United States which is seeking a review of the
20 rulings of Judge Campbell and of the Tenth Circuit and that
21 that petition is pending.
22
I can advise the Court that Dr. Kanth has been
23 advised by the clerk of the Supreme Court that conference on
24 his petition will be held on June 21st, and that their normal
25 procedure then would be to announce the results of that
6

1 conference with regards to his petition on June 25th. And as
2 we indicated, it is our belief- strong belief that because
3 of the unique nature of this particular case and the
4 substantial issues that are raised in an international and
5 federal setting that the Supreme Court will grant Dr. Kanth's
6 petition for writ of certiorari. In any event, that
7 knowledge should be available based upon what he has been
8 told, as of June 25th of this year.
Based on that we
9 would simply request as we did in the previous hearing that
10 this matter be stayed and not go forward today and that after
11 the ruling has been announced by the Supreme Court with
12 regard to his petition for writ of certiorari, the matter can
13 then proceed based on what that indicates to us and to the
14 Court.
15
We believe that it would be as previous argued in
16 written materials and before your Honor, we believe that it
17 would be inappropriate for this Court to proceed at this time
18 and for that reason and in order to avoid any actions that
19 could be determined in future proceedings to be acquiescence,
20 Dr. Kanth has made the decision to not participate in these
21 proceedings, has asked and instructed me not to participate
22 in these proceedings, and I would be happy to answer any
23 questions which the Court may have with regard to what I've
24 stated, but would also ask that I be excused and allowed to
25 leave the proceedings.
7
1
THE COURT: All right, thank you counsel. I don't
2 have any questions. I understand again your request for the
3 stay and that will be denied for the same reasons as
4 expressed back on June 4 and based upon the basic history
5 I've recited here believing that the courts have ruled in
6 this matter and this Court does have jurisdiction as it has
7 been ruled previously. So I'll deny the request to stay the
8 proceedings. This is and was the time set for trial and
9 we'll go ahead with that. I understand his position legally.
101 must confess I don't understand it very well on a practical
11 basis, but I do understand it and you're certainly welcomed
12 to stay, as you would know and participate, but if you're
13 instructions from your client are not to participate, I
14 certainly will grant you permission to be excused.
15
MR. HETTINGER: Thank you, your Honor.
16
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Green, based upon the
17 proceedings as we've outlined them and as you are familiar
18 and as stated by Mr. Hettinger here today, do you have a
19 motion with respect to pleadings and so on this matter?
20
MR. GREEN: May it please the court, I move the
21 Court for the entry of the respondent's default and ask that
22 his responsive pleadings be struck. We propose that we
23 proceed with such evidence as is necessary for the Court to
24 make the equitable relief that the petitioner seeks.
25
THE COURT: That motion to enter the default and
8

1 strike the pleadings will be granted and you may go ahead,
2 Mr. Green, with testimony.
3
MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor, we would call
4 the petitioner, Cory Kanth.
5
CORY LEE KANTH
6
having been first duly sworn, testified
7
upon her oath as follows:
8
DIRECT EXAMINATION
9 BY MR. GREEN:
10 Q Cory, are you going to need any of these notes?
11 A Possibly the one for fees if you're going to ask me
12 about those.
13
MR. GREEN: May I approach, your Honor?
14
THE COURT: You may.
15
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, I have previously marked
17 some exhibits which I can offer to the Court.
18
THE COURT: They'll be received. Thank you.
19
(Respondent's Exhibits received)
20
MR. GREEN: We'll refer to these in the testimony.
21
Q (BY MR. GREEN) Would you state your name please?
22 A Cory Lee Kanth.
23
Q Cory, where do you reside?
24 A In Salt Lake City.
25
Q The address please?
9

1
A 2736 East 7305 South, Salt Lake City.
2
Q And how long have you resided there?
3
A Since March 25th of 1999.
4
Q And that would be more than three months prior to
5 commencing these proceedings according to my calculations;
6 is that correct?
7
A Yes.
8
Q Cory, would you describe please the issues you had
9 with Professor Kanth that resulted in your separation?
10 A Okay. Well, beginning about the time Malini was
11 born, my first daughter - our first daughter Malini was born,
12 and perhaps even before that I remember this from as far back
13 as when I was pregnant with Malini, my husband, Rajani,
14 became extremely controlling, extremely domineering. At
15 times he became violent with me when he became very angry and
16 couldn't control his temper. And this was done on at least
17 two occasions that I can recall in front of the children. At
18 that point - at the point that I'm thinking of it was just
19 in front of Malini, she was the only one that was born.
20
But after that point, after seeing that occur in
21 front of Malini, I was very careful after that to do
22 everything that he asked me and it was another five years or
23 so I believe before I finally left. But in that period there
24 was almost constant threatening of me if I didn't obey his
25 every wish. And those wishes were usually always with regard
10

1 to the children, and they usually prevented me from caring
2 for the children in a way that I thought I needed to.
3
Q Let me interrupt you there. What kind of demands
4 did he make in regards to the care of the children?
5
A Well, he believed that if the children are going to
6 be ill or have been ill or if the weather's bad, if it's
7 gray and rainy outside or all kinds of other things, I can't
8 bathe the children. The children can't be bathed. And that
9 was a large point of contention between us and that began
10 when Malini was born.
11 Q Let me interrupt you again. Did he make any
12 objections to what you considered to be necessary medical
13 care?
14 A Yes.
15
Q What was that?
16 A That was another certain area where this occurred.
17 When the children had fevers, he wouldn't allow me to follow
18 the doctor's recommendations with regard to their clothing.
19 He would demand that I kept them bundled, that I kept the
20 house very warm, I couldn't open windows. Many times Anjana,
21 the smaller one, broke out in fever blisters along her hair
22 line and I was very worried about her, and that happened a
23 number of times.
24 He would also have me give her when I
25 felt like she wasn't sick. He would have me give it to her,
11
1 to Anjana, specifically as a preventative. When she didn't
2 have a cough he would have me for a number of weeks at a
3 time give her small half doses of cough syrup just to make
4 sure that she didn't become ill, things like that.
5
And then shortly before I left, Malini had become
6 ill with a fever and when we woke up in the morning and I
7 told him that he had - that Malini had a fever and said I
8 was going to give him - give Malini Tylenol, he told me that
9 I was not to give her any medicine without his express
10 permission and then threatened to throw me out of the house,
11 took me by the arm and told me he was going to put me out of
12 the house and13 Q Was Professor Kanth violent with you in any other
14 respect or time?
15 A The two -1 can only remember two times when he was
16 expressly violent with me. The first time was when Malini
17 was about two, before Anjana was born and before I was
18 pregnant with her, and Rajani had been away in St. George on
19 a job interview20
Q What did he do?
21
A Well, when he came home he walked in the door and
22 looked at me and said, where is it? And I didn't know what
23 he was speaking about. And he said, "Where is it? And came
24 and took me by the throat and held me by the throat and then
25 let me go. It was a long time that he held me like that
12

1 just holding me and he was so angry and then he just let me
2 go and took my briefcase that was there on the bed and took
3 it and threw it down in front of Malini and turned and left
4 the room. And that was the first instance.
5
And then the other one that I recall was when I was
6 brushing Malini's hair, she was again about two, and we were
7 sitting in the living room and I was brushing her hair and
8 when she said ouch, he came and grabbed the brush and my arm
9 and dragged me through the house by my arm telling me I
10 couldn't brush her hair anymore and threw me down in the
11 bedroom. And I believed that sort of thing occurred more
12 than once, but I can recall that one instance vividly.
13 Q By what other means did he attempt to control your
14 behavior?
15 A Constant threatening. If I bathed the children
16 when he has asked me not to or something like that 17 Q What would he threaten to do?
18 A He would threaten to kick my teeth in or he would
19 say just wait and see what I do to you.
20
Q Any other means by which he attempted to control
21 your behavior? Did he use any financial means?
22 A Yes.
23
Q What was that?
24
A After Malini was born, we went through bankruptcy
25 so that I didn't have any credit cards or anything like that,
13
1 and after that point he didn't allow me any control of any
2 sort of financial resources. I had no checking account that
3 I could sign on, I wasn't a signator on his checking account.
4 I wasn't allowed credit cards. He would give me exactly
5 enough money just for groceries and asked me to return the
6 remainder, and I had to account for everything that I spent.
7
Q While in Australia, did he attempt to control your
8 comings and goings?
9
A Yes.
10 Q How so?
11 A Well this wasn't just in Australia, this was
12 starting in Denmark. We were in Denmark for a year
13 previously to going to Australia. I was only allowed to
14 leave the house when Anjana was sleeping. Rajani himself has
15 to sleep a lot and he didn't like having to tend the two
16 children or to tend Anjana when she was awake, so he would
17 allow me to go out just when she was sleeping so long as I
18 had put her meal on the counter so that would be ready in
19 case she woke up, and then I could go out to go grocery
20 shopping for a time period that, you know, I would discuss
21 with him and so that he could expect how long I'd be gone
22 and I had to be back at the end of that time period. If I
23 wasn't he became very angry and the anger was very intense
24 and he wouldn't speak to me for weeks or in a few instances
25 even months. He would speak to the children in very nice,
14

1 flowery language and so on and would turn to me and wouldn't
2 speak to me at all and that would go on for months like he
3 was just seething.
4
Q Did this behavior continue while you were in
5 Australia?
6
A Yes.
7
Q Who controlled the passports when you were in
8 Australia.
9
A My husband did.
10 Q Physically controlled them?
11 A Yes.
12 Q Did you know where they were?
13 A No. He would tell me he would put them in his
14 waist pack. And when I kept saying - he carries his waist
15 pack with him everywhere and he'd lost it a number of times
16 so I said, you can't be doing that, you know, you need to
17 give them to me. I can put them away, you're going to lose
18 them. And he said, no, no, I'll put them in my office. He
19 said - he told me that they were very valuable and if anyone
20 got a hold of them they could use them and I accepted that
21 at first, but it dawned on me after a while that in specific
22 instances he would give them to me, but then he'd also always
23 specifically ask for them to be returned. For instance, I
24 had to take Malini to the hospital one night when she had a
25 very high fever and a stomach ache and, because that was our
15
1 only identification, he gave the passports to me and I took
2 her to the hospital and when I came back he directly right
3 there asked me for their return. But he would ask for the
4 children's passports, not my own. He would allow me to have
5 mine because I used mine to cash checks and so on. It was
6 always the children's passports.
7
Q Who had the primary responsibility for caring for
8 the children while you were in Denmark and Australia?
9
A I did.
10 Q Was Rajani employed during those periods of time?
11 A Yes, and he worked fiill time and left early in the
12 morning - eight or nine and didn't get back until five or six
13 through most of those periods.
14 Q Chronologically, why don't we take it back to the
15 time you went to Denmark and would you describe when you went
16 there and your employment from then till now?
17 A Do you mean Rajani's employment?
18 Q Yours.
19 A I was not employed since Malini was born - actually
20 since I was pregnant with her. I was working for this CIA
21 when I was pregnant with her and then I separated from them
22 and until this last year after I separated from Rajani I
23 haven't worked.
24
Q Did Professor Kanth ever try to impose some
25 limitations on who the children associated with?
16

1
A Definitely.
2
Q Describe that please.
3
A Rajani is - Rajani is very reclusive himself. He's
4 very picky about the people he will bring into the household
5 and bring around us generally. And he only brings his
6 associates and so on when they're needed or when there's some
7 reason. But with the children, he has a definite idea about
8 the appropriate class of the children who should be visiting,
9 and most everyone doesn't fit that. So the whole time we
10 were in Denmark we were extremely isolated, all of us. I
11 think the children must have left the house - we were living
12 in apartments - and the children must have left the house
13 less than 10 times in the entire nine months that we were
14 there.
15 Q Did Professor Kanth try to impose any restrictions
16 regarding the ethnicity of the children with whom your
17 children associated?
18 A It wasn't so much ethnicity as class background.
19 When we were in Denmark we met a family whose mother - the
20 mother was an attorney and he thought that little girl was
21 okay and so she came over to the house a couple of times.
22 When we were in Australia, Malini started going to public
23 school and Rajani didn't approve of the children at the
24 public school.
25
Q Did Professor Kanth suggest at any time that the
17
1 children be raised in his homeland of India?
2
A He did.
3
Q What did he say?
4
A The only time he suggested that was after we had
5 arguments. The first was on our first trip to Australia and
6 he had just lost his job and we were preparing to go back to
7 Salt Lake and he wanted to enroll Malini in a private school
8 and I said possibly, you know, that wouldn't be a good idea,
9 and my parents would think that was, you know, strange if
10 they're paying for our living expenses and he's sending her
11 to a private school. And at that point he said that we
12 needed to go to India, that perhaps we would all be better
13 off there away from my family.
14
But then the second trip he was much more specific.
15 This was when we were having much more problems and he didn't
16 like his job in Australia and didn't want to be there and had
17 talked about coming back to the U.S., and I said maybe we
18 could go and stay with my parents, and he turned to me very
19 angrily and said, these children are never going to step foot
20 in that household again without me. I think they need to be
21 raised in India around proper children. And that was just
22 shortly before I ended up leaving.
23
Q Who lives with you at the address where you reside
24 presently?
25
A My parents, my mother and my father who are in the
18

1 courtroom and the three of us.
2
Q Did Professor Kanth ever make any threats to take
3 the children away from you?
4
A Many, many times.
5
Q Too many to count?
6
A Yes, many, many times.
7
Q Give me an example of what he would say.
8
A In one instance he simply said, if you don't do as
9 I'm telling you, you'll never see these children again. And
10 starting when Malini was just a little girl he would tell her
11 that mama is evil and bad and she needed to come away from
12 me and that he would - come with daddy and he would teach
13 her so that she didn't need mama anymore. And he said things
14 of that nature.
15 Q Did he ever disparage you in conversations with the
16 children?
17 A All the time.
18 Q And were you present to hear these conversations?
19 A Yeah.
20 Q What would he say?
21 A He called me low class, an idiot, an Avon lady, a
22 moron.
23 Q Did he ever 24 A Base, vial, I could go on and on.
25 Q Did he ever disparage your family?
19
1 A Many times.
2 Q What did he say?
3 A He calls my parents things like my mother is
4 Endora, she's a low class peasant who smells of coffee. He
5 just tells them that my family's base and vial. He calls
6 them a plumber's family.
7
Q Have you ever observed Professor Kanth to disparage
8 the children?
9 A Many times.
10 Q In conversations with them?
11 A Yes.
12 Q What will he say?
13 A It's different for both of them. With Anjana, the
14 little one, normally he would - there's a lot of conflict
15 between the two children, Malini and Anjana, and he was
16 always telling Anjana you're a terrible little girl, your
17 sister's very wonderful and you're a terrible little girl.
18 And he said that many, many times - many, many times. With
19 Malini he becomes angry and would tell her things like she's
20 brainless, brainless idiot, a barnyard chicken. He uses
21 those farm animal kinds of things a lot and whenever she
22 disagrees with him about something and especially if she does
23 something that he feels is similar to my family, for instance
24 he doesn't - he thinks my family eats like peasants, so if
25 Malini wants to eat something that he doesn't feel is
20

1 appropriate, he will turn and tell her that she's a barnyard
2 chicken like my family or something like that.
3
Q Looking at all that behavior together, how's that
4 affected your relationship with the children?
5
A That's difficult for me to say. Could you make the
6 question a little more clear?
7
Q Be happy to. Do you believe that the children are
8 in any particular risk by virtue of Professor Kanth's
9 historical behavior?
10 A Well, certainly. Yeah, they both have emotional
11 problems from this. Malini especially. When we first left
12 Australia it was very evident - well, this is one thing that
13 lead me to leave. Anjana was very nervous. She stood a lot
14 of the time and bit her nails and cried. Malini was having
15 a lot of problems with headaches. We had already, in the
16 last trip in Australia taking her to the -1 had taken her
17 to the doctor four times for persistent headaches and she was
18 very nervous. And when we came - when we left and came back
19 to the U.S. and were alone and apart from Rajani, those
20 behaviors, the headaches and those particular behaviors would
21 go away and then they reappear with substantial contact with
22 Rajani.
23
Q That was my next question. How have the children's
24 behaviors improved since separation?
25
A Well, shortly after we separated - well, before we
21
1 separated by a long time, Malini had been having enough
2 behavioral problems that I had asked to take her to see a
3 psychologist. I said, we all need help in dealing with this,
4 but Rajani wouldn't allow me to do that. And after I came
5 here was the first chance I had to take her to see someone.
6 And the first psychologist that we saw when I described the
7 situation after talking with Malini, this person told me that
8 she might need to be in day treatment, that she might need to
9 be on medication. Within about four months, the behaviors I
10 was seeing were no longer present. Extreme anger - extreme
11 anger with me, she would hit and kick me a lot of the time,
12 have terrible tantrums for hours on end, and those things
13 weren't present and also the headaches weren't present.
14
And I'd noticed in the past too that Malini would
15 have headaches and then during the periods when Anjana and
16 Malini and me would come back to stay with my parents and
17 we'd be apart from Rajani even for a month, these headaches
18 would go away and they would reappear when he came again. I
19 just felt like it was the tension of the household, but you
20 know, I've come to think differently as time has gone on and
21 I've seen that very definitely when he comes to town and
22 spends more time with Malini or when he has a large amount of
23 telephone contact with Malini, the headaches reappear. Last
24 year from August to November we went through a period where I
25 took Malini to the pediatrician and to her therapist numerous
22

1 times to see about these headaches because she was having
2 such severe and persistent headaches that it was hard for her
3 to even attend school. And then when - and she would have
4 the headaches also in any period when he was visiting. When
5 I would accompany them I remember having to leave those
6 accompanied visits to go and get aspirin for her because she
7 was having such terrible headaches. But last November I
8 realized when he came it's like he arrived in November and
9 didn't leave until January, and slightly after he came the
10 headaches got very worse and Malini was saying to me when he
11 would call she would say, please don't make me talk to daddy,
12 mama, I have a headache and he makes the headaches worse.
13 And then she'd also started to become very anxious and she
14 was worrying a lot about eating and foods like poisons in her
15 foods and poisons in the air, pollution, all sorts of general
16 anxieties like that. And she would say daddy - she said I
17 don't know why but daddy makes those worse when I talk to him
18 and please don't make me talk to him, mama. And by the end
19 of that visit, by December when we spent almost 40 hours with
20 him, Malini had stopped eating through that period - almost
21 stopped eating and drinking. I had her - at her, you know,
22 at her therapist I think three times that month. We were
23 desperate to see what was going on.
24
Q How did you address these problems with Malini?
25
A Through talking with her and spending lots of close
23
1 time with her and she would tell me, "Mama, these ladies 2 the therapists - aren't helping me. It just helps me when we
3 talk." And as we talked I found out that a large part of
4 the problem that she was having was that she'd been talking
5 with Rajani a lot on the telephone, they have very extended
6 conversations many times and he had been telling her a lot
7 that mama had done something bad and pretty soon the court
8 would be giving the children to him. He had also been
9 telling her that - and this arose the summer before when he
10 was visiting with them, he had also told Malini, in
11 particular, that when she was at school or when mama
12 otherwise didn't know he was in Salt Lake City that he would
13 come and take her away. And so these were some of the
14 things that were going on inside her that were causing much
15 of this anxiety and once, you know, I became aware of them we
16 could talk about it, we were able to solve the problems. And
17 the problems with anxiety and her eating and so on it took a
18 lot of help from her therapist to help us both understand the
19 nature of the anxieties and so on.
20
Q Who has provided therapy for either of the
21 children?
22
A I have.
23
Q Therapy I'm talking about, professional therapy.
24
A Oh, no, but I mean -1 thought you meant
25 financially.
24

1
Q No, who were the therapists?
2
A Dr. Denise Goldsmith.
3
Q Is she still the treating therapist for either of
4 the children?
5
A Yeah.
6
Q Both or?
7
A For Malini primarily and Anjana, she's seen Anjana
8 through periods when she had nightmares and so on and other
9 than that there's not been much need.
10 Q Has the respondent cooperated with that therapy?
11 A No, in fact 12 Q What has he done?
13 A In fact he has tried very hard to disrupt that
14 therapy. Last year when the therapist wrote a note to the
15 court stating that she - that Malini had stated in
16 conversations to her that her father had talked with her
17 about going out of the country. The therapist recommended a
18 visitation analysis and he came back to Malini and talked
19 with her directly about that and said to her, "What have you
20 been saying to the therapist? What have you been telling her?
21 And that frightened - not frightened Malini, it upset her
22 enough, you know, to know that her father knew something she
23 had said and that that privacy had been given up that she
24 refused to talk to Dr. Goldsmith and it took - and this came
25 at a very bad point where she was really struggling, but it
25
1 took her going in to talk to her pediatrician who convinced
2 her and talked with her about her father and so on and then
3 convinced her that if she went back and talked with the
4 therapist, the therapist would maintain that privacy and not
5 let anyone know what she had been talking about with her and
6 only at that point was she - would she go back and talk.
7
Q Did Dr. Kanth take any steps to call into question
8 Dr. Goldsmith's standing in her profession?
9
A Yes.
10 Q What did he do?
11 A He filed a professional complaint against her.
12 Q Are you aware of any other professional complaints
13 filed against other individuals who have participated in this
14 action?
15 A I believe he's filed three against my attorney Rick
16 Green, he's filed one against Akiko Kawamura, he's filed one
17 against Judge Tena Campbell, an administrative or judicial
18 complaint.
19 Q Was that Judge Campbell or Commissioner Bradford?
20
A Oh, sorry, it was both.
21
Q Oh, both.
22
A One for Judge Campbell and one for Commissioner
23 Bradford.
24
Q Very well. I understand that there was some
25 visitation just this last weekend. How did that come to
26

1 happen?
2
A Rajani waited until the very - but he waited - he
3 has supervised visitation, but he waited until Friday to call
4 and ask if Friday, Saturday and Sunday he could have
5 visitation and he asked me to do it, he did not want the
6 supervisor, he'd had some trouble with them and I said, no,
7 you know, I'll comply by the order of the court so if you
8 want to tell Willwin to call me, you can have visitation.
9 And Willwin called and told me that they weren't able to
10 accommodate him except one day, so he did visit with them on
11 Sunday with the supervisor and he was with them for about
12 seven hours. And they had their fifth trip to Lagoon this
13 summer and these - the sorts of visits that Rajani plans with
14 the supervisor like trips to Lagoon make it almost impossible
15 for that supervision to be extremely close.
16 Q How did the children respond to yesterday's
17 visitation?
18 A When I picked them up, Anjana - when they got in
19 the car and we started to drive away - started to cry and
20 said "Daddy says the divorce is tomorrow, mama. And I said,
21 "When - when was he speaking about this with you? Was your
22 supervisor there? And she said, "No, mama, it was when we
23 were at church earlier." And so Anjana was very upset about
24 that and when we woke up this morning and my parents and I
25 were leaving, she was very upset again and started to cry and
27
1 I knew she was thinking about that because we told her we
2 were going somewhere else, but she said, silly daddy, silly
3 daddy and cried. So I know, you know, it's a continuing
4 problem that they've been involved in the proceedings, and
5 even supervision hasn't taken that away.
6
Q How did Malini react?
7 A Malini's just very quiet. She didn't ask anything
8 about it.
9
Q Aside from these problems with visitation and
10 contact with their father, how are the children doing?
11 A I think they're generally doing very well, much,
12 much better than a few months ago. Around Christmas that was
13 a difficult time for Malini, but I think they both do
14 extremely well in school. Malini's a very talented student.
15 She - neither - well both of the girls are.
16 Q Can I direct your attention to the binder right in
17 front of you?
18 A Sure.
19 Q And working from back forward, let me refer you to
20 tab one.
21 A Okay.
22
Q And the binder's been marked Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
23 A Okay.
24
Q Identify tab one if you would.
25 A This is Malini's report card, her last report card
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1 from her elementary school. And I think you can see she's
2 doing very well.
3
Q Let me direct your attention to tab number two of
4 the same binder and ask you to identify that exhibit.
5
A That is Anjana's report card from Challenger school
6 where she goes to pre-school, in a pre-kindergarten program.
7
Q And how would you characterize her performance
8 there?
9
A Well, I would say extremely good. I don't think
10 there's anything that you could label as negative on there,
11 and it's -1 think it's wonderful that they label her as
12 bright and cheerful. I think her previous report card said
13 something similar that she's socially very good with the
14 other children, she's always cheerful, she's a joy to have in
15 the classroom.
16 Q Let me direct your attention to tab three and ask
17 this question. Would you describe to the Court please how
18 visitation has proceeded since your separation from Professor
19 Kanth? And by that I want to know when has he seen them and
20 whether you were present or whether someone else was present.
21
A Okay. Do you want that from the very beginning?
22
Q If you can expedite that and make it somewhat
23 brief.
24
A Okay. Shortly by just a few days after we
25 separated and the three of us came to - the children and I
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1 came to Salt Lake, Rajani came to Salt Lake also and that's
2 when the first visits happened. The first visit was not
3 extremely successful. The children did not want to go with
4 Rajani alone. He hadn't - up to that point while we were
5 married, except for in one instance, the whole time we were
6 married ever taken both children anywhere together just with
7 him, just alone. And so they just weren't used to being with
8 him, but he insisted on taking them overnight and it also
9 happened at a time when Anjana came down with a fever and
10 wasn't feeling well and she cried and cried and asked to stay
11 home, but he insisted on taking them and told them - he kept
12 saying just see what mama has done to this family. And they
13 cried as he put them into the car, they cried as they left.
14 He called me - they were staying in the city and he called
15 me to come because the children were crying enough that he
16 couldn't calm them down and I talked with them for a while
17 and then said no, I couldn't stay I had to leave and when I
18 got home, Rajani called me about 10:00 to tell me that Anjana
19 had cried until she had thrown up a number of times and then
20 he put Malini on the phone and she cried and sobbed and
21 sobbed and just said to me, "Mama, you just don't know how
22 much I need you." And just cried and sobbed and, you know,
23 I told them just to calm down and go to sleep and then, you
24 know, tomorrow daddy was taking them to the zoo and so on
25 and it would be lots of fun.
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1
Q How long was his visit at that time?
2
A I think he was here about - in Salt Lake about 20
3 days or 21 days or something at that point, but his visit
4 with them at that point was just overnight, but that visit
5 was, created enough anxiety with the two girls that after
6 that point they refused to be with him unaccompanied.
7
Q Who would accompany them then?
8
A I would.
9
Q And during that 20 or 21 day period of time, how
10 frequently did he see the children?
11 A Oh, in that first period, after that first visit he
12 didn't come back and visit them.
13 Q Did he ask to visit them?
14 A He just went to visit Malini at school and I think
15 he would drop by the house to leave things, but then he would
16 just leave a note. He didn't ask for any specific visits
17 after that.
18 Q When did he visit again after that?
19 A Not until August when we were again preparing to go
20 into federal court and he came for that. And at that point
21 he just showed up for the - on the same day as the court
22 hearing and then he was here for four days and during that
23 time I sat with him while he supervised - or I sat with him
24 to supervise while he visited with them at his hotel.
25
Q When was his next visit?
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1
A November of that year, and again he was here for a
2 few days.
3
Q Did you supervise the visitation?
4
A This time Malini refused to go with him. Well, no
5 Malini did go with him for a few hours one evening. They
6 both went unsupervised for one evening, but apparently Malini
7 had cried and said she wanted to come home and he became very
8 angry with her and said, if you keep crying I'm not going to
9 take you home. And that was upsetting enough to Malini when
10 she came home she cried and refused to go with him anymore.
11 So he was just here for the weekend. So that was one day
12 and then the next day he took just Anjana and she went with
13 him for the afternoon, but Malini refused to go with him
14 anymore. Then15 Q Let's jump ahead to the next year in the fall of
16 last year it looks like you made some notes here of visit
17 times during that period of time. Have I got that right?
18 A Yes. This was last Christmas.
19 Q And then the next page refers to November through
20 January of last year and then January of this year; is that
21 right?
22
A Yeah.
23
Q Did you provide the supervision then?
24
A Yes, I did.
25
Q And was there any time when you refused visits with
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1 Professor Kanth?
2
A No, in fact he specifically made a point of not
3 asking for visits at all. He 4
Q How did you react to the requirement that you
5 provide supervision?
6
A I wasn't happy about it, but I felt like the
7 children did not want to be with him otherwise and 8
Q Did you ever travel with the children and Professor
9 Kanth?
10 A Yes.
11 Q When was that?
12 A We went on a trip to Disneyland.
13 Q How long did that take?
14 A Four days.
15 Q And you were with them the entire time?
16 A Yes.
17 Q Did Professor Kanth ever talk about you in front
18 of the children during these visits?
19 A Many times, yeah.
20
Q In a disparaging manner?
21 A Yes.
22
Q I draw your attention to page three of tab three.
23 What year are you referring there in those notes?
24 A Okay. This would be year 2000.
25
Q Did there come a time when you refused to provide
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1 the supervision?
2
A That took until after last - well, there are two
3 periods there. I finally asked for supervised visitation
4 from the court last I think November, but it was not until
5 after his visit last December when we spent so much time
6 together, this 40 hours, that I finally said I won't do this
7 supervision anymore.
8
Q What prompted you to refused to provide the
9 supervision for visitation personally?
10 A A number of things. The atmosphere between the two
11 of us is very conflictual and the children are very much
12 aware of this. He spends much, much time trying to undermine
13 my relationship with the children saying disparaging things
14 about myself and my family.
15
In addition, when he - he's very moody and when 16 when his temper flares up and his mood isn't just right, he's
17 very disparaging to Malini and through many of the visits she
18 would come and not want to be with her father and just sit
19 with me wherever I was sitting and practically sit on top of
20 me and not want to be with her father and then that makes
21 her father very angry and he becomes more disparaging of her
22 and so on. And so those - it was things of that nature that
23 eventually lead me to say this can't go on, it's not a good
24 situation.
25
Q Was there ever an occasion when Professor Kanth
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1 requested visitation in a timely fashion and you refused
2 that?
3
A No, I don't think ever.
4
Q Let me refer you to tab four and ask you to
5 identify and describe that exhibit.
6
A After last summer, after we'd gone to Disneyland, I
7 couldn't be with him and the children one day and he had
8 picked Malini up - or Anjana up from her pre-school and taken
9 them home from the pre-school and I was supposed to meet them
10 later and then he didn't call me for that and I wasn't able
11 to meet them and at the end of that evening, he just notified
12 me he was not bringing them back and he had them for five
13 days. And then after I finally was able to have them
14 returned home, the visitation had a much different tenor
15 after that. He was very angry. At first he wouldn't come
16 to the house, he would stand out in the gutter and tell the
17 children that mama would have him arrested if he came. But
18 nevertheless I was able to convince him that no, I was just
19 fine, he could come and visit at our house. And I told him
20 that's how I'd be willing to do the visitation after that.
21 And so he spent - I'm trying to remember how many weeks, a
22 number of weeks coming to the house and visiting all day long
23 with the children, but each and every day when he would come,
24 he would tell us that he was leaving the next day. So I
25 would say, well if you're leaving tomorrow we'll, you know,
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1 we'll do as much as we can today and he would stay up to say
2 11 hours, ten - 11 hours each time. But each time we
3 thought it was the last day. And, you know, each day he
4 would change his reservations to the extent that when he
5 would come and say you need to come say goodbye to daddy I'm
6 leaving tomorrow, Malini just said him, daddy, you've told us
7 every day you're leaving.
8
Q Is Exhibit 4 more of your notes on visitation and
9 phone calls?
10 A Yeah.
11
Q Describe the telephone call practice that Professor
12 Kanth has employed.
13 A Okay.
14
Q How often does he call the children?
15 A Okay. Oh, okay, I thought you were referring to
16 something else. It varies through periods, but every single
17 day since last summer, every single day, most often more than
18 once a day.
19
Q How much time will he occupy on the phone with the
20 children?
21
A Often it's substantial. I think last year when I
22 averaged the phone calls, it was an average of 50 minutes and
23 often it was longer than that.
24
Q What's the longest he's called and talked to the
25 children?
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1 A It's probably between one and two hours. Oh,
2 except when he's here in town. That's when he's calling long
3 distance. When he's here in town it could go up to a few
4 hours. In the last few days he's been talking with then
5 three or four hours throughout the day. He'll call again and
6 again.
7
Q And is there any supervision on the content of
8 those telephone calls?
9
A No. The only time when I tried to supervise that
10 at all was when over after Christmas when Malini was very
11 upset about food and poisons in food and so on and he would
12 talk with her and exacerbate that situation. She was afraid
13 of BSE in the meat and mad cow disease and so on, and he
14 would talk with her and tell her that she couldn't eat any
15 meat, that it was contaminated with BSE and mad cow disease
16 and she couldn't eat tuna fish because it was contaminated
17 with mercury and so on. And that was, you know, obviously
18 exacerbating the situation. At that point, I tried to ask
19 him a number of times not to talk with her about these things
20 and when she would start talking with him, I would try to say
21 Malini, come and get in the bathtub, you know, don't have
22 this conversation. I think that's about as much as I tried
23 to supervise the phone calls.
24
Q What limitations are you requesting in regards to
25 telephone calls?
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1 A I would like to request that there - that we
2 specify some appropriate time periods that he could call in,
3 maybe a number of day per week such as limited. Malini gets
4 home from school at 4:00 and goes to bed at 8:00, and often
5 times he'll call between 4:00 and 8:00 and spend a
6 substantial number of hours on the phone with her and become
7 very angry if I say she needs to eat dinner, she needs to
8 get in the bathtub.
9
Q What time limit would you propose?
10 A That's hard to say. I hate to restrict it on the
11 one end, but I would say it shouldn't be more than an hour a
12 day a few times a week.
13 Q And with what frequency? How many times a week?
14 A I would say two or three times a week.
15 Q Very well. Have the children responded negatively
16 at any time to these telephone calls?
17 A Yes.
18 Q What is their negative response?
19 A Malini especially refuses to talk many times. And
20 last year he called once and then she said - she was telling
21 me that he was calling to much and I said, Well, you know,
22 maybe we could just have you talk every other day or
23 something. And she said, "How about every New Year's Day?"
24 But in general after that she held to that if he would call
25 he would say, but mama -1 would even try to be handing the
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1 phone to her and she'd say, but mama, I spoke with him
2 yesterday, I don't have to speak with him today. And I tried
3 to speak with him about that nicely, but it increased his
4 phone calls.
5
Q Is there any correlation between the phone calls
6 and Malini's physical symptoms such as the headaches?
7
A Definitely.
8
Q What's the correlation?
9
A As soon as that contact increases, the headaches
10 would increase. And that was - we're doing better with the
11 headaches right now, but she has been self-limiting her phone
12 calls. So that when he calls as soon as he calls she'll
13 say, I have to go eat my dessert, daddy, or I have to watch
14 my movie, daddy. So she self-limits it and we've had less
15 trouble with that lately. But in the period when she was
16 having the phone calls or having the headaches, there was,
17 you know, a marked increase in her headaches.
18 Q Please refer to tab five. Is this the letter from
19 Dr. Goldsmith you referred to earlier that corresponded to
20 the June 2000 visitation?
21 A Yeah.
22
Q And the court's limitation on visitation to
23 supervise visitation? This is the letter that lead to the
24 complaint about violating the privilege between Malini and
25 Dr. Goldsmith, is that correct?
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A Uh-huh (affirmative).
2
Q Is this where Dr. Goldsmith expresses her concerns
3 about the visitation. I believe she suggests here that there
4 be a further evaluation before there be any unsupervised
5 visitation.
6
Tab six. Would you identify that and describe its
7 relevance?
8
A Yes. Just before I left Australia, six days before
9 I'd left Australia, we had had the argument that I referred
10 to earlier where Rajani had told me that I wasn't to give
11 Malini any medicine and then he started taking me to the door
12 and so on, and at that point I was - he had given me the
13 passports earlier in the year in December to fill out some
14 visa applications, and so he knew that I had those passports
15 and he came and asked me for the passports and then started
16 looking in the house for the passports. And so I was aware
17 that - and he also started making many calls to India, to his
18 relatives in India and he never talks with them. In all the
19 years we've been married he never talked with them.
20
Q Who authored tab six here?
21 A Okay. So just after we left by the next day or so
22 I received this fax from a friend of his in India. This man
23 is the governor of a small island off the coast of India.
24 He's very high up in the home ministry and smooths a lot of
25 things during visits, you know, when we visit India and so
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1 on. Apparently he wanted the passports from me because this
2 man had arranged a trip for the four of us to India without
3 my knowledge and when I came to the back to the U.S., Rajani
4 assumed I knew about this and to try to cover the nature of
5 this visit, he had his friend, [inaudible], fax this to me
6 saying - faxed me this letter saying this visit that had been
7 planned was simply a family holiday. But I had not been told
8 anything about it. He had the visas and so on and I hadn't
9 been told anything about it.
10 Q Did that give you some concerns?
11 A Yes.
12 Q Why?
13 A Well, I've told you at the points when the tensions
14 in our marriage became very great, not only at those points
15 but consistently through those points he would talk about
16 going back to India. The first year we were in Australia and
17 he started talking about going back to India, the only thing
18 that dissuaded him was that I pointed out that maybe Anjana
19 would be too little and she would get sick from the water and
20 so on because he had gotten sick the year before and I said
21 that's too risky, and he gave up the idea. But he had
22 talked with me about that a number of times.
23
Q Aside from the fact that you might not want to live
24 in India, what's the problem if you were take the children to
25 India?
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1 A Well, I have a degree in Arabic and Middle East
2 studies. I've lived in the Middle East, I've visited India a
3 number of times. I'm very aware of the patriarchal nature of
4 the society there. I know that I would have much less
5 control over my life and my children's lives. I don't know
6 if I would have the freedom to come and go with the children.
7 I don't even know if I would have very much control at all
8 over the children's lives.
9
Q Do you recall whether India is a signatory on the
10 Hague Convention?
11 A No, definitely not.
12 Q Thank you.
13 A In fact, they have no legislation whatsoever, you
14 know, with regard to children that are retained there, are
15 taken there in any manner.
16 Q Tab seven is some court papers in Professor Kanth's
17 earlier divorce, correct?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Can you describe Professor Kanth's relationship with
20 his children from his prior marriage?
21 A He has no contact with them whatsoever. He has not
22 had contact with them since 1996, and he has tried to get
23 back in contact with them, tried to initiate contact, and the
24 last thing that he told my daughters and I, was that his
25 oldest daughter had written him a note saying something in
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1 the nature of the scars are just too deep and we don't want
2 to have any contact with you, daddy. And he has no contact
3 with them whatsoever.
4
Q Let me direct you to the last four pages of tab
5 seven, it should be the affidavit signed by Professor Kanth's
6 former spouse. Are there any behaviors that she describes
7 there that would correspond with those you have experienced
8 with Professor Kanth?
9
A Yes, in fact, I was shocked when I found this to
10 see that in section two, number two, she's describing the
11 behavior that's virtually the same thing that I described
12 when I filed for a protective order. The fact that he's been
13 verbally and emotionally abusive to her, sometimes violent
14 and threatening temper. Also the fact that they had many
15 agreements for visitation which apparently Rajani didn't
16 return the children and then gave her reason to think he
17 might consider taking them out of the state. And I also had
18 conversations with this - with his ex-wife where she talked
19 about similar things having occurred in their marriage.
20
Q Let me direct your attention to tab eight, a letter
21 from the Department of State, United States.
22 A Yes.
23
Q Directed to you. Why is that significant?
24
A Well, it's significant for a couple of reasons.
25 First off, the reason I have this letter is I wrote to ask
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1 if any additional passports had been applied for on behalf of
2 the children. And this came after I found in Rajani's
3 possession copies of passport applications with pictures of
4 the children. And so I wrote asking if any, you know,
5 additional passports had been applied for and they have
6 placed them in their passport check system and told me that
7 no passports had been applied for, but he said once a
8 passport is issued, it cannot be canceled. So in order for
9 them to deny issuance of duplicate passports, I would need to
10 have certain - certain things entered into a divorce decree.
11 Q And those would include an award of sole custody to
12 you, correct?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Limitations regarding travel and at best have an
15 express limitation regarding the issuance of duplicate
16 passports, is that right?
17 A Yes.
18 Q Tab nine now is a letter addressed to me from
19 Philip Schwartz, counsel in North Carolina - Virginia, excuse
20 me.
21 A Virginia.
22
Q Who is Mr. Schwartz?
23 A He was an expert attorney, an expert in Hague cases
24 that we - that I retained in December as we were preparing to
25 go again in federal court in our Hague case.
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1
Q And he suggested it is important that the decree
2 contain precise paragraphs regarding the international
3 application as security against and abduction, and ensure the
4 enforcement between countries; is that right?
5
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
6
Q And have you looked into that?
7
A I have.
8
Q In fact, you have a document here from the
9 Department of State that makes some suggestions as to
10 particular language regarding the Hague Convention; is that
11 right?
12 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
13 Q And among other things it suggests what we just
14 talked about and a provision that specifically identifies the
15 Hague Convention and applies it to your circumstances in this
16 case; is that right?
17 A Yes, but that's assuming that, that the children
18 are taken to a country where the Hague applies.
19 Q Right. In light of that, what is the relief you
20 request in regards to visitation?
21
A I would ask that no visitation occurs outside of
22 the United States without my express written permission,
23 perhaps even court order. I would ask that they not - that
24 the children not be allowed to visit with Rajani outside Utah
25 without my express written permission.
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1
Q Let me interrupt you. There's one other thing I
2 wanted to ask you about. Has anything occurred in the course
3 of visitation that lead you to suspect that Professor Kanth
4 might have planned to remove the children by some means from
5 this jurisdiction?
6
A Yes, a number of things have. First, when he first
7 came here in August 1999 and I was supervising the
8 visitation, he said to me - he said, you might as well forget
9 worrying about whether 111 take the kids because I found out
10 agents can do it and I'll never have to have a hand in it.
11 No one will ever know because agents handle the whole thing.
12 Then there was another telephone call to me where he reminded
13 me of something like that. He told me I might as well quit
14 worrying about it, it's not in my control, if he wanted to do
15 it he would do it and I wouldn't have any control over that.
16
Now with respect to the children, when he had them
17 in an unsupervised capacity last summer, he told them
18 numerous times that he was planning to take them out of the
19 country. He told them specific things such as he was working
20 with an attorney in Singapore to see how he could keep them
21 there once he got them there. He told them things so many,
22 you know, to such an extent that at the end of five days,
23 Malini called me and she whispered into the phone that daddy
24 was thinking of taking them out of the country and asked me
25 to come and get them. That's when I finally retained - or
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1 got a restraining order to go and bring them back.
2
Another thing, he at the end of that visit in the
3 summer, he gave me a packet of stories that he'd written for
4 the children and asked me to take them for them and I went
5 to copy them at the copy shop and when I opened that folder
6 that he'd given me, a passport fell out.
7
Q Whose passport?
8
A I have the passport with me today if you want.
9
Q Just tell me whose it is.
10 A Yes. I don't know who this person is. It's a
11 [inaudible]. Someone from Hong Kong.
12 Q Do you know who this person is?
13 A I have no idea. And he never mentioned the
14 passport.
15 Q Do you know any reason why he would have that
16 passport?
17 A No, I do not.
18
Q Does it show an address for the individual?
19 A No, it just says that she was born in Hong Kong but
20 this is a U.S. passport.
21
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, I would ask leave to make a
22 copy of that passport. We didn't have it until this morning
23 and then I would submit it to the Court and offer it as
24 Plaintiffs Exhibit 4.
25
THE COURT: That's agreeable.
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1
Q (BY MR. GREEN) Okay, I think we were talking and I
2 interrupted you to address that point about limitations.
3 We've talked about ongoing supervised visitation.
4
A Yes.
5
Q Has Professor Kanth ever submitted to a visitation
6 evaluation as ordered?
7
A No.
8
Q And we've talked about restraining his visits to
9 inside this jurisdiction, the State of Utah, correct?
10 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
11
Q And including the Hague Convention language that I
12 described. Are there any other limits that you would want to
13 impose?
14 A I would need to know by address and telephone
15 number where the children are when they're visiting with him.
161 would also need to know -1 would need to be notified by
17 address and telephone number where his legal residence is
18 before any visitation takes place so that I know where to
19 contact him. I would need to know their itinerary basically
20 if it took place over a number of days. I think also there
21 needs to be - it needs to be in writing the duration of the
22 visits and the time that I can expect them to be returned.
23
Q Are you asking for some sort of pre-notice so that
24 you can make plans?
25
A Yeah.
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1
Q How much notice are you asking for?
2
A Well, I'm not really talking about notice. I don't
3 need notice so much, I mean, 24 or 48 hours or something
4 would be wonderful, but it's more that I want it to be in
5 writing when I can expect that visit to end and when I can
6 expect them to be returned.
7
Q Why is that important?
8
A Because the last time last summer when he took them
9 like that, I - and this has happened more than once, it
10 happened before that even. In fact, gosh, at the outset of
11 all of this, Rajani had taken the children to - he was
12 supposed to take them to Chuckie Cheese and then bring them
13 home, and when he never arrived home, finally I called his
14 apartment and he notified me that he had as much parental
15 rights as I did and he wasn't bringing them home. This is
16 what initially lead me to file a protective order stating,
17 you know, that the children needed to be home where their
18 place of residence was and so on.
19
So when he took them last summer, again he took
20 them, you know, he picked Anjana up at her school, Malini was
21 supposed to accompany him, they were going to a clown days
22 thing at Anjana's school and he was supposed to bring them
23 home. And like I said at the end of the night when I called
24 to say, Well, when will you be bringing them home, he just
25 said I won't be. And it was five days before they came
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1 back.
2
Q In this last period of visitation, the last month
3 or so, has there been any confusion about time?
4
A Yes, a great deal.
5
Q Describe that please.
6 A Basically Rajani calls me to ask when I would be
7 okay with visitation, when it would work in with my hours of
8 being away at work and so on, because I have to drop them
9 off with Willwin. And I told him the hours per week, you
10 know, that I would be able to do that. And then he, in a
11 number of instances, has gotten them mixed up and scheduled
12 for different hours, and then there becomes, you know, a
13 conflict with Willwin and so on because they've scheduled
14 with him for certain hours and I don't know about it. But
15 then also in at least two instances now he's failed to return
16 at the appointed time, even with the supervisor, and
17 apparently he placed some pressure on the supervisor and told
18 her that he could handle me and it would be okay with me.
19 And so he - they don't appear until later. It's been a half
20 an hour and then an hour that they remain longer than the
21 appointed time.
22
Q Let me direct your attention to tab 10.
23
THE COURT: Mr. Green?
24
MR. GREEN: Yes.
25
THE COURT: I wonder if this is a good time to take
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1 a short break?
2
MR. GREEN: That will be fine.
3
THE COURT: We'll do that in the morning break.
4 We'll just be in recess for 10 minutes, resume at 11:00.
5
MR. GREEN: Very well.
6
THE COURT: All right.
7
MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor.
8
THE COURT: You can step down.
9
THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.
10
(Whereupon a recess was taken)
11
THE COURT: All right, we're back on the record.
12 Mr. Green, you can go ahead.
13
MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor. I believe we
14 have a photocopy of the inside page or pages of the passport
15 that we've marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 4. I'll offer
16 these later, your Honor, all at once.
17
THE COURT: All right.
18 Q (BY MR. GREEN) Tab 10 represents your 2000 tax
19 return, is that right, Cory?
20 A Yes.
21
Q You indicated your - the extent of your education
22 earlier. Would you mind my asking your age please?
23 A Thirty-five.
24 Q And how old is Professor Kanth?
25 A I think he's 52 now.
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1 Q And where was he educated?
2
A He was educated in India and in New York City. He
3 also attended Columbia University for a while and then the
4 New School for Social Research where he obtained - he
5 obtained a masters from Columbia and another masters from the
6 New School for Social Research and his Ph.D. there. He also
7 has a masters degree from India.
8
Q I see. Are you employed now?
9 A Yes.
10 Q Where?
11 A The University of Utah.
12 Q And what do you do?
13 A Right now I'm assisting another professor and
14 teaching a course. Up until now I have been teaching courses
15 on my own.
16 Q You earned $9,600 of taxable income through your
17 wages and salaries last year; is that right?
18 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
19 Q Is that what you expect to do this year?
20 A Yeah. It could be less, but I would assume it's
21 going to be just about that same amount.
22
Q I direct your attention to tabs 11 and 12 please.
23 And does this show the history of the support payments under
24 the temporary order?
25 A Yes.
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1
Q What are the terms of the temporary order in terms
2 of child support and alimony?
3
A Alimony is set at $2,000 per month, child support
4 is set at $896 per month.
5
Q And presently is he, that is the respondent, in
6 arrears under that order?
7 A Yes.
8
Q Would you give us the numbers please for child
9 support and then alimony?
10 A Okay, child support he's in arrears $ 10,834.
11 Alimony he's in arrears $31,070. And all amounts that he has
12 sent up until just recently I have credited as child support
13 because I can only assume that's how, you know, how he
14 intends them.
15 Q And that reflects that 16 A Yes.
17 Q - allocation of the payments?
18 A Yes.
19 Q All right. Tab 13 represents your financial
20 declaration. Did you prepare this?
21
A Yes.
22
Q And are the figures that are contained therein
23 accurate?
24
A Yes.
25
Q Now you've shown an income of $666. How does that
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1 compare with the $9,600 you earned last year?
2
A Probably pretty similarly because what I did right
3 now up, you know, up until this point this year, I have not
4 even been paid, I just have a promise to be paid and so the
5 current segment that I'm helping teach with is $4,000 and
6 that will be my whole income through June, so I averaged it
7 out on a monthly basis and that comes to $666 per month.
8 The income last year, I'm sure if you average it out on a
9 monthly basis, it's the similar amount.
10 Q You reflect a budget here on the last - next to the
11 last page of the exhibit.
12 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
13 Q With a total amount of $3,529.50; is that right?
14 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
15 Q What records did you review in order to prepare the
16 budget?
17 A It was not really a review of records, this is more
18 my determining what expenses would be for certain things.
19 It's difficult for me to review any records because since
20 we've been married I didn't handle most of the bills of the
21 household. At this point I'm living with my parents so I,
22 you know, it's -1 don't have any records to review.
23
Q What standard are you attempting to recreate in
24 this budget?
25 A I'm thinking of the standard that my children are
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1 used to. They are used to living in a house.
2
Q During what period of time?
3
A Up until the period when we started traveling
4 abroad. After that period, we put our furniture and so on in
5 storage and we lived out of suitcases for three years. But
6 even in those periods we rented houses and so on. So and
7 before that we either owned a house or had a house to live
8 in, so they've always had a house, a yard, you know, a
9 certain standard of living. And I think this is very frugal
10 estimate of what it would cost to live at that level.
11
Q Tab 14 please is a more detailed budget. To your
12 knowledge does it correspond to the budget we were just
13 talking about?
14 A Yes. The categories are a little bit different,
15 but I tried as much as I could to make them correspond
16 directly.
17 Q Tab 15 appears to be a series of three years tax
18 returns subpoenaed from H&R Block from 1997, 1998 and 1999,
19 correct?
20
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
21
Q Showing income in 1997 of $53,941; 1198 $49,547;
22 and $44,923 in 1999, correct?
23
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
24
Q And there are adjustments in these tax returns 25 and correct me if I'm wrong - are those adjustments due to
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1 the fact that the income was earned abroad?
2
A Yes.
3
Q And is taxed abroad?
4
A Yes - well, yes. Sometimes it is sometimes it
5 isn't, but the United States allows an exclusion of a certain
6 amount of income for tax purposes.
7
Q I'd like you to take a look at exhibits 16,17-16
8 and 17 and also plaintiffs exhibit two which we've had
9 marked separately today. That's in front of you there. Do
10 these represent contracts of employment and offers of
11 employment?
12 A Yes.
13
Q Where is Professor Kanth employed now?
14 A At the National University of Singapore.
15 Q Based upon these records, have you been able to
16 calculate a range of income that he'd be earning there?
17 A Yes. I gave those figures to you, but I believe it
18 was above $71,000 a year or so.
19 Q U.S. dollars?
20
A Yes. In Singapore dollars it's $9,000 per month
21 and I think the exchange rate is about .62.
22
Q In addition to the taxable income that would be
23 reflected, say on a tax return, are there other [inaudible]
24 or benefits that he would earn in his capacity at Singapore?
25
A Yes. The one - the specific one that I'm aware of
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1 is addressed in this contract, which is Exhibit 17. He
2 receives a housing allowance and I have seen the checks for
3 this housing allowance. He just leaves them lying around and
4 I've seen them in his car and they're labeled housing
5 allowance and it's $1,800 Singapore dollars, which would
6 translate to I think about $991 or -1 gave you the figures.
7
Q And taking those numbers together is that how you
8 arrived at the range of income of about $71,000?
9
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
10 Q Now, Cory, has Dr. Kanth ever indicated to you that
11 he has acquired any liquid savings or similar type accounts?
12 A A number of times.
13 Q What has he said?
14 A Well, he has intended he tells me on buying a house
15 for a while, and he's told me that he has a $50,000 down
16 payment. And he - we subpoenaed loan documents and it's
17 reflected in there that he intended to make a $50,000 down
18 payment for the house.
19 Q Do you know where that money is?
20 A Well since his - after his first ex-wife wanted to
21 subpoena his bank records and so on, he doesn't keep any
22 money in bank accounts. He generally keeps a waist pack that
23 he carries all the time with his money in it, or there's a
24 larger waist pack that he kind of carries over his shoulder.
25 And that's how I've know him to carry all money since - since
57
1 we came back from Denmark. He keeps it all in his waist
2 pack or something like that.
3
Q Very well. You have incurred fees and costs in not
4 only this case but the related case in the federal court; is
5 that correct?
6 A Yes.
7
Q In addition to the fees and costs which you
8 incurred with me, have you had to hire other lawyers?
9
A Yes. I had to hire attorneys in Australia, and to
10 the Australian attorneys in U.S. dollars I paid $3,164.93.
11 And I believe the records are, probably it's part of Exhibit
12 3.
13 Q Let me interrupt you there. What is the status of
14 the Australia divorce proceedings?
15 A We stipulated that those proceedings would be put
16 on hold until such a time that we heard the outcome of the
17 Hague case, and they've never been dealt with after that
18 because the Hague case was in my favor. But it was
19 stipulated that they were put on hold. And that's addressed
20 in one of these letters.
21
Q You're referring now to Petitioner's Exhibit 3
22 marked separately?
23 A Yeah.
24 Q We have, I think, on the first page there a letter
25 from Ms. Hayes. Is that the one you're referring to?
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1
A Yeah. No, it's in the - it's in the very first
2 paragraph, let's see if I kept that separately. Okay, I don't
3 think I included that in the papers that I gave to you.
4
Q That's all right. I'm just asking about the
5 status.
6
A Yeah.
7
Q Exhibit P-3 are the different letters, bills and
8 supporting documentation for the legal fees and costs you've
9 incurred with other lawyers, correct?
10 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
11 Q You identified the Australia lawyers. Who else
12 have you had to hire?
13 A I hired the expert Hague attorney from Virginia.
14 Q Mr. Schwartz?
15 A Uh-huh (affirmative). And that came to $4,710. I
16 also retained Heather White from Snow, Christensen &
17 Martineau and those bills I don't have with me today, but I
18 think that's between -1 can't even say between $2,000 and
19 $10,000 and I don't have the bills here. But I do have
20 documentation of this that the Australian attorneys and Mr.
21 Schwartz, and together those amounts all come to $7,874.93.
22
MR. GREEN: Very well. Your Honor, the remaining
23 remaining exhibits include a report we received on Friday
24 from Dr. Natalie Malovich. Dr. Malovich was appointed by the
25 court to conduct an independent medical examination of the
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1 respondent and he has not made himself available for that.
2 However, Ms. Kanth and the children have visited with Dr.
3 Malovich to identify the current circumstances, the
4 children's level of functioning, and even with the
5 limitations of not visiting with respondent, the
6 recommendations of Dr. Malovich - and this is necessary
7 because Dr. Goldsmith will not make herself available, at
8 least not voluntarily, to opine on those issues even as the
9 children's therapist.
10
Furthermore, Dr. Malovich has asked that the
11 portions of her report that relate to the observations of the
12 children or comments of the children be kept confidential.
13 And I would ask that the Court so order that should this
14 evaluation for some reason become - come into the possession
15 of the respondent or his counsel that there be a strict
16 limitation as to its dissemination.
17 Q (BY MR. GREEN) Now, Cory, you reviewed the
18 recommendations of this report, correct?
19 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
20
Q And those recommendations include that there be a
21 complete psychological assessment performed on Dr. Kanth and
22 that the supervised visitation continue by Willwin or a
23 similar agency; that visitation be limited to visitation
24 within the State of Utah; that a formal visitation schedule
25 be developed during periods of time that the respondent is in
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1 Salt Lake including a clear delineation of his arrival to and
2 departure from the United States in order to decrease the
3 children's anxiety, and that Malini continue her psycho
4 therapy with Dr. Goldsmith. Would you agree with those
5 recommendations?
6
A Yes, I would.
7
Q When is Dr. Kanth due to return to Singapore?
8
A I don't know. He 9
Q Has he told you when?
10 A No. As in the past when I specifically ask him
11 that he will not answer my question. He has told me for the
12 last three weeks each week - week by week - he's told me
13 that he would be returning on Sunday. He told me this last
14 week that he would be returning on the Sunday that just
15 passed. He said unless something momentous happened, he had
16 reservations, but he's still here.
17
MR. GREEN: Very well. Your Honor, with that I
18 would offer Petitioner's Exhibit 1, tabs 1 through 18.1
19 will proffer as to my fees and costs as well as Petitioner's
20 Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.
21
THE COURT: Counsel remind me what I've heard about
22 Exhibit 2.
23
MR. GREEN: Exhibit two I believe, let me find just
24 to make sure, is the exhibit regarding - not the attorney's
25 fees, the employment contracts and letters of solicitation
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1 regarding employment.
2
THE COURT: Oh, that went with tabs 16 and 17 of
3 Exhibit 1?
4
MR. GREEN: It would, yeah, it would correspond
5 with those, that is correct.
6
THE WITNESS: Mr. Green, can I ask something?
7
MR. GREEN: Go ahead.
8
THE WITNESS: Sorry. We hadn't addressed the costs
9 for printing the Hague, that Supreme Court case.
10
MR. GREEN: I was going to get to that.
11
THE WITNESS: Okay.
12
MR. GREEN: Perhaps if it pleases the Court, I will
13 make my proffer now prior to any questions that Ms. Kawamura
14 may have.
15
My proffer would be that Exhibits 19 and 20
16 represent the billing statement that I have produced.
17 Exhibit 19 shows charges and payments. Exhibit 20 is a
18 detailed breakdown of time and services between me and my
19 staff as well as costs, showing a total charge of $34,973.18.
20 And as I broke down the expenses, they broke down roughly
21 equally between the Hague related proceedings and these
22 proceedings. Included in that number are costs of $3,323.38.
23 Some of the costs associated with the Supreme Court brief,
24 however, have been paid directly by Ms. Kanth or on her
25 behalf.
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1
Q (BY MR. GREEN) And that's what you're referring
2 to; is that correct, Cory? How much have you paid out-of3 pocket for the costs associated with those proceedings?
4
A Twenty-five hundred dollars.
5
Q How have you been able to pay those sums?
6 A I received an income tax refund last year.
7
Q And have you been able to pay the other costs and
8 fees that you have testified about and that I have proffered?
9
A My family has had to do that for me.
10 Q Who in your family?
11 A My uncle.
12 Q And he's present today, correct?
13 A Yes.
14 Q And is it your desire to repay him for those funds?
15 A Definitely.
16 Q Do you foresee any ability to repay those funds
17 from your income?
18 A No, I don't. Not - no, I don't.
19
MR. GREEN: So I would submit the exhibits
20 including the entirety of P-l, the binder.
21
THE COURT: I'm sorry, the entirety of what?
22
MR. GREEN: Of P-l, the white binder.
23
Nothing further, your Honor.
24
THE COURT: I have a couple of questions, if I can.
25 Tell me just so I can get a clear chronology here. When and
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1 where were you married?
2
THE WITNESS: In Salt Lake City on March 16, 1990.
3
THE COURT: And the first child was born where and
4 when?
5
THE WITNESS: Salt Lake City, April 1,1993.
6
THE COURT: The second child?
7
THE WITNESS: February 20, 1996, Salt Lake City.
8
THE COURT: You lived in Salt Lake City from the
9 time of the marriage until when? Until Denmark?
10
THE WITNESS: Yes.
11
THE COURT: And you went to Denmark when?
12
THE WITNESS: We - the children and I left for
13 Denmark in September of 1996. Rajani had left in July of
14 1996. And we spent until -1 think we returned back here in
15 April of 1997. And16
THE COURT: Lived here in Utah again?
17
THE WITNESS: Lived here, yes, at my parent's house
18 where we're presently living.
19
THE COURT: And when did you go to Australia?
20
THE WITNESS: July of 1997.
21
THE COURT: And back here in early'98?
22
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative). We came back23 I think it was April - it varies each year the times we come
24 back, so it's April - April of 1998 we came back and again
25 stayed with my parents. And then in July of 1998 returned to
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1 Australia and then we came back here in March of 1999, the
2 children and I.
3
THE COURT: So then separated since March of '99?
4
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative).
5
THE COURT: Mr. Green, maybe you would know, when
6 was the first temporary order issued in terms of child
7 support and alimony?
8
MR. GREEN: Precise date, I'd have a hard time. I
9 think it was January of 2000.
10
THE WITNESS: January 19, 2000.
11
MR. GREEN: Thank you. That was the hearing before
12 Commissioner Arnett. At that time the respondent was
13 represented by Lisa Jones, and the order was entered in part
14 by stipulation, but I think that the financial numbers were
15 recommended by Commissioner Arnett.
16
THE COURT: Tell me more about your work. What
17 kind of work did you do before the marriage?
18
THE WITNESS: I - first I was acting as a teaching
19 fellow at the University of Utah. I taught economics classes
20 there. And then after I married my husband, he was a
21 professor in that same department and asked me to withdraw
22 from the department. He felt that wasn't good for his
23 career. So after I withdrew I applied to the CIA and I
24 worked there for a very short period. And I started there
25 just a few days after I found out I was pregnant and after
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1 working there just a few months, I asked them for a year's
2 separation to decide if I wanted to stay, basically because I
3 was having a hard time with the pregnancy and Rajani was here
4 and he wasn't - he wasn't doing very well alone here. And
5 so after separating from them, Malini was born and after she
6 was born, I didn't want to go back to work and so I hadn't
7 worked until, you know, we separated. And then the
8 university asked me to come back and start teaching for them
9 again. So that's what I've been doing last year. And they
10 only ask me when they need me, so it's - it's not a
11 permanent appointment or anything.
12
THE COURT: So you taught the school year of,
13 starting in fall of 2000?
14
THE WITNESS: Yes, starting last January 2000. I
15 taught the January -1 guess that's the spring semester and
16 then the summer semester, and after that they didn't ask me
17 back until just recently and now I'm there again for this
18 semester and they've asked me for the fall semester also.
19
THE COURT: And that's in the economics department?
20
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative).
21
THE COURT: So you're just teaching one class?
22
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative). And that
23 varies. I teach introductory economics, intermediate
24 economics. Right now I'm helping to teach [inaudible]
25 economics.
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1
THE COURT: Ms. Kawamura, do you care to 2
MS. KAWAMURA: I don't have any questions, your
3 Honor.
4
THE WITNESS: Can I volunteer something?
5
THE COURT: Absolutely.
6
THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'm working on my PhD
7 with the department again. That's why they've asked me to
8 teach for them.
9
THE COURT: That's what you were doing when you met
10 the respondent?
11
THE WITNESS: Yes.
12
THE COURT: Okay, I don't have any further
13 questions. You can step down, Ms. Kanth, if you'd like to.
14
Mr. Green, any other witnesses?
15
MR. GREEN: No other witnesses, your Honor.
16
We didn't address this and I'll proffer this. The
17 parties have divided their personal property, and my client
18 does not seek any personal property from the respondent. And
19 as far as we know, the respondent has received his own. That
20 would be with the exception of any funds which have been
21 acquired during the marriage.
22
THE COURT: And you would proffer in terms of the
23 debts there's nothing else on any other debt?
24
MR. GREEN: No joint debts that we are familiar
25 with. Each party has incurred debt since separation. The
67
1 petitioner is prepared to bear her own with the exception of
2 the obligations for fees and costs.
3
THE COURT: And there's no retirement.
4
MR. GREEN: None that we're aware of.
5
THE WITNESS: There is a retirement fund, but I
6 think since he stopped working in 1996 with the university
7 and no contributions have been made since then, I think the
8 contributions that were made in the period since we've been
9 married are relatively low and I'm willing to disregard that.
10
MR. GREEN: Very well.
11
I might address one other area of relief in
12 connection with the visitation. The State Department
13 recommends that a decree in a case where there is a threat of
14 abduction that the decree provide for posting a bond which
15 would then be forfeited if there was a violation of the
16 decree. It doesn't mention any amount, but does suggest that
17 the bond not only is a deterrent but also provides the
18 funding necessary to return a child, which is very
19 substantial. And I would estimate that a $50,000 bond would
20 be the minimum. And even though the State Department
21 guidelines don't recommend this, it would be prudent I think
22 for the respondent to surrender his passport and to be
23 ordered not to seek a duplicate when he is visiting with the
24 children, and that would be surrendered either to the court
25 or to his counsel and be returned to him only upon the terms
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1 of the court order that correspond to his visiting time.
2
Otherwise, I think that the petitioner probably
3 addressed the areas of relief that are necessary, and I'm
4 happy to either prepare findings, conclusions, and a decree
5 or entertain the Court's instruction on that.
6
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Green, I'd like you to do
7 that, I just, actually I think there were -1 anticipated
8 some proposed findings from before.
9
MR. GREEN: I was informed of that, your Honor, and
10 you have my apologies. Sometimes the court requests that and
11 sometimes not, and I, for some reason in the change of one
12 judge to the next didn't get that.
13
THE COURT: Well, you have been through the mill in
14 that regard, but I think that was ordered in February. So
15 I'm trying to think of the best way to proceed in terms of
16 what we've done here today in terms of the default. What do
17 you think I need to find, Mr. Green, in order to direct you
18 to prepare those findings?
19
MR. GREEN: I think we need to find that the
20 children are at risk without supervised visitation, that
21 there is not only justifiable concern regarding the
22 petitioner's behavior and the need for a psychological
23 evaluation prior to unsupervised visitation, but that the
24 supervisor needs to be instructed that they are at no time to
25 allow the children out of earshot so that they can hear and
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1 observe everything that is going on.
2
I recently had - was involved in a case where Judge
3 Lewis did just that, and I think it was appropriate there.
4 It would be appropriate here because of the difficult time
5 that the supervisors have had. I believe that the relief
6 requested in terms of sole custody, limits on telephone
7 visits -1 don't believe the telephone visits should be
8 monitored at this time or recorded, but that might be
9 something that would be necessary if the behavior does not
10 improve, that is the substance of the conversations. I
11 believe that the findings regarding threats of removing the
12 children from the custody of their mother or the jurisdiction
13 warrant some particular relief, and I think the findings
14 would be that there has been that kind of behavior, not only
15 in discussion with the petitioner but the children and then
16 some other suspicious behavior that we can only try to draw
17 inferences from including the mysterious passport and the
18 circumstances of June 2000 when the children were kept beyond
19 their time. And the record will reflect a year ago when we
20 addressed this issue that there was some suspicion at the
21 time that the children had been told they were going to be
22 removed from the jurisdiction and maybe their bags were
23 packed for that purpose.
24
We would want the Court to make and incorporate the
25 findings of Dr. Malovich and seal the record, in particular
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1 Dr. Malovich's report, based upon findings that the
2 respondent has a very poor understanding of his boundaries
3 and appropriate behavior when it comes to discussing the case
4 with the children and the fear is that he will discuss the
5 evaluation with the children, and particularly their comments
6 to the expert, to Dr. Malovich.
7
THE COURT: Are you suggesting that he and his
8 attorney not have a copy of it or 9
MR. GREEN: I'm suggesting that he not have a copy
10 and I have no objection to Mr. Hettinger having a copy under
11 provisions of the decree that the - except for the
12 recommendations the report not be made available directly or
13 indirectly to the respondent, either in discussion or an
14 actual copy thereof.
15
I believe the Court can make findings regarding
16 income based upon the evidence we have. And the child
17 support ought to be according to the Utah Uniform Civil
18 Liability for Support Act, and that alimony should enter in
19 the difference between the total sum testified by the
20 petitioner for her needs and those of the children, less her
21 earned income, net of taxes, and the child support that it
22 would be ordered to continue during the period equivalent to
23 that of the marriage.
24
There is I think some justifiable concern and
25 evidence that funds have been accumulated by Professor Kanth.
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1 He has made that statement to the petitioner, he has
2 indicated to others that he has acquired liquid funds that
3 could be used as a down payment. And of course, he is
4 seriously in arrears in his support payments. Those funds
5 ought to be accounted for by the respondent and divided
6 equally between the parties because they were surely earned
7 during the marriage. Otherwise, the personal property is
8 divided.
9
We've discussed the debt situation.
10
Given the financial disparity in this case, I
11 believe it would be appropriate to allocate the petitioner's
12 fees and costs in both proceedings in proportion to their
13 incomes one to another. And obviously that results in an
14 allocation weighted towards the respondent's end, but I think
15 the Court can view the file it has before it and I can
16 represent to the Court that many of the proceedings here have
17 been particularly burdensome because of the respondent's
18 appearance pro se, even when he's represented by an attorney,
19 he's still files motions and proceeds as his own counsel.
20 That many of the proceedings that we have had to address have
21 been unnecessary but was still taken very seriously by the
22 petitioner and by me and these would include not only the
23 Hague Convention case, but also the current proceedings, and
24 that the bulk of these fees, given the type of case and the
25 issues, should not have been as monumental as they have ended
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1 up being. And I think that that type of an award would
2 serve equity, not to mention meet the standard that we have
3 in Utah for an award of attorneys fees, my client's ability
4 to pay them, the reasonableness of the fees, and then the
5 respondent's ability to pay those fees. And that probably
6 about does it, I would think.
7
THE COURT: Do you have any further information on
8 fees for this Heather White? What was that about?
9
MR. GREEN: That's a good point. I did not
10 understand that we had missed that point. Snow, Christensen
11 & Martineau were co-counsel in the Hague proceeding up until
12-1 think up until just before the scheduled trial, and I
13 would ask leave to supplement the file and proffer an exhibit
14 showing those fees and that would be in the form of the
15 actual billing statement from Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
16
THE COURT: Okay, thank you, Mr. Green. Anything
17 else?
18
MR. GREEN: I believe that will do it.
19
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Green, you know, given that
20 we have this default as we do, I'm certainly going to rely on
21 you to set forth the findings that you've just indicated,
22 which I do find in each instance, finding of course that
23 there is jurisdiction and grounds; grant the decree of
24 divorce as prayed on those grounds; find, of course, that
25 it's in the best interest of the children that petitioner be
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1 awarded sole legal and physical custody with parent time and
2 visitation as set forth by Mr. Green and by the testimony
3 here today, specifically including those devices necessary to
4 ensure the concerns. I find that indeed there is a very real
5 threat based upon not only the testimony, but the review of
6 this file and the responses and lack of responses in the
7 respondent with respect to being amenable to the orders of
8 the court, and so I find that necessary.
9
And Mr. Green, you can, of course, set those forth
10 in more detail, that those precautions be set in place in
11 terms of petitioner's testimony what she desires as far as
12 notice, length and frequency of telephone contacts,
13 surrendering of passport upon his, prior to actual parent
14 time or visitation with the children and being returned to
15 him upon conclusion of visitation. In addition, incorporating
16 those visits only in Utah and with written notice as well,
17 supervised, of course, as has been indicated, including
18 specifically where the respondent would be with them, address
19 and phone number.
20
I'm going make the findings with respect to income,
21 as testimony reflects respondent's income at $71,000
22 approximately hers at $9,600 and find that alimony and child
23 support ought to be as indicated by Mr. Green in his
24 argument. You can then flesh that out, Mr. Green.
25
MR. GREEN: Uh-huh (affirmative).
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1
THE COURT: I'm rambling a bit, but I did receive
2 all the exhibits and well make those findings with respect
3 to Exhibit 18 that - or Exhibit 1, tab 18, report of Dr.
4 Malovich incorporate your request in those findings. Find
5 that as a reasonable again given his overall conduct, not
6 only as reflected by the testimony but as reflected by the
7 history of this case.
8
You should incorporate into those findings the
9 entry of judgment for past-due amounts and for the costs and
10 fees as prayed. I find them to be reasonable. This was a
11 very complicated matter in respect to the fact that the other
12 proceedings were occurring in federal court as well as the
13 defense of his request for stay in these proceedings, and
14 would allow you to supplement with respect to any further and
15 additional fees that haven't been presented here today,
16 specifically with respect to Snow, Christensen.
17
Again, Mr. Green, I'm just sort of going through
18 these very briefly on the nature of this, but assuming you
19 will incorporate the necessary language of her needs and so
20 on.
21
MR. GREEN: I will.
22
THE COURT: I don't - the word isn't guidance, Mr.
23 Green, but is there anything else you think I need to say to
24 give you guidance with what I believe ought to be in the
25 decree?
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1
MR. GREEN: We had addressed the issue of bond.
2
THE COURT: Yes, yes, I did, yes. That amount, Mr.
3 Green, I just have a question, is based upon the testimony
4 about possible money he has elsewhere, it's not - you're not
5 inclined in any way seeking that amount. I don't find
6 there's a certain amount there that I can do that, but 7
MR. GREEN: What I'm asking for in terms of the
8 bond is just enough to ensure compliance and then provide
9 finances in the case he violates the custody order. The
10 funds on hand was another issue. We're asking that he
11 account for any liquid funds and that those be divided
12 equally once he has accounted for them.
13
THE COURT: Okay. So, okay. Well, I think the
14 $50,000 bond is -1 think that's reasonable and I'll order
15 that posted as indicated to avoid a violation and find that
16 he needs to make an accounting of any funds he has on hand.
17 He has not been compliant with orders in the past in that
18 regard and he's not complied with discovery and he's not
19 submitted to his own deposition; has not submitted to an
20 evaluation, custody evaluation or psychological evaluation, so
21 I'm not certain if those have all been tied to his Hague
22 Convention claims or otherwise, but assuming that that issue
23 will be resolved fairly quickly in any event, I certainly
24 make that finding and enter that order that he account for
25 any funds on hand.
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1
To the extent I indicated no visits outside the
2 United States, no visits outside of Utah unless there's a
3 demonstrated change of circumstance, so outside of Utah.
4
Mr. Green, anything else you can think of that I
5 need to say here?
6
MR. GREEN: I think that's it.
7
THE COURT: Okay, well, I again will enter those
8 orders and make those findings based upon the testimony,
9 based upon his default, and based upon the entire file and
10 the representations of counsel here today and ask Mr. Green
11 to prepare those detailed findings in more, of course,
12 details than I stated them from here and a decree in
13 accordance with those findings.
14
MR. GREEN: I will, your Honor.
15
THE COURT: Okay, that'll be the order.
16
MR. GREEN: Thank you.
17
THE COURT: Thank you. Well be in recess.
18
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
19
20
21
22
(C)
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4
MR. GREEN: Good morning Your Honor.
5
THE COURT: Good morning. We're on the record in
6 the matter of Kanth v Kanth. This is Case #994904256. The
7 record should reflect the court is in session in chambers.
8 Present for the Petitioner is Frederick N. Green. Respondent
9 Rajani Kannepalli Kanth is appearing pro se and Akiko
10 Kawamura is appearing as Guardian ad Litem. The matter
comes
11 before the Court pursuant to objections to the commissioner's
12 recommendation, and let's see, Professor Kanth, you may
13 proceed with your arguments. Before you do that
14
MR. KANTH: I want to beg everybody's pardon. I've
15 come down with a chill. My voice is not as clear as I'd like
16 it to be.
17
THE COURT: Professor Kanth, you're going to have
18 to speak much louder though in order for this to be recorded.
19
MR. KANTH: Okay. I'm sorry, Your Honor.
20
THE COURT: Thank you.
21
MR. KANTH: I see myself, Your Honor, as a victim
22 of wrongful removal, wrongful detention and persistent and
23 chronic custodial interference and I feel it was made worse
24 by my victimization over again by the orders of the
25 commissioner which involve, as I am concerned, as I
1

1 understand it, involving gross legal improprieties and
2 (inaudible). I refer to two orders, Your Honor, one issued
3 3/27 by Commissioner Arnett essentially denying my request
4 for a stay and secondly, granting temporary custody to the
5 petitioner and the order on 8/22 signed off by Commissioner
6 Bradford which denied the continuance request from me and
7 also rejected my normal visitation rights with my own
8 children.
9
As I understand it Your Honor, these orders, these
10 two particular orders have no legal or factual basis, in fact
11 they ignore existing laws and statutes and I'd like to now
12 try to restore the statutes that have been ignored. Eight, no
13 custody arrangement can be agreed upon when the Hague
14 Convention was (inaudible) give the dates when these orders
15 were issued and I believe the State Department (inaudible).
16
Secondly17
THE COURT: Okay. Professor Kanth?
18
MR. KANTH: - the uniform child custody
19 (inaudible).
20
THE COURT: Professor Kanth before you proceed,
21 hold on here. Professor Kanth, as to the Hague Convention,
22 that issue was litigated in district court and you appealed
23 the district court's finding against you but Judge Campbell
24 was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and so
25
MR. KANTH: (inaudible) did not happen on the date

2
1 on which these orders were issued, Your Honor, that's my
2 contention that this was well before any such decision was
3 reached by the court.
4
Secondly, Your Honor, under the Uniform child
5 Custody Jurisdiction Act, especially what's called the
6 Bleeding Hands Doctrine as exemplified Crockett and
7 (inaudible) no Court is supposed to assume jurisdiction when
8 there's been a clear abduction or something equally
9 objectionable of that nature with respect to how the children
10 were taken to begin with.
11
Thirdly Your Honor, there is a (inaudible) custody
12 order which was served on the petitioner on June 9th well
13 before she filed her own papers and full faith and credit
14 needed to have been issued to that order and wasn't.
15
Fourthly Your Honor, the Utah Rules of Civil
16 Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah Code of
17 Traditional Administration, as upheld by the Utah Court of
18 Appeals, I believe consistently show that no temporary
19 custody visitation order in contested cases are possible
20 without a proper evidentiary hearing which has never been
21 conducted in this case Your Honor. The effect is ex-parte or
22 default or (inaudible).
23
Secondly Your Honor, with respect to the visitation
24 issue, this order was again issued with undue haste, indecent
25 haste because it was based on an unformed debtor statement
3

1 from a counselor written not to the court but to Counselor
2 Green essentially asking only for an evaluation, and yet it
3 was converted into an order and that too with respect to one
4 count only on both the children and this was converted again
5 into an ex-parte default order without the proper due
6 process. And I think therefore, Your Honor, these orders
7 violate basically the due process rights, if I may use that
8 phrase, both Federal and local and therefore they cannot,
9 really cannot stand if justice is to be served in this case.
10
So what I would like to ask for on that issue alone
11 is that the status quo (inaudible) be restored, that no
12 custody order be allowed to stand without proper
13 investigation, proper evaluation and proper adherence to the
14 rules that are necessary before such orders can be put into
15 place.
16
But also I'd like to add one comment here that I've
17 been denied for one reason or the other, as fully befitting
18 the actions of an abductor who is trying to protect her
19 abduction, 31 months, Your Honor, of young minor children who
20 were closely bonded to me, denied access to (inaudible)
21 continued, as I pointed out both legally and illegally and I
22 believe it's about time that these things were (inaudible)
23 sorted.
24
And lastly, Your Honor, I have mentioned and filed
25 repeatedly the chronic instability of the petitioner's to
4

1 whom this custody has been hastily sort of handed over. The
2 very fact of abduction which was increasingly recognized as a
3 tedious heinous form of child abuse and all the actions taken
4 by (inaudible) since then to coach and somehow turn these
5 children against their own father involving, and I hate to
6 say this but it's a fact, I put in an affidavit to that
7 effect, involving even things like racial stereotyping as
8 part of a a way of indoctrinating them into (inaudible)
9 singled out as a foreign, an outsider and third world
10 personality. I believe that is seriously detrimental to the
11 mental and psychic health of my children. So I believe on
12 all these grounds that I've been seriously mistreated by this
13 process and I would like some justice.
14
THE COURT: Thank you. I will hear from Mr. Green
15 next and then from the Guardian ad Litem.
16
Go ahead, Mr. Green.
17
MR. GREEN: Thank you Your Honor. The respondent
18 refers to two orders. I believe you will have in front of
19 you all the objections to Commissioner Bradford's order which
20 follows the July 31, 2000 hearing. I can address
21 Commissioner Arnett's order but I don't believe that there is
22 an objection before Your Honor as to that order. Many of the
23 arguments apply to both orders and they're the same argument
24 essentially that, because of the appeal of the district
25 court's order in the Hague proceeding that there is some sort
5

1 of a Hague convention defacto stay of proceedings and that
2 would apply to both orders and that is absolutely incorrect.
3 Once the judgment was rendered by Judge Campbell in the
4 district court, the petitioner in that case which is
5 Professor Kanth, asked for certain relief which would
6 normally be allowable under the Hague convention and Judge
7 Campbell's response was, "Now that I've made my decision, I
8 no longer have jurisdiction over this case." The appeal
9 followed. Professor Kanth then asked for a stay of
10 execution. I don't recall whether the request was made of
11 the district court but it certainly was made of the Tenth
12 Circuit Court of Appeals and it was denied.
13
There is no provision whatsoever in the Hague
14 Convention which would apply its precepts or any restriction
15 on these proceedings after the judgment is rendered by the
16 district court. That judgment dismissing the petition does
17 not depend upon the pendency of the appeal either before the
18 Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court and I understand, although
191 have not seen the petition for a writ of certiorari I
20 understand that that has been filed or will be filed. I
21 received a communication from the respondent here that that
22 had been filed. All of that makes no difference without a
23 stay and the stay was not granted so the Clean Hands Doctrine
24 Professor Kanth's concerns over the abduction, the so-called
25 prior custody order, all of that, depends upon Professor's
6

1 Kanth's success in the Hague proceeding and Judge Campbell
2 ruled against him in that case.
3
The Hague Convention essentially gives
4 jurisdictional as to the issue of where will the custody
5 proceeding take place. It does not determine custody but it
6 is jurisdictional on that point so any order, if any, that
7 was entered by any other court, any other proceeding, or any
8 attempted appeal after the termination or disbursal of the
9 Hague petition is irrelevant to these proceedings.
10
As to the argument regarding the evidentiary
11 hearing and the letter from Dr. Goldsmith, the Supreme Court
12 has ruled that it would be preferable to have evidentiary
13 hearings in these cases but they just never occur as I'm sure
14 the Court is aware. The commissioners make a certain stop
15 gap ruling that are meant to secure the status quo or make
16 certain emergency changes where that is called for. There is
17 nothing in this case that would distinguish it from many
18 others. The matter was fully heard. The matter before
19 Commissioner Arnett was heard where the respondent was
20 represented by counsel so this is not a case of surprise or
21 where a continuance should have been granted and was not. It
22 was fully briefed. The evidence was submitted on affidavit
23 and proffer and the recommendation was made and again, I
24 don't believe that, if there is an objection, I don't believe
25 that's before the Court. As to the Commissioner Bradford
7

1 hearing
2
THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. Mr. Green? Let me
3 make sure I understand. It was in the hearing before
4 Commissioner Arnett that the temporary custody order was
5 recommended?
6
MR. KANTH: That's right, Your Honor.
7
MR. GREEN: That was the first order recommending
8 temporary custody, primary physical custody in the
9 petitioner, Cory Kanth. And such visitation as the parties
10 could agree upon.
11
THE COURT: And there was no, and you're saying no
12 written objection to that recommendation and no request for
13 an evidentiary hearing following that.
14
MR. GREEN: I do not recall any such objection or
15 request, Your Honor. I could be wrong.
16
MR. KANTH: Ican17
THE COURT: Wait, Professor Kanth. I'll ask you in
18 a minute but I'm asking Mr. Green first and I would ask you,
19 Professor Kanth, not to interrupt. I'm going to be asking
20 you for response regarding these things.
21
MR. KANTH: I'm sorry. I don't know the
22 procedures, Your Honor.
23
THE COURT: All right. If you would just hold off
24 and make a note of what it is you want to say and as I said,
25 I'm going to be hearing from Mr. Green first and then the
8

1 Guardian ad Litem and then 111 come back to you and ask for
2 your response to these things.
3
MR.KANTH: Very well, Your Honor.
4
THE COURT: Go ahead Mr. Green.
5
MR. GREEN: I am looking at what appears to be
6 Volume II of my pleadings here and I do not see, let's see
7 here, there is an objection to commissioner's ruling dated
8 January 31. All I can tell you is we did not submit
9 that to Your Honor in a notice to submit. I'm sure it's been
10 responded to. I'm sure it's before the Court. I think the
11 nature of that objection, again if I'm not mistaken, if I can
12 find it rather quickly, was to the issue of Commissioner
13 Arnett having possibly represented Professor Kanth earlier
14 and then the argument that the pending appeal of the Federal
15 District Court ruling dismissing the petition somehow kept
16 the petition alive and it deprived this Court of
17 jurisdiction. Those were the two arguments. In fact, I
18 think back when I start looking at the objection now, there
19 is no comment on Commissioner Arnett's prior involvement.
20 The sole argument in the case appears to be the pendency of
21 the appeal as some basis to deny this Court jurisdiction.
22 So, I think I've addressed that point.
23
That order was entered as to custody based upon
24 stipulation again as I recall. The problem occurred in June
25 of this year when Professor Kanth was here for a visitation.
9
1 The parties had agreed that visitation would take place in
2 the presence of both parties and did, and it did day after
3 day even to the point of the parties going to California and
4 visiting Disneyland with the children together, again in
5 keeping with their agreement and the court order. That all
6 changed when Professor Kanth did not return the children
7 following a visitation the first opportunity he had to visit
8 the children unsupervised by my client. He refused to return
9 them and a restraining order was entered requiring that he do
10 so and at the same time Dr. Goldsmith sent her a letter
11 basically saying that there's something seriously wrong here
12 and recommending that before any unsupervised visitation goes
13 forward, that there be an evaluation or at least that was the
14 result of the letter in the eyes of Commissioner Bradford.
15 Commissioner Bradford interpreted not only the letter but the
16 representations by the Guardian ad Litem as to their
17 conversation that there was something wrong, that there was
18 some concern for the well being of the children and that a
19 visitation evaluation would be undertaken with the
20 cooperation of Professor Kanth and reviewed to determine
21 future visitation but in the time being it would be
22 supervised visitation.
23
Now that recommendation that Professor Kanth
24 objects to and refers to the requirement for an evidentiary
25 hearing, he suggested it that it is in essence an ex-parte
10

1 hearing and that it was entered with undue haste and perhaps

2 based upon inadmissable evidence. We've talked about the
3 evidentiary hearing. The matter was not ex-parte. The
4 respondent responded to the Order to Show Cause with his own
5 affidavit and filing. He just before the hearing requested a
6 continuance of that hearing which was not granted and the
7 matter was submitted based upon the evidence, albeit, to the
8 absence of the respondent. I believe that he was given the
9 opportunity to respond and be heard. I believe the
10 commissioner's recommendation was very appropriate based
upon
11 what the commissioner had before her at the time.
12
It is not uncommon, in fact it is very common, for
13 commissioners to act on letters from psychologists,
14 psychiatrists, and doctors provided that the letter appears
15 to be correct and it is written, signed by the doctor and on
16 their letterhead. That is the kind of letter we have here
17 from Dr. Goldsmith. It is supported by the report of the
18 Guardian ad Litem following her conversation with Dr.
19 Goldsmith suggesting that the children were in jeopardy in an
20 unsupervised situation and the court needed some further
21 input from other professionals to evaluate that situation.
22 That's where we are now and the respondent has done
23 absolutely nothing to comply with that order to initiate or
24 cooperate with a visitation evaluation which could have been
25 underway in August and could have accommodated personal
11
1 interviews and testing with the respondent as well as
2 (inaudible) that he has chosen to object to the
3 recommendation and frankly nothing has changed since
4 June until now except Dr. Goldsmith is now, has abated her
5 therapeutic role because Malini, the older daughter, has
6 refused to talk to Dr. Goldsmith because Malini is confronted
7 with her statements such as might have been reported in Dr.
8 Goldsmith's letter or in affidavits and she's confronted with
9 those statements by the respondent in telephone calls when he
10 calls them and those calls are not monitored but Malini has
11 reported to my client that she is asked why she says certain
12 things, why she told the therapist things and Dr. Goldsmith
13 finally determined that therapy was ineffective and was not
14 productive because Malini would not talk to her because she
15 felt that her confidences were being breached where the
16 respondent confronted her with those statements.
17
A similar result has occurred between Malini and
18 the school therapist who was to pick up the therapy role.
19 The main thing she is closed off, will not talk about things
20 because she's afraid that she will be confronted with her
21 statements by the respondent later on.
22
So that's the role the Hague Convention or lack of
23 any (inaudible) in this case. The two hearings won't address
24 any due process concerns other than what I've said. This
25 Court has jurisdiction over the parties. The respondent was
12

1 personably served. He was personally served after the
2 dismissal of his Hague proceeding. The special appearances
3 that he is making again make no difference. The court has
4 acted appropriately and with jurisdiction and in accord with
5 the current status of this case which is the home state, for
6 purposes of Hague jurisdiction is the United States.
7
Thank you, Your Honor.
8
THE COURT: Thank you.
9
And Ms. Kawamura?
10
MS. KAWAMURA: Thank you, Your Honor. I want to
11 mention first that I was not in attendance at that first
12 hearing before Commissioner Arnett and I think that may have
13 been before I was appointed as Guardian ad Litem so I think
14 there are a couple of issues on the table here that I'm not
15 going to address, nor is it really appropriate for me to
16 address anything about the Hague Convention.
17
I am prepared to address the objection to
18 Commissioner Bradford's ruling and as Mr. Green stated, I
19 think that's the objection that I have before me and that I'm
20 prepared to address. The way I see it, correct me if I'm
21 wrong Your Honor, but it appears to be that I think that the
22 main issue is whether there ought to be visitation
23 evaluations conducted or not and I think that there are two
24 kind of concerns of the parties, and one is this sort of
25 kidnaping concern seems to be based on my conversation with
13

1 Dr. Goldsmith and with both of the girls' teachers. There's
2 some anxiety and I don't know where it's coming from but that
3 perhaps puts the professor, they have some concern between
4 the parties that he might take the girls away from the
5 country or that the girls are concerned about this and, of
6 course, the petitioner is concerned about it and I don't know
7 who to eliminate that concern but I do think that absent
8 that, provided that we can eliminate the worry that there's
9 going to be any kidnaping, that it still is in the best
10 interest of these children to see their father. However 11 and I've been looking again at Dr. Goldsmith's letter that
12 was addressed to Commissioner Bradford's ruling and it is
13 here (inaudible) concerned about the erratic visitation
14 schedule that is necessitated by the professor being away
15 from the country and that her recommendation was that a
16 visitation evaluation be conducted in order to determine the
17 right way to address that, and I think in light of all of
18 that, it still appeared that a visitation evaluation would
19 the appropriate way to proceed.
20
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Is there
21 anything else?
22
MS. KAWAMURA: That's it for now.
23
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
24
Professor Kanth?
25
MR. KANTH: Yes Your Honor. I'd like to begin with
14

1 some of the statements made by Counsel Green. First of all
2 with respect to the continuance of the Hague Convention well
3 after an appeal has been dismissed by the Tenth Circuit
4 Court, the (inaudible) for you, Your Honor, to you directly
5 by the department. I'm in the process now of taking my
6 appeal and it's called a petition for certiorari with the
7 Supreme Court, so that's my interpretation and I can recall
8 it with the State Department tells me that my petition
9 remains active until all the legal recourses are gone. I
10 believe I'm not there yet, but that's as far as the Hague is
11 concern.
12
Moving to the second issue about Commissioner
13 Arnett's Temporary Custody Order, I believe I'm on firm,
14 solid legal grounds when I say that no Temporary Custody
15 Order, once again, I'm (inaudible) what I've said, in a
16 contested case can be (inaudible) without a proper
17 evidentiary hearing. My hands were tied given the hearing, I
18 could not participate (inaudible) and therefore the hearing
19 was never completed. Therefore, that order simply cannot be
20 enforced. If a temporary custody order does not exist, the
21 question of the visitation order simply disappears because
22 you cannot award visitations or two custodial parent, because
23 custody itself is in doubt. So I believe that that issue is
24 also mooted by the (inaudible) off that temporary custody
25 order, (inaudible)
15

1
I've again pointed out that in fact contrary to
2 what was suggested the first thing I've done upon arrival
3 here is to contact a psychologist, in fact, believe it or not
4 he is on standby. His name is Dr. Gene Hanson, his number is
5 963-4313 should the Court decide to speak to him. He's
6 available right now on the phone and willing to do all
7 that is necessary (inaudible) letter and is aware that
8 (inaudible) in this case and therefore I have done my job in
9 (inaudible).
10
But I'd like to make a larger case. The reason I
11 look out of order and all of these exist is the fact that the
12 petitioner (inaudible) violation of (inaudible) Hague
13 convention to take care of this, (inaudible) kidnapped my
14 children while I was working overseas and I am out of order.
15 I'm not here. I'm not able to see my children normally,
16 therefore, my visitation schedule has become very erratic and
171 want to inform the court and other that I did not create
18 these problems, Your Honor. These were visited upon me by
19 the actions of the irrational, obviously irrational,
20 petitioner (inaudible). In fact, (inaudible) I have no idea
21 when orders come through and I've handled all this on my own
22 because I'm nearly bankrupt. For 19 months I've (inaudible)
23 the Hague. I've hired lawyers over and over again I've paid
24 (inaudible) money. I'm only an academic. I'm not wealthy.
25 I cannot afford to do this continuously. If I have been
16

1 remise, it's only because I'm stretched to the limits of my
2 professional capacity. I'm a professor of economics. I
3 teach (inaudible) school. My work is not - and I still have
4 to deal with this stuff over and over again. I've taught
5 myself the Hague Convention. I believe I will prevail in the
6 Supreme Court but I've not been able to completely teach
7 myself the local laws that apply here. But I believe once
8 again Your Honor, that I'm on solid ground. I have done no
9 wrong but the petitioner clearly has done wrong and that she
10 should not be rewarded wrongdoing of of this nature. As I
11 see it, kidnaping is being ratified and normalized with any
12 injured parties here have the greater burden of somehow, you
13 know, justifying myself to my own children. And this is
14 (inaudible) abused and exploited and she has told me over and
15 over - she's very closely bonded with me, Your Honor, and she
16 has told me over and over again that she was brainwashed, she
17 was cajoled. In fact there's an affidavit I'm filing
18 that a jacket that was sent to her was returned and cashed
19 in, every means of depravation used so that she would say to
20 the psychologist the things that her mother wanted her to
21 say. (inaudible) to me that reason that she's refused to
22 talk to them and you can (inaudible) she's a very bright
23 child, she's precocious and she's unnaturally precocious
24 because of what they've done to her by the petitioner and I
25 mean the abduction. She would easily talk to you or the
17

1 court and explain why it is that she does not (inaudible).
2 She is quite capable of talking for herself. Again, I am the
3 prejudiced party here. My children are victims of
4 (inaudible) and I will leave no stone unturned (inaudible) no
5 matter how long it takes me and no matter what (inaudible).
6 Thank you.
7
THE COURT: Thank you. How old is Malini?
8
MR. KANTH: She's seven, Your Honor.
9
THE COURT: All right. First of all, as to
10 Commissioner Amett's recommendation, his Temporary Order
11 of Custody recommendation, to the extent that there is an
12 objection to that recommendation, based on the Hague
13 Convention that this Court does not have jurisdiction or that
14 somehow those proceedings are stayed, the objection is
15 overruled. I find that this Court has jurisdiction. The
16 issues involving the Hague Convention were litigated before
17 Judge Campbell. She dismissed the petition filed by the
18 respondent in Federal Court. These is a request to stay
19 these proceedings filed in Federal Court which the Federal
20 Court denied and so there is no jurisdiction that any Federal
21 proceeding has established it has over the party's children.
22 And it appears that this Court does have jurisdiction over
23 these children and these proceeding.
24
With regard to the concerns raised that there has
25 been no evidentiary hearing, the procedures in Utah provide
18

1 that orders of temporary custody may be recommended by the
2 commissioners based on proffers of evidence and after hearing
3 from the parties and that's what happened here. There
4 actually was no formal request for an evidentiary hearing
5 filed before me but that appears to be a concern that
6 Professor Kanth has and my practice is that in view of the
7 case law in the State of Utah, where there is a request for
8 an evidentiary hearing relating to custody only, as a result
9 of a recommendation of a commissioner I will schedule an
10 evidentiary hearing. And so I am prepared to schedule an
11 evidentiary hearing is that is what Professor Kanth is
12 requesting at this time and that would be - when I say an
13 evidentiary hearing, that can be, it can relate to temporary
14 custody of the children and it is not the final trial in the
15 case.
16
Now, I will just inform Professor Kanth and counsel
17 that another way of handling this is just proceeding with a
18 pretrial schedule and getting all the issues that are before
19 the Court lined up so that a trial can occur in this case
20 sooner rather than later. But I have no problem with setting
21a pretrial schedule in this case either but if Professor
22 Kanth wishes to have an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
23 temporary custody, then we can go ahead and schedule that as
24 soon as possible.
25
With regard to the objections to Commissioner
19

1 Bradford's recommendations, those objections are also
2 overruled. It seems to me first of all that Commissioner
3 Bradford properly denied the request for continuance.
4
And I'm hearing two things from you, Professor
5 Kanth. I'm hearing on the one hand that if things are not
6 being handled appropriately and then I hear that things are
7 being handled hastily and then what I'm hearing from you
8 Professor Kanth is you're still dealing with the Hague
9 Convention issues and what's happening in State Court is
10 trying to resolve the issues in the divorce petition and the
11 issues relating to custody and you can put your resources
12 wherever you like Processor Kanth and I'm certainly not going
13 to tell you one way or the other what you ought to do, but in
14 order to establish the contact or re-establish the contact
15 that you evidently really want with your children, then it
16 would be helpful to focus energy and resources on these
17 proceedings because that's what these proceedings are all
18 about. But I don't see that Commissioner Bradford erred in
19 any way in her recommendations. So the objections to the
20 recommendations are overruled.
21
As to the request of the Guardian Ad Litem and in
22 the concern about the children having anxiety, it seems to me
23 that an order needs to entered in this case, if it has not
24 already been entered, that neither party discuss these
25 proceedings with the children. A seven year old cannot
20

1 cogently, even the brightest seven year old really cannot
2 cogently discuss custody or visitation issues with parents
3 and I think that the parties should not be discussing these
4 proceedings with the children. I'm also concerned about the
5 allegations that this seven year old won't take advantage of
6 therapeutic assistance because of discussions she's having
7 with her father.
8
And Professor Kanth, you're telling me that you are
9 talking about these things with your daughter and so I think
10 that an order needs to entered for you not, for neither party
11 to discuss therapy with the children. In other words, except
12 to this extent, if the parties are cooperating with Dr.
13 Goldsmith and do so only as requested by Dr. Goldsmith then I
14 think that would be fine but I don't think generally, you
15 should be talking about issues that Dr. Goldsmith is trying
16 to raise with Malini if it makes her not take advantage of
17 that and it otherwise would help her.
18
I believe that the order now is for supervised
19 visitation and that seems appropriate until there's a
20 visitation evaluation initiated by Professor Kanth and
21 conducted at his expense and with his cooperation and so
22 that's the way it appears to the Court.
23
Are there any questions about the Court's ruling or
24 the reasons for it? Professor Kanth?
25
MR. KANTH: Yes, Your Honor, I would like to know
21

1 if Dr. Dave Hanson who I have mentioned as an alternate
2 psychologist may be brought into this issue of evaluation and
3 clearly Dr. Goldsmith is the one chosen by the petitioner. I
4 believe I would like to draw from my own (inaudible).
5
THE COURT: My understanding, Professor Kanth, is
6 that Dr. Goldsmith is a therapist and is not performing a
7 visitation evaluation. Is that your understanding Professor
8 Kanth?
9
MR. KANTH: (inaudible) she would be the one
10 conducting the evaluation.
11
THE COURT: Usually those people do not have dual
12 roles.
13
MR. KANTH: I see.
14
THE COURT: But that's my understanding and frankly
151 would not be in favor of a child's therapist doing an
16 evaluation because those roles are very different.
17
But Mr. Green, what is your understanding of this?
18
MR. GREEN: I believe that's exactly right. I
19 don't believe Dr. Goldsmith would want to do both and her
20 continued roles of therapist is in doubt for the reasons I
21 said. I'm happy to consider any qualified psychologist or
22 psychiatrist who might conduct a visitation evaluation,
23 however, the first time I've heard of Gene or Dean Hansen is
24 just now. I am not familiar with that psychologist. I would
25 be happy to receive curriculum vitae of Dr. Hanson and
22

1 propose, perhaps if that's not acceptable, several names of
2 therapists and evaluators that are known in the community for
3 that work, propose those to Dr. Kanth and these would be
4 people we have not had any contact with, b y the way, in this
5 case, and reach an agreement which I think is what
6 Commissioner Bradford contemplated, reach an agreement on a
7 court appointed evaluator who would conduct the evaluation
8 forthwith.
f)
T H E COURT: Okay. Ms. Kawamura?
i I!
MS. K A W A M U R A : 1 think that sounds perfectly
\ I i rasonable and I also agree that I don't think Dr. Goldsmith
1'Jwas ever a candidate for conducting the visitation
13 evaluation.
14
THE C O U R I : Okay. Professor Kanth, why don't you
15 send the curriculum vitae of Mr. Hanson or Dr. Hanson to Mr.
16 Green and to Ms. Kawamura so that they can learn about him
17 and then it would be my preference for the parties to reach
18 an agreement about who would perform the visitation
19 evaluation because I want you all to have confidence in this
20 person and there are concerns that one has about people
21 having unilateral contacts with an evaluator and so I would
22 limit your contacts with Mr. Hanson until you can all learn
23 about him and see if he is mutually agreeable and likewise,
24 as far as other people who might be considered, I would avoid
25 having unilateral contacts with them by any party until you

1 all agree on an evaluator.
2
Why don't you do this, see if you can reach an
3 agreement about an evaluator on or before two weeks from
4 today, the 20th of December. If you are unable to agree on
5 an evaluator then each party may submit the names of up to
6 three visitation evaluators to me and then I will make a
7 decision if you can't otherwise agree. It is my preference
8 that you do agree but if you can't, then by December 20th,
9 5:00 p.m. you may each submit up to three names for a
10 visitation evaluator. And this person, it will be helpful if
11 this person has experience in court as a visitation evaluator
12 so I will need more than just a name. I will need to have
13 some curriculum vitae information about each evaluator and
14 that person's experience in doing such evaluations for the
15 court
1 <>
\ l s o , let's see, Professor Kanth, do you wish to
17 have an evidentiary hearing on the issue of temporary
18 custody.
19
MR. KANTH: Your Honor, may 1 just reference back
20 to what you were saying?
21
T H E COURT: Yes.
22
MR. KANTH: Dr. Dean Hansn is available right now.
23 Would it be expedious for him to join the conveisation?
24
T H E COURT: No, it will not.
25
MR. KANTH: Okay, (inaudible).

1
THE COURT: No. Go ahead and submit his
2 information to the other parties.
3
MR.KANTH: Yes, I would like that evidentiary
4 hearing and more than that, if the temporary custody order is
5 going to stand, as I understand it from what you just said,
6 then I would like also given my charges about the incivility
7 of the petitioner, (inaudible) evaluation also (inaudible)
8 because I feel my children are at risk, Your Honor, and I
9 believe I can prove it.
10
THE COURT: All right. Then this visitation
11 evaluator should be a custody evaluator also. I think one
12 person can do both.
13
Are you all there?
14
MR. GREEN: Yes, Your Honor, I think that's right.
15
THE COURT: I don't think we should have two people
16 doing that. We'll have one person doing a visitation and
17 custody evaluation. All right.
18
As far as an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
19 temporary custody, I will schedule, this is a temporary
20 hearing. I will schedule a day for this. Each side will
21 have approximately two hours to present the evidence in
22 support of their respective positions and I'll schedule that
23 as soon as possible.
24
Professor Kanth let me tell you, I tell all people
25 who come before me who are appearing pro se that I think it's
25
1 in there best interest to be represented by counsel. You are
2 entitled certainly to represent yourself in these proceedings
3 but it is difficult and I understand this, to be become
4 familiar with all the rules of evidence and the rules of
5 procedure and such and while it sounds like you're a very
6 capable person and obviously very well read and write very
7 clearly, I'll give you the same advice, if you will, that I
8 give everybody else who appears pro se, that I think it's in
9 your best interest to retain an attorney if you can. But if,
10 you know, I cannot assist you in this case because my job is
11 to remain neutral. I can advise you about matters of
12 procedure but that's as far as I can go in terms of assisting
13 either party. So my job is to remain neutral and I just
14 wanted you to understand what my job is and the limitations
15 that I have to operate under in order to remain neutral.
16
MR. KANTH: I sincerely appreciate your (inaudible)
17 certainly will take that into consideration.
18
THE COURT: Okay.
19
MR. KANTH: I have one last question and this is
20 given the nature of my visit here, I have to be back at work
21 at Singapore (inaudible) University the first week in
22 January. I realize this will take time like all legal
23 matters here, but if there's some way on a humanistic basis,
24 some interim arrangement where I can see my children,
25 otherwise, I won't be able to come back here until next
26

1 summer. It's already two years. M\ little girl is four
2 years old. She's already spent two years of her life without
3 me. It will be another six months. I think this cruel and
4 unusual regardless of what order is in force to have the
5 separation between father and child. If there's some interim
6 way that can be worked out, I would appreciate it on behalf
7 of the children as well as myself (inaudible) notwithstanding
8 all these orders go on. Some decency especially given the
9 Christmas season and the holiday season. I'd like to be able
10 to take them to restaurants and malls and to the opera,
11 things that they absolutely don't seem to have (inaudible).
12 I really don't see why, I have done, there is no wrongdoing
13 other than to be (inaudible) my kidnaped children. It's
14 grossly unfair, Your Honor.
15
THE COURT: Professor Kanth, first we're going to
16 set this evidentiary hearing. We need to ha\ e a date for the
17 evidentiary hearing. All right.
18
COURT CLERK: We can do that on February 8th.
1(i
THE COURT: Can you be here on February 8th?
20
MR. KANTH: I can try to be here, Your Honor, and
21 if (inaudible) because again the rules in Singapore are
22 extremely strict and they're not quite as easy as back here.
23 I'm on leave without pay right now. But I will do my best to
24 be here or to make sure that I'm represented (inaudible) that
25 day.
27
1
THE COURT: Okay. The evidentiary hearing is
2 scheduled for Thursday, February 8th at 9:30 in the morning.
3 As I say, each side will have two hours so that leaves me
4 time also to assess the evidence and make a ruling in this
5 case.
6
So those are the guidelines and as far as
7 visitation, my understanding is that, well, that the order m
8 place is for supervised visitation and what are the
9 parameters of that?
10
Mr. Green, I'll hear from you lirst/
II
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, I have written at least
12 twice to Mr. Kanth with some observations, if not advice as
13 to how that can be completed. Number one, Cory, my client,
14 the mother, has provided supervision already. It is not
15 every day. It is up to a maximum per week, I can't remember,
16 four or eight hours and Cory's actually gone beyond that
17 (inaudible), she's gone beyond what's represented to Dr.
18 Kanth that she would do. I've also given Dr. Kanth the name
19 and number of Will win, the commercial supervising companv
who
20 will supervise for a fee and also provide Dr. Kanth with
21 suggestions of any other supervisor's might recommend. And
22 I've not received a response which is not particularly
23 surprising because Dr. Kanth, I'm sure, hoped to prevail in
24 these proceedings but I extend the same offer now. If he
25 wishes to nominate a supervisor, take advantage of Will win,
28

1 that would supplement supervision that Cory is providing
2 already.
3
THE COURT: All right.
4
Well, let see, Ms. Kawamura?
5
MS. KAWAMURA: I don't have any (inaudible) in the
6 matter. I think Professor Kanth is in the country and it
7 would probably be nice for him to see his girls and I think
8 that if they can arrange something that works, that's a nice
9 way to handle it.
10
THE COURT: Okay. Professor Kanth, let me say
11 this, and this applies to both parties. I believe very
12 strongly that children deserve to have a good relationship
13 with both of their parents. I also believe that it's each
14 parent's responsibility to do what he and she can to insure
15 that the children have a good relationship with the other
16 parent. But I also believe that parents cannot do things,
17 should not be able to do things that cause their children to
18 be anxious or worried either about the legal proceedings or
19 about being returned from a visitation, things of that sort.
20 The order now is for supervised visitation and that is the
21 order that will be in place. It seems to me that what has
22 been proposed, Professor Kanth, is not unreasonable. That
23 you have plenty of latitude to work within those options and
24 that you ought to do everything in your power to be able to
25 see these children as much as possible because I have no
29

1 doubt that they love you and that they need you. So, I would
2 urge you to do all of that, especially if you're about to go
3 out of the country. So, you are not powerless here. You
4 have the ability to schedule a visitation, a rather extensive
5 visitation it seems to me but it will be supervised until
6 further order of the Court. All right.
7
I believe that resolves the matters that are
8 before the Court today. I'd like Mr. Green to prepare an
9 order consistent with these rulings and I thank you all.
10
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, one other minor procedural
11 point.
12
THE COURT: What?
13
MR. GREEN: The posture of this case now is that it
14 has been pretried by Commissioner Evans. We tried to
15 schedule that pretrial around two dates or at least within
16 two months that Dr. Kanth told us he would be available and
17 in the city. Commissioner Evans position at the time of the
18 pretrial was he would consider the pretrial as being the
19 commissioner pretrial pending your ruling on this objection
20 today and I believe it was his intent not to have another
21 pretrial. Could we do that on the same day as the
22 evidentiary hearing for purposes of scheduling a trial and a
23 scheduling order?
24
THE COURT: Okay. Professor Kanth, is there any
25 objection to that?
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1
MR. KANTH: I'm not entirelv conversant with some
2 of these terms. Perhaps it might be (inaudible) to me to
3 space the two events so that in case I'm defending for mvself
4 I do have time to prepare it for what I believe to be
5 (inaudible).
6
THE COURI: Professor Kanth, are you there"/
7
MR. KANTH: I'm here. Can you hear me?
8
THF COURT: Yes. You faded away.
9
MR. KANTH: (inaudible) gap between the two
10 sessions would be appreciated at my end.
11
THE COURT: Well, actually the proposal made sense
12 to me. It alleviates a separate hearing, I mean, it avoids
13 that which is expensive to the parties if there's counsel
14 involved or inconvenience. It seems to me we can probably
lb handle - what the final pretrial conference does is I just go
16 over the issues that remain in dispute and we schedule a
17 trial date. That's essentially it so I think that it's
18 probably a good idea to go ahead and schedule the final
19 pretrial at the same time on February 8th so bring a calendar
20 with you because we may be scheduling the trial date and I'm
21 interested in getting this case, as any another case,
22 resolved as efficiently as possible especially where there
23 are young children involved and these issues, very serious
24 issues, of custody and visitation.
2*>
Now, there is one thing, and that is that this
^1

1 issue about the visitation and custody evaluator must be
2 resolved and we've got a framework in which to do that
3 because in order to keep this case moving along, we need to
4 have, as long as custody and visitation are issues, that
5 evaluator needs to be appointed. The recommendation has been
6 that Professor Kanth pay the initial expense for the
7 evaluation and I think that's probably reasonable under the
8 circumstances, however, I would modify it this way that
9 although the initial expense will be born by Professor Kanth,
10 the ultimate allocation of the cost of the evaluation is
11 something that I will reserve as a triable issue unless the
12 parties agree otherwise.
13
MR. KANTH: Your Honor, the visitation evaluation
14 we're talking about or the custody evaluation?
15
THE COURT: Both.
16
MR. KANTH: Two different evaluations'.'
17
THE COURT: Both. It will be done by the same
18 person and actually there will be some savings done to have
19 it done this way but both of those will be done as I've just
20 indicated.
21
MR KANTH: Your Honor. I would like to make onr
22 statement for the record because 1 do remain a Hague
23 petitioner notwithstanding all that has happened today.
24
THE COURT: Go ahead.
25
MR. KANTH* With respect to that I need to say that

1 as far as I'm concerned given the fact that I'm taking
2 (inaudible) to the Supreme Court it is my obligation and duty
3 to state that both the temporary custody order and the
4 temporary visitation order are really not orders that should
5 have been passed given the various arguments that I brought
6 forward, especially given the (inaudible) Hague Convention,
7 the (inaudible) custody order and, of course, the Utah Rules
8 of Civil Procedure. I can make that statement only for the
9 record (inaudible) myself given the (inaudible) Supreme Court
10 denies the issue (inaudible).
11
THE COURT: The issues are preserved. They were
12 preserved even though you didn't make that last statement but
13 certainly they are preserved in the record. Very well. That
14 concludes the hearing for today. Are there any questions?
15
MR. GREEN: No Your Honor. Thank you.
16
MR.KANTH: Thank you, Your Honor.
17
MS.KAWAMURA: Thank you, Your Honor.
18
THE COURT: All right. Good day.
19
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
20
21
22
23
24
25
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SAL1 LAKE COUNTY, UI AIL FEBRUARY 8, 2001
2
HONORABLE JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO
3
PROCEEDINGS
4
THE COURT: This is the case of Kanth \ s. Kanth and
5 this is an evidentiary hearing and pretrial.
6
MR. GREEN: Fred Green appearing for the
7 Petitioner, Your Honor.
S
KIR. HETTINGER: Russ Hettinger appearing for the
9 Respondent.
10
MS. KAWAMURA: Akiko Kawamura, Guardian Ad Litem.
11
MR. GREEN: You are correct, Your Honor, that is
12 the purpose of the hearing today, an evidentiary hearing at
13 the behest of the respondent, Professor Kanth. The Court
14 also ordered a scheduling conference today at the same time
15 because of the length of time this case has been pending. By
Id \\ ay of procedure, it may be appropriate to consider
17 Professor's Kanth motion to continue this hearing. He had
18 earlier made that motion and I responded. I understood that
19 his motion to continue pro se, was denied. If I'm not
20 mistaken he has now retained counsel who is here renewing
21 that motion.
22
MR. HETTINGER: Yes, Your Honor. May I speak to
23 that? It is my understanding that Professor Kanth who
24 resides in Singapore has been proceeding in this case since
25 the early stages as a pro se litigant and it is also m>
1
1 understanding that he did file a motion for a continuance of
2 this hearing based on his unavailability and based on the
3 custody evaluation which apparently was discussed at a
4 previous hearing, having not been initiated and/or completed.
5 1 believe it has not even been initiated at this point
6
He contacted me first about this particular case in
7 December while he as here. He asked me in a consultation to
8 explain to him a couple of rules of procedure and we
9 exchanged some telephone calls and communications on ilial I ml
1U a I that point in time he did not retain me to act as his
11 counsel. He again attempted to contact me on January 31 with
12 regard to appearing on his behalf in a hearing that was
13 scheduled in this case on an Order to Show Cause. I was in a
14 trial in Davis County on the 31st of January and February 1,
15 was unavailable and then immediately after that left the
16 state for a brief family trip to Nevada from which I returned
] 7 on the 5th. So on the 6th we had an exchange of communication
1S and 1 was retained to represent him in this matter. So the
19 motion that was filed yesterday and 1 hope the courtesy
20 copies of my motion and my affidavit made it to you. I
21 delivered them for Judge Stirba and in that I simply set
22 forth, based on having just been retained, I'm not in a
23 position to present any kind of evidence, witnesses,
24 documents, whatever, or meaningfully cross examine any
25 witnesses in an evidentiary hearing and ask that based on
2

1 that, the evidentiary hearing be continued.
2
Now, I'm not coming into the case nor is Dr. Kanth
3 at this point in time seeking any undo delays in the case, so
4 in terms of setting up a schedule for hopefully a re5 scheduled date for an evidentiary hearing, and a final trial
6 date, discovery cutoff and all of those types of things, I'm
7 happy to participate in that process today and get that set
8 and I have some information from Dr. Kanth with regard to
9 when he would be available to travel back to the United
10 States from Singapore.
11
So my request to you is that the evidentiary
12 hearing that's scheduled for today, be continued to another
13 date. That the pretrial portion of today's proceeding go
14 forward and dates be set for this matter to be moved to final
15 resolution.
16
I believe the posture of the case also is that
17 there is a request for appointment of a custody evaluator and
18 in the process of the pretrial, I think it would be
19 appropriate for that to be resolved and for that to be able
20 to move forward so the matter can be concluded. So that's
21 what we would request from the Court today.
22
MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to
23 ask for a little indulgence, Your Honor, because the matter
24 is a little more complicated than Mr. Hettinger has
25 indicated, maybe due to Mr. Hettinger's recent involvement in
3
1 this aspect of the case. There are actually two components
2 to this case. The divorce coincides with a Hague Convention
3 proceeding which has been pending until recently in the
4 federal courts. That matter was initiated by Professor Kanth
5 and it was determined some 14 or so months ago, that his
6 petition to establish Australia as the home state of the
7 children, was denied. He appealed that case to the Tenth
8 Circuit and Tina Campbell, Judge Campbell's order was
9 sustained, his appeal was denied. He has appealed it to the
10 Supreme Court but due to procedural errors, his petition for
11 a writ of certiorari was sent back to him so it was never
12 lodged or logged into the docket by the court and I believe
13 that case is finally done.
14
I know the Court has had the file and perhaps has
15 got a little flavor of what the Professor's position is in
16 this case but it generally relates to his complaints about
17 separation and the fact that he felt that the Australian
18 Courts should be the courts of home state jurisdiction for
19 purposes of custody and it's more or less an extension of his
20 position in that federal court case and on appeal. I believe
21 that matter is done.
22
In June, 1999 this action was filed in the District
23 Court for divorce. Approximately one year ago, February or
24 late January of last year, 2000, while Professor Kanth was
25 represented by counsel, Lisa Jones, a very competent counsel
4

1 111 her own right, the matter came to court and it was
2 resolved, the temporary order was resolved at a temporary
3 hearing before the commissioner, including partial
4 stipulations and some rulings by the commissioner. Shortly
5 after that ruling, the counsel for the respondent withdrew.
6 Since that time, Professor Kanth of his own choice has been
7 pro se and representing himself.
8
I need to back up just a minute and explain that
9 what is happening in this case is the exact same thing and
10 the exact behaviors that Professor Kanth attempted in the
11 Federal Court. In the Federal Court case at the time first
1J set for the trial of the Hague Petition, Professor Kanth
13 hired two lawyers, a Salt Lake attorney and a California
14 expert in the Hague Convention proceedings. He did not,
15 Professor Kanth, did not show up for the trial in front of
16 Judge Campbell. Rather the matter was settled on authority
17 conveyed to his attorneys. Not two weeks had passed before
18 Professor Kanth had fired his two attorneys, reported them to
19 their respective bar associations, rescinded the settlement
20 agreement and commenced to represent himself pro se in thai
21 case. The same thing proceeded there. We would set
22 deposition dates and he would not appear. We would set
23 deposition dates, he would ask for relief. We would set
24 trial dates, subsequent trial dates after Judge Campbell
25 allowed him to rescind the settlement agreement.
5
1 Parenthetically 1 want to add that settlement agreement would
2 have resolved all of the issues in this divorce case as well,
3 not only the Hague Convention proceedings. And ultimately a
4 trial was scheduled in that case only to have Professor Kanth
5 at the eleventh hour, move the court to continue that trial
6 for what, lack of counsel and because he could not appear.
7 As it turned out he was in Salt Lake and he formally and in
8 writing waived his right to appearance at the trial so Judge
9 Campbell ruled on the record as it was before her at the
10 time
11
In all of the hearings we've had m this case and 1
12 won't even try to put a number to them, Professor Kanth has
13 appeared at one hearing in the Federal Court at a motion that
14 he had to appear on to rescind his settlement agreement.
15 Every other hearing, every other procedure except that
16 hearing in front of Judge Campbell, and Professor Kanth's
17 deposition in that case, he has not appeared. That includes
18 a pretrial in this case, the divorce case that we scheduled
19 and re-scheduled at the request of Professor Kanth. He did
20 not appear at that either and that is why before you is a
21 motion to enter Professor's Kanth's default as to this
22 divorce case so that the matter might become final.
23
In any case, moving back to this matter, he was
24 represented by Lisa Jones up until a year ago. He's been pro
25 se ever since that time but in candor, counsel appearing
6

1 today on behalf of Professor Kanth has acknowledged to me
2 that he has been in contact with Professor Kanth I believe
3 since last June on this matter procedurally and on the
4 appellate matter before the Federal Court. Counsel can
5 correct me if I'm wrong. And we know this is the case at
6 least as of December because my client happened to be at
7 Professor's Kanth's residence in Salt Lake in order to
8 facilitate visitation when she overheard a telephone call
9 from counsel to Professor Kanth in December saying I got your
10 call, I'm returning your call, so we know that there was
11 contact. Everything counsel is saying may indeed be true.
12 He may have been retained just several weeks ago or last week
13 or Monday or whatever it was but all it took for him to be
14 retained in this case was a simple request by Professor Kanth
15 for representation. Apparently that request was never made
16 and apparently counsel has been advising him as to certain
17 matters in this case on a basis that did not require his
18 appearance of record.
19
The inference that can be drawn from that is that
20 Professor Kanth is doing the same thing in this case that he
21 did in the Federal Court case. He is playing this out right
22 up until the eleventh hour on the dates of hearings when he
23 knows that true prejudice could be worked on him and at the
24 very last minute he is saying, go in there, throw up this
25 defense, delay these proceedings and my goal, Professor
7
1 Kanth's goal will be accomplished which is further delay and
2 further expense.
3
In this divorce case, I first tried to take
4 Professor Kanth's deposition by way of a notice filed in June
5 or July of last year. He did not appear for his deposition
6 which was scheduled for July. We had a hearing to compel
7 that. We scheduled a pretrial and at that time we agreed to
8 postpone the pretrial before the commissioner in order to
9 accommodate Professor Kanth's schedule. He told us when he
10 would be in town or could be available and that was October
11 as I recall. We'd had an earlier date. We put it off, pure
12 concession, pure courtesy extended to Professor Kanth. At
13 that pretrial Professor Kanth did not appear. It goes
14 without saying he didn't appear at his deposition.
15 Furthermore, he has not answered the discovery which is
16 outstanding in the case.
17
After the failure to appear at the commissioner's
18 pretrial in October, Commissioner Evans, I believe it was at
19 that time, we're down to one commissioner in this case. One
20 commissioner I think recused himself because of the conflict.
21 Commissioner Bradford heard this matter only to find that
22 Professor Kanth has lodged a commissioner's conduct complaint
23 against her so she removed herself and we're now down to
24 Commissioner Evans. He did not enter his default but reserved
25 that issue for later determination and now we have raised
8

1 that issue and the hearing was held last week and
2 Commissioner Evans has referred that issue to this court, the
3 issue of Professor Kanth's default in those proceedings and
4 the remedy of striking his pleading so that this matter might
5 be brought to a conclusion. He didn't show up at the
6 pretrial. We've attempted to take his deposition again and
7 he did not appear, but in December when we sent out the most
8 recent notice of deposition he called me to tell me, or
9 wrote, to say that he could not appear on the date scheduled
10 because he was working on his Supreme Court petition. 1
1 MTeed with him to continue the deposition date once again.
i. 1 his would have been early January of this year. He did not
13 appear, instead he sent me a communication saying, I can't
14 appear after all and I don't have an attorney. This was more
15 than a month ago.
16
And so we have the unusual experience of a part\
17 whose saying that this matter should be continued because he
18 doesn't have an attorney that he's been talking to for more
19 than half of a year and he's had more than a year to find
20 successor counsel. By all rights, Your Honor, this matter
21 ought to be concluded today once and for all because
22 Professor Kanth isn't here, all be it, he is represented by
23 counsel today, not because of today's default but because of
24 his default at the pretrial hearing before Commissioner
25 Evans. His default should be entered and his responsive
9

1 pleadings removed from the record and default judgment
2 entered in favor of my client and we so move the Court.
3
Now, it's always a balance in these cases between
4 due process and expediency but we have a case now that is
5 coming on 20 months before the Court and 20 months into this
6 case Professor Kanth now comes before the Court and says one
7 more delay and this isn't a delay of any final proceeding.
8 This evidentiary hearing was scheduled before the Court
f
) 11 day, was scheduled at the request of Professor Kanth. 1
in Mill don't know what he wants to do at an evidentiary
1 I 11 i i ni i ig because there are no pleadings whatsoever which would
1 11 auk any issues for this Court.
13
Procedurally, a year ago. a stipulation was reached
14 to confer temporary physical custody on my client provided
15 that Professor Kanth had the opportunity to raise any
16 objections he had and the court would entertain those
17 objections. Now, J would submit, Your Honor, that he has not
18 raised any objections. He did object to the several orders
19 of the commissioners and Judge Stirba denied those objections
20 during a telephone hearing, I believe early in January.
21 Since then there has been no new objections filed by
22 Professor Kanth, rather there was some vague request that he
23 made during that telephone conference to have an evidentiary
24 hearing today, apparently to address whatever remaining
25 objections he might have to the temporary orders of this
10

1 court. I would submit, Your Honor, that we all are here
2 today because of that vague request Professor Kanth
3 scheduled this. He was in the telephone conference, I was a
4 party, the Guardian Ad Litem was a party. We scheduled this
5 today at his convenience with the assurance that he would be
6 here. There was never any mention of any delay necessitated
7 because of his fruitless search for counsel. In fact there
8 was no mention that he had been talking to counsel for six
9 months or more in the divorce case.
10
If the Court is disinclined to enter Professor
11 Kanth's default today, and I would understand that although I
12 truly think this is a case where it ought to be done and my
13 motion remains, I would ask the Court to consider not only
14 the facts that I have indicated but these as well, Professor
15 Kanth does not appear here through counsel with clean hands.
16 He is more than $30,000 in arrears, child support and alimony
17 under the temporary order of the court. He has defaulted in
18 every procedural step of these proceedings including
19 discovery and the commissioner's pretrial. He has had a year
20 to secure counsel and has been talking to counsel who appears
21 here today and could have retained counsel to represent him
22 in this matter.
23
The commissioner has reserved contempt sanctions on
24 two separate occasions now against Professor Kanth.
25 Professor Kanth has been the subject of a restraining order
11
1 when he unilaterally violated the temporary order of the
2 court and took physical custody of the children beyond the
3 parties agreement. This occurred in June of last year.
4 Perhaps most important is the fact that the children in this
5 case are paying the highest price. I will leave that to the
6 Guardian to explain in greater detail but the lack of
7 finality in this case has not been lost on the children
8 although they are not exposed directly to the case by my
9 client, they are by Professor Kanth, hence the more recent
10 order in this case restraining the parties and that is simply
11 a nice way of restraining Professor Kanth from any further
12 behavior like he has engaged in exposing the children to
13 these proceedings. They are exposed. They know it's not
14 done. They know that daddy keeps calling them and saying
15 you'll be in my custody soon. When I have you we'll go to
16 Singapore, we'll go to India and so forth. This is a case
17 that cries out for some finality.
18
Therefore, again, if the Court is disinclined to
19 enter the default of Professor Kanth today, I would ask that
20 we have a scheduling order cutting off all discovery by May
21 15th, that would be all written discovery and all
22 depositions. I would ask that the Court set a one, and at
23 the outside, two-day trial for some time in June of this year
24 which is more than sufficient time for this case to be
25 prepared for trial.
12

1
I would ask that the Court appoint a custody
2 evaluator today. I have been in touch with four custody
3 evaluators not in this case, but in another case, all of whom
4 as of three weeks ago, could have commenced an evaluation
5 within a week, three psychologists and one very well known
6 social worker. I'd ask that the evaluator be appointed
7 today, that counsel elect one of those four, that Professor
8 Kanth be ordered to pay for that evaluation because of his
9 delinquency under the temporary order and because the court
10 has previously ordered Professor Kanth to pay for a
11 visitation evaluation which he has not done. We haven't
12 agreed on anybody so there's nobody to pay yet.
13
First of all I would recommend Dr. Quackenbush and
141 believe it is Susan Quackenbush. She is a psychologist, a
15 child psychologist who has been conducting evaluations now
16 for about six months, highly recommended by Dr. Valerie Hale
17 among others. Second, Heather Walker, Dr. Heather Walker,
18 psychologist, more experience than Dr. Quakenbush, an
19 associate of Valerie Hale whom I'm very certain we're well
20 acquainted with here. Kim Peterson is a social worker, again
21 with 25 to 30 years experience in doing custody evaluations
22 who could begin on this case and would be done by June and
23 I'm forgetting the fourth name, I forgot it yesterday and I
24 remembered it on my way to work today and I will remember it
25 before we're done here. It's another psychologist who could
13

1 begin with some dispatch again and be done by June.
2
I'm asking that the respondent make contact with
3 the evaluators, make arrangements or pay the evaluators
4 according to their demands within 14 days or have his
5 responsive pleadings removed from the record and enter his
6 default. The Professor has 47 days of official leave from
7 his teaching duties in Singapore. Last year, at least up
8 until the Fall, he would visit the states about once a month.
9 There's no reason be can't do that now. He has always been
10 able to come here at his whim, either because of the official
11 leave of absence rules that they have or because of hardship
12 applications that he makes with the various teaching
13 institutions that he's been involved with in the last two
14 years and there are three of them. At any given time,
15 Professor Kanth has been employed at one and maybe two
16 institutions. The left hand doesn't know what the right hand
17 is doing because he claims hardship due to the divorce and
18 the Federal Court proceedings, so there should be no reason
19 that Professor Kanth can't accomplish what he needs to do
20 between now and June and the discovery cutoff by May 15
21 because he has the opportunity to come here and take care of
22 that.
23
I would ask the Court to declare that the
24 respondent has forfeited his rights to an evidentiary hearing
25 today. If the respondent feels that he must address any
14

1 latent objections to the commissioner's recommendations that
2 have not already been overruled by Judge Stirba, then I would
3 ask that he bring them anew and do this in the proper way.
4 Let us know what his issues are, frame the issues with an
5 appropriate objection and affidavits and a memorandum and if
6 these matters are new matters, then I would ask that they be
7 heard by the commissioner as they should have been in the
8 first place. Today is the day for this hearing and the fact
9 that he is not here and the fact that he has acted
10 irresponsibly in retaining counsel should not be visited upon
11 me, my client, the Guardian and her clients.
12
So, again we as for a default ruling and barring
13 that, a very definitive scheduling order as I have outlined 14 and that name almost came to me for the evaluator but I'll
15 think of it - and some finality and some light at the end of
16 the tunnel for this case which I can only stress one more
17 time is something desperately needed by my client.
18
Thank you Your Honor.
19
I believe the Guardian may have something to say.
20
MS. KAWAMURA: I do have some testimony to proffer
21 regarding custody and the children if Your Honor will allow
22 it (inaudible).
23
MR. GREEN: I assume that would go to the
24 evidentiary part of the hearing of that.
25
MS. KAWAMURA: To some extent.
15
1
MR. GREEN: I simply observed that as a matter of a
2 courtesy because she is here representing the parties and if
3 she had anything to say on the motion to continue it was
4 simply my suggestion that that invitation be extended to her.
5
MR. HETTINGER: That is why I look to her to defer
6 for her opportunity, Your Honor. She indicated that I should
7 go ahead so let me respond to the statements by Mr. Green.
8
First of all, let me repeat and clarify for the
9 Court with regard to my participation. Mr. Green's statement
10 about that is inconsistent with the facts and inconsistent
11 with what I told him before the hearing. It is true that in
12 June I was contacted by Dr. Kanth who is an individual that I
13 represented several years ago in a prior divorce proceeding.
14 His contact with me at that time was exclusively with
15 reference to the Federal Court appeals which were proceeding
16 relating to the Federal Court proceeding which Mr. Green
17 described and my involvement was simply to consult on
18 procedure and formatting for briefs and in content of briefs
19 rather than the substantive side of the case although there
20 was discussion with me with regard to the substantive side of
21 the Federal Court case.
22
In connection with his consultations which were
23 fairly brief, I did not ever even go to the Federal Court and
24 look at the file which I would have done if I was involved in
25 a substitive way. It was simply to assist him in
16

1 understanding the rules of appellate procedure and what his
2 options would be with regard to possible rulings that may be
3 made by the Tenth Circuit and then once a ruling was entered,
4 what his options were after that, and I have also consulted
5 with him with regard to procedure and format for his writ of
6 certiorari to the Supreme Court. It may be true as Mr. Green
7 indicates that that has been finally denied and over. I'm
8 not aware of that because I've never made an appearance in
9 the case and Dr. Kanth has not indicated that to me, but in
10 any event, my understanding is that he is still attempting to
11 have a writ of certiorari considered by the Supreme Court.
12
With regard to this proceeding, I did not have any
13 discussion with him other than that there was a state ourt
14 case until December of this year. In December, while he was
15 here, he did call me and on one occasion came to my office
16 and again, that consultation was procedural rather than
17 substantive to help him understand the Utah Rules of
18 Procedure and what alternatives might exist in light of
19 rulings that had been made or might be made by the court.
20 Again, because I was not consulted with regard to substantive
21 issues, I did not even come to the court and look at the file
22 except for one occasion and that was for the limited purpose
23 of indicating to him whether or not a ruling had been made of
24 record with the court as of that point in time.
25
So as far as my involvement goes, I am obviously at
17
1 a disadvantage to Mr. Green with regard to what he has
2 indicated about the events that have occurred in both cases.
3 I have not been involved as counsel. I have not been
4 involved in any substantive way in discussions with Dr. Kanth
5 about the case until this week. As a result, I can't, you
6 know, say whether or not Mr. Green's recitation of the course
7 of those cases is accurate or not.
8
What I do know is that this hearing today to the
9 best of my knowledge was not set or noticed for consideration
10 of the entry of a default judgment against Dr. Kanth. It's
11 my understanding that there was an Order to Show Cause
12 hearing before Commissioner Evans last week and that there
13 was a recommendation, although after reviewing the minutes,
14 I'm a little uncertain as to exactly those proceedings but
15 apparently there was a recommendation that the issue of Dr.
16 Kanth's default for the entire case be considered by the
17 trial judge. However, Dr. Kanth, under the Utah Rules of
18 Judicial Procedure has ten days from the date of that hearing
19 within which to file an objection and to have a hearing today
20 on the entry of his default as recommended by Commissioner
21 Evans would eliminate that right under the Rules of Procedure
22 to object to that recommendation and have the Court consider
23 it within that framework. And so it would be completely
24 inappropriate Your Honor that a default judgment be entered
25 against Dr. Kanth today.
18

1
Now, I would just note that this is obviously a
2 case that has a lengthy history and although I'm not
3 completely sure what the issues are as I stand before you
4 today, I do know that the law in the State of Utah does not
5 favor the entry of final judgments based on default and I
6 know that's particularly true in a custody case and so I
7 think it's appropriate that the Court not consider a default
8 judgment against Dr. Kanth today; that he be given his right
9 to file an objection if that's his choice and that that be
10 done as Mr. Greene says, according to the rule implemented
11 procedures and that we consider the entry of his default, if
12 that's the way the case is going to be, under those rules and
13 in a way that accords him appropriate due process which I
14 think considering it today would not, given the fact that the
15 recommendation was made just seven days ago.
16
With regard to the rest of what Mr. Green has
17 indicated, again, I don't have facts in my knowledge to say
18 whether it's accurate one way or the other. He went through
19 a litany of things which he argued suggest that there's no
20 clean hands on the part of Dr. Kanth and I don't know whether
21 that's accurate or not. But with regard to his proposal that
22 in the event there is a continuance of matters today,
23 basically his proposal is in accord with what Dr. Kanth has
24 indicated he would want to and be willing and able to do. We
25 would request that the discovery cutoff be made the 31st
19
1 rather than May 15th as proposed by Mr. Green. I don't know
2 that I can indicate to the Court whether or not a two-day
3 trial would be adequate but I'll defer to Mr. Green on that.
4 He has a great amount of experience and a good sense for
5 those kinds of things, and so I assume a two-day trial would
6 be sufficient. For Dr. Kanth's schedule with his teaching
7 responsibilities in Singapore, he's a professor at a
8 university there, it would be best if the trial could be
9 scheduled toward the end of June.
10
And with regard to the custody evaluators I'm not
11 familiar with the first two identified by Mr. Green. I am
12 familiar with Kim Peterson and have had excellent experience
13 with him. However, there may be some benefit from having a
14 licensed psychologist to help in this matter and I guess what
15 I would request is that I be given through Friday to submit
16 three names on behalf of Dr. Kanth, and then the Court choose
17 from among those six names. If we don't submit any then
18 obviously one of the names identified by Mr. Green would be
19 selected. I think under all the circumstances that that
20 would be, it would be appropriate to appoint an evaluator,
21 the identify of which should be made or determined after we
22 have an opportunity to submit some names ourselves.
23
With regard to payment arrangements with regard to
24 the evaluator I believe it would be appropriate for Dr. Kanth
25 to simply have the responsibility of making payment to the
20

1 evaluator as required under the terms of any agreement he may
2 enter into for payment with the evaluator and I'm not sure
3 what that requirement would be. Some of them require the
4 entire fee up front, some of them require it to be paid in
5 stages and so whatever that requirement is by the appointed
6 evaluator, I think the order ought to require him to pay in
7 accord with that agreement.
8
And so we basically are very close in terms of what
9 we would like to see in terms of the scheduling order and
10 there are some limitations on Dr. Kanth's availability to
11 return to the United States due to his teaching
12 responsibilities but I believe, based on my conversation with
13 him on the 6th, he has the ability to be here once in April
14 when his deposition could be taken and once again in June for
15 a trial and so we would request that that structure be
16 implemented as part of the pretrial order.
17
Thank you, Your Honor.
18
MR. GREEN: Brief response Your Honor. I hope
19 counsel has not taken offense at anything I've said. It's
20 not intended to be that way but what we know is Professor
21 Kanth contacted this attorney in June. He at least talked to
22 him about this case, the divorce case in December and all he
23 had to do was say, will you be my attorney? What does it
24 take? Mr. Hettinger was more than happy to represent him,
25 I'm sure, just like he is now. So any disadvantage or any
21
1 problem that we have today became of the late appearance of
2 counsel, is a problem of Professor Kanth's own making. Now
3 it's not Mr. Hettinger's job to volunteer but it was
4 Professor Kanth's job to get an attorney and not wait until
5 the last minute because I don't believe that he is being
6 genuine and sincere when he suggests that he did all he could
7 to get an attorney and this matter today and this whole case
8 should be delayed because he did not.
9
As to the default, the matter was reserved based
10 upon the failure of Dr. Kanth to appear at the pretrial. I
11 brought that up by way of motion in order to show cause which
12 was heard last week. What is Professor Kanth going to do by
13 way of objection to the recommendation of Commissioner Evans
14 that that issue be deferred to this court for consideration?
15 Is he going to object to that? Is he going to object to the
16 matter and say that it shouldn't have been referred to this
17 court? It should have been decided by Commissioner Evans?
18 He has no remedy. And additionally the Rules of Judicial
19 Administration clearly state that an order of a commissioner
20 is the order until it is changed, if it is changed by the
21 court. Otherwise, nobody would pay any support in the
22 meantime when there's an objection pending.
23
I suppose that it's entirely within the discretion
24 of the Court to reserve that issue. To say we'll leave it
25 pending until we see if Professor Kanth complies with the
22

1 order of this court and say if he doesn't then his default
2 will be entered and that might be one rational response to
3 this problem although the Court can sense the outrage that my
4 client and frankly I share, having been run around in this
5 case for almost two years. I don't believe that Professor
6 Kanth is in any position to ask for any further delay of this
7 matter. You'll notice that counsel has not suggested there
8 is any reason to believe that Professor Kanth is not more
9 than $30,000 in arrears. You know that hearing last week,
10 raised all those issues, they were properly framed and
11 presented to the court and Professor Kanth responded to the
12 Order to Show Cause in writing but he never at any time
13 disputed that claim that he was that far in arrears, that he
14 had the ability to pay it. He is earning more than $5,000 a
15 month in Singapore. I have asked for the detail. I've asked
16 for the evidence. I've asked to depose Professor Kanth. He
17 won't give me any of that. We alleged that he had the ability
18 to pay. We alleged he was in arrears and he didn't dispute
19 any of that so a judgment was entered last week.
20
In the face of that, in the face of the kind of
21 delay we have suffered through here, I would ask the Court
22 not to extend the cutoff to May 31st. If we're looking for a
23 trial in June that does not give us enough time to deal with
24 any problems that come up and still hold onto that trial date
25 in June. Professor Kanth can be here more or less when he
23
1 wishes. He has 47 days. He has claimed hardship in the
2 past. He will have extend himself a little bit. He might
3 inconvenience himself a little bit, for a change, rather than
4 the court and the other parties and I would ask that the
5 Court abide by those cutoffs that I have suggested, the
6 cutoff of May 16th as to - and that means answer to
7 interrogatories and requests for production.
8
The last name that I was thinking of is Natalie
9 Malovich, a psychologist. What I don't want to get here,
10 Your Honor, a situation where Professor Kanth comes up with
11 names that nobody has ever heard of and are not available to
12 start and finish in time. There are a lot of evaluators that
13 1 might pick that would be four or more months out before
14 they could start and that will not work in this case. These
15 people can start. These people can finish in time for a June
16 date and if counsel needs a day or two to investigate and
17 select one of them, surely he can select one from the four
18 and if the Court does allow Professor Kanth yet another delay
19 to nominate names, I would ask that they be limited to those
20 that are certified as ready to start and ready to finish in
21 time to accommodate our expectations in this case.
22
My experience with Kim Peterson, is even though
23 he's a social worker, he performs an excellent evaluation and
24 the fact that he cannot administer some psychological tests
25 is no limitation. He hires others that do. They evaluate to
24

1 the extent they need and he takes their evaluations. It's a
2 common procedure and I would suggest that while we're here
3 today, the way to expedite this is select one of those names,
4 if its Kim Peterson, that's fine, let's get going and I'm
5 asking also that when I prepare the order, if the Court
6 permits that, that I be instructed to include language that
7 indicates that any further delay default, any further
8 disobedience on the part of Professor Kanth be considered a
9 default and that the court will, at least on motion, not only
10 consider but award the remedy of default.
11
Does the Court have any questions for me?
12
THE COURT: Not at this time. I think I'll hear
13 form the Guardian Ad Litem.
14
MS. KAWAMURA: I don't have anything to say that
15 goes directly to the Motion to Continue but to the extent of
16 the custody of the girls is at issue and is part of the
17 request for a default, I think I might have (inaudible) that
18 will help the Court. I was appointed to this case in about
19 August or September or last year, I believe, at the behest of
20 the respondent, correct me if I'm wrong and there were some
21 allegations of abuse made by the respondent at that time.
22 There are two little girls, they are living with their mother
23 at the maternal grandparents home. They have been there
24 since about March of f99.
25
Is that correct?
25
1
Almost two years. I have found no evidence of
2 abuse and have visited the girls at their home twice. My
3 first visit I was there for about an hour and a half and also
4 spoke to their mother and the maternal grandmother. The
5 second time I was there for about two hours and just spent
6 time with the girls. It appears to me to be a stable and
7 happy home. They have a good relationship with their family,
8 their immediate family as well as their extended family.
9 They have cousins that they speak of often.
10
Although I'm not an expert in that regard, I have
11 also spoken to their teachers, both of their teachers who say
12 that they're doing well in school. The younger daughter is
13 at Challenger. Both of her teachers say that she's bright
14 and intelligent and is doing well and is ahead of her age
15 ability in some respects. The older daughter is also
16 excelling in school. She's ahead of her grade level in math
17 and in some reading. It appears that they both have a good
18 group of friends and have established a peer group there.
19
The pediatrician whose name is Dr. Metcalf, Tom
20 Metcalf, I spoke to him and asked him about the allegations
21 of abuse and if you'd allow me to proffer his testimony, he
22 has represented that there is absolutely no evidence of
23 physical abuse. He does think that the girls, particularly
24 the older daughter, I think he's only been seeing the older
25 daughter, but she does have some symptoms of stress and some
26

1 emotional problems that he thinks are attributed to the
2 stress of having this divorce go on for so long. He did
3 indicate that the pendency of this has caused her to have
4 some headaches and some stomach problems and other physical
5 symptoms that he thinks are stress related.
6
And there's also a therapist who is treating the
7 older daughter. Her name is Denise Goldsmith, and I have not
8 been able to speak to her recently. She has told me she's
9 reluctant to have me proffer anything that she has to say at
10 this time based on her concerns about patient confidentiality
11 but she did confirm that she doesn't think there's any abuse
12 going on.
13
So, basically I have no reason to believe that
14 there's a problem with the status quo. I think that the two
15 years that the girls have been here, they seem to be doing
16 well.
17
As far as, just very briefly, the custody
18 evaluators that have been suggested by petitioner's
19 respondent, I'm familiar with Deborah, I think it's Deborah
20 Quackenbush and Heather Walker by name and I have no
21 objection to any of the names that he's suggested.
22
And I would also like to briefly, I think there is
23 an issue about whether there is a problem with visitation
24 over the holidays when the Professor was here from Singapore.
25 I don't think there's any evidence that visitation was being
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1 withheld. The petitioner herself has given me her records of
2 telephonic visitation and it appears - and I also requested
3 those from respondent and did not receive any - it appears
4 the girls have been able to speak to their father almost
5 daily on the telephone and the girls also indicated that to
6 me themselves. They may be a little young to be able to
7 understand what it means to be able to talk to their father
8 every day. It appears that the respondent has not been
9 denied telephonic visitation.
10
And as far as supervised visitation over the
11 holidays, there was an order for supervised visitation. I
12 believe that both parties suggested supervisors, petitioner
13 supervised some of the visits herself and when that turned
14 out not to be working, there was some names suggested. The
15 last thing that happened was petitioner's counsel suggested
16 Willwin supervise and I think that the respondent did follow
17 up on that based on my conversation with the clinical
18 director over at Willwin whose name is Margaret. She told me
19 she did speak to the respondent. She did say that Willwin
20 was available to supervise those visits. The respondent
21 indicated that he would follow up and set those visits up and
22 he never did. So I also have no evidence that visitation has
23 been withheld.
24
Is there anything else Your Honor would like to
25 know.
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1
THE COURT: Not unless counsel have any questions.
2
MR. GREEN: I would simply again renew my request
3 that this evidentiary hearing not be continued, that it be
4 declared forfeited and any rights to a forfeited unless
5 respondent commences anew, some new objection. Today was his
6 day to do this and there is no evidence to support any vague
7 claim that he might have had.
8
MR. HETTINGER: Your Honor, the only comment I have
9 with regard to the representation of the Guardian Ad Litem is
10 it is my understanding that the petitioner did supervise
11 personally the visits that were agreed upon to take place
12 during the Christmas break while he was here and I assume
13 that was the reason why there was no contact with Will win,
14 was basically the visits that were outlined between Mr. Green
15 and the respondent were supervised by the petitioner.
16
MR. GREEN: That is incorrect, Your Honor. My
17 client has supervised most of the visitations even to the
18 point of going to Disneyland last year in June of something
19 like that. It became apparent in December of this year that
20 her continued supervision was inappropriate. The respondent,
21 Professor Kanth, acted inappropriately. The dynamic of their
22 relationship in front of the children was not healthy and it
23 was simply too hard for my client. They're getting divorced.
24 It's an acrimonious divorce. She accommodated him almost
25 daily in supervision. It came to the point where I wrote
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1 Professor Kanth a letter saying this can't continue and it
2 won't continue, that Cory will supervise this much but only
3 this much. He complained. I suggested Willwin. He
4 contacted Willwin in order to facilitate more visitation. He
5 simply never followed through. He suggested some third party
6 that again, nobody except him knew about who could perform
7 the supervisory function. Nobody knew who this person was so
8 we rejected that name in favor of an institution that is
9 competent not only to supervise visitations but to observe
10 any inappropriate or untoward behavior, namely Willwin. He
11 could have taken advantage of it. He did not.
12
MR. HETTINGER: Well, Your Honor, I apologize for
13 my lack of information with regard to what's gone on that has
14 led to this representation. That was my understanding of it
15 so I apologize.
16
THE COURT: That's one of the problems there's
17 failure upon the party to contact the Court timely, counsel
18 timely and, you know, retain counsel timely and creates a
19 problem both for the Guardian Ad Litem, for the petitioner
20 and often for counsel that is representing him.
21
At this time I think as far as a motion for
22 continuance of evidentiary hearing, the Court is going to
23 grant that but I'm going to set a scheduling order as
24 suggested and a very firm scheduling order. If he fails to
25 meet it and doesn't respond in a timely manner and doesn't
30

1 communicate with his counsel so counsel is unable to
2 represent him properly, it's going to be his fault. So at
3 any time during those proceedings, he should be made aware of
4 that, you know, default may entered against him for his
5 failure to appear.
6
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, can we get some specific
7
THE COURT: I think this has been going on for
8 quite some length of time. There's a lot of different
9 proceedings that have sort of been brought in the interim on
10 this divorce proceeding which has kind of delayed actually
11 having this matter heard on its merits but I think that June
12 is not too far away for this to be heard and that we should
13 frame everything within that June period of time as far as
14 discovery cutoffs and motion cutoffs and so forth.
15
COURT CLERK: We're looking for two days? We could
16 it the 18th and 19th.
17
THE COURT: Okay.
18
MR. HETTINGER: Let me just double check, Your
19 Honor, my schedule.
20
(Discussion of other cases and dates)
21
COURT CLERK: Other than a discovery cutoff, do you
22 need any other cutoff dates?
23
MR. GREEN: I don't think there's any -1 think
24 there will only be motion cutoffs we might want to consider
25 and I would suggest that those track with the discovery as of
31
1 May 15th. By that time we'll have our discovery in and if
2 there's any further motions.
3
COURT CLERK: So discovery and motion cutoffs will
4 be May 15th?
5
MR. GREEN: That is what I would propose.
6
MR. HETTINGER: We would prefer the 31 st but if
7 it's the 15 th then
8
COURT CLERK: If you're going to keep your trial
9 date on the 18th, you've got to have time to have your
10 motions heard.
11
THE COURT: That's right.
12
MR. HETTINGER: All right. The 15th then Your
13 Honor.
14
COURT CLERK: Is there anything else?
15
MR. GREEN: The custody evaluator again Your Honor
16 and I don't want to get in a situation where we get one that
17 can't get it done and then we're back in here in May saying
18 no evaluation, no trial. The four names I've provided are
19 competent, good, experienced, they can start and they can
20 finish. I would simply ask that counsel make an election
21 today and inform me who he would like. I'll put that in the
22 order and then it'll be incumbent upon Professor Kanth to
23 make contact and arrangements to pay and so forth so we can
24 get it done. Even a two or three day delay is going to
25 jeopardize our calendar here.
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1
MR. HETTINGER: Well, I would like the opportunity
2 to discuss it with my client and may contact with these
3 people that I don't know and there may be people who have the
4 same ability to begin immediately that Mr. Green has
5 represented these four individuals have and I think if we
6 have other names to present and we present them to the Court
7 by Friday that should fulfill the need to move expediently on
8 this, Your Honor.
9
MR. GREEN: Yeah, except it never works that way.
10
COURT CLERK: This Friday, tomorrow?
11
MR. GREEN: Yes, tomorrow. I don't mind doing that
12 if we can have a telephone conference with Your Honor
13 tomorrow at some point where we all know where we're going to
14 be and we're all not waiting for one thing to get hand
15 delivered or mailed. I know how this works.
16
THE COURT: Yeah. If I don't hear anything by
17 Friday we'll pick one of the four that you've recommended.
18
MR. GREEN: Can we, if there are other names that
19 the respondent wishes, can we, I don't know if Your Honor is
20 going to be here tomorrow or if we could schedule a time so
21 that we all are on the same page and get this done.
22
(Inaudible conversation)
23
COURT CLERK: We do have a criminal calendar that
24 will go from probably 10:00 until through the noon hour.
25
THE COURT: Can Brandee do something with that?
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COURT CLERK: No. She's here with me.
2
THE COURT: We'll try to work something out for
3 tomorrow, a telephone conference.
4
COURT CLERK: We could do it in the afternoon.
5
MR. GREEN: Could be do it in the afternoon?
6
COURT CLERK: What time is convenient?
7
MR. GREEN: Could we say 1:30, 2:00? That would
8 work for me.
9
THE COURT: Okay.
10
MR. HETTINGER: That would be fine.
11
MS.KAWAMURA: That's good for me Judge. 1:30
12 tomorrow?
13
MR. GREEN: 1:30.
14
MR. HETTINGER: In the interest of expediency
15 perhaps I could suggest that rather than trying to file
16 something with the court that includes those names, I will
17 fax any names that I have to Mr. Green and to the Guardian Ad
18 Litem and then we can just discuss them with Your Honor
19 during the telephone conference. Is that acceptable?
20
THE COURT: Okay.
21
MR. GREEN: Marci, can I give you a number where I
22willbeatl:30?
23
COURT CLERK: Yes.
24
MR. GREEN: 641-3955.
25
Is that a first place setting, by the way, in June?
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1
COURT CLERK: Usually domestic custody is a first
2 place. The only thing that usually bumps it is a felony
3 trial.
4
MR. GREEN: And I assume that Professor Kanth,
5 consistent with the Court's earlier order, will be liable for
6 the immediate cost of the evaluation. The ultimate cost can
7 be reserved as a trial issue. I'm going to ask the Court, I
8 did not raise this earlier but I'd asked the Court for an
9 order that does not require any other further commissioner
10 pretrial in as much as we had one in October.
11
MR. HETTINGER: That's agreeable.
12
THE COURT: I don't think that's necessary.
13
MR. GREEN: I'm just trying to anticipate
14 everything that could go wrong here. I'm sure I haven't
15 figured everything out but I'm trying to anticipate what I
16 can. Thank you Your Honor.
17
COURT CLERK: And it's Judge Stirba's practice to
18 ask for proposed findings and conclusions one week prior.
19
MR. GREEN: One week prior, okay.
20
THE COURT: Can you prepare the order on this?
21
MR. GREEN: I can, Your Honor.
22
THE COURT: Okay. Any other matter that we should
23 consider at this time?
24
MR. GREEN: I believe that does it. Oh, one other
25 thing Your Honor. As I understand the Court is continued the
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1 evidentiary hearing. I'm still a little lost to know what
2 we're here to consider.
3
THE COURT: Iftherehadbeenaneedfor an
4 evidentiary hearing we ought to probably set a date for that
5 but I don't think there is because you're going to have a
6 trial on this.
7
MR. GREEN: That's my thinking. I would ask that
8 if the respondent is intent on doing this that he file
9 something that frames the issues.
10
THE COURT: Right. I don't think there's really
11 any necessity for any evidentiary hearing since we've set
12 trial date on this.
13 •
MR. HETTINGER: To be candid 14
THE COURT: If he feels that there is then he ought
15 to file a motion.
16
MR. HETTINGER: To be candid with you, Your Honor,
17 that's my thinking as well but if there is a need for that,
18 we will file a pleading in response to Mr. Green's concern.
19
THE COURT: File it in a timely way so it's not
20 going to delay the trial.
21
MR. HETTINGER: Absolutely.
22
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, thank you very much for
23 your time.
24
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
25
(C)
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THE COURT: A motion for Temporary Restraining
5 Order has been submitted to the Court by Mr. Hettinger. I
6 guess there's been a request that we have some oral argument
7 on this before the Court takes any action on it. So, Mr.
8 Hettinger I suspect that you should proceed in regards to
9 granting of the motion.
10
MR. HETTINGER: All right. Thank you Your Honor.
11 I know that you're in the midst of a jury trial so I'll go
12 through this pretty quickly. I think it's a pretty straight
13 forward set of facts. There is a pending divorce case
14 between Cory Kanth and Dr. Rajani Kanth. It's been pending
15 for some time. Prior to it being filed, they had been
16 residing in Sydney, Australia and as the affidavit indicates
17 in May of I believe 1999 or, excuse me, March of 1999, she
18 took the children from Sydney to Salt Lake City without any
19 warning or communication to him and he's been pursuing a
20 number of different avenues claiming and believing as he does
21 today, that that was a wrongful abduction of the children and
22 that it was inappropriate for this Court to take
23 jurisdiction.
24
Nevertheless there have been proceedings in this
25 case over a long period of months and at one point in time a
1
1 temporary and I don't have the date right in front of me, I
2 apology, but there is a temporary order which has been
3 entered which gives Cory Kanth, the petitioner, temporary
4 custody of the two minor children. Prior to March 1999 and
5 all during the period when they were residing together,
6 neither Dr. Kanth, Cory Kanth or the children had any
7 involvement with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
8 Saints. In fact, it's my understanding that there was
9 basically no religion practiced in the home. Recently, Dr.
10 Kanth was advised by the youngest child that the older child,
11 Malini, was intending to be baptized or at least there was a
12 baptism being scheduled for her when she turned eight to be
13 baptized into the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
14 Saints. Her 8th birthday was Sunday I believe, April 1st.
15 That information was confirmed about the same time by a
16 letter from Mr. Green which is attached to Dr. Kanth
17 affidavit.
18
Dr. Kanth communicated immediately directly to Cory
19 and also I think to Akiko, the Guardian Ad Litem, his extreme
20 reluctance and displeasure about this given the fact that it
21 was a complete departure from what had been their practice in
22 the home when they lived together and that she was taking
23 this action based on a temporary order rather than a
24 permanent custody order.
25
I wrote a letter to Mr. Green indicating basically
2

1 the same thing that I believed it was inappropriate for this
2 type of decision which is a final and permanent decision once
3 it's made, it's made and the fact of the decision cannot be
4 undone and the act cannot be undone and whatever impact it
5 has on Malini cannot be undone, and indicating that I believe
6 that was inappropriate based upon a temporary order and
7 especially in light of the fact that we have a trial date in
8 this case for determination of permanent custody which is
9 coming up June 18th and 19th and so I requested that this
10 action be deferred until after the trial so that, you know,
11 recognizing that a permanent custodian would have the
12 authority to make that kind of decision but believing
13 completely that this type of decision, particularly where
14 it's a complete departure from their prior practices, ought
15 not to be made on the basis of a temporary order. So that's
16 the basis for our request for the TRO.
17
THE COURT: Okay.
18
Mr. Green?
19
MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor. The Court may
20 recall in the case, it was the subject of an in-chambers
21 hearing not long ago when we - it may have been in court
22 actually when the Court entered an order setting the June
23 date along with very specific cutoffs and time requirements
24 and I raise that, number one, to refresh the Court's memory
25 but number two, to also make sure that everybody is aware
3
1 that this trial date that counsel has referred to which looms
2 large in this case is a date that hopefully we all consider
3 to be set in stone and that it would be very extraordinary
4 for that date to be continued.
5
Having said that, I've looked at the case law on
6 temporary versus final orders and I cannot find any
7 distinction in the case law between a temporary order and a
8 final order of custody when it comes to the exercise of
9 parental rights. There's only one difference that doesn't
10 apply in this case. The difference is a temporary order can
11 be modified by a decree whereas a decree must be modified
12 based upon a petition to modify and there are different
13 standards for those two changes in the order.
14
The importance of that is demonstrated by the fact
15 that Mom in this case who is the custodial parent is
16 exercising her parental rights when she takes the children to
17 one church or another. That is something squarely within her
18 rights. Nobody disputes that fact and it is actually that
19 parental decision, based upon parental rights that reside
20 solely with her that precedes Malini's decision, that's the
21 eight year old daughter, Malini's decision to participate in
22 this religious ordinance.
23
The one thing that Mr. Kanth does not talk about at
24 all in the argument or his affidavit is what is in the best
25 interest of his daughter. He knows full well that Malini has
4

1 made this decision for herself, that it is not just a light
2 decision that she has made. It's a very significant
3 decision. He knows this because he has almost daily
4 telephone contact with the child typically during which he
5 tries to dissuade her from this decision. Is it that factor,
6 or factors that the child's own desires at an age where she
7 should be able to make that decision, coupled with my client
8 being the reponsitory of parental rights at this point, that
9 suggests to me that this is the type of thing that would be
10 in the child's best interest.
11
As for the final decision part and this also kind
12 of goes to the irreparable harm part, I have to disagree with
13 counsel. Membership in one church does not preclude
14 membership in another church at a later time. People make
15 those decisions and change their minds frequently in this
16 life. There's no reason to think that Malini, if she decided
17 to change would be somehow limited by doing that.
18
Lastly, I want to address the bulk of Mr. Kanth's
19 petition or affidavit. Most of it deals with old facts
20 regarding circumstances surrounding their separation some two
21 years ago. That case has been heard and decided by the
22 Federal District Court by Judge Tena Campbell and she
23 dismissed Professor Kanth's petition and found that the
24 United States was the habitual residence of the children for
25 jurisdictional purposes and that case was appealed to the
5
1 Court of Appeals and Judge Campbell was upheld. I think this
2 objection on the part of the respondent has more to do with
3 that but that that is no basis upon which to make this kind
4 of a ruling.
5
Having said all that, my client's position is this,
6 that her role in supporting Malini is just that. Malini has
7 strong feelings about this. My client is supporting her.
8 She has no particular investment in this decision beyond that
9 and she would just as soon have the baptism ten days from now
10 as now and the one thing that we're probably missing in this
11 dialogue is input from the Guardian as to Malini's maturity
12 level and her level of sincerity, if not her motivation, in
13 making this decision and I think that the appropriate step to
14 take would either be to acknowledge Malini's position or to
15 confirm Malini's decision which would require the Temporary
16 Restraining Order with the hearing ten days hence during
17 which time the guardian could ascertain the level of
18 sincerity, maturity, and make the decision at that time.
19 Based upon that Your Honor, I would submit it.
20
THE COURT: Guardian Ad Litem?
21
MS.KAWAMURA: Thank you, Judge. I have not had an
22 opportunity to speak with Malini about this particular issue
23 and so I am not prepared to make any representations to the
24 Court today regarding her wishes and I think that is probably
25 an important thing to offer. I have met with her twice in
6

1 person now and I think although she is eight years old, which
2 is pretty young, she's very mature and articulate and able to
3 sort of voice what she thinks about some things and counsel
4 has represented that it is her decision and I haven't had the
5 opportunity to speak with her but I would be able to meet
6 with her in the next few days provided that that works with
7 her family schedule and I would agree that that might be
8 something that I would be in a position to represent to the
9 Court if you were to give us a little bit more time.
10
And also for the record on behalf of the children
11 with regards to that June trial date I just would like to say
12 that I think that there needs to be some resolution in this
13 matter. It has dragged on for a pretty long time and so I
14 think that to the extent that it's possible it is important
15 to adhere to that trial date.
16
THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask this question. What
17 difference would it make if we waited until after the trial
18 and the matter of custody is determined? What if, for
19 whatever reason, the father should gain custody of the child?
20
MR. HETTINGER: The other part of that which
21 unfortunately I've seen that happen in one case is you know,
22 what happens if the mother is killed unexpectedly, you know,
23 then he automatically becomes the custodial parent.
24 Certainly until there's a determination that she's entitled
25 to full and complete custody I don't see any harm that occurs
7
1 to her or to Malini with regard to her desire to be baptized
2 if in fact that is her desire.
3
THE COURT: On the other hand too, what if the
4 father were the one that may have abducted the children,
5 taken them to say India, China or someplace else and had the
6 children converted to that particular faith, what would the
7 position of the mother be because she has not had an
8 opportunity to have the children with her, to have the
9 children brought up in an environment in which they would
10 become LDS or any other religion here in the United States
11 and they are baptized in the religion of the country in which
12 there were taken? What would be the position of the Mother
13 under the same circumstances?
14
MR. GREEN: I think the position of the mother
15 would be the same as it is in the case that if the laws of
16 that jurisdiction conferred upon Mr. Kanth the parental
17 authority to raise the children in that faith, that's it.
18 That's the way it is, just as it has happened in this case.
191 think the point we're missing is that this isn't about the
20 parents. It shouldn't be anyway. It's being portrayed that
21 way.
22
THE COURT: It's not about the parents, it's about
23 the circumstances of this particular case. If it were
24 anyone's child, not these parties here, I think that they
25 would like to have that child at an appropriate age where
8

1 they have an opportunity to really understand the nature of
2 what they're doing and have an opportunity to exposed to
3 other religions possibly or other alternatives before a
4 decision is made with both parents taking part in that
5 particular decision and offering the alternatives that they
6 feel might be in the best interests of the child.
7
MR. GREEN: That's why I wrote the letter to
8 counsel, Your Honor, was so he could be informed and could
9 consult with my client and talk to the child which he did
10 not. But I think the point is, this ought to be about the
11 child and before we make a decision, now or in June
12
THE COURT: The problem I have is a child brought
13 here and being exposed to whatever they're exposed to here,
14 the nature of what happens is like, you know, if you're in
15 Rome, you do as the Romans do kind of thing. You have no
16 other alternative if you live here if you're very young. You
17 have no really exposure and from what I can gather, that has
18 taken place. She's been, I guess, brought into the LDS
19 environment and there's been no other exposure to anything
20 else.
21
MR. GREEN: We don't know that.
22
THE COURT: That's why.
23
MR. GREEN: I think those are issues of fact, Your
24 Honor that need to be determined; hence the guardian's
25 involvement. She speaks for the child. If the guardian, I
9
1 think, were to represent to Your Honor that she has had that
2 exposure, that she is mature enough to make this decision and
3 that she's committed to that decision. What the case ought
4 to be about is her best interest.
5
THE COURT: Right. And that's what I'm thinking
6 about in the long term.
7
MR. GREEN: I agree, Your Honor.
8
THE COURT: Not just for this particular divorce
9 that's pending but in terms of what are the consequences of
10 the decision that she makes based on all of the circumstances
11 and we won't know that until we get into the divorce
12 proceeding and the reasons for the divorce and what happened
13 and so forth all come out and whoever is the final decision
14 maker will have to decide who is going to gain custody and
15 for what reason and what the circumstance are going to be and
16 what kind of visitations are going to be allowed and so forth
17 and all of that should be taken into consideration, you know,
18 before any person at that tender age makes this really very
19 important decision.
20
(Over talking)
21
MR. GREEN: - the case when you hear this matter at
22 a hearing.
23
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).
24
MR. GREEN: You might conclude that the best
25 interests of the child are served by deferring until the
10

1 trial. That's okay with my client if, if, it's okay with the
2 child and her attorney and if, Your Honor - this is very
3 important and I know there's a lot cases pending over there 4 but if this matter is heard in June and I have reasons to
5 think that Professor Kanth is going to try to do what he has
6 done in the past which is put that trial date off
7
THE COURT: The problem I have is the child being
8 that young and being in the circumstances in which she is and
9 the peer pressure and the pressure from other sources in this
10 community being placed upon her, her alternatives are very,
11 very limited because she's not going to have really too much
12 exposure to anything else and until the trial comes up and
13 she's, you know, had an opportunity to have other
14 alternatives explained to her with people that are interested
15 that are present physically with her, I think it going to be
16 very difficult.
17
So what I'm thinking is that doing it right now in
18 terms of making this very, very important decision rather
19 than waiting until the final divorce is heard, I think it's
20 going to be more like when you're talking about custody of
21 children and the pressure of both parents being placed on
22 this child makes it so very difficult for the child to really
23 make a decision but if both parties say, okay, now this is
24 very important but it's more important that we wait and see
25 what's going to happen before you make this because you can
11
1 always make a decision later on because this is not something
2 that cannot wait. It can wait, as long as pressure is not
3 put on that child by anyone.
4
MR. GREEN: Well, and I respect what the Court is
5 saying but I don't think there's any competent evidence
6 before the Court about pressure being put on the child.
7
THE COURT: Well, I think I could probably assume
8 that if they're living in a community where things are taking
9 place that what's taking place is the kind of pressure that,
10 you know
11
MR. HETTINGER: I'd certainly suggest that by the
12 fact that prior to March of 1999 none of the members of this
13 family had any involvement with the church and so something
14 has happened and Dr. Kanth doesn't know what that is and I
15 think that is an appropriate matter to be explored in depth
16 at the trial which will provide the best opportunity to do
17 that.
18
THE COURT: Yeah. And then
19
MR. GREEN: Well, we would once again ask that we
20 at least ascertain the facts as best we can through the
21 guardian and have this matter heard at whatever kind of a
22 hearing the Court would like.
23
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). I think, it is
24 my opinion that we should wait because for people who are
25 going to be baptized in any religion, they should have this
12

1 opportunity and let's determine what kind of influence or
2 forces have played upon that child making that decision
3 because if you're in a situation where all of your peers are
4 of one religion, that peer group pressure is very, very
5 strong on influences and the younger you are the more
6 influence that peer group pressure plays and so I think we
7 have to kind of look at the total picture and at that time
8 this very critical decision can be made as to whether, you
9 know, the child's wishes should be granted based on the fact
10 that she's had this opportunity to really explore it.
11
So, it's the opinion of this Court that the
12 Temporary Restraining Order should be signed at this time and
13 we should wait until the divorce when the child has an
14 opportunity to have both sides, you know, give her access to
15 whatever is necessary for her to make the decision based on
16 all of the facts.
17
MR. GREEN: I hate to bring up the subject which
18 I've kind of danced around, Your Honor, but the temporary
19 order is only good for ten days.
20
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). Well, I'll sign
21 it and whatever takes place after that. I think there's a
22 provision in there that there be a hearing within those ten
23 days.
24
MR. GREEN: That's my understanding, Your Honor.
25
THE COURT: So, I'll sign it and then I'll have to
13
1 let my Clerk get together with you folks to set up the date
2 to be set for the hearing.
3
MR. HETTINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.
4
MR. GREEN: And in that period of time I assume the
5 Guardian Ad Litem will ascertain whatever facts she can on
6 this point?
7
THE COURT: Right. Everybody should do whatever
8 they can in order to make sure the child makes the right
9 decision.
10
MR. GREEN: That's all I've been saying.
11
THE COURT: Yeah.
12
MR. HETTINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.
13
MR. GREEN: Can you connect us with your clerk and
14 we'll see about that date?
15
THE COURT: Can you just hand on?
16
MR. GREEN: Okay, with that Akiko?
17
MS.KAWAMURA: I'm fine with that.
18
MR. GREEN: Just talk directly with Cory about
19 this.
20
MS.KAWAMURA: I'll do that. You heard that, that
21 I'll be contacting Cory directly?
22
MR. HETTINGER: Yeah. That's fine.
23
COURT CLERK: Okay, counsel.
24
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
25
(c)
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4
COURT CLERK: Please be seated
5
THE COURT: Good afternoon. We're here today in
6 the matter of Kanth vs. Kanth, case number 994904256
7 calendared today for oral argument. Would counsel please
8 state their appearances?
9
MR. GREEN: May it please the court, Rick Green
10 appearing for the petitioner.
11
MR. HETTINGER: Russ Hettinger appearing on behalf
12 of Dr. Kanth and I'll explain this in more detail, but our
13 appearance here today is special appearance in order to
14 preserve his rights under the Hague Convention.
15
MS. KAWAMURA: Akiko Kawamura, guardian ad litem.
16
THE COURT: Well, counsel, unless I missed a few
17 things, I think we're here on a couple of motions. First is
18 the motion of respondent to stay these proceedings.
19
Mr. Hettinger, I wanted to hear you on that.
20
MR. HETTINGER: Thank you. I think your Honor,
21 without being too presumptuous, I think argument that I make
22 will be relevant to Mr. Green's argument, and I suspect his
23 response to my argument will also be relevant to his motion,
24 and so I would like to proceed on the motion to stay first,
25 but as I'll explain in my argument, our motion to stay is to
1

1 a great extent a response to his motion to compel and for
2 sanction.
3
THE COURT: All right.
4
MR. HETTINGER: As I indicated, I'm appearing
5 specially in order to preserve the rights of Dr. Kanth under
6 the convention on the civil aspects of international child
7 abduction, commonly referred to as the Hague Convention. And
8 although we're in state court here today, I'll be talking
9 about the Hague Convention, which is a treaty to which the
10 United States became a party in 1985. It was entered into
11 force between the United States and Australia on July 1,
12 1988. I have for the convenience of the court a copy of the
13 Hague Convention. There is a copy in the file, but I thought
14 it might be of assistance if I had a separate copy that you
15 could refer to as we go through the arguments.
16
THE COURT: I think I have seen most of it. Let me
17 ask you this first, counsel. Your client appears to have
18 filed this motion to stay proceedings, but in there he
19 indicated you either wouldn't or couldn't.
20
MR. HETTINGER: Yes, the reason at that point in
21 time was two-fold. At the point in time that he filed it, he
22 had just recently, a few days before that perfected a
23 petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
24 United States with regard to a federal court proceeding under
25 the Hague Convention.
2

1
THE COURT: Didn't the Tenth Circuit deny rehearing
2 back in, what was it, November?
3
MR. HETTINGER: There was a denial of rehearing and
4 subsequent to that, he filed a petition, there were some
5 defects, it was re-filed and ultimately was docketed on April
6 22,1 believe, with the Supreme Court and is pending. And
7 that's the reason that we're here at this point in time.
8
At that point in time having just perfected that
9 appeal, he wanted to immediately file this motion for stay.
101 was physically unavailable due to commitments in other
11 cases to do the filing immediately. In addition, there were
12 issues as to which I had not previously prepared myself
13 relating to the Hague Convention with which he, having argued
14 this through the federal court system, was completely more
15 familiar than I, and as a result of those two factors, we
16 agreed that he would go ahead and file the writ and petition
17 so that it would be before the court as soon as possible
18 after the perfecting of his petition for writ of certiorari.
19 So that's the reason that he filed - prepared and filed the
20 written materials rather than I.
21
THE COURT: Okay.
22
MR. HETTINGER: Would the copy be of assistance to
23 the Court?
24
THE COURT: I do have it in the file.
25
MR. HETTINGER: All right. There was a copy of
3

1 that, as you've seen, that was sent in November 2000 by Mary
2 Marshall of the United States Department of State along with
3 a letter to Commissioner Evans.
4
Just to give you some background quickly on the
5 case, and to understand the facts and the feeling of what
6 brings us before the Court. Maybe I can portray that by
7 suggesting to the Court that on one occasion I, in
8 representing - or in discussing this matter with Dr. Kanth,
9 indicated to him that I felt like I understood what he was
10 going through. And he corrected me in a kindly way
11 indicating that he didn't really believe anyone could
12 understand what he was going through unless they had gone
13 through the experience of having their children clandestinely
14 and unilaterally removed from their place of residence
15 without any prior warning, taken thousands of miles away from
16 Australia to Utah, and then placed under restriction when he
17 came here to Utah so that he could not interact with his
18 children and enjoy the normal relationship of a father to a
19 child even when he was here. And although that circumstance
20 is the genesis of the case, today that's not what the Court
21 has to determine. The Court has to determine today whether
22 this case should proceed to a final decision as it is
23 currently schedule to do.
24
In March 1999,1 believe the 25th of March, the
25 petitioner without any prior warning packed up herself, her
4

1 children, Dr. Kanth's children and left Sidney, Australia
2 where they were residing where Dr. Kanth was employed at the
3 university.
4
THE COURT: Let me just interrupt you, counsel. I
5 want to hear you, but let's say that's true. There is a
6 ruling from the district court and the Tenth Circuit on that
7 issue - on the Hague Convention, isn't there?
8
MR. HETTINGER: There is a ruling from the United
9 States District Court for the District of Utah. That opinion
10 was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, but it's currently on
11 appeal to the - or excuse me, a petition for certiorari has
12 been filed with the Supreme Court of the United States
13 seeking review of those decision. And it's our position that
14 until that matter is decided finally, one way or the other by
15 the United States Supreme Court and/or subsequent federal
16 court proceedings, that it would be inappropriate under the
17 very clear provisions of the Hague Convention to proceed with
18a trial on the merits in this matter.
19
THE COURT: You have some optimism that the Supreme
20 Court will entertain that petition?
21
MR. HETTINGER: Well, one always files with
22 optimism. They have received it. Mr. Green has responded,
23 and it's our understanding that it is scheduled to go to
24 conference this week. It's also our understanding that there
25 will be a referral of or an inquiry, I guess is a better
5

1 word, to the Department of State and Department of Justice
2 with regard to the case so that that input would be received
3 as part of the determination by the conference of the United
4 States Supreme Court on this particular case. But yes, we
5 have optimism because we believe that that ruling was
6 incorrect and that ruling focused on a narrow provision of
7 the Hague Convention with regard to what was, at the time of
8 removal, the habitual residence of the children, and we
9 believe that that ruling by Judge Campbell was incorrect and
10 have requested with optimism that the Supreme Court review
11 that by granting a writ of certiorari. Do you have other
12 questions on that?
13
THE COURT: No, and that's the basis for the
14 request to stay this pending the Supreme Court resolution?
15
MR. HETTINGER: It is. And the reason that that is
16 germain is that Article 16 of the Hague Convention contains a
17 prohibition to courts other than the state from which the
18 children were removed and the language that I would cite to
19 the court is at the end of Article 16 and indicates that a
20 court shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody
21 until it has been determined that the child is not to be
22 returned under this convention.
23
Now our position is, your Honor, that until there
24 has been a complete course through the federal judiciary
25 system that that determination has not been made. And this
6

1 position was taken initially by Dr. Kanth in this case at a
2 hearing in January of 2000. Lisa A. Jones appeared specially
3 on his behalf, made this argument to the court before
4 Commissioner Arnett, and Commissioner Arnett entered a ruling
5 which awarded petitioner temporary custody, but I would like
6 to call the attention of the Court to the language of that
7 order which is an order entered March 22,2000. And I have
8 an extra copy of that if it would be of assistance to the
9 Court rather than digging through your file.
10
THE COURT: Why don't I take it? It's all in here,
11 but it might be easier.
12
MR. HETTINGER: Well, I'm cognizant of how thick
13 that is, so if I may.
14
Rick, here's a copy.
15
MR. GREEN: I don't need it.
16
It's exhibit C to our response, your Honor.
17
THE COURT: Okay, I see that order.
18
MR. HETTINGER: It provides at paragraph one that
19 the respondent's motion for stay of proceedings or their
20 abatement is hereby denied for the following reasons. And
21 reason A is that the petitioner at that time is seeking
22 temporary relief and not a final order by the order to show
23 cause, and therefore, this decision - meaning the temporary
24 order - is not won on the merits and thereby contemplated by
25 Article 16 of the Hague Convention. The language which I
7

1 just quoted to you from Article 16 clearly would prohibit the
2 entry of a final decision on the merits.
3
Dr. Kanth, I should note, objected to that ruling
4 because the language of Article 16 does not really
5 distinguish between a temporary order and a final order. It
6 simply says a determination on the merits of custody, and we
7 believe that a temporary order is a determination on merits,
8 but however that may be, what is contemplated as a trial on
9 July 17 - or excuse me, June 17 and 18 clearly would be a
10 final determination on the merits and therefore, would be
11 inappropriate under Article 16 of the Hague Convention.
12
That put Dr. Kanth in a difficult position.
13 Basically since the entry of that temporary order determining
14 that this court had jurisdiction and rejecting his arguments
15 for a stay based on the Hage Convention - and also I should
16 note rejecting his arguments made under the UCCJA, the
17 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which was premised on
18 the fact that he had initiated a proceeding in Australia
19 immediately after he discovered the children had left, at
20 least a couple of months, maybe three months before the
21 proceedings here were initiated. In any event, the court
22 assumed jurisdiction, entered that temporary order and since
23 then Dr. Kanth has been walking a judicial tightrope, so to
24 speak. The reason that he has been forced to do that is
25 because there is a doctrine within the Hague Convention under
8

1 Article 13 A which basically creates an affirmative defense
2 which can be raised to a Hague Convention petition which he
3 had pending in federal court based on "acquiescence" to the
4 court proceedings that had been filed outside of the Hage
5 Convention. In other words, Dr. Kanth could lose his federal
6 court Hague petition case if he was deemed to have acquiesced
7 to the jurisdiction being exercised by this court.
8
So as the federal court case was proceeding down
9 its path through the federal district court, Judge Campbell's
10 ruling, the appeal to the Tenth Circuit, their ruling, and
11 the perfection of the petition for writ of certiorari, Dr.
12 Kanth has attempted to avoid actions which would subject him
13 to the affirmative defense which could be raised by the
14 petitioner in the Hague Convention case that he had
15 acquiesced to these proceedings in state court and thereby
16 lost his right to proceed with the Hague Convention case in
17 federal court. And that is premised upon the optimistic
18 optimism and the hope that the Supreme Court will reverse 19 ultimately accept the case, grant the petition for writ of
20 certiorari, and will enter a ruling in favor of Dr. Kanth or
21 at least sending it back to the federal district court for
22 further proceedings.
23
There is a case - as you might expect due to the
24 fact that we're talking about a treaty that has been adopted
25 by many nations, there are cases outside the United States
9

1 which are germane to interpreting the statute. But I have
2 identified one which I would like to provide to the court if
3 I may which is a decision out of the Sixth Circuit Court of
4 Appeals on the subject of acquiescence and gives a definition
5 which I think may be helpful to the Court in understanding
6 the tightrope that Dr. Kanth has been walking. May I hand a
7 copy to the Court?
8
THE COURT: Yes.
9
MR. HETTINGER: This is a case of Frederick v.
10 Frederick and if I can call your attention to page 33, toward
11 the end of the decision they deal with the affirmative
12 defense which had been raised and argued in that case that
13 Mr. Frederick had acquiesced to the proceedings that were
14 filed and taking place outside of the Hague Convention
15 petition. And in the first paragraph on page 33 the last
16 sentence I believe gives some insight into the doctrine of
17 acquiescence. "It says although we must decide the matter
18 without guidance from previous appellate court decisions, we
19 believe that acquiescence under the convention requires
20 either an act or statement with the requisite formality such
21 as testimony in a judicial proceeding, a convincing written
22 renunciation of rights, or a consistent attitude of
23 acquiescence over a significant period of time." Well, that
24 we believe and as I say there are other cases from outside
25 the United States which interpret that provision of the Hague
10

1 Convention consistently. There's a case by the name of In
2 Re: H, which is a 1997 case from the House of Lords. The
3 citation for which is 2 WLR 563 in which a father was found
4 to have acquiesced because he did involve himself in
5 proceedings in an Orthodox Jewish religious court before
6 bringing his petition for - petition under the Hague
7 Convention.
8
To be real candid with you, your Honor, Dr. Kanth
9 hoped that this particular day would not come when he would
10 be back before this court arguing for a stay of proceedings.
11 It was his hope that the federal court case would have taken
12 its course prior to this point and some determination would
13 have been made either against him finally or in his favor
14 that would have lead to a stay being issued with regard to
15 this case. The things which have been identified in the
16 motion to compel; the failure to attend his deposition, to
17 respond to written interrogatories, to participate in
18 custodial evaluation, interview with psychologist, so forth.
19 Those actions on the part of Dr. Kanth would have lead to an
20 affirmative defense of acquiescence being raised and provable
21 against him in the event that his federal court Hague
22 Convention proceeding is given, is reversed and he's given
23 the right to have his day in court on that in the federal
24 system.
25
THE COURT: Let me understand that. Let me see if
11

1 I understand what you're saying. You're saying that you
2 believe the federal court - the United States District Court
3 would say to a petitioner that you didn't protect your rights
4 under the Hague Convention because you did what a state judge
5 told you to do?
6
MR. HETTINGER: That's right. And that's what I
7 think is suggested by the language that I quoted to you from
8 the Frederick case, that is the specific ruling of the In Re:
9 H case which I cited to you. In that case he participated in
10 Jewish Orthodox religious court and was found to have
11 acquiesced. The reason for that is that the whole purpose of
12 the Hague Convention is to stop the proceedings of any court
13 other than the - a court in the state of origination, which
14 would be Australia in this matter, and the underlying purpose
15 behind that is to prevent people from abducting children,
16 taking them outside a jurisdiction and engaging in forum
17 shopping. The petitioner could have filed a case in
18 Australia. The Australian court clearly had jurisdiction,
19 but she chose to leave that jurisdiction and not only do
20 that, but to not participate by filing or by responding in
21 the case that was filed by Dr. Kanth in Australia. And I
22 believe that the language of Article 13 A where it speaks
23 about the doctrine of acquiescence and the case law that I
24 have cited to you, the Frederick case and the In Re: H case
25 support the position that if he had taken the actions of
12

1 which Mr. Green is now complaining, he would have been deemed
2 clearly to have acquiesced in these proceedings. And so that
3 is in fact, your Honor, our position that he, you know,
4 certainly couldn't predict in advance what the federal court
5 system would do with that, but Mr. Green is already argued in
6 his response to the petition for writ of certiorari that Dr.
7 Kanth has acquiesced and that argument is based simply on one
8 letter that he wrote several years ago to the petitioner.
9 And so it is in a very real sense a dangerous doctrine for a
10 Hague Convention petitioner and something of which they have
11 to be very cognizant or they can lose their rights. And he
12 has attempted to avoid that and that is the reason that 13 that is the fundamental reason that we're before the court at
14 this point in time requesting the stay and requesting that
15 Mr. Green's motion be denied.
16
And so this point in time we would ask the Court to
17 grant the motion to stay proceedings, both as to the trial
18 date and the discovery proceedings until there is a final
19 determination by the Supreme Court or whatever court that
20 case may be referred to as to whether his Hague Convention
21 petition will be considered and we would respectfully urge
22 the Court to grant our motion and deny the motion of Mr.
23 Green.
24
THE COURT: So if they deny cert in the next
25 whenever, that would be it.
13

1
MR. HETTINGER: If they deny cert, that's the end
2 of his I suppose there could be a request for a rehearing,
3 but that's I'm not even sure you can get that on a petition
4 for writ of certiorari. But if the ultimate result is that
5 the Supreme Court refuses to consider the case, then that's
6 the end of his federal court case and his Hague Convention
7 petition would have run its course in the federal system.
8 And that's all we're asking for is that it have a chance to
9 run its course in the federal system.
10
THE COURT: And if they grant the cert in the near
11 future, when would you anticipate they would?
12
MR. HETTINGER: Well, that's hard to predict. They
13 have obviously, then they have a generally have a briefing
14 and/or oral argument schedule that they set up, and I have
15 not frankly participated in the Supreme Court enough to
16 really have a feeling for what those are running these days
17 in terms of time requirements, so I can't give the Court any
18 assistance on that particular point. But undoubtedly it
19 would take some [inaudible].
20
THE COURT: Okay, thank you, counsel.
21
MR. HETTINGER: Thank you.
22
THE COURT: Mr. Green?
23
MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
24
Your Honor, let me deal first of all with the
25 special requirement - or special appearance issue which keeps
14

1 coming up in this case. With all respect to the respondent
2 and his counsel, that is simply not an issue. A special
3 appearance, even in light of the Hague Convention, is a
4 jurisdictional issue. And the court ruled in spite of
5 Professor Kanth's objection last year that the court has
6 jurisdiction over this case. The parties lived here as
7 husband and wife and the professor was served here with
8 process to commence these proceedings.
9
Now whether or not these proceedings should be
10 stayed because of the current circumstances of Professor
11 Kanth's Hague Convention petition is an entirely different
12 matter. It's significant because we want to proceed in any
13 event on the scheduled dates for trial. Concerning the
14 matters that this court and this court alone has jurisdiction
15 over - the marriage, property, debts, and I will submit to
16 the Court that the Court should exercise its equitable
17 jurisdiction over custody and visitation and child-related
18 matters as well, and it should do that in spite of the filing
19 of the petition for a writ of certiorari and it should that
20 for a number of legal and equitable reasons. So the special
21 appearance matter is not an issue. It's been ruled upon and
22 the law of this case is that the court has jurisdiction, not
23 to mention the fact that at least three appearances this year
24 that has not been raised by counsel on behalf of Professor
25 Kanth.
15

1
As the Court will remember in our responsive
2 memorandum, I freely brought to the Court's attention the
3 commissioner's January order - January 2000 order wherein the
4 court adopts jurisdiction over the case and also acknowledges
5 for a variety of reasons, the respondent's petition for a
6 stay at that time would be denied. And it is not unusual for
7 the court to adopt the narrowest possible reason, and at that
8 time there were really two reasons for the denial of that
9 petition or motion for a stay. One of them has been cited by
10 counsel and the other one he has ignored. And it is the most
11 important. Commissioner Arnett did say that this was only a
12 temporary hearing, and that is something commissioners say
13 over and over again for a variety of reasons. It's only a
14 temporary hearing, it's only a temporary order. But the
15 second point of that order was that Professor Kanth had not
16 received a stay from the Tenth Circuit. What we didn't know
17 on that date, I think it was January 20th, was that the Tenth
18 Circuit had indeed decided that issue on the previous day,
19 but we didn't find out until three days after the hearing.
20 That is exhibit D to our response, the decision of the Tenth
21 Circuit squarely denying the respondent's petition for a stay
22 of these proceedings in the state court. He specifically
23 asked that the Tenth Circuit stay these proceedings because
24 of his appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
25
The Tenth Circuit responded by saying no for a
16

1 variety of reasons. Number one reason is you have not
2 demonstrated that you would be likely - the likely prevailing
3 party on appeal. And I would submit that is even much more
4 the case today given the significant odds which are against
5 the respondent in his petition for a writ of cert to the
6 United States Supreme Court. Very same issue that is
7 presented to this court today has been denied by the Tenth
8 Circuit. And in so doing, they have not only relied upon the
9 fact that he's unlikely he would prevail, and of course he
10 didn't prevail, but they're also suggesting that there may be
11 some irreparable harm to the petitioner, Ms. Kanth in this
12 case, and that public interest would not be consistent with
13 granting the stay.
14
Now I don't know how we get around that in this
15 case when the very jurisdiction that was opted for by
16 Professor Kanth has said after the decision by Judge Campbell
17 there has been a determination of habitual residence, and
18 that was Judge Campbell's determination. And even when he
19 had a possible or at least a fair chance at success on an
20 appeal before the Tenth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit said no,
21 that's not enough. As far as the Hague Convention is
22 concerned there has been a determination, and that
23 determination is that the United States is the state of
24 habitual residence. And unless that changes, then that
25 provision of Article 16 of the Hague Convention does not
17

1 apply in these proceedings.
2
Now I want to correct one matter that has been
3 referred to in the pro se pleadings and here today as well.
4 I don't think we need to get into the facts regarding the
5 removal of the children from Australia and their return to
6 what we now know as the state of habitual residence, and that
7 is the United States. But for the respondent to now allege
8 that somehow his visitation rights have been unduly
9 compromised by this court or the actions of my client is
10 very, very unfair. He had virtual unrestricted visitation up
11 until June of last year, approximately one year ago. All it
12 took was an agreement by the parties, and the agreement for
13 visitation was freely given, there was liberal visitation
14 until the one - when my client made one error and that is she
15 allowed Professor Kanth overnight, unsupervised and unlimited
16 visitation for a period of time. No sooner had that happened
17 but he exercised total control over those children resulting
18 in a temporary restraining order issued by the court and the
19 return of the children under circumstances which would have
20 suggested their possible abduction from this jurisdiction.
21 That is when the supervised order of visitation went into
22 place and the respondent has nobody but himself to blame for
23 that.
24
Now let me try to clarify the doctrine of
25 acquiescence when it applies to a Hague Convention
18

1 proceeding. In this case, Professor Kanth wrote a letter
2 after the parties separated saying if you want to stay in the
3 United States, I will come, I will look for work, 111 do
4 whatever I can, it's your decision and I will, essentially he
5 said I will follow that decision and honor that decision. To
6 what extent Judge Campbell relied upon that letter, I don't
7 know. That's the doctrine of acquiescence. If the
8 respondent wants to come here and say nothing I do and
9 nothing I say should constitute my acquiescence of my rights
10 under the Hague Convention, that is fine. If I'm not
11 mistaken before counsel appeared in this case when Lisa Jones
12 was counsel more than a year ago, we agreed with that. There
13 was never the suggestion that by appearing in this action any
14 of his rights under the Hague Convention are in any manner
15 diminished or compromised. And we've never made that
16 argument. But I'm going to make that argument today because
17 of what counsel has suggested here might constitute
18 acquiescence. This year on two and probably three occasions,
19 a telephone scheduling conference with Judge Stirba, an
20 appearance before Judge Uno and an appearance before Judge
21 Hanson in this case, the trial has been set, discovery cut22 off s agreed to, deposition dates agreed to, custody
23 evaluator's agreed to, a psychological evaluation's
24 stipulated to and then the psychologist was elected by the
25 respondent. At no time, never, did Professor Kanth object to
19

1 any of those actions taking place. Now if we want to adopt
2 the respondent's view of acquiescence, then he needs to die
3 by that sword as well, which means he waived his rights under
4 the Hague Convention by not raising those issue. And you
5 will not find those issues addressed in any of the court's
6 orders. There's no reservation of rights, there's no
7 preservation of that claim. Counsel for the Professor stood
8 before the court and said we will do this, we will do that,
9 we will have a trial, this is how we will proceed.
10
Now to suggest that because the Supreme Court
11 finally accepted Professor Kanth's brief in support of his
12 petition that changes things is disingenuous. It was the
13 third attempt by Professor Kanth to file that brief. The
14 first attempt pre-dated the hearing in front of Judge Uno and
15 Judge Hanson at least. It may not have predated the
16 scheduling telephone call with Judge Stirba. The respondent
17 and his attorney knew full well that the Professor was trying
18 to appeal the Tenth Circuit decision, that he was filing his
19 petition and memorandum, it was lodged with the court, it was
20 not docketed until April, but they knew full well this was
21 happening and they never once raised that as a possible
22 reason for the continuance of this case, for a stay of
23 proceedings. Instead, we set these dates and the court set
24 them with great prejudice. And that is reflected in the
25 order. The court said this will be the case, we will have a
20

1 trial. And not only that, Judge Uno also noted that if the
2 respondent failed to honor the scheduling order for discovery
3 and for the evaluation of the children, that the court could
4 revisit the issue of his default and appropriate sanctions.
5 That's specifically referred to in the court's order. That
6 is how certain we all wanted this. And I remember making
7 that plea to Judge Uno saying whatever we do and whenever we
8 do it, just make sure it's solid, that it's in place, and it
9 will not be tampered with. And that was the judge's intent
10 in entering that order.
11
Now, instead of coming to this Court before hand
12 and saying, as one would do under the rules of procedure if
13 requesting a protective order, which is really at least part
14 of what the respondent has asked in his pro se pleading, you
15 should do that before the date set for the response to the
16 discovery or your appearance at deposition, or any other act
17 that has been ordered. That didn't happen. All of those
18 dates have come and gone without even a letter from the
19 respondent saying, by the way, I don't think I'm bound by
20 this order that I stipulated to because I'm trying to file a
21 petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
22 Supreme Court. Instead he just doesn't follow through just
23 like he didn't follow through last October for the pretrial
24 settlement conference before Commissioner Evans which was
25 continued and postponed at the specific request of the
21

1 respondent to accommodate his travel schedule as he is now
2 teaching in Singapore.
3
So I would suggest, your Honor, that if that is
4 truly the argument here that somehow having a trial in this
5 case on custody and children-related issues will compromise
6 the petitioner's rights under the Hague Convention, then he
7 has already waived those rights, I don't believe that's a
8 legitimate argument in the first place, but if it is, then I
9 think the court can find clear waiver of those rights. And
10 that is different and separate from the type of acquiescence
11 addressed in the Frederick case and other cases which is
12 essentially a different kind of waiver. That's a consent to
13 the relocation of the children. I think it's pretty clear
14 here that Professor Kanth doesn't consent to that.
15
I would like to suggest to your Honor because I
16 believe the law of the case and also public policy suggests
17 that this matter be resolved entirely, or at least to the
18 extent that the Court feels comfortable resolving it. I
19 would ask the Court to leave the trial setting in place. And
20 even if the Court is persuaded by the respondent's argument
21 that the issues that are properly before this Court, the
22 issues over which the Court has undeniable jurisdiction, be
23 resolved at trial. And that the Court at least at that time
24 entertain whatever further evidence might be appropriate, and
25 fashion an order of custody and visitation. If it needs to
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1 be a temporary order until the Supreme Court makes a
2 decision, so be it. There's no reason we can't do that. The
3 Court has continuing jurisdiction for a reason. And the
4 continuing jurisdiction is to entertain changes in
5 circumstances. And there's absolutely no reason that we
6 can't proceed and get the best evidence possible, and let me
7 also add, your Honor, that Judge Hanson extended the
8 discovery time in this case right up until trial in order to
9 accommodate the objections of the respondent expressed
10 through his counsel that he lacked funds and time to do
11 things as agreed and as ordered by the court. Again at that
12 hearing there was no suggestion that the respondent was not
13 honoring this court's order because of some reading of the
14 Hague Convention. It was time and it was money. So Judge
15 Hanson said extend discovery up until trial, we want the best
16 evidence possible.
17
The fact that the respondent has failed to
18 participate in this case, virtually in any sense - any
19 meaningful sense - will not be a bar to introducing evidence
20 which will be sufficient for this Court to make whatever
21 ruling it needs to make on best interest of these children,
22 whether it is a provisional order pending the decision by the
23 Supreme Court, whether it is a modification or continuance of
24 the temporary order pending the same resolution of that
25 petition, or whether it is a final order with the right of
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1 the respondent to petition this court to modify that order
2 when the Supreme Court makes its decision, if that decision
3 is not rendered by the time of trial. Any one of those
4 resolutions, those provisional remedies would be
5 satisfactory, they would protect the respondent and we will
6 have sufficient evidence for the Court to make that decision.
7 That ought to take care of the respondent's concerns, and it
8 ought to take care of the Court's concerns over doing what's
9 right, seeing to the best interest of the children in some
10 fashion, and following through with what the court has now
11 ordered two and maybe three times.
12
Can I be of any help to the Court?
13
THE COURT: Tell me your view of things if in fact
14 we go ahead and do whatever is going to happen, and the
15 Supreme Court on August 15, says Judge Campbell and the Tenth
16 Circuit were wrong. Where would that place everyone?
17
MR. GREEN: I think -1 don't know to be honest
18 with you. But at a minimum this court would continue its
19 temporary order. There simply needs to be some ground rules
20 while these parties go through the process. And if a
21 temporary order is in place, then it clearly doesn't violate
22 the Hague Convention because it is not a decision on the
23 merits. And the Court could reserve that and call the
24 decision as to those issues, custody and visitation only,
25 custody only really, and in the unlikely event that the court
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1 adopted that petition and not violate the Hague Convention
2 even according to the respondent's argument. And then if the
3 court did not grant the petition, the provisional order would
4 simply say no change of circumstances, that's the order. If
5 the court did grant the petition, then either as a self6 executing order, the order would automatically say this is
7 deemed a temporary order, Professor Kanth is not prejudiced
8 in any manner, and that is the stipulation of the petitioner
9 right now and here today. That proceeding in that matter
10 will not be prejudicial to the petitioner and that can be by
11 stipulation and court order, and then it would simply go back
12 and wind its way through the courts if the court were to
13 grant that petition. I can see no prejudice for Professor
14 Kanth under those circumstances, and the children are
15 protected.
16
THE COURT: The only other question I suppose I
17 have, and you answered it, I'm not asking you to tell me
18 what, but we're talking about a custody situation without an
19 evaluation, without a psychological that was agreed to 20
MR. GREEN: Well, that's a problem.
21
THE COURT: Are you parties convinced that custody
22 decision ought to be made on what you're going to present?
23
MR. GREEN: What we will present, your Honor, is
24 the independent evaluation of Dr. Natalie Malovich, a child
25 psychologist, who has interviewed my client and the children.
25

1 It will not be custody evaluation. We will not have the
2 benefit of that kind of evidence because of the respondent's
3 behavior.
4
THE COURT: She's the person who was agreed to in
5 April.
6
MR. GREEN: That is correct. That is the person
7 elected by the respondent, elected without any reservation of
8 Hague Convention rights. We gave them a list of names and
9 they adopted Dr. Malovich. She has interviewed the children,
10 she has interviewed my client, she is awaiting the call of
11 Professor Kanth, he can still get in there. I happen to know
12 that Dr. Malovich is on a river trip this week, but shell be
13 back Monday and happy to work in this case and all that
14 Professor Kanth has to do is to show up and be evaluated and
15 the court, I'm convinced, will probably have sufficient
16 evidence to satisfy the court, and if not, then we'll do
17 something else and perhaps the court can once again try to
18 persuade the respondent that if he doesn't follow the court's
19 order, then his default will be entered. It would be very
20 unfortunate if there was any sort of a reward given to the
21 respondent for his behavior in this case, such as a
22 continuance or anything else that would reward his
23 recalcitrance and his disobedience to this court's order.
24 The suggestion that his attorney has not had time or he's not
25 familiar with this or he didn't understand that, I think is
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1 again too little and too late after we've stipulated and
2 after the court has ordered and after we really chiseled this
3 in stone - at least we thought we had. And if this - if we
4 can't stick to something like this, I have grave misgivings
5 of any hope of any compliance on the part of the respondent
6 as to any order this court might issue in the future.
7
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Green.
8
MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor.
9
THE COURT: Mr. Hettinger, do you want to reply?
10
MR. HETTINGER: I'm not sure if it will be
11 appropriate at some point in time 12
THE COURT: I did want to hear from her. I will do
13 that, counsel. Go ahead first.
14
MR. HETTINGER: [inaudible] in advance of that.
15 Thank you. Your Honor, I think that the circumstance that we
16 face here today and the arguments of Mr. Green illustrate
17 first and substantially why the ruling of Commissioner Arnett
18 was inappropriate. And again it's our position that the
19 Article 16 of the Hage Convention does not anywhere in it
20 contain any distinction between a temporary and a final
21 order. And since that was done, Dr. Kanth has, as I
22 indicated, been walking this legal tightrope. Some of the
23 things which - again as illustrated by the argument of Mr.
24 Green, some of the things which he was supposed to do in this
25 case, had he done them would then have been argued by Mr.
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1 Green if the Supreme Court gives him the opportunity as
2 illustrations of acquiescence. Mr. Green has already raised
3 that defense in the federal court proceeding. And so Dr.
4 Kanth is faced with the ultimate catch 22. If he
5 participates as ordered by this court, then he puts his risk
6 - or his Hague Convention petition at risk. Not knowing
7 whether ultimately the Supreme Court will reverse and enter a
8 ruling that Australia is the habitual residence of the
9 children and therefore the case should be heard in Australia
10 and the children should be returned there, or reverse and
11 send it back to the United States District Court for further
12 proceedings. That's the problem here. If he takes the
13 actions which the court wants him to take, and I can assure
14 you that my participation in the case and Dr. Kanth's
15 participation to the extent I'm familiar with it has been in
16 good faith subject to that risk and that catch 22.
17
There was a schedule set because we hoped that the
18 federal court proceeding would have run its course by that
19 point in time. We did not file for a stay based on that,
20 well, other than the previous stays. Actually if you look at
21 the court docket, Dr. Kanth has requested a stay on at least
22 two previous occasions in this case. But we did not file for
23 a stay because had we done so, Mr. Green would have stood up
24 in response to that argument and said your Honor, that's
25 premature, there's, you know, a ruling by the Tenth Circuit
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1 indicating that his case - or his petition is denied and
2 there's nothing pending before the Supreme Court. So as soon
3 as the petition for writ of certiorari was docketed with the
4 Supreme Court and the petition was perfected, Dr. Kanth
5 brought this - or prepared the documents and filed this
6 request for the stay.
7
Obviously just based on numbers alone, there are
8 difficult odds for him at the Supreme Court, but
9 nevertheless, the Supreme Court grants petitions for writ of
10 certiorari regularly. This is a unique case, we are not
11 aware of a case by a Hague Convention petitioner coming
12 before the Supreme Court previously, and it's our optimistic
13 belief that the petition will be granted and that subsequent
14 proceedings will lead to the reversal. And the whole point
15 of today is to urge the Court not to put Dr. Kanth in a
16 position where he has to make a final choice, where he has to
17 put his Hague Convention petition at risk by proceeding in
18 this case, or lose his right to proceed in this case. And we
19 think that that would not be fair to Dr. Kanth within the
20 structure of the Hague Convention, the UCCJA, and the federal
21 law on this subject. The whole purpose of the Hague
22 Convention is to prevent a person from being put in this
23 circumstance because the children are supposed to be returned
24 to the state from which they were abducted.
25
Let me just, because Mr. Green brought it up,
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1 indicate one word on the subject of the visitation and that
2 it was originally unrestricted. Dr. Kanth had his children
3 visiting with him at the Crystal Inn, they were playing in
4 the swimming pool when police arrived with a temporary
5 restraining order snatching the children back from him and
6 taking the children away from him based on unwarranted
7 allegations that were made in an affidavit. Dr. Kanth has
8 never done anything to suggest that he would abduct those
9 children, he's been here with them many times, and there was
10 no basis for that action or for the restrictions that have
11 been placed on him since then, but he has come on at least
12 two occasions since that trip to the United States, spent
13 time with his children in very restricted and limited
14 circumstances, has done so at great financial cost to him
15 because he's been here without leave, and solely because he
16 loves his children and he wants to be with them. That is the
17 whole reason that he has done what he's done up to this point
18 both in federal court and state court.
19
We would simply urge the Court as I previously
20 indicated that at this point in time, there ought to be stay
21 entered with regard to both the trial date and the discovery
22 proceedings because participation in the trial, even as
23 structured by Mr. Green, would then put at risk Dr. Kanth's
24 petition under the Hague Convention, and we would
25 respectfully urge the Court to make that ruling.
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1
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
2
Ms. Kawamura, do you want to be heard with respect
3 to the children?
4
MS. KAWAMURA: Does your Honor have particular
5 questions for me? I think that most of the argument today
6 has been primarily procedural.
7
THE COURT: Just how are things going the way they
8 are.
9
MS. KAWAMURA: It appears that things are going
10 quite well the way they are. I have not spoken with Dr.
11 Malovich. I had in the past communicated with their
12 therapist, Dr. Goldsmith, as well as their pediatrician and
13 their teachers, and have visited them at their home twice 14 for the first time for about an hour and the second time
15 about two hours - and I've also spoken with Ms. Kanth and
16 Professor Kanth separately and it doesn't appear there are
17 any problems with the status quo. I think the girls have
18 been living with their mother and their maternal grandparents
19 for about two years - a little over - since about March, so
20 as of March it would have been two years.
21
THE COURT: Okay, I don't have any further
22 questions. Is there anything else you want to advise the
23 Court of?
24
MS. KAWAMURA: Nothing [inaudible], your Honor.
25
THE COURT: Okay.
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1
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, would it be appropriate for
2 me to have the last run on my motion?
3
THE COURT: You have a motion to compel, while you
4 basically addressed it, yeah.
5
MR. GREEN: I will be very brief. I understand the
6 Court's hesitancy letting me get it started again. If I can
7 direct the Court's attention to Exhibit C attached to our
8 response, and I think counsel actually offered another copy
9 to the Court, precisely page three, paragraph 10. I think
10 this will illustrate the frustration that the petitioner has
11 with this kind of a motion. Obviously the motion was brought
12 once before and I was looking for this and I couldn't find it
13 until just now, and my apologies to the Court from bringing
14 it up, but I stipulated back in January of 2000 that if the
15 stay were denied, that we would not raise this issue of
16 acquiescence. And that's exactly what paragraph 10 says.
17 That if the stay is denied, that the appearance of the
18 respondent in these proceedings will not be relied upon by my
19 client in the appeal in the federal court action as a basis
20 for acquiescence. Furthermore, we haven't relied on it. We
21 relied upon the letter that Professor Kanth wrote shortly
22 after the parties' separation, but we have not relied upon
23 his participation in this case in our responsive memorandum
24 filed with the United States Supreme Court. I would not do
25 that. And because we wanted to reassure the respondent that
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1 that is not a problem, we entered into a stipulation at that
2 time, and I've offered it again today. There is no risk to
3 the respondent. The law of this case is that his
4 participation in this case may not be grounds to support a
5 finding of acquiescence in the federal court case. There are
6 other reasons the respondent wants this stay. Thank you.
7
MR. HETTINGER: Your Honor, that's a new point.
8 May I have one word with regard to it?
9
THE COURT: Yes.
10
MR. HETTINGER: First of all, the language of
11 paragraph 10 is very limited. Respondent's appearance in
12 this action in a filing of a pleading in response to the
13 petition shall not be deemed in acquiescence. Secondly, even
14 if that were broadly worded, it's our belief that the parties
15 cannot go to federal court and say by the way, we stipulated
16 that the things I did in the state court proceeding do not
17 constitute acquiescence. That will be - determination will
18 be made by an independent judicial tribunal, they will look
19 at the facts and that issue has already been raised. I agree
20 with Mr. Green that he has not pointed to this point to
21 anything other than the letter, but that issue is raised and
22 it's Dr. Kanth's very substantial concern that in future
23 proceedings in federal court that would become a concern.
24
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Give me just a
25 moment. I'm just again reading the Tenth Circuit opinion. I
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1 read it before along with Judge Campbell's and I just wanted a
2 chance to review it.
3
Well, counsel, this isn't easy, because I can
4 certainly understand the respondent saying, you know, there may
5 be a ruling in a couple of weeks and that will end it. On the
6 other hand, it seems to me that we just don't have any idea
7 when the Supreme Court may act. So I'm going to deny the
8 respondent's motion for a stay of proceedings.
9
This motion of acquiescence - it seems pretty clear
10 to me, Mr. Hettinger, that Mr. Green has indicated he is not
11 going to rely on anything that happens from now until the trial
12 date to argue that the Hague Convention does not apply. And I
13 think he would be wrong if he did that. For your client to
14 sometime go into federal court and answer an allegation that he
15 gave up any rights under the Hague Convention by saying I did
16 what the state district court judge told me to do. The state
17 district court judge ordered me to file interrogatories, I
18 agreed and the judge ordered me to undergo an evaluation, the
19 judge ordered me to participate and pay for a custody
20 evaluation, and so I did those things. To argue that that is
21 acquiescence in something that would defeat any rights under
22 the Hague Convention, I think would be bad faith on behalf of
23 Mr. Green, and I don't think he'll do it. And it would be an
24 extremely weak argument I think, so I don't think there's any
25 acquiescence by following the orders of the court in this
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1 matter. The alternative is simply not to come at all. And I
2 don't think that's required. I think he can do as he's done.
3 He can say I disagree with the court, I don't think the court
4 has jurisdiction, but if the court's ordering me to do items
5 one through three, I'll do those, but respectfully I don't
6 think the court can do that. But that will not, I think,
7 amount to acquiescence.
8
So I don't -1 certainly don't say, counsel, that
9 he's acting in bad faith, but I think it's misplaced faith.
10 I've read the Tenth Circuit opinion again and Judge Campbell's
11 opinion and I think it's just too tenuous to believe that they
12 are wrong and that the Supreme Court will somehow rule in his
13 favor. So I don't think that for that reason the Hague
14 Convention prohibits this court from going forward. The
15 previous judges have ruled in this case that there is
16 jurisdiction in this matter, it is here, federal courts have
17 ruled that this is primary residence and there is jurisdiction
18 in this court. And so we'll go ahead with the scheduled
19 proceedings on June 18.
20
As far as petitioner's motion to compel, again Mr.
21 Hettinger, I'll leave it to you and your client - there's
22 already been an order and I don't think it's going to do any
23 good to order it again. There has been an order that he
24 participate in those things, the evaluation and according to
25 counsel there's still time for that if he cares to do it, his
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1 examination. I suppose his deposition won't be able to be
2 accomplished, but that's up to you if you want to try.
3
So I believe the Court has jurisdiction to deal with
4 everything, and I'll await and make a decision later on whether
5 I adopt Mr. Green's suggestion of making any custody awards
6 provisional, but I certainly believe we can go ahead and hear
7 the evidence, make whatever rulings are appropriate and founded
8 on the facts, and then deal with the Supreme Court ruling if
9 that eventuality occurs in your client's favor. I suspect 10 and I ask both of you at least in an around about way if the
11 Supreme Court ruled after a trial in this matter that this
12 court had no jurisdiction, I suspect we might be able to honor
13 that and deal with it. But I think we can still go ahead and
14 do that and have a hearing scheduled for the date it is
15 currently scheduled. So I'll deny respondent's motion. I
16 think I just won't even enter a ruling on the petitioner's
17 motion to compel because it's already been ordered, and I think
18 it's simply then your tactical decision as to whether you want
19 certain evidence before the court on custody matters or not.
20
MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor.
21
THE COURT: Mr. Green, can I get you to prepare that
22 order?
23
MR. GREEN: I will.
24
THE COURT: Anything further?
25
MR. HETTINGER: Not that I'm aware of, your Honor.
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1
THE COURT: All right, thank you. We'll be in
2 recess.
3
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
4
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ADDENDUM " D "

Pinal Act of the Fourteenth Session
The undersigned. Delegates of the Governments of Argentina
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, /Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the
Arab Republic of Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Surinam,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Venezuela,
and the Representatives of the Government of Brazil, the Holy
See, Hungary, Monaco, Morocco, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and Uruguay participating by invitation or as Observer,
convened at the Hague on the 6th October 1980, at the invitation
of the Government of the Netherlands, in the Fourteenth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Following the deliberations laid down in the records of the
meetings, have decided to submit to their Governments-A.

HAGUE CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL IAW

The following draft Conventions--

I.
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
The States signatory to the present Convention,

FOURTEENTH SESSION
FINAL ACT
(Excerpts containing the text of
the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction and the recommended
form for the Request for Return)

Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount
importance in matters relating to their custody.
Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful
effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish
procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their
habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of
access.
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have
agreed upon the following provisions-CHAPTER I--SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article 1
The objects of the present Convention are-(a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to
or retained in any contracting State; and
(b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law
of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting States.
Article 2

Gl

G2

>ntracting States shall take all appropriate measures to secure
Lthin their territories the implementation of the objects of the
>nvention. For this purpose they shall use the most expeditious
rocedures available.

having autonomous territorial organizations shall be free to
appoint more than one Central Authority and to specify the
territorial extent of their powers. Where a State has appointed
more than one Central Authority, it shall designate the Central
Authority to which applications may be addressed for transmission
to the appropriate Central Authority within that State.

rticle 3

Article 7

he removal or the retention of a child is to be considered

Central Authorities shall co-operate with each other and promote
co-operation amongst the competent authorities
in their
respective States to secure the prompt return of children and to
achieve the other object's of this Convention.

rongful where-a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person,
n institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under
he law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
mmediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were
ctually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so
xercised but for the removal or retention.
'he rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may
irise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial
>r administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having
Legal effect under the law of that State.
article 4
The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually
resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of
custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply
when the child attains the age of 16 years.

In particular, either directly or through any intermediary, they
shall take all appropriate measures-(a) to discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully
removed or retained;
(b) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to
interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional
measures;
(c) to secure the voluntary return of
an amicable resolution of the issues;

the child or to bring about

(d) to exchange, where desirable, information relating to the
social background of the child;
(e) to provide information of a general character as to the law of
their State in connection with the application of the Convention;

For the purposes of this Convention--

(f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or
administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of
the child and, in a proper case, to make arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access;

(a) 'rights of custody' shall include rights relating to the care
of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to
determine the child's place of residence;

(g) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate
the provision of legal aid and advice, including the participation
of legal counsel, and advisers;

(b) 'rights of access' shall include the right to take a child for
a limited period of time to a place other than the child's
habitual residence.

(h) to provide such administrative arrangements as may be
necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child;

Article 5

CHAPTER II--CENTRAL AUTHORITIES

(i) to keep each other informed with respect to the operation of
this Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any
obstacles to its application.

Article 6

CHAPTER III--RETURN OF CHILDREN

A Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority to

Article 8

discharge the duties which are imposed by the Convention upon such
authorities.
Federal States, States with more than one system of law or States

G3

G4

person, institution or other body claiming that a child has
i removed or retained in breach of custody rights may apply
ier to the Central Authority of the child's habitual residence
o the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for
stance in securing the return of the child
application shall contain-information concerning the identity of the applicant, of the
Ld and of the person alleged to have removed or retained the
Ld;
where available, the date of birth of the child;
the grounds on which the applicant's claim for return of the

The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States
shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.
If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not
reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement
of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the
requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central
Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to
request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is
received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that
Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of
the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.
Article 12

ld is based;
all available information relating to the whereabouts of the
ld and the identity of the person with whom the child is
sumed to be. The application may be accompanied or supplemented

Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of
Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings
before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting
State where the child is, a period of less than one year has
elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the
authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.

an authenticated copy of any relevant decision or agreement;

The judicial or administrative authority, even where the
proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period
of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also
order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the
child is now settled in its new environment.

a certificate or an affidavit emanating from a Central
hority, or other competent authority of the State of the
Id'8 habitual residence, or from a qualified person, concerning
• relevant law of that State;
any other relevant document.
:icle 9
the Central Authority which receives an application referred to
Article 8 has reason to believe that the child is in another
atracting State, it shall directly and without delay transmit
e application to the Central Authority of that Contracting State
a inform the requesting Central Authority, or the applicant, as
e case may be
tide 10
e Central Authority of the State where the child is shall take
cause to be taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain
e voluntary return of the child.

Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested
State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to
another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the
application for the return of the child
Article 13
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the
judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not
bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution
or other body which opposes its return establishes that-(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the
person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights
at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order
the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to
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being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at
which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the
judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account
the information relating to the social background of the child
provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of
the child's habitual residence.
Article 14

The provisions of this Chapter do not limit the power of a
judicial or administrative authority to order the return of the
child at any time.
Article 19
A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the
child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of
any custody issue.
Article 20

In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or
retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or
administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice
directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative
decisions, formally recognized or not in the State of the habitual
residence of the child, without recourse to the specific
procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of
foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.

The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be
refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
CHAPTER IV--RIGHTS OP ACCESS
Article 21

Article 15
The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State
may, prior to the making of an order for the return of the child,
request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the
State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other
determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within
the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, where such a decision
or determination may be obtained in that State. The Central
Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as practicable
assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination.

An application to make
the effective exercise
Central Authorities of
an application for the

arrangements for organizing or, securing
of rights of access may be presented to the
the Contracting States in the same way as
return of a child*

The Central Authorities are bound by the obligations of
co-operation which are set forth in Article 7 to promote the
peaceful enjoyment of access rights and the fulfillment of any
conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject.
The Central Authorities shall take steps to remove, as far as
possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.

Article 16
After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a
child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative
authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been
removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the
merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the
child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an
application under this Convention is not lodged within a
reasonable time following receipt of the notice.
Article 17
The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given
in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State shall not
be a ground for refusing to return a child under this Convention,
but the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested
State may take account of the reasons for that decision in
applying this Convention.
Article 10

G7

G8

The Central Authorities, either directly or through
intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of
proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting these rights
and securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of
these rights may be subject.
CHAPTER V--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 22
No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required
to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses in the judicial or
administrative proceedings falling within the scope of this
Convention.
Article 23
No legalization or similar formality may be required in the
context of this Convention.

may require the payment of the expenses incurred or to be incurred
in implementing the return of the child.
However, a Contracting State may, by making a reservation in
accordance with Article 42, declare that it shall not be bound to
assume any costs referred to in the preceding paragraph resulting
from the participation of legal counsel or advisers or from court
proceedings, except insofar as those costs may be covered by it9
system of legal aid and advice.
Upon ordering the return of a child or issuing an order concerning
rights of access under this Convention, the judicial or
administrative authorities may, where appropriate, direct the
person who removed or retained the child, or who prevented the
exercise or rights of access, to pay necessary expenses incurred
by or on behalf of the applicant, including travel expenses, any
costs incurred or payments made for locating the child, the costs
of legal representation of
the applicant, and those of returning
the child.

Article 24
Any application, communication or other document sent to the
Central Authority of the requested State shall be in the
original language, and shall be accompanied by a translation into
the official language or one of the official languages of the
requested State or, where that is not feasible, a translation into
French or English.
However, a Contracting State may, by making a reservation in
accordance with Article 42, object to the use of either French or
English, but not both, in any application, communication or other
document sent to its Central Authority.
Article 25
Nationals of the Contracting States and persons who are habitually
resident within those States shall be entitled in matters
concerned with the application of this Convention to legal aid and
advice in any other Contracting State on the same conditions as if
they themselves were nationals of and habitually resident in that
State.
Article 26
Each Central Authority shall bear its own costs in applying this
Convention.
Central Authorities and other public services of Contracting
States shall not impose any charges in relation to applications
submitted under this convention. In particular, they may not
require any payment from the applicant towards the costs and
expenses of the proceedings or, where applicable, those arising
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article 27
"Then It is manifest that the requirements of this Convention are
lot fulfilled or that the application is otherwise not well
founded, a Central Authority is not bound to accept the
application. In that case, the Central Authority shall forthwith
Inform the applicant or the Central Authority through which the
application was submitted, as the case may be, of its reasons.

as referring to the legal system specified by the law of that
State.
Article 33
A State within which different territorial units have their own
rules of law in respect of custody of children shall not be bound
to apply this Convention where a State with a unified system of
law would not be bound to do so.

Article 2 8
K Central Authority may require t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n be
accompanied by a w r i t t e n a u t h o r i s a t i o n empowering i t t o act on
behalf of the a p p l i c a n t , or t o d e s i g n a t e a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e so t o
act.
Urticle 29
This Convention shall not preclude any person, institution or body
who claims that there has been a breach of custody or access
eights within the meaning of Article 3 or 21 from applying
directly to the judicial or administrative authorities of a
Contracting State, whether or not under the provisions of this
Convention.
Article 30
Any application submitted to the Central Authorities or directly
to the judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting
State in accordance with the terms of this Convention, together
with documents and any other information appended thereto or
provided by a Central Authority, shall be admissible in the courts
or administrative authorities of the Contracting States.
Article 31
In relation to a State which in matters of custody of children has
two or more systems of law applicable in different territorial
units-(a) any reference to habitual residence in that State shall be
construed as referring to habitual residence in a territorial unit
of that Statelb) any reference to the law of the State of habitual residence
shall be construed as referring to the law of the territorial unit
in that State where the child habitually resides.
Article 32
In relation to a State which in matters of custody of children has
two or more systems of law applicable to different categories of
persons, any reference to the law of that State shall be construed
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This Convention shall take priority in matters within its scope
over the Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the powers of
authorities and the law applicable in respect of the protection of
minors, as between Parties to both Conventions. Otherwise the
present Convention shall not restrict the application of an
international instrument in force between the State of origin and
the State addressed or other law of the State addressed for the
purposes of obtaining the return of a child who has been
wrongfully removed or retained or of organizing access rights.
Article 35

between the acceding State and such Contracting States as will
have declared their acceptance of the accession. Such a
declaration will also have to be made by any Member State
ratifying, accepting or approving the Convention after an
accession. Such declaration shall be deposited at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; this Ministry
shall forward, through diplomatic channels, a certified copy to
each of the Contracting States.
The Convention will enter into force as between the acceding State
and the State that has declared its acceptance of the accession on
the first day of the third calendar month after the deposit of the
declaration of acceptance.

This Convention shall apply as between Contracting States only to
wrongful removals or retentions occurring after its entry into
force in those States.
Where a declaration has been made under Article 39 or 40, the
reference in the preceding paragraph to a Contracting State shall
be taken to refer to the territorial unit or units in relation to
which this Convention applies.
Article 36
Nothing in this convention shall prevent two or more Contracting
States, in order to limit the restrictions to which the return of
the child may be subject, from agreeing among themselves to
derogate from any provisions of this Convention which may imply
such a restriction.
CHAPTER VI--FINAL CLAUSES
Article 37
The Convention shall be open for signature by the States which
were Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
at the time Of its Fourteenth Session.
It shall be ratified, accepted or approved and the instruments of
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Article 38
Any other State may accede to the Convention.
The instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for a State acceding to it
on the first day of the third calendar month after the deposit of
its instrument of accession.
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Article 3 9
Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, declare that the Convention shall extend to
all the territories for the international relations of which it is
responsible, or to one or more of them. Such a declaration shall
take effect at the time the Convention enters into force for that

The Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the
third calendar month after the deposit of the third instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in
Articles 37 and 38.

State.
Such declaration, as well as any subsequent extension, shall be
notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the

1. for each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to
it subsequently, on the first day of the third calendar month
after the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession;

Netherlands.
Article 40
If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which
different systems of law are applicable in relation to matters
dealt with in this Convention, it may at the time of signature,
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession declare that this
Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to
one or more of them and may modify this declaration by submitting

Thereafter the Convention shall enter

2. for any territory or territorial unit to which the Convention
has been extended in conformity with Article 3 9 or 40, on the
first day of the third calendar month after the notification
referred to in that Article.

another declaration at any time.
Any such declaration shall be notified to the ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and shall state
expressly the territorial units to which the Convention applies.
Article 41
Where a Contracting state has a system of government under which
executive, judicial and legislative powers are distributed between
central and other authorities within that State, its signature or
ratification, acceptance or approval of, or accession to this
Convention, or its making of any declaration in terms of Article
40 shall carry
no implication as to the internal distribution of powers within
that State.
Article 42
Any State may, not later than the tine of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, or at the time of maVing a
declaration in terms of Article 3 9 or 40, make one or both of the
reservations provided for in Article 24 and Article 26, third
paragraph. No other reservation shall be permitted.
Any State may at any time withdraw a reservation it has wade. The
withdrawal shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The reservation shall cease to have effect on the first day of the
third calendar month after the notification referred to in the
preceding paragraph.
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rticle 44
he Convention shall remain in force for five years from the date
f its entry into force in accordance with the first paragraph of
rticle 43 even for States which subsequently have ratified,
ccepted, approved it or acceded to it. If there has been no
enunciation, it shall be renewed tacitly every five years.
axy denunciation shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign
iffairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands at least six months
>efore the expiry of the five year period. It may be limited to
rertain of the territories or territorial 'units to which the
:onvention applies. * The denunciation shall have effect only as
regards the State which has notified it. The Convention shall
remain in force for the other Contracting States.
article 45
rhe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
shall notify the States Members of the Conference, and the States
rtiich have acceded in accordance with Article 38, of the
following-1. the signatures and ratifications, acceptances and approvals
referred to in Article 37;
2. the accessions referred to in Article 38;
3. the date on which the Convention enters into force in
accordance with Article 43;
4. the extensions referred to in Article 39;
5. the declarations referred to in Articles 38 and 40;
6. the reservations referred to in Article 24 and Article 26,
third paragraph, and the withdrawals referred to in Article 42;
7. the denunciations referred to in Article 44.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto,
have signed this Convention.
Done at The Hague, on the 25th day of October 1980 in the English
and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, in a
single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and of which a
certified copy shall be sent, through diplomatic channels, to each
of the States Members of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law at the date of its Fourteenth Session.
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ADDENDUM " E "

Public Law 100-300
100th Congress
(H.R. 3971, 29 Apr 19B8J
42 USC 11601 et seq
An Act

(B) the need for uniform international interpretation of the
Convention.
(4) The Convention and this Act empower courts in the United
States to determine only rights under the Convention And not ihn
merits of any underlying child custody claims.

To establish procedures to implement the Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on
October 25, 1980, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
|
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "International Child Abduction
Remedies Act".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS

[42 USC 11601J

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. (42 USC 11602]
For the purposes of this Act(1) the term "applicant" means any person who, pursuant to the
Convention, files an application with the United States Central
Authority or a Central Authority of any other plarty to the
Convention for the return of a child alleged to have been
wrongfully removed or retained or for arrangements for organizing
or securing the effective exercise of rights of access pursuant
to the Convention;

(a) Findings.—The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The international abduction or wrongful retention of children
is harmful to their well-being.
(2) Persons should not be permitted to obtain custody of children
by virtue of their wrongful removal or retention.
(3) International abductions and retentions of children are
increasing, and only concerted cooperation pursuant to an
international agreement can effectively combat this problem.
(4) The Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980, establishes
legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of children who
have been wrongfully removed or retained, as well as for securing
the exercise of visitation rights. Children who are wrongfully
removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention are to
be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set
forth in the Convention applies. The Convention provides a sound
treaty framework to help resolve the problem of international
abduction and retention of children and will deter such wrongful
removals and retentions.

(2) the term "Convention" means the Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on
October 25, 1980;
(3) the terra "Parent Locator Service* means the service
established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under
section 453 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 653);
(4) the term "Petitioner" means any person who, in accordance
with this Act, files a petition in court seeking relief under the
Convention;
(5) the term "person" includes any individual, institution, or
other legal entity or other legal entity or body;
(6) the term "respondent" means any person against whose
interests a petition is filed in court, in accordance with this
Act, which seeks relief under the Convention;
(7) the term "rights of access" means visitation rights;
(8) the term "State" means any of the several States, the
District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States; and

(b) DECLARATIONS. -The Congress makes the following declarations:
(1) It is the purpose of this Act to establish procedures for the
implementation of the Convention in the United States.

o r t h e C FF edd ^ ail U Grolvte e d S C a t e S C e n t r a l ^ h o r i t y " •••"» the agency
9ecE!8n ? 5F
m m e n t designated by the President under

(2) The provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in lieu
of the provisions of the Convention.
(3) In enacting this Act the Congress recognizesS*C

4. JUDICIAL REMEDIES. (42 USC 11603,

(A) the international character of the Convention; and
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exercise its jurisdiction In the place where the child Is located
at the time the petition is filed.

<h) REMEDIES UNDER THE CONVENTION NOT EXCLUSIVE.-The remedies
established by the Convention and this Act shall be in addition
to remedies available under other laws or International
agreements.
SEC. 5. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES. (42 USC 11604)

(c) NOTICE.-Notice of an action brought under subsection (b)
shall be given in accordance with the applicable law governing
notice in interstate child custody proceedings.
(d) DETERMINATION OF CASE.-The court in which an action is
brought under subsection (b) shall decide the case in accordance
with the Convention.

(e) BURDENS OF PROOF.-(1) A petitioner in an action brought under
subsection (b) shall establish by a preponderance of the
evidence(A) in the case of an action for the return of a child, that the
child has been wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning
of the Convention; and
(B) in the case of an action for arrangements for organizing or
securing the effective exercise of rights of access, that the
petitioner has such rights.
(2) In the case of an action for the return of a child, a
respondent who opposes the return of the child has the burden of
establishing(A) by clear and convincing evidence that one of the exceptions
set forth in article 13b or 20 of the Convention applies; and
(B) by a preponderance of the evidence that any other exception
set forth in article 12 or 13 of the Convention applies.
(f) APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION.-For purposes of any action
brought under this Act(1) the term "authorities", as used in article 15 of the
Convention to refer to the authorities of the state of the
habitual residence of a child, includes courts and appropriate
government agencies;
(2) the terms "wrongful removal or retention" and "wrongfully
removed or retained", as used In the Convention, include a
removal or retention of a child before the entry of a custody
order regarding that child; and
(3) the term "commencement of proceedings", as used in article 12
of the Convention, means, with respect to the return of a child
located in the United States, the filing of a petition in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(<j) ^ W ^ A l T % p 9 X C ^ ^ V ^ a i faith and. credit-shail be-' *
accqrogj^jffi^fe^
Stages Jwdrthe courts of the United
.Sta^e^'j^p^J^fi^u^gSent of any other such court ordering or
denyingMAe 'return of a child, pursuant to the Convention, in an
action brought under this Act.
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(a) AUTHORITY OF COURTS.-In furtherance of the objectives of
article 7(b) and other provisions of the Convention, and subject

to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, any court
exercising jurisdiction of an action brought under* section 4 (b)
of this Act may take or cause to be taken measures under Federal
or State law, as appropriate, to protect the well-being of the
child involved or to prevent the further removal or concealment
before the final disposition of the petition.
(b) LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY.-No court exercising jurisdiction of
an action brought under section 4(b) may, under subsection (a) of
this section, order a child removed from a person having physical
control of the child unless the applicable requirements of State
law are satisfied.

SEC. 6. ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENTS. (42 USC 11605)
With respect to any application to the United States Central
Authority, or any petition to a court under section 4, which
seeks relief under the Convention, or any other documents or
information included with such application or petition or
provided after such submission which relates to the application
or petition, as the case may be, no authentication of such
application, petition, document, or information shall be required
in order for the application, petition, document, or information
to be admissible in court.
SEC. 7. UNITED STATES CENTRAL AUTHORITY. [42 USC 11606)
(a) DESIGNATION.-The President shall designate a Federal agency
to serve as the Central Authority for the United States under the
Convention.
(b) FUNCTIONS.-The functions of the United States Central
Authority are those ascribed to the Central Authority by the
Convention and this Act.
(c) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.-The United States Central Authority is
authorized to issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out its functions under the Convention and this Act.
(d) OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM PARENT LOCATOR SERVICE.The United
States Central Authority may, to the extent authorized by the
Social Security Act, obtain information from the Parent Locator
Service.
SEC. 6. COSTS AND FEES. (42 USC 11607)
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(a) ADMINISTRATIVE C O S T S . -No department, agency, or
instrumentality of the Federal Government or of any State or
local government may impose on an applicant any fee in relation
to the administrative processing of applications submitted under
the Convention.
(b) COSTS INCURRED IN CIVIL ACTIONS.-(I) Petitioners may be
required to bear the costs of legal counsel or advisors, court
costs incurred in connection with their petitions, and travel
costs for the return of the child involved and any accompanying
persons, except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(2) Subject to paragraph (3), legal fees or court costs incurred
in connection with an action brought under section 4 shall be
borne by the petitioner unless they are covered by payments from
federal State, or local legal assistance or other programs.
(3) Any court* ordering the return of a child pursuant to an
action brought under section 4 shall order the respondent to pay
necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner,
including court costs, legal fees, foster home or other care
during the course of proceedings in the action, and

transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless
the respondent establishes that such order would be clearly
inappropriate.
SEC. 9. COLLECTION, MAINTENANCE, AND DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION. 142 USC 11608J
(a) IN GENERAL.-In performing its functions under the Convention,
the United States Central Authority may, under such conditions as
the Central Authority prescribes by regulation, but subject to
subsection (c), receive from or transmit to any department,
agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government or of any
State or foreign government, and receive from or transmit to any
applicant, petitioner, or respondent, information necessary to
locate a child or for the purpose of otherwise implementing the
Convention with respect to a child, except that the United States
Central Authority(1) may receive such information from a Federal or State
department, agency, or instrumentality only pursuant to
applicable Federal and State statutes; and

d e p a r t m e n t , a g e n c y , o r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e
w h e t h e r the i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u e s t e d is c o n t a i n e d in any such files
o r r e c o r d s . If s u c h s e a r c h d i s c l o s e s the i n f o r m a t i o n requested,
the h e a d of s u c h d e p a r t m e n t , agency, o r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y s h a l l
i m m e d i a t e l y t r a n s m i t s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
C e n t r a l A u t h o r i t y , e x c e p t that a n y s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n the

disclosure of which(1) would adversely affect the national security interests of the
United States or the law enforcement Interests of United States
or of any State; or
(2) would be prohibited by section 9 of title 13, United States
enforcement Code;
i

shall not be transmitted to the Central Authority. The head of
such department, agency, or instrumentality shall, immediately

upon completion of the requested search, notify the Central
Authority of the results of the search, and whether an exception
set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) applies. In the event that the
United States Central Authority receives information and the
appropriate Federal or State department, agency, or
instrumentality thereafter notifies the Central Authority that an
exception set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) applies to that
information, the Central Authority may not disclose that
information under subsection (a) .
(d) INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM PARENT LOCATOR SERVICE. -To the
extent that information which the United States Central Authority
is authorized to obtain under the provisions of subsection (c)
can be obtained through the Parent Locator Service, the United
States Central Authority shall first seek to obtain such
information from the Parent Locator Service, before requesting
such information directly under the provisions of subsection (c)
of this section.
(e) RECORDKEEPING.-The United States Central Authority shall
maintain appropriate records concerning its activities and the
disposition of cases brought to its attention.
SEC. 10. INTERAGENCY COORDINATING GROUP. (42 USC 11609)

(2) may transmit any information received under this subsection
notwithstanding any provision of law other than this Act.
(b) REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION.-Requests for information under this
section shall be submitted in such manner and form as the United
States Central Authority may prescribe by regulation and shall be
accompanied or supported by such documents as the United States
Central Authority may require.
(c) RESPONSIBILITY O F GOVERNMENT ENTITIES.-Whenever any
department, agency, or instrumental of the United States or of
any State receives a request from the United States Central
Authority for information authorized to be provided to such
Central Authority under subsection (a), the head of such
department, agency, or instrumentality shall promptly cause a
search to be made of the files and records maintained by such
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The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and the Attorney General shall designate Federal
employees and may, from time to time, designate private citizens
to serve on an interagency coordinating group to monitor the
operation of the Convention and to provide advice on its
implementation to the United States Central Authority and other
Federal agencies. This group shall meet from time to time at the
request of the United States Central Authority. The agency in
which the United States Central Authority is located is
authorized to reimburse such private citizens for travel and
other expenses incurred in participating at meetings of the
interagency coordinating group at rates not to exceed those
authorized under subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title 5, United
States Code, for employees of agencies.

H6

SEC* 11. AGREEMENT FOR USE OF PARENT LOCATOR SERVICE IN
DETERMINING WHEREABOUTS OF PARENT OR CHILD,
Section 463 of the Social Security Act (42 U,S.C. 663) is
amended(1) by striking "under this section" in subsection (b) and
inserting "under subsection (a)";
(2) by striking "under this section" where it first appears in
subsection (c) and inserting "under subsection (a), (b), or (e)";
and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
" (e) The Secretary shall enter* into an agreement with the Central
Authority designated by the President in accordance with section
7 of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, under which
the services of the Parent Locator Service established under
section 453 shall be made available to such Central Authority
upon its request for the purpose of locating any parent or child
on behalf of an applicant to such Central Authority within the
meaning of section 3(1) of that Act. The Parent Locator Service
shall charge no fees for services requested pursuant to this
subsection.".
SEC. 12. AUTHORISATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. (42 USC 116101
There are authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year such
sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
Convention and this Act.
Approved April 29, 1988.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-H.R. 3971:
HOUSE REPORTS: No. 100-525 (Coram, on the Judiciary).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol, 134 (1988):
Mar. 28, considered and passed House.
Apr, 12, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Apr. 25, House concurred in Senate amendment.
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ADDENDUM " F "

UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT

SECTION 1. [Purposes of Act; Construction of Provisions.]
(a) The general purposes of this Act are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of
children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a
custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the
interest of the child;

(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place
ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest
connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts
of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family
have a closer connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to
obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state
insofar as feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned
with the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(b) This Act shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this
section.
SECTION 2. [Definitions.] As used in this Act:
(1) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to
custody or visitation rights with respect to a child;
(2) "custody determination" means a court decision and court orders and
instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation rights;
it does not include a decision relating to child support or any other monetary
obligation of any person;

(3) "custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a custody determination
is one of several issues, such as an action for divorce or separation, and
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includes child neglect and dependency proceedings;
(4) "decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determination contained in a
judicial decree or order made in a custody proceeding, and includes an initial
decree and a modification decree;
(5) "home state" means the state in which the child immediately preceding the
time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent,
for at least 6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months
old the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons
mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted
as part of the 6-month or other period;
(6) "initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning a particular
child;
(7) "modification decree" means a custody decree which modifies or replaces a
prior decree, whether made by the court which rendered the prior decree or by
another court;
(8) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child;
(9) "person acting as parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has
physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court
or claims a right to custody; and
(10) "state" means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
SECTION 3. [Jurisdiction.]
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within 6 months before
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State because
of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this
State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least
one contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is
available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is
otherwise neglected [or dependent]; or

(4)(i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or
another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
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State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume
jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence in
this State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child
custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
SECTION 4. [Notice and Opportunity to be Heard.] Before making a decree under
this Act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously
terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of
these persons is outside this State, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be
given pursuant to section 5.
SECTION 5. [Notice to Persons Outside this State; Submission to Jurisdiction.]
(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this
State shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice,
and may be:
(1) by personal delivery outside this State in the manner prescribed for service
of process within this State;
(2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is
made for service of process in that place in an action in any of its courts of
general jurisdiction;
(3) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a
receipt; or
(4) as directed by the court [including publication, if other means of
notification are ineffective].
(b) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, or delivered, [or last
published] at least [10, 2 0] days before any hearing in this State.
(c) Proof of service outside this State may be made by affidavit of the
individual who made the service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of this
State, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place
in which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt
signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(d) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECTION 6. [Simultaneous Proceedings in Other States.]

(a) A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if
at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the
child was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction
substantially in conformity with this Act, unless the proceeding is stayed by
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the court of the other state because this State is a more appropriate forum or
for other reasons.
(b) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine
the pleadings and other information supplied by the parties under section 9 and
shall consult the child custody registry established under section 16 concerning
the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child in other states. If the
court has reason to believe that proceedings may be pending in another state it
shall direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or other appropriate
official of the other state.
(c) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a
proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state
before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and
communicate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end
that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that
information be exchanged in accordance with sections 19 through 22. If a court
of this State has made a custody decree before being informed of a pending
proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court of
the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding was commenced in another
state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to
the end that the issues may be litigated in the more appropriate forum.
SECTION 7. [Inconvenient Forum.]
(a) A court which has jurisdiction under this Act to make an
modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction
making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum
determination under the circumstances of the case and that a
state is a more appropriate forum.

initial or
any time before
to make a custody
court of another

(b) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or
upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the
child.
(c) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if
it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For
this purpose it may take into account the following factors, among others:
(1) if another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) if another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or
with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in
another state;
(4) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate;
and
(5) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene
any of the purposes stated in section 1.
(d) Before determining whether to decline or rebain jurisdiction the court may
communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that
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jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum
will be available to the parties.
(e) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it
may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions which may be just
and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent
and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum.
(f) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if a
custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another
proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
(g) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may
require the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs
of the proceedings in this State, necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be
made to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(h) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall
inform the court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact or, if the
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known,
shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate
official for forwarding to the appropriate court.
(i) Any communication received from another state informing this State of a
finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this State is the more
appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate
court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this State shall inform the
original court of this fact.
SECTION 8. [Jurisdiction Declined by Reason of Conduct.]

(a) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from
another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may
decline to exercise jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the
circumstances.
(b) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise
its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner,
without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the
child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has
improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of
physical custody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a
custody decree of another state the court may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(c) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may
charge the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses.

SECTION 9. [Information under Oath to be Submitted to the Court.]
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(a) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading or in an affidavit
attached to that pleading shall give information under oath as to the child's
present address, the places where the child has lived within the last 5 years,
and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived
during that period. In this pleading or affidavit every party shall further
declare under oath whether:
(1) he has participated (as a party, witness, or in any other capacity) in any
other litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or any other
state;
(2) he has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending in
a court of this or any other state; and
(3) he knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who has physical
custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect
to the child.
(b) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in the affirmative the
declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court.
The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information
furnished and as to other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the
disposition of the case.
(c) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody
proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state of which he obtained
information during this proceeding.
SECTION 10. [Additional Parties.] If the court 3earns from information furnished
by the parties pursuant to section 9 or from other sources that a person not a
party to the custody proceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to
have custody or visitation rights with respect to the child, it shall order that
person to be joined as a party and to be duly notified of the pendency of the
proceeding and of his joinder as a party. If the person joined as a party is
outside this State he shall be served with process or otherwise notified in
accordance with section 5.
SECTION 11. [Appearance of Parties and the Child.]
[(a) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in this State to
appear personally before the court. If that party has physical custody of the
child the court may order that he appear personally with the child.]
(b) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is
outside this State with or without the child the court may order that the notice
given under section 5 include a statement directing that party to appear
personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear may
result in a decision adverse to that party.
(c) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this State is directed to appear
under subsection (b) or desires to appear personally before the court with or
without the child, the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of
the court travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of
the child if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
SECTION 12. [Binding Force and Res Judicata Effect of Custody Decree.] A custody
decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction under section 3
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binds all parties who have been served in this State or notified in accordance
with section 5 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who
have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the custody
decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the
custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified
pursuant to law, including the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 13. [Recognition of Out-of-State Custody Decrees.] The courts of this
State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court
of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions
substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as this
decree has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards
substantially similar to those of this Act.
SECTION 14. [Modification of Custody Decree of Another State.]
(a) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this State
shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of this State
that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or has
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this
State has jurisdiction.
(b) If a court of this State is authorized under subsection (a) and section 8 to
modify a custody decree of another state it shall give due consideration to the
transcript of the record and other documents of all previous proceedings
submitted to it in accordance with section 22.
SECTION 15. [Filing and Enforcement of Custody Decree of Another State.]
(a) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed in the
office of the clerk of any [District Court, Family Court] of this State. The
clerk shall treat the decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the
[District Court, Family Court] of this State. A custody decree so filed has the
same effect and shall be enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by
a court of this State.
(b) A person violating a custody decree of another state which makes it
necessary to enforce the decree in this State may be required to pay necessary
travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the party
entitled to the custody or his witnesses.
SECTION 16. [Registry of Out-of-State Custody Decrees and Proceedings.] The
clerk of each [District Court, Family Court] shall maintain a registry in which
he shall enter the following:
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing;
(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other states;
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a court of
another state; and
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody proceedings in another
state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this State or the
disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding.
SECTION 17. [Certified Copies of Custody Decree.] The
Court, Family Court] of this State, at the request of
or at the request of any person who is affected by or
in a custody decree, shall certify and forward a copy

Clerk of the [District
the court of another state
has a legitimate interest
of the decree to that
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court or person.
SECTION 18. [Taking Testimony in Another State.] In addition to other procedural
devices available to a party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian ad litem
or other representative of the child may adduce testimony of witnesses,
including parties and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state.
The court on its own motion may direct that the testimony of a person be taken
in another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which
the testimony shall be taken.
SECTION 19. [Hearings and Studies in Another State; Orders to Appear.]
(a) A court of this State may request the appropriate court of another state to
hold a hearing to adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give evidence
under other procedures of that state, or to have social studies made with
respect to the custody of a child involved in proceedings pending in the court
of this State; and to forward to the court of this State certified copies of the
transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise adduced, or any
social studies prepared in compliance with the request. The cost of the services
may be assessed against the parties or, if necessary, ordered paid by the
[County, State].
(b) A court of this State may request the appropriate court of another state to
order a party to custody proceedings pending in the court of this State to
appear in the proceedings, and if that party has physical custody of the child,
to appear with the child. The request may state that travel and other necessary
expenses of the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be
assessed against another party or will otherwise be paid.
SECTION 20. [Assistance to Courts of Other States.]
(a) Upon request of the court of another state the courts of this State which
are competent to hear custody matters may order a person in this State to appear
at a hearing to adduce evidence or to produce or give evidence under other
procedures available in this State [or may order social studies to be made for
use in a custody proceeding in another state]. A certified copy of the
transcript of the record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise adduced [and
any social studies prepared] shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court to the
requesting court.
(b) A person within this State may voluntarily give his testimony or statement
in this State for use in a custody proceeding outside this State.
(c) Upon request of the court of another state a competent court of this State
may order a person in this State to appear alone or with the child in a custody
proceeding in another state. The court may condition compliance with the request
upon assurance by the other state that state travel and other necessary expenses
will be advanced or reimbursed.
SECTION 21. [Preservation of Documents for Use in Other States.] In any custody
proceeding in this State the court shall preserve the pleadings, orders and
decrees, any record that has been made of its hearings, social studies, and
other pertinent documents until the child reaches [18, 21] years of age. Upon
appropriate request of the court of another state the court shall forward to the
other court certified copies of any or all of such documents.
SECTION 22. [Request for Court Records of Another State.] If a custody decree
has been rendered in another state concerning a child involved in a custody
proceeding pending in a court of this State, the court of this State upon taking
jurisdiction of the case shall request of the court of the other state a
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certified copy of the transcript of any court record and other documents
mentioned in section 21.
SECTION 23. [International Application.] The general policies of this Act extend
to the international area. The provisions of this Act relating to the
recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other states apply to custody
decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody
institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons.
[SECTION 24. [Priority.] Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding
which raises a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this Act
the case shall be given calendar priority and handled expeditiously.]
SECTION 25. [Severability.] If any provision of this Act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, its invalidity does not
affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this Act are severable.
SECTION 26. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.
SECTION 27. [Repeal.] The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:
SECTION 28. [Time of Taking Effect.] This Act shall take effect
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ADDENDUM " G "

UNIFORM CHILD-CUSTODY JURISDICTION
AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (1997)
[ARTICLE] 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE. This [Act] may be cited as the Uniform Child-Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
[Section 1 of the UCCJA was a statement of the purposes of the Act. Although
extensively cited by courts, it was eliminated because Uniform Acts no longer
contain such a section. Nonetheless, this Act should be interpreted according to
its purposes which are to:
(1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other States in
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of
children from State to State with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other States to the end that a
custody decree is rendered in that State which can best decide the case in the
interest of the child;
(3) Discourage the use of the interstate system for continuing controversies
over child custody;
(4) Deter abductions of children;
(5) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other States in this State;
(6) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other States;
SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this [Act]:
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care
or supervision.
(2) "Child" means an individual who has not attained 18 years of age.
(3) "Child-custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a
court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with
respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and
modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support
or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(4) "Child-custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody,
physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term
includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency,
guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from
domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include a
proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or
enforcement under [Article] 3.
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a State to establish,
enforce, or modify a child-custody determination.
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(7) "Home State" means the State in which a child lived with a parent or a
person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before
the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. En the case of a child less than
six months of age, the term means the State in which the child lived from birth
with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the
mentioned persons is part of the period.
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child-custody determination
concerning a particular child.
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child-custody determination for
which enforcement is sought under this [Act].
(10) "Issuing State" means the State in which a child-custody determination is
made.
(11) "Modification" means a child-custody determination that changes, replaces,
supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the
same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous
determination.
(12) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government;
governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; public corporation; or any
other legal or commercial entity.
(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who:
(A) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period
of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one year
immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding; and
(B) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody
under the law of this State.
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a child.
(15) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, cr any territory or insular
possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
[(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan Native village, which is
recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a State.]
(17) "Warrant" means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement
officers to take physical custody of a child.
SECTION 103. PROCEEDINGS GOVERNED BY OTHER LAW. This [Act] does not govern an
adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency
medical care for a child.
SECTION 104. APPLICATION TO INDIAN TRIBES.
(a) A child-custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., is not subject to this
[Act] to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.
[(b) A court of this State shall treat a tribe as if it were a State of the

2

United States for the purpose of applying [Articles] 1 and 2.]
1(c) A child-custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances
in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this [Act] must
be recognized and enforced under [Article] 3.]
Subsection (a) is not bracketed. If the Indian Child Welfare Act requires that a
case be heard in tribal court, then its provisions determine jurisdiction.
SECTION 105. INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF [ACT].
(a) A court of this State shall treat a foreign country as if it were a State of
the United States for the purpose of applying [Articles] 1 and 2.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a child-custody
determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in
substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this [Act] must be
recognized and enforced under [Article] 3.
(c) A court of this State need not apply this [Act] if the child custody law of
a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.
SECTION 106. EFFECT OF CHILD-CUSTODY DETERMINATION. A child-custody
determination made by a court of this State that had jurisdiction under this
[Act] binds all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this
State or notified in accordance with Section 108 or who have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard.
As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as to all decided issues of
law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.
SECTION 107. PRIORITY. If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction
under this [Act] is raised in a child-custody proceeding, the question, upon
request of a party, must be given priority on the calendar and handled
expedit iously.
SECTION 108. NOTICE TO PERSONS OUTSIDE STATE.
(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outside
this State may be given in a manner prescribed by the law of this State for
service of process or by the law of the State in which the service is made.
Notice must be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice but
may be by publication if other means are not effective.
(b) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this
State or by the law of the State in which the service is made.
(c) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

SECTION 109. APPEARANCE AND LIMITED IMMUNITY.

(a) A party to a child-custody proceeding, including a modification proceeding,
or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding to enforce or register a
child-custody determination, is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this
State for another proceeding or purpose solely by reason of having participated,
or of having been physically present for the purpose of participating, in the
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proceeding.

(b) A person who is subject to personal jurisdiction in this State on a basis
other than physical presence is not immune from service of process in this
State. A party present in this State who is subject to the jurisdiction of
another State is not immune from service of process allowable under the laws of
that State.

(c) The immunity granted by subsection (a) does not extend to civil litigation
based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this [Act]
committed by an individual while present in this State.
SECTION 110. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN COURTS.
(a) A court of this State may communicate with a court in another State
concerning a proceeding arising under this [Act].
(b) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the
parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the
opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on
jurisdiction is made.
(c) Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and
similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be
made of the communication.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a record must be made of a
communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of the
communication and granted access to the record.
(e) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
SECTION 111. TAKING TESTIMONY IN ANOTHER STATE.
(a) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a
child-custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in
another State, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition
or other means allowable in this State for testimony taken in another State. The
court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in
another State and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which the
testimony is taken.
(b) A court of this State may permit an individual residing in another State to
be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic
means before a designated court or at another location in that State. A court of
this State shall cooperate with courts of other States in designating an
appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
(c) Documentary evidence transmitted from another State to a court of this State
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by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not be
excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.
SECTION 112. COOPERATION BETWEEN COURTS; PRESERVATION OF RECORDS.

(a) A court of this State may request the appropriate court of another State to:
(1) hold an evidentiary hearing;
(2) order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that
State;
(3) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child
involved in a pending proceeding;
(4) forward to the court of this State a certified copy of the transcript of the
record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any evaluation
prepared in compliance with the request; and
(5) order a party to a child-custody proceeding or any person having physical
custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.
(b) Upon request of a court of another State, a court of this State may hold a
hearing or enter an order described in subsection (a).
(c) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under
subsections (a) and (b) may be assessed against the parties according to the law
of this State.
(d) A court of this State shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records
of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a
child-custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon
appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of another State, the
court shall forward a certified copy of those records.
[ARTICLE] 2
JURISDICTION
SECTION 201. INITIAL CHILD-CUSTODY JURISDICTION.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2 04, a court of this State has
jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if:
(1) this State is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, or was the home State of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a
parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;
(2) a court of another State does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1), or
a court of the home State of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on
the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum under Section 207 or
208, and:
(A) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a
person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other
than mere physical presence; and
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(B) substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child's care,
protection, training, and personal relationships;
(3) all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 207 or
208; or
(4) no court of any other State would have jurisdiction under the criteria
specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional -basis for making a
child-custody determination by a court of this State.
(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is
not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination.
SECTION 202. EXCLUSIVE, CONTINUING JURISDICTION.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State which has
made a child-custody determination consistent with Section 201 or 203 has
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(1) a court of this State determines that neither the child, the child 1 s
parents, and any person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection
with this State and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this
State concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal
relationships; or
(2) a court of this State or a court of another State determines that the child,
the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside
in this State.
(b) A court of this State which has made a child-custody determination and does
not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that
determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under
Section 201.
SECTION 203. JURISDICTION TO MODIFY DETERMINATION. Except as otherwise provided
in Section 204, a court of this State may not modify a child-custody
determination made by a court of another State unless a court of this State has
jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Section 201(a) (1) or (2)
and:
(1) the court of the other State determines it no longer has exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction under Section 2 02 or that a court of this State would be
a more convenient forum under Section 207; or
(2) a court of this State or a court of the other State determines that the
child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently
reside in the other State.
SECTION 204. TEMPORARY EMERGENCY JURISDICTION.
(a) A court of this State has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is
present in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the
child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
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(b) If there is no previous child-custody determination that is entitled to be
enforced under this [Act] and a child-custody proceeding has not been commenced
in a court of a State having jurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203, a
child-custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an
order is obtained from a court of a State having jurisdiction under Sections 201
through 203. If a child-custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a
court of a State having jurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203, a
child-custody determination made under this section becomes a final
determination, if it so provides and this State becomes the home State of the
child.
(c) If there is a previous child-custody determination that is entitled to be
enforced under this [Act], or a child-custody proceeding has been commenced in a
court of a State having jurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203, any order
issued by a court of this State under this section must specify in the order a
period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to
obtain an order from the State having jurisdiction under Sections 201 through
203. The order issued in this State remains in effect until an order is obtained
from the other State within the period specified or the period expires.
(d) A court of this State which has been asked to make a child-custody
determination under this section, upon being informed that a child-custody
proceeding has been commenced in, or a child-custody determination has been made
by, a court of a State having jurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203, shall
immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this State which is
exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 201 through 203, upon being
informed that a child-custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a
child-custody determination has been made by, a court of another State under a
statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of
that State to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the
child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.
SECTION 205. NOTICE; OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD; JOINDER.
(a) Before a child-custody determination is made under this [Act], notice and an
opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standards of Section 108 must be
given to all persons entitled to notice under the law of this State as in
child-custody proceedings between residents of this State, any parent whose
parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any person having
physical custody of the child.
(b) This [Act] does not govern the enforceability of a child-custody
determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
(c) The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a
child-custody proceeding under this [Act] are governed by the law of this State
as in child-custody proceedings between residents of this State.
SECTION 2 06. SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State may not
exercise its jurisdiction under this [article] if, at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child
has been commenced in a court of another State having jurisdiction substantially
in conformity with this [Act], unless the proceeding has been terminated or is
stayed by the court of the other State because a court of this State is a more
convenient forum under Section 207.
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(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State, before
hearing a child-custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other
information supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 209. If the court
determines that a child-custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in
another State having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this [Act],
the court of this State shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court
of the other State. If the court of the State having jurisdiction substantially
in accordance with this [Act] does not determine that the court of this State is
a more appropriate forum, the court of this State shall dismiss the proceeding.
(c) In a proceeding to modify a child-custody determination, a court of this
State shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been
commenced in another State. If a proceeding to enforce a child-custody
determination has been commenced in another State, the court may:
(1) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a
court of the other State enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the
proceeding for enforcement;
(2) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or
(3) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.
SECTION 2 07. INCONVENIENT FORUM.

(a) A court of this State which has jurisdiction under this [Act] to make a
child-custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and
that a court of another State is a more appropriate forum. The issue of
inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court's own motion,
or request of another court.
(b) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this
State shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another State to
exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to
submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the
future and which State could best protect the parties and the child;
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this State;
(3) the distance between the court in this State and the court in the State that
would assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which State should assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending
litigation, including testimony of the child;
(7) the ability of the court of each State to decide the issue expeditiously and
the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each State with the facts and issues in the
pending litigation.
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(c) If a court of this State determines that it is an inconvenient forum and
that a court of another State is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the
proceedings upon condition that a child-custody proceeding be promptly commenced
in another designated State and may impose any other condition the court
considers just and proper.
(d) A court of this State may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this
[Act] if a child-custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other
proceeding.
SECTION 2 08. JURISDICTION DECLINED BY REASON OF CONDUCT.
a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204 [or by other law of this State],
if a court of this State has jurisdiction under this [Act] because a person
seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
(1) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the
exercise of jurisdiction;
(2) a court of the State otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 201
through 203 determines that this State is a more appropriate forum under Section
207; or
(3) no court of any other State would have jurisdiction under the criteria
specified in Sections 201 through 203.
(b) If a court of this State declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to
subsection (a), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the
child and prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying
the proceeding until a child-custody proceeding is commenced in a court having
jurisdiction under Sections 201 through 203.
(c) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to
exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a), it shall assess against
the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary and reasonable expenses
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees,
expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the
assessment would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs,
or expenses against this State unless authorized by law other than this [Act].
SECTION 2 09. INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED TO COURT.
(a) [Subject to [local law providing for the confidentiality of procedures,
addresses, and other identifying information], in] [In] a child-custody
proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall
give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the child's
present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived during the
last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom
the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit must state
whether the party:
(1) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any
other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the child and, if
so, identify the court, the case number, and the date of the child-custody
determination, if any;
(2) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including
proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence,
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protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so,
identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; and
(3) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding
who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or
physical custody of, or visitation with, the child and, if so, the names and
addresses of those persons.
(b) If the information required by subsection (a) is not furnished, the court,
upon motion of a party or its own motion, may stay the proceeding until the
information is furnished.
(c) If the declaration as to any of the items described in subsection (a)(1)
through (3) is in the affirmative, the declarant, shall give additional
information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the
parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and other matters
pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(d) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in
this or any other State that could affect the current proceeding.
[(e) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the
health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by
disclosure of identifying information, the information must be sealed and may
not be disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court orders the
disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into
consideration the health, safety, or liberty of the party or child and
determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice.]
SECTION 210. APPEARANCE OF PARTIES AND CHILD.
(a) In a child-custody proceeding in this State, the court may order a party to
the proceeding who is in this State to appear before the court in person with or
without the child. The court may order any person who is in this State and who
has physical custody or control of the child to appear in person with the child.
(b) If a party to a child-custody proceeding whose presence is desired by the
court is outside this State, the court may order that a notice given pursuant to
Section 10 8 include a statement directing the party to appear in person with or
without the child and informing the party that failure to appear may result in a
decision adverse to the party.
(c) The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the child
and of any person ordered to appear under this section.
(d) If a party to a child-custody proceeding who is outside this State is
directed to appear under subsection (b) or desires to appear personally before
the court with or without the child, the court may require another party to pay
reasonable and necessary travel and other expenses of the party so appearing and
of the child.
[ARTICLE] 3
ENFORCEMENT
SECTION 301. DEFINITIONS. In this [article]:
(1) "Petitioner" means a person who seeks enforcement of an order for return of
a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction or enforcement of a child-custody determination.
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(2) "Respondent" means a person against whom a proceeding has been commenced for
enforcement of an order for return of a child under the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or enforcement of a child-custody
determination.
SECTION 302. ENFORCEMENT UNDER HAGUE CONVENTION. Under this [article] a court of
this State may enforce an order for the return of the child made under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as if it were a
child-custody determination.
SECTION 3 03. DUTY TO ENFORCE.
(a) A court of this State shall recognize and enforce a child-custody
determination of a court of another State if the latter court exercised
jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this [Act] or the determination was
made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this
[Act] and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this [Act].
(b) A court of this State may utilize any remedy available under other law of
this State to enforce a child-custody determination made by a court of another
State. The remedies provided in this [article] are cumulative and do not affect
the availability of other remedies to enforce a child-custody determination.
SECTION 304. TEMPORARY VISITATION.
(a) A court of this State which does not have jurisdiction to modify a
child-custody determination, may issue a temporary order enforcing:
(1) a visitation schedule made by a court of another State; or
(2) the visitation provisions of a child-custody determination of another State
that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule.
(b) If a court of this State makes an order under subsection (a)(2), it shall
specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the petitioner
to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria specified
in [Article] 2. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the
other court or the period expires.
SECTION 3 05. REGISTRATION OF CHILD-CUSTODY
(a) A child-custody determination issued by
registered in this State, with or without a
enforcement, by sending to [the appropriate

DETERMINATION.
a court of another State may be
simultaneous request for
court] in this State:

(1) a letter or other document requesting registration;
(2) two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be
registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the
knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been
modified; and
(3) except as otherwise provided in Section 209, the name and address of the
person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has
been awarded custody or visitation in the child-custody determination sought to
be registered.
(b) On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a), the registering
court shall:
(1) cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one

11

copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form;
and
(2) serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to subsection (a)(3) and
provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with
this section.
(c) The notice required by subsection (b)(2) must state that:
(1) a registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration
in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this State;
(2) a hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be
requested within 2 0 days after service of notice; and
(3) failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the
child-custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination
with respect to any matter that could have been asserted.
(d) A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request
a hearing within 20 days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court
shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration
establishes that:
(1) the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under [Article] 2;
(2) the child-custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated,
stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2;
or
(3) the person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was
not given in accordance with the standards of Section 108, in the proceedings
before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought.
(e) If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the
registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and
the person requesting registration and all persons served must be notified of
the confirmation.
(f) Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after
notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any
matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.
SECTION 3 06. ENFORCEMENT OF REGISTERED DETERMINATION.
(a) A court of this State may grant any relief normally available under the law
of this State to enforce a registered child-custody determination made by a
court of another State.
(b) A court of this State shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify,
except in accordance with [Article] 2, a registered child-custody determination
of a court of another State.
SECTION 307. SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS. If a proceeding for enforcement under
this [article] is commenced in a court of this State and the court determines
that a proceeding to modify the determination is pending in a court of another
State having jurisdiction to modify the determination under [Article] 2, the
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enforcing court shall immediately communicate with the modifying court. The
proceeding for enforcement continues unless the enforcing court, after
consultation with the modifying court, stays or dismisses the proceeding.
SECTION 308. EXPEDITED ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD-CUSTODY DETERMINATION.
(a) A petition under this [article] must be verified. Certified copies of all
orders sought to be enforced and of any order confirming registration must be
attached to the petition. A copy of a certified copy of an order may be attached
instead of the original.
(b) A petition for enforcement of a child-custody determination must state:
(1) whether the court that issued the determination identified the
jurisdictional basis it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what
the basis was;
(2) whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated,
stayed, or modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under this [Act]
and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the
proceeding;
(3) whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current
proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective
orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the
court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding;
(4) the present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known;
(5) whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child
and attorney's fees is sought, including a request for assistance from [law
enforcement officials] and, if so, the relief sought; and
(6) if the child-custody determination has been registered and confirmed under
Section 3 05, the date and place of registration.
(c) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the
respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing and may
enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The
hearing must be held on the next judicial day after service of the order unless
that date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the
first judicial day possible. The court may extend the date of hearing at the
request of the petitioner.
(d) An order issued under subsection (c) must state the time and place of the
hearing and advise the respondent that at the hearing the court will order that
the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child and the payment
of fees, costs, and expenses under Section 312, and may schedule a hearing to
determine whether further relief is appropriate, unless the respondent appears
and establishes that:
(1) the child-custody determination has not been registered and confirmed under
Section 3 05 and that:
(A) the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under [Article] 2;
(B) the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been
vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under
[Article] 2;
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(C) the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in
accordance with the standards of Section 108, in the proceedings before the
court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or
(2) the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought was
registered and confirmed under Section 3 04, but has been vacated, stayed, or
modified by a court of a State having jurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2.
SECTION 3 09. SERVICE OF PETITION AND ORDER. Except as otherwise provided in
Section 311, the petition and order must be served, by any method authorized [by
the law of this State], upon respondent and any person who has physical custody
of the child.
SECTION 310. HEARING AND ORDER.
(a) Unless the
upon a finding
the child, the
custody of the

court issues a temporary emergency order pursuant to Section 204,
that a petitioner is entitled to immediate physical custody of
court shall order that the petitioner may take immediate physical
child unless the respondent establishes that:

(1) the child-custody determination has not been registered and confirmed under
Section 305 and that:
(A) the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under [Article] 2;
(B) the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been
vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a State having jurisdiction to do so
under [Article] 2; or
(C) the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in
accordance with the standards of Section 10 8, in the proceedings before the
court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or
(2) the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought was
registered and confirmed under Section 3 05 but has been vacated, stayed, or
modified by a court of a State having jurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2.
(b) The court shall award the fees, costs, and expenses authorized under Section
312 and may grant additional relief, including a request for the assistance of
[law enforcement officials], and set a further hearing to determine whether
additional relief is appropriate.
(c) If a party called to testify refuses to answer on the ground that the
testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverse inference
from the refusal.
(d) A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses and a
defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and
child may not be invoked in a proceeding under this [article].
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ADDENDUM " H "

2.
FORM 1
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Fnmily L*w (Child Abduction Convention) Regulation*
•LIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
IE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION FOR
THE RETURN OF A CHILD ABDUCTED FROM AUSTRALIA
UESTING CENTRAL AUTHORITY
APPLICANT: The Secretary,
T»onweaUh Attorney
raTs Department
erns the following children:
vill attain the ages of 16 on:

Place of birth:

Salt Lake City, Utah, United States of

2.2

New South Wales, Australia

passport No. or Identity Card No.

VS Passport No. 0542 9912

Description and photo if possible:

Photo annexed

Photo annexed

Name and first names:

Cory Leigh KANTrl

Dote of birth:

8 September 1965

Place of birth:

Salt Lake City, Utah. United States
of America

Nationality:

American Citizen

Occupation:

Horaemakcr

Habitual residence:

New South Wales, Australia

Passport No. or Identity Card No., if any:

America
Habitual residence:

Description and photo if possible:

Mother

CHILD

1 April 1993

VS Passport No. 05452 9913

2.1

IDENTITY OF THE CHILD AND THE PARENTS

Date of birth:

Passport No or Identity Card No.

PARENTS

Malini Amstel Kanth and Anjana Kesari
Kanth
1 April 2009 and 20 February 2012

Malini Amstcl KANTH

New South Wales, Australia

2,

REQUESTING AUTHORITY
NSW Department of Community
Services, 164 Liverpool Road,
Ashfield, NSW, Australia

Name and first names:

Habitual residence:

US Passport No. 154507481

Father
Name and first names:

Rajani KanncpaJli KANTH

Date of birth:

8 February 1949

Place of birth:

Madras, India

Nationality:

American Citizen

Occupation:

Professor

Habitual residence:

New South Wales, Australia

CHILD
Name and first names:

Anjana Kesari KANTH

Date of birth:

20 February t996

Place of birth:

Salt Lake City, Utah, United States

Passport No. or Identity Card No., if any:

US Passport No: 054335271

o f America

2-3

Al

Dxte and place of marriage:

Salt Lake City, Utah, United States of

A2

4.
3.

Maternal Grandparents:

Marvin and Judy Meyer,
2736 East 7305 South Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84121, United States of America

America in March 1992.
REQUESTING INDIVIDUAL OR INSTITUTION:
Nome and first names:

Rajani KannepalH KANTH

Nationality of individual applicant:

American Citizen

Occupation of individual applicant:

Professor

Habitual residence:

32 High Street. RanrJwick, 2031,
New South Wales. Australia

Passport No. or Identity Card No, if any:

US Passport No. 05433 5271

Relationship to the children:
Father
Name and address of legal adviser, if any:
Not applicable
PLACE WHERE THE CHILDREN ARE T n O U G I l t TO BE:
t

Information concerning the person alleged to have removed or retained the child.
Name and first names:

Cory Leigh KANTH

Date of birth:

8 September 1965

Nationality:

American Citizen

Occupation:

rlomemaker

Last known address:

2736 East 7305 South Salt Lake City. Utah.
84121, United States of America
Tel:
801733 9775

Passport No. or Identity Card No., if any: US Passport No. 154$07481
Description and photo:
Address of children:

Photo annexed
2736 East 7305 South Salt take City.
Utah 841211 United Slates of America

Other persons who might be able to supply additional information relating to the
whereabouts of the children:

A3

TIME, PLACE, DATE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF TIIE WRONGFUL
RETENTION
The applicant father and the respondent mother were married in March 1992
in Salt Lake City, Utah, United States of America. On I April 1993 the
child. Mai mi Amstcl fCanth was bom In Salt Lake City. Utah and the childL
Anjana Kesari Kanth was bom on 20 February 1996 in Salt Lake City, UtahLater In 1996 the father accepted an appointment as an academic in Denmark
and the mother and children accompanied him to live in that country from
1996 to 1997. In June 1997 the father accepted an appointment as an academic
at the University of New South Wales artjl the family travelled to Australia so
that he could take up that position. It was the parents* intention to reside in
Australia permanently.
\i
The father later in 1997 transferred to the University of Technology Sydney
where he is currently employed on a three year renewable contract which will
expire in 2001. Between April and June 1998 the father and mother and the
children returned to Salt Lake City. Utah for a holiday. The whole family
came back to Australia in June 1998 with d e intention of residing here
permanenlly.
On 25 March 1999 the father relumed home from work to find the mother and
the children and their belongings missing. The mother had leA a note stating
that she loved tho father and that she and the children would be living in their
home in Utah. The father had no prior knowledge of his wife's intention to
leave Australia with the children and he did not consent to this and has not
since consented to their remaining in the United States of America.
The father believes that the mother and the children flew back to Salt Lake
City, Utah on 25 March 1999. He has since had contact with the mother and
knows that she and the children arc living with the maternal grandparents,
Marvin and Judy Meyer at 2736 East 7305 South Salt Lake City, Utah.
FACTUAL OR LEGAL GROUNDS JUSTIFYING THE REQUEST
(1)

The parties and the children were habitually resident in Australia at the
time of the wrongful removal.

(2)

The children have permission to reside in Australia as temporary
residents until I July 2001
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5.
(3)

(4)

(5)

Anncxure '«CT - copy orbirth certificate o f Anjana Kcsari Kanth

There are currently no Court orders concerning custody of ihc children.
In the absence of any such order, Sections 61D and 61C of the Family
Law Act 1975 (a Federal Act) state that the applicant and the
respondent have joint rights of custody over the children.
The Applicant has had no contact with the respondent since a
telephone conversation on 13 May 1999 or the children
since a telephone conversation on 12 May 1999.
The Applicant has at no time consented or subsequently acquiesced to
the removal of the children to the United States of America or their
retention there.

a ^ ? 0 7 o ! i ? l ^ q U C S t C d C c n t n U A u * " f t y and It, agents to act on my behalf
and to do all things reasonable and necessary in connection ^ t h ^ f f i ^ ^

DATED:

IIf

day o f

May

1999.

PLACE: Ashiicld, N e w South Wales, Australia

Signature o f the^AppIicant
CHILDREN TO BE RETURNED T O :
Name:
Date of Birth:

Rajani Kanncpalli XANTH
r
* February 1949 ,,,

Place of Birth:

Madras, India

Address:

32 Hifih Street. Randwick 2031,
New South Wales, Australia

Telephone Number.

02 9399 3785 (Home)
02 9514 7734 (Work)

u

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR T H E RETURN OF THE
CHILDREN:
The applicant father would seek that the mother meet all requisite costs but
failing this, he would be prepared to meet tlic costs himself.

OTHER REMARKS
Nil

LIST OF DOCUMENTS ATTACHED

Anncxure "A" - photograph of the children and the respondent
Anncxure "BM - copy of birth certificate of Malini Amslel Kanih

A5

A6

United States Department of State
Washington. D.C. 20520
UNITED STATES CENTRAL AUTHORITY
HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL A S P E C T S ^ n K T a . f T COURT
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION " ^ j ' d i c S District
Office of Children's Issues, Room LI 27
Bureau of Consular Affairs
NOV 9 5 22C3
Department of State
-;
K ^^JL J
Washington, D.C. 20037
^ J^^^^n/Sl^
ByTEL: (202)736-7000
'
/
Deputy «•*
FAX: (202)663-2674
November 3, 2000
Commissioner Michael Evans
Third District Court
Salt Lake City
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE: Case number 994904256
Kanth
Dear Commissioner Evans:
As you may know, on July 1, 1988, the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Convention") entered into force between the
United States and Australia, The International Child Abduciion Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11601-11610 (1988) ("ICARA") implemented the Convention in the United States.
U.S. Department of State regulations implementing the Convention and ICARA can be
found at 22 C.F.R Part 94. The Convention is available at 5 i Fed. Reg. 10503 (1986),
and is a treaty of the United States within the meaning of Article II of the Constitution.
Pursuant to 22 C.F.R § 94.2, the U.S. Department of State, Office of Children's
Issues, performs the functions of the Central Authority for the United States under the
Convention. By agreement between the National Center for Missing & Exploited
Children ("National Center") and the U.S. Central Authority, applications seeking the
return of or access to children abducted to the United States, are processed by the National
Center.
We write to inform you that Mr. Kanth has submitted an application for the return
of his children to Australia with the U.S. Central Authority under the Hague Convention.
We draw your attention to certain important articles of the Convention. Article 11 of the
Convention requires the judicial or administrative authorities of contracting states to "act
expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children." In addition, "...judicial or
administrative authorities of the Contracting state to which the child has been removed or
in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits or rights of custody until it
has determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an
application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following
receipt of the notice" (Article 16).

We also invite your attention to Article 17 which provides that "the sole fact that
a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in the
requested State shall not be a ground for refusing access to a child under this Convention,
but the judicial or administrative authorities of die requested State may take account of
the reasons for that decision in applying this Convention."
Finally, pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention, if a petition isfiledwithin a
year of a child's wrongiul removal or retention, courts "shall order the return of the child
forthwith." Furthermore, even if more than one year has elapsed from the time of the
wrongful removal or retention, courts "shall order the return of the child unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment".
Please find attached a legal analysis of the Hague Convention published in the
Federal Register on March 26,1986 (Vol. 51, No. 58) and a copy of the explanatory
report of Elias Perez-Vera. The Perez-Vera report is recognized by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law as the official history and commentary on the
Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of its provisions.
This letter should not be construed by the court as constituting an opinion of the
United States, the Department of State or of the National Center regarding the merits of
the case. Our purpose is solely to apprise you of the Convention and of the request
pursuant thereto and to request expeditious consideration as required by Article 11
of the Convention. Should you have any questions or need additional information,
please do not hesitate to contact Kathleen Ruckman at the National Center 877-446-2632
x 6297, or write to 699 Prince Street, Alexandria, VA 22314.

Mary B. Marshall
Director
United States Central Authority'
Enclosures:
1. U.S. implementing legislation
2. Perez-Vera Report
3. Convention and legal analysis
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COMMONWEAT/TH OF AUSTRALIA
Faintly Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations
Affidavit in Support or Application for the Return of a Child in
Accordance with the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction
AFFIDAVIT

*£EN EDITH MUIRHEAD, o f ! 6 4 Liverpool Road, Ashfield in the State of
toulh Wales, Solicitor, affirm as follows:

0)

7.

Subsection (1) has effect subject to any order of a court for the time
being in force (whether or not made under this Act and whether made
r-,ivuiwi
vri tt\j\ maqc~runaer
Act *•
0 ...
before
or.~.*.~
after Vthe
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§ui uus
.:—•*
before or after the commencement of this section)/
It Is submitted that Rajani Kannepalli Konth has Wights of custody**
pursuant lo Article 3 of the Convention and was exercising those rights
at the time immediately prior to the wrongful removal of the children
to the United States of America.

AFFIRMED at Ashfield in the State
oftyew South Wales on 14 May,
1999 before me:

~
^ ^
•....jQ..:..XCh+*tt*r~^.
Doreen Edith Muirhead

I am a solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
I am employed by the New South Wales Department of Community Services
which is the Central Authority for the State of New South Wales pursuant to
the Hague Convention on the* Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(the Convention).

Solicitor of the Supreme Court
of New South Wales.

I have knowledge of the application made by Riijani Kajinepalli Kanth
pursuant to the Convention seeking Che return of his children, Malini Amstel
Kanth bom 1 April 1993 and Anjnna Kcsaii Kanth bom^O February 1996 to
Australia.
I have been informed by Rajani KannepalH Kanth that there are no orders
made by the Family Court of Australia or under the Family Law Act 1975 in
respect of his children, Malini Amstel Kanth and AnjanafKesari Kanth,
relating to matters of residence or contact (formerly custody and access).
Section 61B of the Family Law Act 1975 us amended (hereafter "the Act")
states:
u

In this Part, •'parental responsibility- in relation to a child, means all the
duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in
relation to children."
Section 61C of the Act states:
"(1)

Each of the parents of a child, who is n o l j 8 has parental
responsibility for the child.

(2)

Subsection (I) has effect despite any changes in tjhc nature of the
relationships of the child's parents. It is not affected, for example,
by the parents becoming separated or by either or both of them
marrying or re-marrying.
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ADDENDUM " I "

United States Department ofState_
Washington, D.C 20520
UNITED STATES CENTRAL AUTHORITY
HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL A5FECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Office of Children** Issues, Room 4311
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
TEL: (202) 735-7000.
FAX: (202) 647-2835

m
Sir fern

June 21,1999
Ms- Cory Leigh Kanth
2736 E- 7305 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
DearMs.Kautb:
We are writing to inform you that the Australian Government has forwarded to us an
application fiom Mr. Rajani Kanth, who is seeking assistance under the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in returning Malini and Anjana to Australia.
We are requesting that in light of the Convention, you consider voluntarily agreeing to return the
children to Australia in order to avoid the initiation of legal proceedings by the applicant under
the Hague Convention in the United States.
On July 1,1988, the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects ofInternational Child
Abduction (copy enclosed) entered into force between the United States and Australia. Under
Article 1 of the Convention, the United States is obliged to facilitate the prompt return of
children removed to or retained in the United States. The Department of State, Office of
Children's Issues, performs the functions of Central Authority for the United States. By
agreement between the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the U S . Central
Authority, applications seeking the return of or access to children in the United States are
processed by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Pursuant to Article 10 of
"the Convention, the Central Authority of the State where the child is located must "take or cause
to be taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain the voluntary return of the child."
Please note that the Commtion does not specifically address the issue of who should
have custody of the children, but rather deals with the question of where custody should be
decided. The goal of the treaty is to protect children from the harmful effects of wrongful
removal or retention by establishing procedures to ensure their prompt return to the country of
their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access. The Convention
certainly envisions that the original taking parent may get custody once the children are returned.
In fact, Article 19 of the Convention clearly states, "A decision under the Convention concerning
the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody
issue."

>
X
-I
>
Z

If a voluntary return is not agreed to, legal proceedings under the Hague Convention may be
initiated by Mr. Kanth. We note thai pursuant to the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (TCARAX 42 U-S-C. §1160M 1610 (1988), which serves as the implementing law for this
Convention, a court that orders return of the child under the Convention shall also order the
taking party to pay necessary expenses incurred by or oh behalf of the petitioner. Expenses may
include: legal fees, court costs, foster home or other care during the course of the proceedings in
the action, and transportation costs related to the return pf the child, unless the taking party
establishes that such an order would be clearly inappropriate.'
In addition, the burden of proof for the petitioner in a Convention case is by a
preponderance of the evidence, whereas the taking party claiming an exception set forth in
Articles 13(b) or 20 of the Convention has the much more difficult burden of establishing their
claim by clear and convincing evidence (§ 4(e) of 1CARA).
For your convenience, we have enclosed a complete package of information concerning
the Hague Convention. We encourage you to review thb information carefully. After reviewing
the infottnation, we would appreciate it if you would advise Jennifer Penta at the National
Center for Missing & Exploited Ctitidren, 2101 Wilson Blvd. Suite 55Q> Arlington, VA 2220J3077 or (800) 8J3*5678, ext 6118> by July 2 7 1999, as to when the children will be returned to
Australia* Please indicate bow the children will be returned. If we have not received your
response by July 2,1999, or if you elect not to return the children to Australia, then we will be
obliged under Article 7(f) of the Convention to facilitate :the initiation of judicial proceedings by
Mr. Kanth to seek return of the children. Please do not'hesitate to contact Ms. Penta if you have
any further questions or need additional information.
We look forward to your favorable reply.
Sincerely,

UJlSJ^'fcMary B. Marshall
Director j
Office of Children's Issues
United States Central Authorit
Enclosures:
As stated
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MJLY COURT Of AUSTRALIA
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Application for
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Final orders
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State briefly but
precisely what orders
you seek

see annexure 7C

Goulburn SI. Sydney

nircdttMt* hejui»p.
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>tfce lo lite rcsiio;it!c»il(.s)
D

serve t sealed copy of fh« Response on the
»pplicant(<) at Uatt 7 days before the dirtctiont
h*arfog In Box C above, and
O attend the directions "hearing.

jroo oppose the orders woghi hi Hem 7 OR
nt the court to make t final order of your own
a must
flit wjih ih« court • Response (FormTA), »<»d

31 Relttfotisfttyf.sj •rfiiiirtit**
Date cohabitation of
applicant tnd
respondent commenced
(if applicable)

SOctiiib Of parties
Applicant 1

Respondent 1

Foil name

KANTH
RAJAN1 KANNEPALLl

JSAIiDi-

Dale of birth

08 02.1949

08.09.1965

Citizenship, etc

Is present io Australia
Is ordinarily resident in Australia

9

rORY LEIGH

Wife

Marital w parental Ham*

Date of marriage
(if applicable)

.03.1992

10 Town/city and country
of marriage
(if applicable)

Salt lake City
Utah, United States of America

11 Date of final separation
(if applicable)

23.03.1999

In these proceeding*

12 Date divorce became
absolute (if applicable)
fa) Postal address for

service of document*
on applicants)
;b) Solicitor for
appHeant(s)

Postal address of
respondent

send to solicitor in 5(b)

1ANE HOBSON
TURNER WHELAN
(•»,,. A.74Q
Suite 2. Uvel 1 lf>2 G«»ul»wn Street. E*ct Sydney NSW 2010
Tel: (02)9261 3122 Fox: (02) 9261 1250
DX21I SYDNEY

-X
^ South Salt Lake City.
Utah. USA H4121

.T \JXt
crjw5TA«U ftkm. SALT
LAKECOUNTY. UTAH

WDMME

}**9TS

R2

Child 2

Child 1
Thai the children namely M»lini Amsiel K>nth bom 1 Aptil 1993 »nd Anjana Kcsati Kanth born 70
Fftbru»ry 1996 reside w?ON the Applicant Fhther.

13

Details of eoch child

KANTH

KANTH

- full name

MALINI AMSTEL

ANJANA KESAR!

01 CM 1993

20 02 1996

Female

Female

That the Respondent Mother have reasonable contact io the said children
• date of birth
Such further or other Order* the Court deems fit
The Respondent Mother p*y

Jnc

Applicant Father*! costs of an incidental to this application.

• full name of mother

- full name of father

KA NTH

KANTH

CORY LEIGH

CORY LEIGH

KANTH

KANTH

RAJANI KANNEPALL!

RAJANI KANNEPALU

child 3

Child 4

• full name
• date of birth

full name of mother

- full name of father

Cross-vcstoil Jurisdiction
;•

-

s

lunupktc unly if I'ctjing uit cross-usicd jut-fctlitflori) ,1

*-„ v
14

Particular State or Territory

Not applicable

law relied on
15

Statement of Claim

Not applicable

^' ' ^ ^

B3

B4

1

16

It

Affidavit of service

Are there any family Uw, domestic
violence or child welfare proceeding*
pending, order* sought, order* made,
undertaking* lo a court or registered
agreement* concerning a party or
child listed above'

( c w t t «>• only)

JANE HOBSON

Name, address and
occupation of person
serving documents

7J0V / ; . 3oo U> S^\b^Jjf3

3

Person served

KANTH

4

Date documents served

5

Wbai documents were

f give the AppMean'(5) a copy of the Ftmlly Court* mediation icrvice* brochure f*a(h*^y <o Afntrntnl

IK

0rf*> ft r*\\M>\

OefX^hj Cp^rjJ^^
A

J It. '79

I gave the appticant(s) a copy of the Family Court brochure A/orr/nyr, Famtll** anil Stporathn G9

JANE HOBSON

9 rr

RAMNI KANNEPALLI

2
Date

1
sh

.Pyrin Cy

HP-I-II"

Parry on whose behalf this
document is filed

ttrvtdl

Print full name

tteatSnj d»i«

1

Solicitor's declaration

Signature of soliffior

f'ffjzsr/?*?
^7-?*) C-o^(h^<^

Piled o *
C

W» .ppllc.lon w « prcp.™) by IANE HOBSON *.lfciior

1

Filed »i

1

Solicitor for appHcant(s)

I3Z

FTU M o « b «

U

Ftrnt 12 - Ftrwfly Law Rvtai Ord«r II r»lt 15

Sigtuiurc

Signed

SA

6
®

~*

3 it

' ??\

How were they served on
the perton*

CORY LEIGH

f ai*u m?
(a) Copy of application for Final Orders stamped" wfih the Court $e*i
(b) Family Court brochure Marriagt,Farmlits ani Stparotltm (Order
25 rule 3)
1 handed them to the person at j

-—* -y.

p?

—-+ ry

r-

f\

Hmv wis the person served identified?
Grfc^d , ^ n-crs*yi <scJ C&^f L-u^U l<*s-fC,
I rwear/affirm that tha facts <et out are true

90682

Signature

Sworn/affirmed

Before trw (dgnmra of w l t y a ^

Full name «f witness (pitm print)

£\>IJT 1*4
p.-.g; veJr
ui -

1

\

AfTDtrAJU JO0497S
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C R I O N MADS EN
first duly sworn on oath and My* I am a duh/ appointed Deputy Corwtebto, SALT l A K l County, State of UTAH, • cMxen
United States ov*f the 194 of 21 year* *t ifte Omt of service herein, and not » part of or Interest ad In the vrfthln action.
-ecefved the wfthln end hortrto annexed,
APPLICATION FOR FINAL ORDERS (FORM 7- FAMILY LAW RULES)
1 MARRIAGE, FAMILIES ft. SEPARATION BROCHER

vine 0», 1 J»»
and swved the « m « upon
CORY LEIOM KANTH
>\n named Defendant In »«W ertlde(s) by serving a true copy of said wtlde(j) for the defendant with
CORY U I O H KANTM (PERSONALLY)
son of sultabto age and discretion there rosidng at
275« 1 730S 3 , SOUTH SALT LAKH
sr usual pf»c« of ABODE.

on June Of, 1 l » t

>ief cartlfy Ihat at lha Bma of wrvlce of the said artWef,s), I indorsed the dele and place of servtco and added my namt
>md«t UUe (hereto
on June 0 9 , 1 t * t

Deputy

o^^

8L102

ROBERT J "BOB* REITZ. CONSTABLE. SALT LAKE County
7304 SOUTH 300 WEST SUITE 203. MIDVALE. UTAH M047. 255-S488

NOTARY FEE'
MILEAGE CHARGE:
SERVICE CHARGES.
TOTAL CHARGES
NOTES
SSCRIBEO AMO SWORN TO BEFORE ME ON THIS / /

A

PAY OF "Tfjn.C

B7

1009

5 00
IS 00
6 00
*2« 00

ADDENDUM " K "

^ - ^ u states department ot btate
Washington.

D.C.

20520

UNITED STATES CENTRAL AUTHORITY
^t
HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD .ABDUCTION
' ' \3
V-3)
Office of Children's Issues, Room L127
I Y \
Bureau of Consular Affairs
3y
/
/
Department of State
L / s - p u t y cier*
Washington, D.C. 20037
TEL: W(202) 736-7000
FAX: (202) 663-2674
November 3, 2000
Honorable Anne Stirba
Third District Court
Salt Lake City
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, U T 84111
RE: Case number 994904256
Kanth
Dear Judge Stirba:
As you m a y know, on July 1, 1988, the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Convention") entered into force between the
United States and Australia. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11601-11610 (1988) ("ICARA") implemented the Convention in the United States.
U.S. Department of State regulations implementing the Convention and ICARA can be
found at 22 C.F.R P a n 94. The Convention is available at 51 Fed. Reg. 10503 (1986),
and is a treaty of the United States within the meaning of Article II of the Constitution.
Pursuant to 22 C.F.R § 94.2, the U.S. Department of State, Office of Children's
Issues, performs the functions of the Central Authority for the^United States under the
Convention. B y agreement between the National Center for Missing & Exploited
Children ("National Center") and the U.S. Central Authority, applications seeking the
return of or access to children abducted to the United States .are processed by the National
Center.
W e write to inform you that Mr. Kanth has submitted an application for the return
of his children to Australia with the U.S. Central Authority under the Hague Convention.
W e draw your attention to certain important articles of the Convention. Article 11 of the
Convention requires the judicial or administrative authorities of contracting states to "act
expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children." In addition, "...judicial or
administrative authorities of the Contracting state to which the child has been removed or
in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits or rights of custody until it
has determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an
application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following
receipt of the notice" (Article 16).

We also invite your attention to Article 17 which provides that "the sole fact that
a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in the
requested State shall not be a ground for refusing access to a child under this Convention,
but the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take account of
the reasons for that decision in applying this Convention/'
Finally, pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention, if a petition is filed within a
year of a child's wrongful removal or retention, courts •'shall order the return of the child
forthwith." Furthermore, even if more than one year has elapsed from the time of the
wrongful removaLor retention, courts "shall order the return of the child unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment".
Please find attached a legal analysis of the Hague Convention published in the
Federal Register on March 26, 1986 (Vol. 51, No. 58) and a copy of the explanatory
report of Elias Perez-Vera. The Perez-Vera report is recognized by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law as the official history and commentary on the
Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of its provisions.
This letter should not be construed by the court as constituting an opinion of the
United States, the Department of State or of the National Center regarding the merits of
the case. Our purpose is solely to apprise you of the Convention and of the request
pursuant thereto and to request expeditious consideration as required by Article 11
of the Convention. Should you have any questions or need additional information,
please do not hesitate to contact Kathleen Ruckman at the National Center 877-446-2632
x 6297, or write to 699 Prince Street, Alexandria, VA 22314.
Sincerely,

/JtvUc
Mar/B. Marshall
Director
United States Central Authority
Enclosures:
1. U.S. implementing legislation
2. Perez-Vera Report
3. Convention and legal analysis

ADDENDUM " L "

FAAAS, Inc.
Families of Adults Afflicted with
Asperger's Syndrome
PO Box 514 Centerville, MA 02632

The following outline is from a conference in February 1999, and
the transcript is from a "Practical Strategies Conference" geared to
help partners of people with Asperger's Syndrome. This
transcribed conference featured Dr. Tony Atrwood and was
recorded at the National Autistic Society in London, England on
March 22nd, 1999.
Some of the core members of FAAAS, Inc. attended this
conference. Because of this, this meeting was considered to be
the first international meeting of partners of spouses with
asperger's syndrome.
Please note that the following pages are still being edited and
refined. Please accept our apologies for any mistakes or
omissions. Thanks for your patience.

Please note the following:
. 1. The National Autistic Society of London,
England reserves all rights regarding
reprinting and publication of the following
outline.

• 2. Dr. Tony Attwood and the National
Autistic Society of London, England reserve
all rights regarding reprinting and
publication of the transcript which follows.
• 3. FAAAS, Inc. reserves all rights regarding
the layout and the HTML formatting.

February 1999 Workshop Outline
Family Life
• Misunderstandings, misinterpretation leading to constant tension and
conflict.
• Unable to take responsibility or to apologize for own actions which have
upset others, will place blame on others and absolve themselves
completely in conflicts.
• Controlling to such an extent that partner lives in fear.
• Irratic mood swings, anger over tiivial things, condemnation and lack of
understanding for partner's residual anger.
• Going from one extreme to the other when criticised.
• Lack of initiative and/or imagination, inability to accept criticism or
suggestions.
• Unpredictable and easily angered if monitored or check upon by partner.
• Routine/obsession extremely important, unable to veer from
routine/obsession even if it inconveniences others.
• Stress caused by inability to comprehend problems, emotions, etc. in
others.
• Problems with in-laws or other family members.
Children
• Lack of knowledge of level of reasonable behaviour for age of child.
• Lack of understanding of needs of that age leads to inappropriate care in
feeding, clothing, discipline, e.g. how long child can go without food,
how hot bath water should be, etc.
• Lack of appreciation or comprehension of reasonable abilities for that
age, over-critical or lack of praise.

• Jealousy of attention given to children, can be vindictive.
• Lack of awareness of potentially harmful or dangerous situations.
• Emotional, psychological, mental and sometimes physical abuse and
bullying.
• Does not want or allow children's friends to visit.
• Lack of involvement, interest, affection.
• Inability to see that diagnosed child has any problems or difficulties.
Intimate Relationship
• Don't 'know1 you and don't 'know' themselves, self-knowledge not
accurate.
• Lack of communication at all levels, i.e. lack of appreciation and the
inability to show even the most basic of loving/romantic emotions.
• Indifference when partner is ill, even seriously ill, lack of involvement in
partner's well-being.
• Secretive about even the most basic of information, behavior and/or
activities.
• Believes sex/physical intimacy to be a solution to arguments/problems,
unable to comprehend partner's need to find a solution to conflict.
• Will only make romantic or affections overtures as preludes to physical
intimacy, physical intimacy extremely one-sided, lack of concern for
partner's pleasure, unable to comprehend the need for non-sexual love
and affection.
• Unable to acknowledge or discuss problems/conflicts as they relate to
patient, will place blame for all problems on to partner.
• Cannot make a connection between partner's distress and patient's
behaviour or see that said behaviour is unreasonable.
• Psychological visits unsucessful, counsellors unfamiliar with syndrome
do not understand the problem.
• Emotional, psychological, mental and sometimes physical abuse
Page 1 of3

Money
• Lack of understanding of connection between money, budgeting, and
economising.
• Spend freely on own interests or hobbies even when short of money, will
criticize partner's spending.

• Odd priorities, spend on non-essentials when there is no food in the
fridge.
• Unable to comprehend partner's need to know the whole financial
"picture", will often exclude partner from all financial dealings.
• Often will go into serious debt without realising it so that a loan is
needed to sort things out.
Social Life
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Wears clothing inappropriate to situation or partner's clothing.
Refuses to go at the last minute or arrives late.
Falls asleep in company.
Leaves without informing partner or host.
Will not introduce partner or include partner in social interactions.
Causes embarrassment or offense and astounded that anyone is upset.
Will happily go to social occasions with his family/friends but will not
accompany partner to social functions for partner's family/friends or
functions where partient does not know anyone.
Isolated from community because of refusal to socialise.
Shopping problems, e.g. has to control packing food into categorised
bags.
No friends, or very few friends, or makes friends but loses them because
of inability to keep in touch.
Holidays are spent where they want.
Easily lost easily confused with map reading, direction finding, and
estimating time of arrival and unable to make even the most simple of
arrangements OR
Patient is at the other extreme, has to control everything and is brilliant
at map-reading.

Employment
• Constant worry about employer "finding out" and eventually losing job.
• Lack of empathy can cause colleagues to think badly of them, should
they be told reason.
• Clever men are told they have communication problems, should
employer be told reason.
• If in a senior position lack of empathy can lead to unfair treatment of
subordinates.
• If in a professional job lack of comprehension can cause wrong or
inappropriate advice or action or grave injustice.

• Lacks the compassion and basic comprehension of human nature to
perform jury duty
Diagnosis/Genetics
• How does the partner approach the subject of AS, how should the
partner react if the patient refutes all know evidence of AS symptoms?
• How does the partner a competent expert, informed about the syndrome
as not just a children's syndrome.
Page 2 of 3

• Is this information that should be shared with the patient's children?
• Could a court require testing for AS in cases involving abuse?
• How much information should be shared with other family members, i.e.
about heriditary factors?
• Leaflets about AS produced by Autistic Societies do not mention the
hereditary factor if they do mention causes, some do not mention cause.
• How can people make an informed choice whether to have more
children if they are ignorant of the possible hereditary facts?
• What is the current state of knowledge about genetics?
• Are there any known tests, brain scans, urinary peptide tests, etc, which
wrould help to diagnose AS?
Professional Help
• Alienate professionals by litigoiis attitude, misunderstanding situation or
taking literal meaning.
• Difficulty understanding implied meaning behind a question.
• Solicitors needed who understand AS in adults and can act for partners
in divorce, family courts etc.
• Mediation, welfare and probation officers, police, social services, health
visitors, Samaritans, agony aunts, counsellors, all need to be educated
about AS in adults.
• Literature explaining AS in adults needed suitable for giving to bank
managers, solicitors, etc.
• Age appropriate literature needed for children who have a parent with
AS.

• Counsellors needed to help partner and children cope with loneliness,
isolation, frustration, resentment, stress, depression, loss, grief, etc,
associated with an AS diagnosis.
Old Age
• Difficulties when retired or made redundant no routine or structure or
escape route.
• Difficulties when ill or has to go into hospital.
• Cannot participate in managing their financial affairs or take
responsibility for their own wellbeing. partners unable to find
compassion or understanding as AS patients are not classed as mentally
ill.
Page 3 of3
Transcript

Copyught c 1999-2000 FAAAS, Inc
All rights resen ed
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ADDENDUM " N "

IMVERSITY
David Ecule*

School of Bustoeia

October 29,1999
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I have known Rajani Kanth as a friend and colleague for more than ten years, and T am
also acquainted with Ms wife, Cory, and their children. Due to an unfortunate personality conflict
andftnsmngtension with Dr. E X Hunt, L)r. Kanth was denied tenure in the Department of
Economics at the T Iniversity of Utah. Since that time, Dr. Kanth has undertaken a permanent
position at a major university in Australia. The market for academics in the field of economics is
one in which 300-400 individuals apply to each open position. It is a testament to Dr. Kanth's
scholarship that he obtained the permanent position in Australia.
Through frequent communication with Dr. Kanth, I know that be was setded in Sydney
and doing well on both a professional and personal level. He found his association with
colleagues aud the university to be satisfying intellectually, and Sydney was an appropriate place
for him'and Cory to raise their children. Although I have been aware of Cory's mental and
personal instability, I was still extremely dismayed to hear of her unannounced and sudden
departure from Sydney. Indeed, Rajani was not even aware of their whereabouts for some two
days and was himself exceedingly alarmed and concerned. Rajani has been a primary caretaker of
his children siuce their birth, as well os the primary income producer. The abduction of his
children and ensuing separationfromthem has been damaging to both him and the children to an
extreme degree.
As a professor myself, I know that it is typical for academics to continually apply for
regular or visiting positions in other universities. Because our salaries and position* are evaluated
regularly, we must often provide evidence of our value to other universities and to the market in
general. Thus, it is common to apply to other schools as a way of gaining leverage with uue's own
university in terms of salary, research grants, teaching loads, and promotion and tenure decisions.
Given this and the general conditions of the academic profession, such inquiries and applications to
other universities are not considered to be an indication of dissatisfaction with one's current
position.
In closing, Dr. Rajani Kanth has provided a stable socioeconomic environment in which to
raise his family. Furthermore, he has been careful to undertake a position in a community that is
amenable to the multicultural makeup of his family. He deserves every consideration for his
efforts.
Sincerely,

Sftfa of- Wfak . , ,
fotAhiW of tilt UW
U

J 1A -V
l*s*'~

•

A / J a n c c n Arnold QestG=TNOTARY PUBUC
>/ Associate P r o f e 4 s ^ g ^ M J H * R L 0 n E TURNER
AirJ

,

J M
» / ^

Dq*rtmei* of Marketing
JOII t-a*c v^ij, uutu c

7091 South 1700 W * * t

West Jordan. Uten $4034
My Commission Expiree
May 15,2001
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ADDENDUM " O "

X^TL: tiAJAiNA K A N T H

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Tracy Lee
17/15A Herbert St
St Leonards 2065
Australia

To Whom This May Concern
I have known Prof Kanth since 1997 as an undergraduate student in his
economics course held at the University nf NSW and hove since become well
acquainted with the rest of the Kanth family. During the time the entire family
was in Australia, I observed a healthy, happy and harmonious household. My
opinion is based on numerous visits to the Kanth household and some examples
include:
•

4* Ap*& 1W8- MatinPs 5* birthday party visit

Prof Kanth and Mrs Kanth displayed deep love and affection towards Malini and
Anjana on this special occasion. They were both dedicated in ensuring that
MaJsnPs party was a success by preparing various games for entertainment,
hcaltby snacks and gifts for all of Malini's friends. The day was quite enjoyable
for all parents and children ending the day with Malini and friends playing
happily in the garden under close supervision.
•

?7* fti/r 1998 Park outing with Prof Kanth and children

Prof. Kanth's devotion to the children's needs was obvious with his disapproval of
my lateness since he had made plans with the girls to go to Coogcc playground
scheduled at my anticipated arrival 1 hour earlier. During this playground visit, 1
observed Prof Kanrh*s deep affection for his children in the degree of care
provided, ensuring that they played safely by being close and watchful of Malini
as she climbed with other children on varioa<? apparatus. My attention was also
drawn to the great deal of concern for their health and general wellbcing when
Prof Kanth insisted that the girls had on adequate clothing being mindful of their
play activities, I was often instructed to watch over Malini whenever Anjana
wanted to go on the baby slide or swings requiting his attendance and

participation. These outward displays of care and affection from a father are
unparalleled for fostering a close and bonded relationship with the children,
which was obvious from the way the children and Prof Kanth interacted.
*

IJfOUSC hunting

With Mr$

jCpnth

On one of my visits to the Kanth household, Mrs Kanth and I went house hunting
together and in our discussions there were no signs of discontent with neither
Australia not her husband. We chatted along the way to various apartments
talking "about various aspects of Australia. Mrs Kanth 6id not mention any major
dislikes of the country during this or any other subsequent conversations. If I
recall correctly, I believe she stated that she had wanted to come to Australia
mote so than her husband (who was understandably nervous) and that it was
upon her insistence that convinced Professor Kanth to make the move. She did
not seem to have regretted making her choice for Australia
When I learned of the abduction I was totally shocked. Mrs Kanth had never
displayed any characteristics whatsoever capable of such an act and there was no
indication of unhappiness rendering such drastic action necessary. She always
seemed to be a kind, caring and open person. I never sensed that there were any
real major problems in the family and Mrs Kanth's overall appearance and
conversations did not give the impression that there were any domestic worries.
•

Small gathering

I attended a smaH gathering of about nine family friends where Mr and Mrs
Kanth both seemed quite content and sociable. I visited the children in their
bedroom and they were very happy and excitable. Mrs Kanth waited until the
children were asleep before joining us but there did not seem to be any hostility
between husband and wife. I stayed along with some other guests til quite late in
the evening because it was such an enjoyable night.
•

MLS^HzncQiis visits

Prof Kanth was very fond of his children showering them with love and attention,
ensuring their personal interests were always kept a priority. Consideration of th
children's needs and desires were more of a priority than other concerns such as
work. The children seemed to benefit substantially from this, always happy and
cheery whenever I visited the family. The number of achievements both the girk
had made despite their young age demonstrates a stable family life, allowing
them to concentrate and excel in various schooling and extracurricular activities.

maum piayea tne piano for me on one of my visits to show me what she had
learned from her piano lessons. She also had lessons in ballet, gymnastics, drama
and swimming which demonstrates a very bright and well-adjusted child. Both
MaJxni and Anjana's intellectual, physical and emotional progress was
astounding. The numerous awards won by Malini from various sources and
Anjana's vocabulary and knowledge never ceased to amaze me. The family had
settled into a routine in Australia and the children's accomplishments and
happiness largely reflect this domestic stability and willingness to stay in
Australia.
The children's success and happiness was undoubtedly attributable to a good
domestic home life, which to nic was certainly secure and safe. In particular, both
parents took an active and responsible role in taking care of the children since
they never permitted external babysitters to look after ihe children. The family
unit seemed to be extremely important, a view shared by both parents as to
ensure the girls were properly brought up with sufficient love and attention.
Efforts in shielding the children from course language and violence on TV was
particularly admirable in this day and age. In light of my observations over the
past as a family acquaintance, it would be a shame to see such genuinely sweet
and innocent girls separated from either parent
1

Since the family separation

I observed a distinct and extreme change in Professor Kanth's emotional state
aftet the tightly bonded famuy unit became divided. This psychological transition
was in my opinion, undoubtedly generated by the personal pain caused from the
sudden departure of his wife and children from Australia. Owing to the untimely
and abrupt separation, Professor Kanth was severely traumatised by the
experience leading to obvious physical stress and signs of inadequate sleep and
eating disorders. I was seriously concerned for his physical and emotional
wcllbeing. I kept in frequent contact during this time to lend my support and
ensure he continued to look after his health whilst he tried desperately to cope
with the new circumstances. From my understanding of his emotional state, he
was deeply disturbed by the forced separation of his beloved children against his
will and knowledge.
Since Professor Kanth and his wife separated, 1 observed some drastic and
uncharacteristic changes in his personal behaviour which included poor

concentration

and

attention;

lack

of

motivation;

bouts

of

confusion

compromising his ability to make simple decisions; inability to concentrate;
memory problems/loss, social withdrawal; feelings of detachment from others as
well as being easily irritable. He seemed deeply consumed in his grief from the
loss of his children and this sadness generated into, in my opinion, a severe case
of depression. I became increasingly concerned for his welfare when little
progress appeared to have been made during the months that led up to his
necessary departure for the US in regards to the Hague case. Even at the airport
upon his departure, Professor Kanth continued to show physical malnutrition and
general despondency from food and sleep deprivation. The physical and
emotional trauma faced by Professor Kanth suggests not only that the break up of
the family unit had come as a surprise to him but also the stresses involved with
being a vety caring and devoted parent wanting only the best for his children in
the long-term.

Tracy Lee

ADDENDUM " P

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District-

Prof. Rajani Kanth
National University of Singapore
10 Kent Ridge Crescent
Singapore 119260

Deputy Cleric

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CORY LEIGH KANTH,

NOTICE OF ABSTENTION:
AFFIDAVIT OF RAJANI
KANEPALLI KANTH

Petitioner,
vs«
RAJANI KANEPALLI KANTH,
Respondent,

Civil No. 994904256 DA
Judge Anne Stirba
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

RAJANI KANEPALLI KANTH, being first duly sworn, deposes, and 'appearing
specially \ says as follows:
1.

I am the Respondent in the above identified manner and I have personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances set forth herein.

2.

Petitioner and Respondent are the parents of two minor daughters, Malini and
Anjana,

3.

In March, 1999, Petitioner and Respondent were residing in Sydney, Australia
with our minor children, where Respondent had a been employed since June,
1997.

4.

On March 25,1999, without any warning or communication whatsoever,

Petitioner abducted the minor children and took them from Sydney, Australia to
Salt Lake City. Utah. Indeed for a full 24 hrs. after the disappearance, Respondent
was wilfully kept in the dark as to their whereabouts, misled in this regard by
Petitioner's family who pretended to be unaware of their situation after having
made all arrangements leading up to the abduction.
After arriving in Salt Lake City, Petitioner, after due passage of time qualifying
her for residency in Utah, but only after Respondent had already started Custody
proceedings in Sydney (EXHIBIT 3 ) , initiated this reactive lawsuit seeking the
entry of a Decree of Divorce and an award, inter alia, of sole custody of the minor
children.
In spite of the Wrongful abduction of the minor children by Petitioner on
March 25,1999, and in spite of prior instituted proceedings in Sydney for the
entry of an Order by an Australian Family Court awarding Respondent custody,
and a pending Hague Convention International Child Abduction Case (EXHIBIT
2) against the Petitioner with the Tenth Circuit in Denver (pending since
December of 1999), this Court entered an order awarding Petitioner temporary
custody of both minor children.
Indeed, As late as November of 2000, Le. well after this Court had already made
an award of temporary custody of the Kanth children to the Petitioner, the US
State Department wrote to the Court explaining the implications of the Hague
Convention for local Court actions, and explaining why such determinations may
not be made under International and Federal law (EXHIBrT 1), To that extent,
the temporary custody order, much as its implied legal processes, remains out of
accord with various applicable Federal (the UCCJA, Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act; and the ICARA, the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act)) and International Laws (The Hague Convention On International Child
Abduction). The UCCJA, e.g., was enacted precisely to (Section-1. (a), 5) :
Deter abductions and other unilateral removal of children
Undertaken to obtain custody awards.
2

Furthermore, under the so-called "Clean Hands' Doctrine, enunciated in the
UCCJA, Sections 8. a) and b) , this Court should have declined assumption of
jurisdiction as specified below:
a) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from
another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may
decline to exercise jurisdiction...
b) .. .the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree
of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to
custody, has improperly removed the childfromthe physical custody of the
person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child
The US ICARA - International Child Abduction Remedies Act - Section 2. (a). 1-2, is
equally explicit when it says:
LThe international abduction or wrongful retention of children is harmful to
their well-being.
2. Persons should not be permitted to obtain custody of children by virtue of
their wrongful removal or retention
Finally, International Law, as embodied in the Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction (Article 16 of the Hague Convention), to which the US is a signatory,
states unambiguously:

After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the
sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the
contracting state to which the child has been removed or in which it has been
retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been
determined that the child is not be returned under this Convention or unless
an application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time
following receipt of the notice.
8.

The Court, nonetheless, has scheduled trial in this matter for June 18 and 19, as
reiterated in the Hearing on June 4*, 2001, which will determine, inter alia%
whether Petitioner or the Respondent will be the permanent custodial parent of
our minor children.

9.

Throughout the legal proceedings in this case, except for short interludes,
Respondent has functioned Pro Se in this case, 'appearing specially5 and arguing

3

unsuccessfully, despite the support of international and federal law, that this
Court had no jurisdiction over the custodial matters raised in this Case, given
the family's residency in Australia at the time that unilateral and unlawful actions
were taken by Petitioner to secure Wrong&l Possession of the Kanth Children,
who, subsequent to the possession, were kept apart from their father by various
legal and extra-legal stratagems on part of the Petitioner and her Counsel.
10.

As a necessary, and final step, in this continuing effort,, in continuation of an
Appellate process commenced in November, 2000, and a culmination of two
years of arduous Pro Se legal labors, Respondent has just petitioned the USSC
(the United States Supreme Court) for a Writ of Certiorari on the Tenth Circuit
on April 25, 0 1 .

11.

Given the Articles of the Hague Convention, Respondent cannot, without
prejudice to his Hague case, participate in Local Court processes, touching upon
custodial and related matters, until such time that the status of his USSC Petition
is made clear. Indeed, any such participation, under Article 13* a, covering the
doctrine of 'acquiescence', of the Convention, would effectively forfeit his
Hague Case which is precisely about jurisdictional issues, as to whether it is
Australia or the United States that is the children's habitual residence, and the
legality of the Petitioner's current possession of the Kanth children in clear
violation of Respondent's custodial rights.

12.

Petitioner's Counsel, who is also the responding, adversarial Counsel in the
Hague matter, is well aware of the on-going Hague Case, and has accordingly
pushed for immediate compliance on the part of the Respondent with Local
Court directives in these matters so as tofrustrateRespondent's Hague Case and
win it, in effect, by imposing an involuntary default on the part of the
Respondent Indeed, the charge of acquiescence, under Article 13a of the
Convention, has already been leveled by Counsel Green in his Supreme Court
Brief filed with the US Supreme Court on May 25, 2Q0L

13.

Given these intricate set of legal circumstances, Respondent has little choice but
4

to respectfully abstain from all proceedings that involve the direct or indirect
interest of the Kanth children who remain to this day hostages in wrongful
possession of the Petitioner, abused victims of a heinous international child
abduction. Any participation on the part of this Respondent, as made clear in his
brief argued in the Hearing on June 4,2001, would place in outright jeopardy his
rights under the Hague Convention, and the legal process therein, in which he
has labored extensively, Pro Se, for over two years now.. Additionally,
Respondent emphasizes his continuing belief, which forms the basis of his
Hague Convention case, that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the Kanth
children. As such, Respondent respectfully hopes that the justifiable legal
rationale for his reasoned abstention are understood by Court, even were the
abstention itself not to be condoned.

14.

Petitioner harbors no desire to impose any needless hardship or costs on cither
Court or the Petitioner; as such, it seemed appropriate to give this advance notice
of the unavailability of this Respondent in both the pre-Trial proceedings and the
the scheduled Trial itself as set for June 18-19.

Dated: June

, JM

, 2001.

Rajam Kannepalli Kanth

SALTLAKECITY

)

)ss.

)

5

Theforegoinginstrument was acknowledged before me this

/r^day of

June, 2001, by Rajani Kanepalli Kanth.

P. Suturf l*id

tto 6MM fact UIMO* twd.
y(*nto,Uttfi MC*7

p.'m?^-'

STArtOTOTAH

NOTARY PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Affidsmt of Rajani Kanepalll

Kanth, was sent by facsimile this

// day of June 2001, to

the following:

Frederick N. Green
Green & Berry
AttorneysfoxPetitioner
10 Exchange Place #622

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Seat by facsimile to 801-363-5658

Akiko Kawaraora
Hobbs Adoudakis & Olson, L.C.
Felt Building
Suite 208
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Sent by facsimile to 801-519-2999
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ADDENDUM " Q "

No
In The

United States Supreme Court

PROFESSOR RAJANI KANTH
PRO SE Petitioner/Appellant
ON WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE
US TENTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS IN
HAGUE CONVENTION
INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION CASE
Vs.

CORY KANTH
Respondent / Appellee
PETITION REQUESTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN
HAGUE CONVENTION INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION CASE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
PROFESSOR RAJANI KANTH
PRO SE Petitioner/Appellant
Senior Fellow
National University of Singapore
10, Kent Ridge Crescent
Singapore 119260
Tel 011-65-874-4877
Fax 011-65-7752646

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Utah District Court and the Tenth Circuit Court
erroneously determined that the United States, rather than
Australia, was the applicable 'HabitualResidence' of the
Petitioner's family, when they applied the Hague Convention
Against International Child Abduction Law to the Facts of
this Case.
2. Whether the Utah District Court and the Tenth Circuit
erroneously ruled in this Case, contravening due process,
without exploring the Facts through a Hearing, and without
Examination of the Evidence and Briefs presented by the
Petitioner, and without allowing time to Petitioner to secure
proper representation by Counsel.
3. Whether the Circuit Court should have Stayed Utah State
Court proceedings, during the Course of the Appeal, when
requested, as required under the Hague Convention , to ensure
that a final determination regarding the Return of Abducted
Children under the Hague Convention was entered, prior to
the Utah State Court taking up Child Custody matters with
respect to the abducted children.
4. Whether the Utah Federal District Court erred, stepping
outside its jurisdiction, when it consented to 'settling' a
Hague Convention Child Abduction Case, in fact actually
dismissing it, in favor of a Divorce and Custody Stipulation,
in the absence of the Petitioner, requiring the latter to
gratuitously 'win back', on a Pro Se basis, his Properly filed
Hague Convention Case as an entre back into the protection of
the Hague Convention.
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE TENTH
CIRCUIT COURT
The Petitioner, Professor Rajani Kanth. respectfully prays to Courttc
Issue a Writ of Certiorari to Review and Set Aside the Judgment and
Opinion(s) of the Tenth Circuit Court in Denver.

OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion of the Utah District Court {APPENDIX C) is Reported a
79F.Supp.2dl317
The Opinions of the Tenth Circuit Court are included in
APPENDICES,A,
B,D&£
BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court has jurisdiction to
review this matter pursuant to U.S.C. § 1254(1).
The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed
Petitioner's Hague Convention Case en Dec 14th- 1999. Petitioner
filed a timely Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, which issued a Ruling on November 2, 2000 denying
Petitioner's Appeal. Petitioner's timely petition for rehearing was
denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit or
Nov. 22, 2C00.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
The Articles of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction {APPENDIX I)
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 USC 11601,
Section 2. {b) 3(B).{APPEND IX J); also Sec.2.(b).4
The Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution
Article III, Sections 1 and 2. of the US Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Facts pertaining to the Kanth Family's Normal Residence in
Australia'
Petitioner, a US academic sought and found employ, as a Visiting
Professor, in Sydney, Australia, moving there with his family (wife
and two very young daughters) in June of 1997. In the course of his
stay there, his contract with the University of New South Wales was
renewed, but on February 19, 1998, he received a permanent offer of
employ from the University of Technology, Sydney, which he
accepted. {APPENDIX I ) . In early Spring of 98, however, his wife,
the Respondent, was assaulted in a Sydney street and, to help her
recuperate, the family took a short holiday in April 98, visiting
Respondent's family at the latter's home in Salt Lake City.
At the end of their brief and refreshing holiday, the family returned to
their residency in Sydney, Australia , confident in the knowledge of
the previously accepted permanent job offer from the University of
Technology, in June of 98, where they remained.until the Respondent,
with a long history of radical substance abuse and serious
psychological disabilities, suddenly departed unannounced abducting
the Petitioner's minor children on March 25 th , 1999.
Facts pertaining to the Acclimitisation of the Kanth Children in
Australia:
Upon their original arrival in Sydney, Australia, in June of 97, on
resident Visas, the Kanth girls were only 4 and 2 and had never
attended school., having spent the previous academic year in Denmark
' where Petitioner had held a Visiting Professorship. As such, Sydney
was the very first school experience for the older child, Malini, who
graduated from Kindergarten, and 1st grade, in two separate Sydney
public schools, being well ahead in 2nd grade ((indeed being granted
'advanced standing* and placed in an accelerated learning group )
before her residence in Australia was rudely terminated. She secured
numerous , indeed weekly, competitive awards at her grade school for
her remarkable academic abilities.
The younger child, Anjana, barely 2 years old. was part of church
based play groups close to home as more appropriate to her age. The
o)der child, barely 4 at the time of arrival in Sydney and bur 6 when
abducted, was involved in a range of cumcular and extra-curricular
activities: she took gymnastics classes, securing a diploma; took
swimming lessons, at the University pool ; took part in a program of
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Dramatic Arts at the prestigious National Academy of Dramatic Arts;
took part in a children's theatre group; and took separate piano and
ballet lessons (the last cut short almost at inception, after her very first
lesson, by the abduction).
Their family life was both pleasant and bountiful (with no record of
domestic discord) as appropriate to an academic family, with frequent
academic and social visitors, students, colleagues, their families and
their children, at dinner parties, birthday parties, and such. The
children enjoyed the beachesrtrre rmisenrnsrthe zoo, and the relaxed
and recreational lifestyle of Sydney (they had a home with a pool for
part of their stay there). In effect, the children had lived in Sydney, as
normal and ordinary residents, from June of 1997 to March of 1999,
with the older child actually proud of her ability to near perfectly
mimic the Australian accent.
Legal Proceedings Under the Harue Convention:
After the sudden and surreptitious abduction, on the part of a
chronically unstable Respondent, Petitioner traveled to Utah to
inquire as to the rationale for the abduction and the welfare of his
abducted children. It became apparent.that that the Respondent was
under pressure from her family to disdain the marriage owing to the
latter's religious and ethnic preferences. Petitioner then returned to
Australia and filed a Petition for Return of his Abducted Children
under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction
[APPENDIX H), on the 14th of May, 1999, [and also instituted
Custody Proceedings in the Family Court of New South Wales on the
3rd of June, 1999: See APPENDIX M], which was duly endorsed and
forwarded to the US by the Commonwealth Government of Australia.
August 27 th , 1999 was the date set for a Hearing in the District Court
in Utah. Petitioner arrived there on the very day of the Hearing only to
discover that his attorneys had been engaged in trying, without his
knowledge or acquiescence, to 'settle' the case, on the lines of
divorce and custody stipulations, apparently with the approval of the
District Court. Petitioner strongly resisted the unauthorised
'settlement', and won his Case back after a lengthy Pro Se legal
struggle, in the same Federal Court, on October 18 t h , 1999
{APPENDIX G).
Thereafter, Petitioner's Hague Convention Case (X99-CV-532-C),
argued Pro Se by the Petitioner, was dismissed by the Utah District

Court on December 14th' 1999, without a requested Hearing
{APPENDIX C) , after disallowing a request by Petitioner to be
granted time to retain Counsel, and after also excluding his principal
Petitioner's Brief from due and deserving consideration , putatively
on grounds of late mail delivery, as recorded and represented in the
Court docket, though it had been transmitted earlier by facsimile m all
appropriate timing {APPENDIX K).
The primary basis for the Dismissal was the mistaken Argument of
the Utah District Court pertaining to the putative Intent of the
Petitioner with respect to residing in Australia permanently. Ignoring
the factual evidence of their nearly 2 year residence in Australia, and
the Petitioner's permanent employment there, and primarily on the
basis of Petitioner's applications to US universities, Court concluded
that Australia was not the family's habitual residence [ a Key Hague
Convention Precept],
In effect, the critical Hague Convention concept of Habitual
Residence , a finding of fact under the Convention, was being
redefined: a) in terms of parental intentions subsequent to the fact of
moving to a new country, and b) in terms of permanence, both of
which are serious and major errors of interpretation of Hague
Convention protocols and Case Law (stated briefy: the Convention
takes the point of the view of the child, not the parent, and looks
backwards, not forwards, in time).
Petitioner next filed an Appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court in Denver
(Case#99-4246) which handed down its judgment on November 2 ,
2000 {APPENDIX A) upholding the Judgment of the Utah Court,
again denying a request for Oral Argument, and also Excluding
Petitioner' s previously excluded Brief yet again from due
consideration (this ruling was upheld again in the Circuit Court's
denial of Petitioner's Request for an En Banc Rehearing on Nov 22,
2000; APPENDIX B) . In effect, Petitioner's case had been
adjudicated twice, but each time with both his Petition and his right
to a Hearing, (apart from the previously denied Right to Counsel)
summarily denied.
Yet again, the primary legal argument of the Tenth Circuit, echoing
the District Court, referred to the absence of a permanent intent' to
settle in Australia, as putatively inferred by Court principally from
Petitioner's post-Relocation correspondence with US universities.
Parenthetically, it is necessary to point out that the local family Courts
in Utah proceeded vigorously, ail through the Hague process, on
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custodial , visitation, and support matters, awarding Respondent
almost her demands, granting her temporary custody (see APPENDIX
F), and assessing ail manner of sanctions against the Petitioner
including an effective denial of visitation rights with the abductees ,
even whilst Convention proceedings were still pending in Federal \
Courts , against the specific prohibitions of the Hague Convention
Articles (APPENDIXI: See Article 16), much as their enabling
counterpart legislation in the US, the ICARA (International Child
Abduction Remedies Act: APPENDIX J). The Tenth Circuit refused
to Stay local proceedings in Utah, whilst_the Appeal was pending, and
also refused to grant a Hearing, despite Requests by the Petitioner
(APPENDICES D andE). In consequence, the carefully planned
Forvm-shopping, against which the Hague Convention was primarily
instituted, had paid off, from the abducting Respondent's point of
view, as obviously expected, handsomely.

THE ARGUMENT
Preamble: Hague Convention Judgments of the District and Circuit
Courts
Petitioner's Case, under the applicable protocols of the Hague
Convention on International Child Abduction , originally supported
and brought forward to the US by the Commonwealth of Australia
(APPENDIX H), was dismissed by the Utah District Court on
December 14, 1999 (APPENDIX Q, and denied on Appeal by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on Nov.02, 2000 (APPENDIX A) in
Denver, which denied again , on Nov.22, 2000, a requested En Banc
Panel Rehearing Petition ( APPENDIX B). The Rationale for this
Request for a Review, simple and ineluctable as they are solemn and
significant, are clarified succinctly below.
A. GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORT OF ERRONEOUS
RULINGS:
This Case concerns a Hague Convention International Child
Abduction Case Appeal involving Critical Issues of proper
interpretation, adjudication , and implementation of the Convention
Articles (APPENDICES I & J) , carrying enormous import not just for
the individual Petitioner but for the cause of abandoned parents
across the globe seeking relief through the only truly international
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means available - The Hague Convention - for the ultimate crime of
impassioned thoughtlessness and cruelty : the abduction of minor
children, in order to play the adult game of successful forumshopping. Errors of judgment and mistaken inferences here carry the
potential for becoming the intolerable precedent setting windows of
opportunity for would be abductors forevermore frustrating the high
intent, and noble resolve, of the Convention.
It is the only International Covenant of its kind the world has, arrived
at after years of deliberation by distinguished jurists and policy makers
from the world over, and its high intent and purpose cannot be
thwarted , procedurally and substantively, as it has been in this Case,
without courting reciprocal disaster internationally;
Stated simply, the Circuit Court Judgment, has, howsoever
unwittingly, effectively Rewritten the Hague Convention, eroding its
Intent, and undermining its accumulated Case Law Judgments, to
forever favor the Child Abductor, threatening to permanently
frustrate, thereby, a vital instrument of International Public Policy in
the highly sensitive and significant area of Child Abduction, both in
the US and across the worldIt would seem apparent, to this Petitioner, that, when Lower Courts
elide the objective intent of international protocols, as duly ratified by
the Congress of the United States, and inappropriately legislate new
meanings to accepted terms, posing a risk to the effective
implementation of public policy, the Supreme Court, in the interest of
safeguarding uniformity and reciprocity* the fundamental axioms of
^ international law, has to serve as the Constitutionally prescribed
Court of Last Correction.
B. THE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT:
While the uninformed and voluntanst nature of the Circuit Court
Judgment is the key issue in this Petition, equally significant and
compelling, from a Public Policy standpoint, is the nature of the
integrity of the Hague Process - honored essentially in the breach visited upon this Petitioner; stated plainly, it was invidious and
anomalous with unwarranted disabilities imposed upon him , the
Petitioner in a Hague Convention action (i.e., the victimised Party to a
Hague Convention litigation), from a Denial of Right to Counsel, to a
Denial of an Oral Hearing, and to an explicit refusal to even Read,
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let alone evaluate and adjudicate, the very Brief and Documentary
Evidence undergirding the principal Petition under adjudication.
His personally described and Reformulated PRIMARY HAGUE
BRIEF (included as APPENDIX K), and its Supportive
Documentation, much as his Appellant Briefs were, by explicit
admission of Court, never read (let alone evaluated, or even
adjudicated) - only summarily, and wholly improperly, denied and
dismissed, not once but twice. The Errors, both Procedural and
Substantive, violating both Hague Protocols and the common
constitutional safeguards of elementary due process, were,-stated
simply,, legion. In effect, the Courts rendered a strikingly Ex Parte
Judgment based solely on evidence proffered by the Respondent, no
less, in a Hague Convention Child Abduction Case..
The Convention Articles , as comprehensively explained in the
authoritative Elisa Perez-Vera Report, key document of the
Convention, demand a substantive review, not legalistic finessing, of
a Hague Petition, with the benefit of doubt accruing to the Petitioner,
and with the burden of defense against an Order Returning the
Children necessarily, and asymmetrically, falling on the abducting
Respondent; the actual process in this Case, however, reversed that
important emphasis decisively.
Additionally, there can be no precedent, "m the US, for a Federal
Judge, within a Federal Court, to de facto preside over a'divorce and
custody' settlement (as proposed by renegade counsels in the absence
of this Petitioner) as prelude to a dejure dismissal of a Hague Case, in
context of an on-going Hague Convention Case Child Abduction Case
(contrary to 42 USCI160L Sec 2. b.4), amd yet this is exactly what
the Utah District Court did, until this Petitioner relinquished his
Counsels, and won his Hague rights back, by Refiling the Case and
prevailing solely on the merits of his own Brief and Argument (SEE
APPENDIX G) . And yet this should never have happened in the first
place. In effect, Petitioner had been burdened, at the very outset, with
a gratuitous legal battle simply to secure bis Hague Convention rights.
Furthermore, a Federal judge, in clear, and self- acknowledged,
unfamiliarixy with Hague Convention Protocols, nonetheless sat in
Final Judgment on this Petitioner's Hague Case; in process, a Pro Se
Hague Petitioner was severely burdened (forced to personally travel
and depose, at his own expense, in Utah, though he was resident
elsewhere,); his Motions left unread, or summarily dismissed; and his
Case ignored, jmd rejected, in toto . And the Circuit Court Panel, far
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from comprehensively reviewing the Petitioner's Case for Appeal, on
its factual and legal merits , simply echoed the District Court's Errors
and Omissions of procedure and judgment almost tout a fait.
The Tenth Circuit refused to Stay local proceedings in Utah whilst the
Appeal was sub-judice, contrary to Article 16 of the Convention,
thereby placing the Petitioner in double jeopardy as the local Courts
moved swiftly to grant the Abductor- Respondent temporary custody,
assessing all manner of damages against this Hague Convention Child
Abduction Petitioner, and blocking his rights of access to his own
abducted children
Both the District Court and the Circuit Court, thereby, disregarded
the Petitioner's Constitutionally guaranteed Due Process Rights (as
laid out in the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution), and
applicable Hague Convention Guidelines, as they pertained to the
Adjudication Process in a Case properly brought forward under the
protection of both US and International Covenants.
The Courts are the traditionally jealous Custodians of such Rights to
Process , as the grand history of US judicial policy amply reveals; it
were a shame to traduce that honorable tradition by allowing to let
stand, without proper review, an ill-considered Judgment that capped
a similarly ill-endowed legal process that altogether Excluded this
Petitioner, a US citizen, albeit a Resident of Australia at the time of
the Wrongful Removal of his children, effectively from ALL the
means of defending his own Case involving the vital interests of his
abducted and abused minor children.
Matters are placed in clear perspective if the shoe were to be on the
s
other foot; i.e. if a hypothetical Foreign Court were to treat a US
Petitioner similarly, in reciprocating unfairness and iniquity, by a
refusal to honor the Hague Treaty protocols, and, in sum, refusing to
Return children abducted from the US., as is quite conceivable now,
after che Tenth Circuit judgment An International Treaty, to state the
moral, is only as good as the Standards of Compliance set by the
Signatory Nations.
C. THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFAULT:
The Substantive Basis of the Circuit Judgment, echoing as it does the
District Court Ruling, is not only mistaken in its own understanding
of key Hague Convention terms, in Three Critical and Vital Regards,
but also flies in the face of the burden of received US, and Convention
related, judicial wisdom as embodied in benchmark Circuit
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Circuit Judgments and Expert Legal Opinion, that have thus far
governed applications within this area of Law.
I. Habitual Residence and Post-Factum 'Intentions':
In the First Instance, the Tenth Circuit, following the District Court
(indeed almost the entire text of the Judgment of the District Court is
run through with this sole, if mistaken, prepossession of examining
the 'Intent' of the Petitioner after taking up his new residence in
Australia), defines the key Hague Concept of 'Habitual Residence' (a
finding offactt under the Convention) in terms of the Post-Factum
Intentionality of one parent after taking up a new residence (i.e. with
respect to parental intent vis a vis the Future, after the fact of a
consummated move to a new location} in a new environs , rather than
looking at the child's lived experience, i.e. the immediate Past, in the
new location, along with the nature of rhzA Priori Intent of the
parent prior to the original move to the new location.
Once located in a new environs , it is simply incontestable that it b
from the Child'sperspective that a Hague Case is argued. The
District Court emphatically did the opposite, and was , astonishingly,
upheld by the Circuit Court: indeed, this reference on/7. 6 of the
District Court Judgment, para#026, leaves no room for doubt on this
matter:
..as far as Anjana could be seen as settled in Australia.....the
focus must be dictated by the perspective of her parents
(emphasis supplied by the Petitioner).
The Circuit Court echoes this error when it boldly states , on para#3,
p. 2 of its Judgment, that:
.,.the conduct, intentions and agreements of the parents
during the time preceding the abduction are important
factors to be considered (emphasis supplied by Petitioner).
In so scaling in, and placing reliance on, wholly irrelevant Parental
Post-Factum motivations, after the fact of the move to a new environs,
as opposed to the physical, and cultural, lived experience of the
children in their new habitat, and the A Priori Intent of the Kanths in
moving to Australia (which remains totally ignored in the judgments),
the judgments referred to are profoundly out of accord with the burden
of US, and International, Hague Judgments and Case Law In this Area,
-9-

and the primary thrust of the Articles and Documents of the Hague
Convention. The Judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court clashes with the
explicit ruling in the Landmark Opinion of FRIEDRICHII(78F. 3d
J 060, 1068, 1996)y perhaps the most cited of all Hague Cases, which
summarily rejects this parental emphasis:
To determine habitual residence the court must focus on the
child, not the Parents and examine past experience, not
future intentions, (emphasis supplied by the Petitioner)
This is correctly echoed by the Third Circuit, in the other Benchmark
Hague Convention Case of FEDER (63, F3d at 224, 1995). To Cite:
Tnat Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain in Australia
permanently...does not void the couple's settled purpose to
live as a family in the place where Mr. Feder hadfound work
The Judgment in MOZES vs MOZESI {DC California 1998, 19 F.
Suppl. 2d. 11 OS) underscores and repeats the same point with respect
not just to the ruling in FEDER (op. cit) , but also the equally
categorical Judgment of the Sixth Circuit in FRIEDRICH H (op.cit),
and the near canonical Judgment in BATES (UK:CA, 122/89, 1989):
The Third Circuit in Feder "guided by the aims and spirit of
the Convention and assisted by the tenets enunciated in
Friedrich vs Friedrich and Bates uheld that a child's habitual
residence is the place where she has been physically present
for an amount of time sufficient for acclimitization and which
has a degree of "settled purpose "from the child's
perspective" ^emphasis supplied by the Petitioner).
Indeed, FRIEDRICHII
matter dispositively:

(op. cit) had, a long time ago, defined the

Any future plans that Mr. Friedrich hadfor Thomas...are
irrelevant to our inquiry...habitual residence can be altered
only by a change in geography and the passage of time, not
by changes in parental affection and responsibility (emphasis
supplied by Petitioner)
Similar is the affirmative confirmation of the principle at issue, as
given in many other cases that rely on this mainstream consensus
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such as, e.g., SHAL1T vs SHALIT (DAlaska, 1998 CaseU A98-328
CV (JWS), para. 010 ) which approvingly cites the judgment of
TORENvs TOKEN(F.Suppl. 2d. 1998 WL 756366) thus:
It does not matter that the US was not intended to be the
children s permanent residence, nor that it was intended
when they came here that they were to return to Israel in
2000. What may happen in thefuture has little, if any,
relevance to whether the children have become so "settled"
in their place of residence that it may fairly be described in
the present, but by reference to the past, as their "habitual'
residence. The Court must look back in time, not forward
(emphasis supplied by the Petitioner).
Finally, in BENSON vs BENSON, (Skane County Admn. Court,
Sweden, Section 114, No. 9748-98, 1998, para 024-25) the judgment
reads:
..too rigorous demands cannot be made concerning the
person s intentions for the future... thus it need not be a
permanent residency (emphasis supplied by Petitioner)
Other Cases that endorse and uphold this received norm of
interpretation, and give vital and stadial support to the Case of the
Petitioner, include TOREN vs TOKEN (op. cit), MOZES vs
MOZESI^op. cit) and WALTON vs WALTON (S. D. Mass. 1996,
925 F. Suppl. 453). The principle is also found- strongly affirmed in
Expert Legal Opinion as well, as in the words of Katherine Hung, in
Article titled There is no Place like Home: Determining Habitual
Residence: Feder vs. Evan Feder, 26, Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law, 487,1997:
Evidence that one would prefe* to live elsewhere does not
clearly demonstrate a lack of voluntariness (emphasis
supplied by Petitioner)
Suffice to say, postfactum parental changes of heart have no critical
bearing on Habitual Residence as much as the empirical facts of the
childrens' residence in a new environs In effect, the Kanths had
traveled to Australia twice, once on a temporary contract, the second
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time on a permanent contract, thereby fulfilling the rational essence
of the notion of intentionaltry, as it bears on the criteria of Habitual
Residence.
II. Habitual Residence and 'Permanent Residence '*
In the Second Instance, as made clear in Footnoted!, on Fage#7, of
the Utah District Court Judgment, endorsed by the Tenth Circuit,
Habitual Residence is erroneously confused with 'permanent
residence'.. To cite the Utah Court:
The evidence before the Court, as discussed below, leads the
Court to the conclusion that Mrs. Kanth is correct when she
states in her affidavit that neither she nor Mr. Kanth intended
to permanently settle in Australia (emphasis supplied by
Petitioner).
This defies the clear conviction of definitive Hague Judgments ,
such as BATES (op. cit.\ the Landmark Case that stands on par with
FRIEDRICHII and FEDER in its authority, where the judgment
cites the classic Opinion in R. vs BARNET (London Borough
Council: Ex Parte Nihil Shahf 1983 2 AC 309 at 314) approvingly:
...(it is not necessary that) tJtepropositus intends to stay where
he is indefinitely. Indeed his purpose while settled may be for
a limited period, (emphasis supplied by Petitioner)
This view is also confirmed in the other representative Case of R vs
BARNET (op.cit. at 343) :
I unhesitatingly subscribe to the view that "ordinary resident"
refers to a man's abode in a particular place or country which
he has adopted voluntarily andfor settled purpose as part of
the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of
short or long duration.
Categorical reaffirmation of this definitive Hague articulation is also
available in BENNETT vs. S. A USTRALIA (No. AD 1168 of 1993)
where Judge Forbes puts it in the Australian context where Petitioner's
Case originated:
And it is worth mentioning, I think, that for the purposes of the
[Australian] Family Law Act 1975 (section 4) "ordinarily
resident" is defined as including "habitually resident"
(emphasis supplied by Petitioner)
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To underline the point yet again, as in BENSON vs BENSON {op.
at.):
(Habitual Residence,} need not be a permanent residency
(emphasis supplied by Petitioner).
This is found to be amply and unmistakably reconfirmed in key
Authoritative Convention Documents such as the Elisa Perez-Vera
Report (op. at), and widely referenced literature on the subject such
as Dr. Eric Give's, The Concept of Habitual Residence (in The
Judicial Review, Part 3, 1997).
As such. Habitual residence is simply Ordinary Residence, as
explicitly defined in R vsBARNET (op. clt). On the other hand, the
cognate Factor of adequate Temporality, given the important attribute
of 'Settled Intent1 [ established unequivocally in the Case of the
Petitioner by the Permanent Job Offer -APPENDIX L- from
Sydney, accepted by h i m ] , ranges variably, in Hague Case Law
interpretations, from periods of but just One Day to Six Months
(with the latter being accepted now as the definitive threshold period
of time), as illustrated in the chorus of Opinions rendered in ZENEL
vsHADOW(1993f SLT, 975) BROOKE vs WILLIS (S.D.MY. 1995.
907.F. Suppl.57)t andBENNETvs S. AUSTRALIA (op. at) ) , C vs
S (A Minor, 1990 2 FLR 442) , et al
In sum, the Kanths were under no Hague Convention statutory
obligation to intend to live in Australia permanently, nonetheless, they
had traveled to Australia not once but twice, and the second rime being a Return to their Habitual Residence , rather than a 'second
visit', since all their personal furnishings had been left behind in
Sydney - armed with a permanent contract. No discussion of their
subjective, subsequent intent can gainsay the objective nature of the
permanent contract that attracted them , voluntarily and freely, back
to their continuing Australian residency.
III. HABITUAL RESIDENCE AND TEMPORALITY
Furthermore, as a Third Issue, of a factual nature (with which the
notion of habitual residency is more concerned, after a relocation),
the Courts, quite remarkably, ignored the empirically operative fact
that there were Two family visits to Australia, the second return visit
made on the firm basis of a permanent job offer, concentrating their
attention, in effect, entirely on the first visit ( which, while still
entirely sufficient in its 'SettledIntent' rationale from a Hague
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perspective, was nonetheless made even stronger by the indisputable
intentionality involved in the family's second return to, and sojourn in,
Australia). The factualimportance of the family's Second Return
visit to Australia in June, 98, having had several weeks of family
vacation time to ponder their continued resolve to return, cannot be
understated:. A family that went there not once, but Twice, returning
in the second instance armed with a permanent job offer, can hardly
be seen as lacking purpose, determination, or, ' settled intentionality'.
Furthermore, and even more importantly, the Courts also ignored the
single most important empirical parameter pertaining to the Kanth
family's habitual residency in Australia vie. their prolonged sojourn
in Australia across three Calendar years that would have
overwhelmingly supported the Petitioner's Case, and instead focused
on the first, and only one, of the two visits suggesting thereby a
misleading penumbra of indecision and uncertainty. In fact, so much
stress is placed on post-factum intentions that the factual, empirical
issues of the family's and the childrens' actual, settled, physical and
cultural residence in Australia, with which the Convention notion of
'habitual residence' is properly concerned, are given but short shrift.
Stated importantly, the key statutory requirements of the Hague
notion of habitual residence of the Kanth family ( free and voluntary
Residents of Australia from June 1997 through March 1999 , barring a
brief vacation in between , when the Abduction abruptly cut short the
sojourn of the children) are satisfied as much by their prolonged
Temporal Situation, in Australia as by their demonstrated (a priori)
'SettledIntent', quite overabundantly. Given the Petitioner's
employment, the family's length of stay , and the range of curricular
and extra-curricular involvements of the older child, they were
emphatically Ordinarily, and hence Habitually, Resident in Australia
beyond the sftadow of a doubt (somewhat more information on these
Hague Issues is provided in A.PFENDIX K op. cit).
Both the Federal Courts discounted these impeccable Hague Rationale
vis a vis habitual residence - a combination of a reasonable
indication of settled (but a priori) parental intent and a threshold of
temporality allowing for acclimitisation of children - in favor of
taking a wholly unprecedented stance of basing Habitual Residence on
the putative Intent of the Petitioner (and demanding an intent of
permanency of residence from it), as supposedly 'revealed',
moreover, in his applications to universities elsewhere, but well after
his move to Australia, all the while ignoring important factual,
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empirical details of the Kanth children's actual sojourn in Australia.
In this, they are making invidious and illegitimate legal history.
The US Courts need to ponder whether they now wish, tiiereby, to
Rewrite , and Reinvent, the Hague Convention , but in the novel and
unintended direction of eroding its Principal Intent - the Mandated
Judicial Duty , of Signatory States, to Return Abducted Children
(Article 12 of the Convention), given the novel exit to abductors
offered by the redefinition, should they let this unprecedented
restatement stand unchecked and uncorrected.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
It is apparent that the Judgments of the Utah Court and the Circuit
Court may both be hoisted on the same petard: they were both
seriously misconceived, based as they were on a plainly erroneous
understanding of the Key Hague Convention concept of Habitual
Residence as it pertains to: a) the Role, Place, and Significance of
Post-Relocational Parental Intentions in a Hague Convention Case ,
b) the critical importance of the empirical and cultural facts of
residence and acciimitisation on the part of the children, and, c) the
issue of 'permanency' of residence
The judgments go erratically against the grain of widely respected and
universally cited US Circuit Court Rulings that have taken on, by
now, a near canonical authority in the US, and abroad, within
Convention Case Law. Aside from misinterpreting Hague Convention
protocols, the Tenth Circuit unwittingly usurps a legislative function
that is not its prerogative by inadvertently redefining the meaning of
vital, and well-ordained terms such as 'Habitual Residence'7 and
'Settled Intenf, and in a direction arguably antithetical to
Convention intent.
This unilateral, precedent-setting, rewriting carries the very real and
serious potential of making it easier for potential abductors to bypass
the Convention, thereby entailing the risk of permanently nullifying
the explicit aim of the Hague Convention by providing a significant
legal bypass to would-be abductors in terms of a novel ' change of
heart' pleading that would now be canonized , by this Case, as a
permanent escape clause from the explicit judicial mandate to return
abducted children which is the cornerstone of the Convention.
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An International Treaty can only survive on the basis of uniformity of
application. If each Circuit Court in the US were to impart its own
definition to thQ Convention, as is apparently now becoming the trend
[as reflected in the recent ruling in Motes II - FJd.D.C. 9th Circuit,
2001. CV-98-56505 - that, unlike Motes I (op. cit), tries to depart
from mainstream renditions of Habitual Residence and Settled Intent],
in the direction of deviating from, and relaxing the import of, the
essential aim of the Convention , the 'restoration of the pre-abduction
status quo' (as quoted in FRJEDRICHII, op. cit) , it were only a
matter of time when the Convention would no longer be applicable in
the US.
As such, the Tenth Circuit ruling is an invitation to anarchy in this
field of law, inviting, in time, predictably reciprocal responses from
the other Signatory nations of the rest of the world, with the
unfortunate casualties being both the Convention itself, and the
scores of victimised minor children forced into international play,
annually, as hapless pawns by calculating and unscrupulous parents.
The economic and social trends of Globalisation extant today make
for fluid transience in the residency of qualified individuals
responding increasingly, and in larger numbers, to opportunity and
need in international markets the world over, but these latter-day
realities of a mobile society must not be allowed to abrogate , willynilly, the inviolate rights to stability of minor children innocently
caught in the altered intent of a dissatisfied parent, as was clearly
intended by the framers of the Hague Convention. Stated succinctly,
discord in a marriage, after the fact of an agreed-upon relocation,
should not be reason enough for a spouse to forum-shop his/her way
back to a more hospitable jurisdiction hauling minor children, as
either chattel or as bargaining chips.
In this respect, the Supreme Court could provide a valuable assist to
public policy, in the US and abroad, if it were to provide ^uniform
standard of evaluation , but one that is respectful of Convention
Intentions (involving a subtle combination of a definable a priori
parental Intent and a threshold of acclimitisation time for the children,
as described earlier) for the key Convention notion of "habitual
residence", that may then serve as a safeguard against both willful
and inadvertent misinterpretation and redefinition.
That much is actually indicated by the ICAM, ( 42 USC1601, Sec 2.
b. 3. B ), when it calls explicitly for a "uniform international
interpretation of the Convention". Prima facie, there is sufficient
-16-

warrant to believe that the mainstream standards in this regard (as
already cited in this Petition), from which the Tenth Circuit judgment
deviates drastically^ are entirely adequate , appropriate, and consistent
with Convention guidelines. As such, Court could do little better than
emphatically uphold , reinforce, and standardize those very standards. N
At another remove, serious violations of the most elementary judicial
procedural ethics, as they pertain to the domain of due process rights
in litigation, protected in general by the US Constitution ,and
protected specifically also by the ICARA (42 USC U601.et.seq)
within a Hague context, are also at issue here given that Petitioner's
Brief was excluded on (specious) technical grounds, a requested
Hearing was disallowed, and a request for time to find Counsel was
denied. As such,, it is Petitioner's contention that his Case was never
really adjudicated, only dismissed; and, more so, dismissed in favor of
a child abductor, and in conflict with the burden of Hague Case Law.
Even where misinterpretation may not be the issue, there is enough
gray area in the Application of the Hague Convention, particularly in
the federalist US, with its parallel and competing jurisdictions, to
invite confusion even on the part of the most sagacious judicial
authorities. It is unclear, for. instance, exactly -when a Hague
Petitioner's legal recourse, under the Convention, ceases to apply such
that local courts can go forward with'their business determining
custodial issues. The Tenth Circuit refused to Stay local proceedings,
when requested, presumably on the presumption that the District
Court dismissal of the Petition terminated the operation of Article 16
of the Convention. It is Petitioner's conviction , on the other hand, that
unless all legal recourse is exhausted, including the Appellate process
in full (subsuming also petitions to the Supreme Court) , the
Convention continues to apply, which would seem to fit the
Convention intent better of securing maximum substantive justice for
the left-behind spouse, who is at a radical disadvantage given the
'home court advantage' of the Abductor-Respondent in a Hague Case.
Again, the Supreme Court can lend a hand at clarification of such
issues so that Hague Petitioners, victims already to begin with, may
not be victimized yet again by jurisdictional confusion , competition,
and conflict.
The UCCJA (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act) is a domestic
attempt to establish uniform standards in the area of child custody,
precisely because of wide variance in the practices of individual
States; the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction is a
-17-

parallel attempt to legislate similarly enforceable and uniform
guidelines for the world at large in the field of Child Abduction.. But
the latter intent can hardly be realized, if, even within the limited
sphere of just one sovereign nation, multiple and competing
definitions, and diverging approaches to key parameters, are
permitted to coexist uneasily , as is now the case with each Circuit
Court defining Habitual Residence unilaterally, and according to its
own lights.
CONCLUSION
In sum , it is Petitioner's contention that his Case was, thereby, as
Wrongfully Adjudged as his own Briefs, Documents, and
Participation, were Wrongfully Excluded. En passant, the heinous
offense of international abduction of minor children, recognized now
as the newest form of Child Abuse in the Global arena , was, in effect,
condoned by the Tenth Circuit contrary to the explicit raison d'etre of
the Hague Convention, and the legacy of landmark US Circuit Court
judgments within it.
As such, Petitioner prays for an immediate and effective Redress of
these Wrongs. This will not merely rig^t his own personal wrongs, but
also restore the integrity of the Convention (placed at risk by the
Tenth Circuit Decision) and fulfil, as intended, the Treaty Obligations
of the United States under the relevant Covenants of an important
Agreement in International Law.
It is this Petitioner's contention that only the Supreme Court, unlike
Lower Courts usually occupied with more parochial, domestic matters,
may be expected to have both the Constitutional Stature, and the
larger Judicial Interest, Responsibility, and Vision, as the highest
Court in the land, to pay serious heed to the critical issue, fraught
with enormous implications, of the importance of US Compliance ,
within a uniformly established and enforced framework of
Reciprocity, with International Laws and Treaties , much as the basic
Civic Rights issues of protection of due process guarantees to private
citizens forced into litigation, as raised in this Case.

-18-

Given the foregoing, Petitioner, pleads for all due, and requisite,
Relief.
Respectfully,

Professor Rajani Kanth
Singapore,
Pro Se Hague Convention Petitioner

-19-

February 19, 2001
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June 21, 2000

Frederick Green, Esq.
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 841U
Re: Malini Kanlh
Dear Mr, Green,
As you know, I have been seeing Malini in therapy for approximately one year. I have
become increasingly concerned about the impact of Malini's erratic visitation schedule with her
father. She and her sister have no advance notice regarding the length or frequency of their visits
with their father. In my opinion, this lack of predictability contributes to Malini's elevated level of
anxiety.
As such, I am recommending that a visitation evaluation be conducted in order to obtain an
objective professional's recommendations regarding a visitation schedule. Certainly, the fact that
Mr, Kanth resides out of the country will make the establishment of a regular, predictable schedule
difficult. Nonetheless, it will be important for an evaluator to address the situation.
On another note, in my last session with Malini she told me that her father discussed with
her the possibility of going to India or Australia together without her mother's knowledge. I am
concerned that this type of comment increased Malini's anxiety.
Sincerely,
i j

Denise Goldsmith, Ph.D.
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Whereas 20 years ago the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction was a bold step
forward to provide a uniform process for resolving international child abduction cases;
Whereas t *u fhu pasl . i l ^ a d ^

tli*- Convention I us I i

creasinqly inipnrhnl ind positive effects and has gmwn

in terms of the number of Contracting States and the
level of interest of other nations;
Whereas there has been an increase of multinational marriages and a corresponding increase of international abductions of children by parents;
Whereas as travel becomes faster and easier, and as multinational marriages become more common, the Convention
is more significant than ever;
Whereas on 2 occasions, the International Centre for Missing
and Exploited Children and the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children have convened professionals and experts in international child abduction to examine their experiences with the Convention;
Whereas on both occasions, the participants affirmed their
overwhelming commitment to the Convention, but were
also unified in the conclusion that there are serious shortcomings in its implementation;
Whereas the shortcomings include—
(1) a lack of awareness by policy makers and the
general public of the Convention and of the problem of
international child abduction, making the successful resolution of cases more difficult;
(2) the fact that, in too many instances, the process
for resolving an international child abduction is too slow;
(3) a lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the
Convention from nation to nation;
(4) the fact that key exceptions provided in the Convention to ensure reason and common sense have in some
cases ceased to be viewed as exceptions, have instead become the rule, and are frequently used as justifications
for not returning abducted children;
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tions to the implementation of the Convention bi jt recognizes that more needs to be done; and
Whereas the International Centre foi Missing and Exploited
Children has promisee to support an effort to produce
practice guides ' j provic*
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(B) practice guides should be developed for

10

the Convention that build on recognized best

1

practices under the Convention and provide a

2

framework for applying the Convention;

3
4

(C) the Convention itself need not be modified;

5

(D) the practices identified and included in

6

the practice guides should not be legally binding

7

on Contracting States to the Convention and

8

should be based on research and the advice of

9

experts to help ensure the most effective proc-

10

ess possible;

11

(E) the practice guides should be developed

12

in 3 stages: comparative research and consulta-

13

tions, meetings of expert committees to develop

14

drafts, and consideration of the drafts by a fu-

15

ture Special Commission and

16

(F) the Permanent Bureau of The Hague

17

Conference on Private International Law should

18

organize the process of developing the practice

19

guides; and

20

(2) the Congress urges all Contracting States to

21

the Convention to adopt a resolution recommending

22

that—

23

(A) the Permanent Bureau of The Hague

24

Conference

25

produce and promote practice guides to assist
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on

Private

International

Law

1

in the implementation and operation of the

2

Convention; and

3

i

a

;

•

4

guides be adopted . ; • ^ Fourth Special Com-

5

mission at The Hague in March 2001.
" -. S'.:.K-HI ill.' Mnii'iM i ,i Kepiesentatives i.Marci;
Attest:
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•°y*°S ESS H. CON. RES.69
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Congress on the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction and urging all Contracting
States to the Convention to recommend the production of practice guides.

Sam Gejdenson
Committee on International Relations
Ranking Democratic Member
U.S. House of Representatives - B360 Ra> burn Building - Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE ADOPTS RESOLUTION URGING
COMPLIANCE WITH HAGUE CONVENTION ON CIVIL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTION
Gejdenson voices strong support for H. Con. Res. 293
i UR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: International Relations Committee Democratic Staff
1 ( i \hington, DC-May 19, 200011. S. Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-C1), Ranking Member of the
House International Relations Committee, praised the committee's adoption of H. Con. Res. 293
today, a resolution urging compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction. The committee passed the measure unanimously. It will now go to
the floor for consideration by the whole House.
"International child abduction remains an issue of great concern," said Gejdenson. "it is
unconscionable that despite heightened attention by the media and Members of Congress, an
estimated 10,000 American children are being held in foreign countries in violation of the Hague
Convention and against the wishes of their custodial parents." Further compounding this tragedy,
Gejdenson noted that frequently, ieft-behind' parents are denied contact with their children, even
when U.S courts ha^e granted them custodial or \isitation lights
"Sadly, we have found that many governments ad t<» i rutim drprec as u complices fn llns t i im
b> providing shelter for abductors," he said.
1 he Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was established in
1980 to provide private civil remedies to custodial parents seeking the return of, or access to, their
children that have been abducted or wrongfully detained b> the non-custodial parent in another
country. Under the Convention, countries agree, with certain exceptions, that a child who is removed
to, or retained in another country in breach of the custody rights of the Ieft-behind' parent, shall be
promptly returned to the country of habitual residence
"Since 1980, tiity-tour nations have signed the Hague Convention," Gejdenson noted. "But many
still fail to comply fully with the letter and the spirit of their international legal obligations under the
convention."
"There are some who ha\c tried to justiiy abduction on the grounds that the child would have a
better life in their countr). Indeed, we have people in this country who believe it would be better for
all children to be brought up in the United States. But there is a principle at issue here. The Hague
Convention clearly states that custody should be decided by the courts in the jurisdiction of habitual
residence, not by cultural attitudes. We must remain committed to that principle."

must strive to do better and we would hope and expect other nations who are signatories to the
Convention, particularly our counterparts in Europe, to do the same."
-30-

** MEDIA ADVISORY**
The Committee on International Relations Hearing Notification Line can be reached at:
(202)225-3184
Rep. Gejdenson, D-CT, is the Ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee

ADDENDLN

COMPLAINT AGAINST COMMISSIONER,
THE HON'BLE SUSAN BRADFORDRe: Case#994904256: Kanth i\s Kanth
(In Third Judicial District, Salt Take County)

Nature of Complaint:
i/.: * -r ••a «/e to recognize the elementary proprieties of minimal judicial scrutiny of
*,':< ^ * ince of a Case , in the face of a veritable deluge of countervailing fact and
tnjarnufitJti, while passing, indeed rushing to, summary 'judgment* against a Pro se
Respondent based 1OK miles away from Court
As such, Commissioner Bradford revealed, leastways to this Lay litigant, some
combination of the following elements:
a) a wanton ignorance of the larger countervailing facts of the case placed before
her
b) a possible (exclusionary intent' in the summary disregard of a Lay
Respondent fs pleadings stemming, possibly, either from:
1) the foreignness' of the Respondent (in effect this is what is meant by the
telling phrase (the home court advantage' that, in this case, apparently
rested with the Petitioner)
2) the Lay nature of the Respondent's litigant status whose reaso
pleadings didn't seem to merit attention, since the Respondent
duly licensed attorney.
c) an apparent indifference to any elementary concept of substantive justice
which must undergird any judicial officer's dispensations from the Bench.
d) An obvious and astonishing indifference to the possible damage done to the real
victims of this case, the Respondent's abused and abducted minor children, as a
consequence of her Rulings, appalling in context of a 'Family Court7 officer
who is supposedly'the guardian of their interests,
I'he Facts:
Briefly:
L, 1 he I11 " ztiti : • T ?; ( i ":;' i ucted Respondent's minor children from their home in Sydney
Australia on March 25, 2000.
2.Since then a Hague Convention Petition for The Return of Abductees pends
(currently with the Tenth Circuit) against the Petitioner
3Jn effect the Petitioner, already guilty of Wrongful Rei
Wrongful Possession (and, as will be seen, aggravated
Interference)

1

3. Given that, a Lower Court should not be, quite so readily, ruling against this
Respondent (who is the Petitioner in the Hague Case).
4.Additionally, a Custody petition filed by the Respondent, is also pending with the
Courts in Sydney, Australia, filed long before the present Case and should, as a matter
of due faith and credence, take precedence under UCCJA guidelines.
5. Respondent has also raised the issue of appropriate jurisdiction since the litigants
were married in New York in a Hindu religious ceremony long before the civil
marriage in Utah.
6. At any rate, Since March of 99, as befits a child abductor, the Petitioner, ably
assisted by her Counsel (against whom 2 ethics complaints were filed by the
Respondent, with the Tenth Circuit and the Utah State Bar) has prevented normal
visitation (Respondent can only 'appear specially' and Cannot be asking for
affirmative relief from the local Courts owing to his Hague Case thereby being
seriously hamstrung by the jurisdictional problem, which has been taken full
advantage of by the Petitioner, who, along with her Counsel has written herself her
own 'contract* now duly consecrated by the Commissioner).
7. To this effect, the Petitioner took Respondent's children to a psychologist to get a
letter suggesting that the kids were unhappy with the infrequent visits of their father
who lives 10K miles away.
8. The psychologist provided such a letter readily but Respondent found out that
she actually coaxed the child, putting words in his older daughter's mouths, rather
than obtain a true index of children ys feelings: in effect, the letter was a fraud (a
Complaint against the shrink has been filed and the Court was notified of this).
9. Court had been informed that the older child had been a victim of both physical and
emotional abuse by a radically unstable Petitioner who feared her close links to her
father.
10. Court was also informed of documentary evidence establishing that child abduction
is a serious form of child abuse; as such the children were obviously abused children
and the Petitioner was both a kidnapper and a child abuser.
1L This summer, Respondent visited Utah to see the children and was basically denied
normal visitation, with the Petitioner calling in the Murray Police to break up an
ongoing visitation (snatched from the swimming pool of a hotel) without legal rhyme
or reason (an Ex Parte Order was obtained, fraudulently, to restrain the visitation
again without any legal or other reason). Court was made aware of all this.
12. Finally, in frustration, on July 2, Respondent left for Singapore where he is a
Senior Professor to teach Term.
13. Petitioner was served Papers just prior to leaving by Petitioner's Counsel to attend
an Order to Show Cause Hearing on July 31.
14. Both Petitioner and her Counsel were fully aware that Respondent had teaching
obligations beyond July 15. In effect, they had hoped for a default judgment in their
favor.
15. Since Returning to Singapore, and all the way though the date of the Hearing,
Respondent, petitioned Court by fax and letter to alter the date until his next mid-term
break in the first week of October which might afford the possibility of yet another trip
to the US from Singapore (subject to permission from his University).
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16. Despite all of the foregoing. Commissioner Bradford refused to Continue the case,
and gave Petitioner all she had asked for, in effect granting her exactly the default
judgment she craved. Indeed the Wronged Parent is now being asked to undergo
psychological evaluation before being allowed to see his own abducted children (in
effect, and in all irony, blaming the victim!).
17. Respondent filed an Objection to the Commissioner's Ruling which was again
summarily overruled and matters are now in the hands of the judge.
18. It is true that the judge may yet overrule the Commissioner but a Commissions is
responsible for acting responsibly in the first instance. In Respondent's view the
Commissioner's Order is simply unconscionable under any system, of legal ethics since
Court had been made aware of the following actionable charges against the Petitioner':
a) Wrongful Removal, Le. kidnapping of minor children
b) Wrongful Possession, in violation of Respondent's Custodial Rights
c) Custodial Interference, by denying Respondent due rights of visitation.
19. As such, The Commissioner willingly, disregarding all arguments, rewarded a
Wrong-doer - possibly the worst of legal sins - and went on to impose restrictions on
the rights of the Wronged Parent to see his children (and vice versa) all in sovereign
blindness to the facts of the Case. Petitioner was also awarded alimony and child
support, in effect rewarding kidnapping with extortion.
20. There was no Urgency to the case: Respondent's Hague Convention Case was
pending at the Tenth Circuit; Petitioner was living with her parents, having her legal
and other bills paid by her well-to-do family, and had also been receiving support from
the Respondent
21. Obviously, the denial of the simple request for Continuance sought for by the
Respondent-a courtesy in any legal proceeding - was neither legally nor materially
mandated by any legal or material need on part of Petitioner.
22 As such it is reasonable to assume that, only an unbecoming haste to rule in favor
of the Petitioner could have produced the Ruling in Question.
Summin2 Up:
Justice is not a matter of legalisms; the latter are but a means to the former end.
Commissioner Bradford, in Respondent's considered opinion, misused her powers
without warrant, in effect acting injudiciously and irresponsibly and with undue haste.
Commissioner Bradford, in effect, failed to note that a confirmed child abductor, in
patently Wrongful Possession of minor children, who had exacerbated, kidnap and
Wrongful Possession with the further misdemeanor of custodial interference, was
calmly seeking to ratify the abominable act by means of a default Court ruling. Court
quite amicably rewarded the Wrong-doer without so much as casting a glance at the
voluminous submissions of affidavits and documents by the Respondent
The fact that the Judge might yet reverse the Commissioner's Recommendations does
not absolve the latter from the due legal and judicial responsibility to evaluate
proffered evidence, from either side of the litigation, rationally, fairly, and in a nonarbitrary manner.
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This Respondent may not be up in the terms of art of the profession but he is well
aware of the foundations of the legal system; indeed so much so that his work has been
cited in the Stanford Law Review.
He has struggled for a year at Federal and State levels, relying on his own mettle, to
protect the interests of his abducted and abused minor children. It never occurred to
him that he would have to protect them against the arbitrary actions of a judicial
official herself: and all that from a distance of 1 OK miles.
Respondent is a US citizen; the Constitution does not, in any relevant Article, decry
self-representation -possibly the best guarantee for a mature republic is an educated
populace that can be its own fearless advocate; as such it is profoundly wrong to scorn
the representation of a Pro Se Litigant ( especially in Case that involves the interests of
minor children themselves the victims of a brutish, international kidnapping).
Stated succinctly, to countenance only one side of a legal argument is aflat denial of
due process rights.
There is such a thing as a Culture of the Court'; in this case, it fell far short of being
civil.
Needless to add, this Complainant intends no personal disrespect, in any shape or
form, to either the Commissioner, or the Third Judicial Court, or any other party
referred to in this Complaint, in advancing this legitimate Complaint.
Respectfully,

Professor R. Kanth
Pro Se Respondent
Copthorne Orchid Hotel
214 Dime am Rd.
Singapore 119260
Fax: 065-2509292

Dated September 5, 2000

Enclosures:
L U.S. State Dept. Document suggesting Wrongful Removal of Respondent's Minor
Children by Petitioner.
2. A Supreme Court of New South Wales Affidavit affirming the Wrongful Removal
3. Text of Default 'Order' eventually signed by Commissioner Bradford.
4. Text of Objection filed by Respondent.
5. Text of Commissioner's 'Evaluation* of the Objection
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FOR: MR. DANIEL J. BECKER
[Court Administrator]

October 2, 2000
Re: Case# 994904256/Salt Lake County/
Third Judicial District
Dear Hon'ble Mr. Becker:
I wish to respectfully place before you continuing irregularities and infelicities on the
part of the Third Judicial District Court that have severely inhibited my legal rights of
due process and representation (amounting virtually to a trial by absentia and default)
despite repeated pleas for correction and amendment made by facsimile and voice mail (I
am based presently in Singapore) to various Court functionaries.
Indeed, the practice of excluding this Pro Se Respondent from news/ information of
proceedings continues unabated despite my recently filed Complaint against
Commissioner Susan Bradford - born of complete frustration - with your office.
Briefly, the facts are as follows:
1. My wife - the Petitioner in this Case - abducted our children from Sydney,
Australia in March Of 99, and has now filed for divorce and custody in Utah.
2. An International Hague Convention Child Abduction Case against her sits with
the Denver Federal Appellate Courts.
3. I am technically forbidden by my Hague Convention protocols from participating
in these local Utah actions; yet I have had to repeatedly "appear specially" to
prevent further prejudice to my interest.
4. I am 10K miles away and The Court has not transmitted ANY information to me
in any form since August 1, in effect barring me from effective participation.
5. Court dates, trial dates and such are being set without my knowledge and
Participation^ and over my objections) despite the Court being informed (I
append my latest requests to this letter).
6. To make matters worse, I have pending Divorce proceedings in Sydney, Australia
That were filed prior to my wife's filing and as such should take precedence over
the Utah procedures under the UCCJA, a matter ignored by Court.
7. As a realist, I quite understand that my wife has a ;home court advantage' in these
proceedings (which is why Parental kidnappers go forum shopping in the first
place), but this is a bit ridiculous.
8. I live neither in the state of Utah, nor in the USA, and to set trial dates to
suit the needs of Petitioner's Counsel while ignoring my constraints is to
seriously prejudice my interest.
9. I requested a Continuance of a Hearing on the Order to Show Cause (July 31)
which was denied. I have now asked for a Continuance of the trial which most
likely will be similarly ignored.

10. To sum up: I am appearing for myself against a child kidnapper being based 10K
miles away in an employment that does not permit frequent departures from duty:
and yet the Court finds it unimportant to even keep me (literally) posted on
important developments let alone accord my representations the respect they
deserve.
I realize that not all of these issues are relevant to your jurisdiction but I believe some of
them - including the principal one of treating both litigators equally on all scores- are
clearly an important pan of it.
I must also make clear that while I am indicating m> obvious frustration with a process
that has seemed exclusionary vis a vis my representations, none of the foregoing should
be taken to imply any disrespect for either the laws of the State of Utah or any of the
individual Officers of the Court in question.
I request you to kindly assist me to get the equal treatment - specially equal access to
Case information and consideration when setting important Court Dates and such - that
is, I believe, my constitutional right.
Respectfully,
Professor Rajani Kanth
Pro Se Respondent
Copthorne Orchid Hotel
214 Dunearn Road
Singapore 299526
Fax: 65-2509292

ADDENDUM "U"

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING:
A NEW FORM OF CHILD ABUSE
by Dorothy S. Huntington, Ph.D. 1
Parental child stealing-the abduction or unlawful retention of a
child by a parent-has since the mid-1970s gone from being a
virtually unrecognized problem to an issue of serious national and
international concern. As the divorce rate and the rate of marital
breakdown in this country have jumped dramatically, so have the
number of cases involving child custody disputes and those
culminating in parental kidnapping. The damaging impact of child
snatching on both children and parents has just begun to come to
our attention. Despite the widespread public and professional
interest in parental child stealing, there has been to date only
one systematic research study (Agopian, 1979) on the topic, with
only two other projects currently underway. One of these projects
is being carried out at the Center for the Family in Transition and
it is from this project that I will speak today.
The object of the child stealing project of the Center for the
family in Transition has been to examine this until now almost
invisible population of children and adults involved in child
stealing, and to develop ways of helping the children and adults
involved. We knew at the time that we started the project that
the lives of parents from whom children have been stolen become
inextricably bound with a sense of violation and loss, as they
search and face constant frustration in their quest for their lost
children. Equally important was our knowledge that those children
who are returned need enormous help in coping with their anxieties
and sense of traumatic disruption.
There is almost no solid knowledge about the children, the parents
who perpetrate the stealing, or the victimized parents. We have
made a systematic attempt to assemble and analyse data about the
families involved. Through this, we have attempted to generate an
understanding of the practical implications of the experience and
its legal, psychological and economic impact.
The causes of parental kidnapping and the motivations of the
kidnappers are obviously highly varied, but if one is ever to
control this constantly increasing social problem, some estimates
must be made of the most likely causes. It is only in this way that
we can formulate ideas of how and why this occurs, with the purpose
of predicting and preventing this stealing: are there certain kinds
of situations where snatching is more likely? Are there certain
family constellations or background patterns more highly associated
with child stealing? Are there certain signs which could be
recognized as warnings?
A final goal of the project is the formulation of information for
the education of judges, attorneys, and court personnel
specifically directed to their complex concerns, such as
information on circumstances in which child custody might be
granted to the "snatcher"; what sorts of visitation and under what

circumstances visitation ought to be permitted after-a child is
returned, and in what types of situations child kidnapping is
likely to occur: family vioLence, extended and bitter litigation,
cross-national marriages, cases where restrictive visitation rights
have been imposed, etc.
Child stealing is an issue that fits well in the context of The
Center for the Family in Transition, which is a non-profit clinical
and research center founded in 1980 to help families with children
cope resourcefully with the problems and possibilities that are
part of family transitions, such-as divorce and remarriage. The
aims of the Center are to ameliorate distress and significantly
reduce the psychological toll of divorce on families, with special
emphasis on the children; to evaluate the efficacy of brief
preventive services for these families; to generate new knowledge
about families in the process of change; to catalyze needed
supports for these families; to act as an advocate locally and on
state and national levels for programs that support families during
times of stressful change; and to join in the education and
training of personnel who work with families in transition.
To return to the phenomenon of child stealing, it is sad to note
that the literature pertaining to child snatching is rudimentary.
Few clinical cases have been described. Epidemiological studies
have not been undertaken. The few articles on the subject are in
the legal and lay press (see attached bibliography).
"As in the case of other social issues that emerged from behind the
closed doors of American households to become social problems in
the 1970s, the mandate to address the problem of child kidnappinq
was generated by presenting estimates of tens of thousands of
victims, personal testimony of the anguish and emotional heartache
of the parent who has a child abducted, and references to the
likelihood of significant long term damage to the children who are
kidnapped. Mention is sometimes made in newspaper accounts of the
case of the child who was in fact killed in an automobile accident
during the course of an abduction (Haas, 1977)." (Gelles, 1980)

"In addition to the parallels between the generation of concern for
child kidnapping and other social/family problems such as family
violence, child abuse and neglect, marital rape, sexual abuse of
children, etc., there are similarities between the current state of
knowledge and research on child kidnapping and the early stages of
research on child abuse, child neglect, wife abuse, sexual abuse,
elderly abuse, and domestic violence.
"First, although interest and concern about parental kidnapping
emerged in the 1970s, there is some evidence in legal case law, and
a general feeling that child kidnapping has always been an aspect
of marital and custody disputes and divorce (Katz, et al, 1980).
Thus, parental kidnapping, like child abuse and family violence,
has probably not been attended to as a result of 'selective
inattention' (Dexter, 1958). Legal precedence, such as the 1932
federal kidnap legislation, also called the 'Lindbergh Law',
specifically excluded the taking of a child by a parent from

another parent as a case of kidnapping requiring legal redress.
Case law indicates that many courts do not view the so called
abduction of a child by one custodial parent from another as a case
of kidnapping (Katz, et al, 1980). In other words, in many states,
if there is no custody decree, or if there is joint custody, a
father 2 can take his child to another state, or country and deny
the mother access to this child and not be liable to criminal
prosecution . . . . In short, parental or child kidnapping was not
considered a social problem prior to the 1970s, in large part
because it was not illegal in many states, and even the victim—the
parents from whom children were taken or retained-would not think
of themselves as a victim of a crime." (Gelles, 1980)
Until the recent passage of the Uniform ChiLd Custody Jurisdiction
Act this was the situation. Thus, just as it was difficult to
measure the extent of child abuse before it was viewed as a crime
and a social problem, it has been equally difficult to determine
the magnitude of parental kidnapping without a legal definition of
what parental kidnapping is, and a consciousness on the part of
victims that may have been victimized from the legal point of view,
not only from the psychological point of view, which they always
knew.
Until recently, a parent could "legally" kidnap a child by taking
the child out of the state where he or she did not have custody to
another state and obtain a favorable custody ruling. This practice,
called "forum shopping" or "court shopping", was possible because
of the state's failure to give full faith and credit to prior
decrees; unwillingness to practice the "clean hands" doctrine;
inclination to favor the local petitioner; and adherence to the
parens patriae 3 doctrine, which states that the court must be
primarily concerned with the child's best interest (although this
in itself has never been explicated properly in child stealing
cases).
In an attempt to avoid jurisdictional competition, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State-Laws drafted the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 1968. To date, fortyeight states have adopted the Act, 4 which provides uniform
guidelines for determining the proper forum for a custody hearing.
The federal Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 USC 1738A), which
requires nationwide adherence to UCCJA, was then signed into law in
1980 5. The Federal Act has three basic provisions: 1) it requires
all states to honor the child custody decisions of other states; 2)
it authorizes use of the Parent Locater Service; and 3) it
authorizes the FBI through the fugitive Felon Act to track parents
suspected of abducting their children.
There remain numerous unsolved problems with the federal
legislation, among them the fact that a child snatched prior to a
custody decree is not protected by the UCCJA, and that the
perpetrator must initiate a custody proceeding in another forum in
order for the UCCJA to be invoked. For these reasons and others
(Bodenheimer, 1978, Shutter, 1981), the new legislation, while a
step in the right direction, does not significantly alleviate the
problem of child stealing.

As a result of the lack of hard data about child stealing, we have
no reliable, scientifically generated statistics on the incidence
and "prevalence of child stealing; on demographic and psychological
characteristics of offenders, victims and children involved; on the
number and status of officially reported cases; and on the
psychological consequences of child stealing for the child, the
custodial parent and the new family. We have little about the
psychological profile of the parent perpetrator, nor do we know
about the effectiveness of prevention and treatment strategies for
families of child stealing. What we do know is that the
consequences of child stealing are profound. The parent who loses
the child has to deal with a precipitous loss beyond the feelings
related to the marital breakup or divorce itself. The child who is
kidnapped must cope with the shock of the kidnapping, the sudden
loss of a parent and social circle, and an abrupt adaptation to a
new environment. The child also often has to deal with lies that
the snatching parent tells about the other parent, for example,
"Mommy doesn't love you anymore", or, "Your father is dead".
It is now generally agreed that the frequency of parental child
stealing is increasing (Agopian, 1981) United States Senate, 1979),
and while there is every indication that this is true, again there
is no strong evidence for this fact (Gelles, 1980). Most
commentators ascribe the increase to the rapidly rising divorce
rate (Agopian, 1981, Fisk, 1977; United States Senate, 1979).
Another factor cited is the advent of no-fault divorce, which has
encouraged spouses to shift the arena of their hostilities from
divorce to custody proceedings (Bodenheimer, 1975). Another
contributor is the greater interest of fathers in seeking custody
of their children as sex role definitions change to include active
parenting by fathers. Also implicated is the proliferation of
alternative family life styles, such as dual career/dual residence
marriages which makes kidnapping logistically possible (Gelles,
1980).
The serious difficulties confronting researchers attempting to
assess incidence and prevalence and even to define child stealing
have been well addressed by Gelles (1980, 1983). He points out that
the use of official statistics is not indicated in the case of
"latent social problems" like parental kidnapping—sensitive,
emotion laden topics -because subjects are difficult to locate and
resistant to participating in research projects. In addition, the
low base rate necessitates an extremely large sample. Agreeing on a
definition of child stealing has been difficult because experts
have not been able to agree on whether a "stolen child" need have
been 1) taken or retained, 2) whether the child's whereabouts need
be concealed, and 3) whether there need be a custody decree.
The number of children stolen each year has until this time been
estimated at 100,000 per year, but there is new and very tragic
evidence that this number is under-reported by at least three to
four hundred percent. The figure of 100,000 children was so often
cited that it had begun to seem "official" but, in fact, the figure
had no scientific standing and was a guess and a projection,
probably attributable to the founder of a parent support group

(Gelles, 1980).
A new national study of the parental kidnapping of children shows
that there are many more such abductions than previously believed.
The study estimates that there are at least 313,000 incidents a
year, possibly as many as 626,000. The research was conducted by
Richard Gelles, a professor of sociology at the University of Rhode
Island and a lecturer in pediatrics at Harvard University Medical
School. In this study, Gelles (1982) defined child abduction by
parent as an incident in which a parent physically takes, restrains
or does not return a child under the age of fourteen, after a visit
and keeps the child concealed so that the other parent does not
know where the child is.
Gelles (1982) has now presented the results of this national survey
designed to provide the National Institute of Justice with a
preliminary estimate of the incidence of parental child snatching.
The findings constitute the first attempt to assess the extent of
child snatching in the United States. The survey was conducted by
telephone with a representative cross section of adults eighteen
years of age and over, at 3,745 sampling points within the United
States. The survey was conducted in three waves between June 18 and
August 10, 1982. Figures for age, sex, and race were weighted,
where necessary, to bring them in line with their actual
proportions in the population. The results show that the best
estimate of parental cliild snatching should vary from 313,000 cases
a year to 626,000 a year. Taking into account the expected limits
of sampling error, the survey data yield a minimum estimate of
230,000 cases a year to a maximum estimate of 751,000 cases a year.
At minimum, then, the annual incidence of parental child snatching
appears to be at least twice the generally reported rate.
Victims, legal experts, and authors of magazine and journal
articles also guess that the frequency of parental kidnapping is
increasing, perhaps as a consequence of the rapidly rising divorce
rate. Back (1981), using National Center for Health Statistics
data, estimates that with the 1979 divorce rate at 5.4 per 1,000
population and the number of children involved at 1.18 million and
with 12.5% of the 63.2 million under-eighteen children living with
mother only (separated or divorced) and 1.6% living with father
only, one can derive a ballpark estimate of 8.9 million potential
targets of child stealing, up from 6.3 million in 19?0, an increase
of 41%). Assuming a distribution similar to that of the total child
population, roughly 74% of these children are below the age of
fourteen and may, therefore, constitute an especially high risk
group (Agopian, 1981).
Along with lacking accurate statistics on the magnitude of the
problem, we also lack accurate statistics on "demographic"
characteristics, such as the ages of the children involved, the sex
of the perpetrator, geographic locations, etc. We certainly know
nothing of the statistics on the return rate and essentially
nothing on the circumstances of the majority of the returns.
We also have a current need for information and informational
sources at state and at federal levels—statistics on what happens

when we need most strongly special information on the situation of
unmarried couples and couples lacking custody decrees. We even need
information on federally sponsored child stealing. For fathers
entering the Federal Witness Protection Program and being given a
new identity, the government may snatch a child from the mother's
custody in order to give the father both a new identity and his
children (Civil Liberties News, April 1981). We know nothing of how
often this is occurring.
We have for a long time believed that if a parent does something to
a child then that is all right. The concept of child as chattel is
still with us. Gradually over the years we separated child abuse
and neglect out from permissible parental actions. The debate over
the issue of whether it is possible to charge a parent with a crime
against a child has led us to understand that parents can be,
should be, and must be charged with child abuse when they have
committed crimes against a child. This whole area of children's
rights has been assessed within the context of maltreatment,
serious neglect, physical and sexual abuse of children. We now must
reconceptualize child stealing as child abuse of the most flagrant
sort.
Child stealing, from the point of view of the child, is child
abuse. In child stealing, the children are used as both objects
and weapons in the struggle between the parents which leads to the
brutalization of the children psychologically, specifically
destroying their sense of trust in the world around them. This is
one basic definition of child abuse. Child stealing is turning up
the seamier side of child physical abuse and sexual abuse where
there is every evidence that the care given to the children in many
cases once they have been stolen clearly fits within the definition
of maltreatment and abuse. In situations not involving parental
kidnapping, child abuse charges are brought when it is found that
the child's diet is inadequate, where schooling is only
intermittent if at all, where the surroundings are extremely
deprived and where the children are constantly terrified.
Nonetheless, when all of this is true within the circumstance of
child stealing, we have not conceptualized child stealing as child
abuse.
One of the reasons for this may be the lack of any universally
accepted definition of abuse and neglect. Although numerous
definitions abound, none are free from ambiguities. According to
the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, child
maltreatment is defined as "the physical or mental injury, sexual
abuse, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the
age of eighteen by a person who is responsible for the child's
welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's health
or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby" (Public Law 93-247,
93rd Congress, Senate 1191, 1974). Certainly, most of our child
stealing cases would fit this definition.
Child maltreatment is a multi-faceted phenomenon, Acts of
commission (for example, physical abuse) and/or acts of omission
(for example, emotional neglect) may be categorized as follows
(Halperin, 1979):

1) physical abuse: infliction of physical injury, to the
child;
2) sexual abuse: subjection of a child to sexually
stimulating acts by an adult;
3) physical neglect: failure to provide a child with a
nurturing home environment that supplies the basic
necessities of life (for example, food, clothing,
shelter, supervision, and protection from harm);
4) medical neglect: failure of a caretaker to provide
medical treatment in cases of suspected or diagnosed
physical ailments except for religious reasons);
5) emotional abuse: speech and actions by a caretaker that
thwart the health personal and social development of a
child;
6) emotional neglect: failure of a caretaker to show concern
for a child or his/her activities;
7) educational neglect: failure of a caretaker to ensure
that a child is provided with the opportunity to learn;
8) abandonment: failure of a caretaker to make provisions
for the continued sustenance of the child;
9) multiple maltreatment: a severe and complex combination
of several types of abuse and/or neglect.
Every one of these elements is present in most cases of child
stealing. Child stealing should thus not be characterized as a
domestic problem, but as serious child abuse. We must visualize
the harm that is done to both the parents and the child and must
become sensitized to the fact that stolen children frequently
become gypsies, leading a nomadic lifestyle, deprived of stable
schooling and of many of the basic necessities of life. In domestic
relations courts we talk about the best interests of the child but
that element seems not to be considered in child stealing cases.
What is it then that we really do not know at this time about child
stealing? First, the incidence, although Gelles in his new survey
has partially answered this problem. Second, how many child
stealings occur before a custody decree is issued? Is the
frequency of child stealing increasing? Are men typically the
abductors and women the victims? How many of the stolen children
are found, and after what period of time? What is the
psychological impact in the short run and in the long run for the
child, parents, and family? What is the sex ratio and age of the
"typical" stolen child, and are there ethnic and socioeconomic
differences? (Gelles, 1980).
We also do not know the differential impact on a child of an active
abduction versus passive restraint, such as not returning a child

after a vacation. We also do not know the differential
psychological impact of an active abduction involving a traumatic
snatch versus a non-traumatic removal by someone well known and
beloved to the child, nor do we know the differential impact of a
traumatic "re-snatch" versus a relatively calm return to the
custodial parent. A kidnapping within the context of the previously
warm relationship with the parent perpetrator may have a totally
different psychological impact over time compared with a child
stealing within the context of a previously absent or negative
relationship with the parent perpetrator. One must look also at the
past and current relationships with the parent victim to understand
whether this has meaning for the long term impacts of child
stealing.
Given all of this, what do we know now, at least partially? First,
what do we know about the parent perpetrator? In a search of the
literature (Agopian, 1981; Geiss, 1981; Gill, 1981; Senior,
Gladstone and Nurcombe, 1982), in many interviews with police,
investigators and attorneys, and in discussions with three
perpetrators (two fathers and one mother), these are some of the
issues that have come to light:
1) Agopian (1981) found that the perpetrators in his sample
of 91 cases from the Los Angeles County District
Attorney's office between July 1977 and June 1978 were
70% male, 68% Caucasian, with a mean age of 32 years.
Elliott (1980) found in his content analysis of news
stories that the perpetrators were 60% male, and that
fathers were more likely to steal more than one child.

2) Child stealing seems to occur much more frequently at
points of transition: when one spouse announces they are
going to file for divorce; when one or the other after
separation or divorce becomes heavily involved with
someone else, including but not necessarily remarriage;
or when a geographic move is contemplated.
3) When a marriage sours, partners frequently experience
tremendous anger, desire for revenge and thoughts of
violence. They need to go through the grieving process,
and cope with their depressions. Children are frequently
used to ward off the parents' depression, and parenting
becomes inadequate to the needs of the child. There are
significant changes in parent-child relationships after
separation, and for many parents the narcissistic injury
involved in the loss is so great, they lose their
capacity for concern for the child. The parent may need a
child in a way they have never needed them before:
unconsciously, for sexual gratification; as the
repository for all their anger; and as a comfort to the
parent; that is, the child must parent the parent.
Parents use the child in parental conflicts. Some parents
and children may have difficulty in separating
psychologically and have confused ego boundaries.
Perpetrators may have an inability to endure the chronic

separation from the child and need to have the children
with them for ego support. They cannot face the feelings
of isolation and loss that come with divorce, and take
the children for comfort.
4) For the parent who has been "left" in the marital
breakup, there may be a sense of frustration, a sense
that life is totally out of control. This strengthens
their sense of inadequacy and helplessness, and the
subsequent need for revenge against and punishment of the
parent whom they blame for their agony. There may be
enormous hostility toward the spouse, or the ex-spouse,
and the use of the child to provoke, agitate, control and
attack the opposing parent. The children may also be used
as hostages in a twisted reconciliation attempt with the
other parent, or as instruments of psychological torture
of that parent. Perpetrators seem to have a difficult
time accepting the divorce, and frequently have
reconciliation fantasies that are shattered if the parent
victim remarries. They then act on their rage and
jealousy over the remarriage or a new, stable liaison.
Particularly for fathers, the desire for revenge and
vengeance is overwhelming, for they have a sense of
losing their whole world, of being narcissistically
injured when the wife leaves with the children. Not
only revenge is operative here. There is an attempt to
use the child to stay close to the wife, particularly
in situations where they desperately do not want the
divorce. The abduction is used as a club to force the
estranged spouse to return to the marriage, or as a
"getting even" with the custodial parent—and
frequently these issues are not separate ones.
5) Perpetrators, particularly fathers, have complained
about poorly enforced visitation rights, and that child
support is demanded without visitation being permitted.
Many fathers also complain about mothers who move out
of state with the child without any consultation with
the father. It is to be noted that many fathers do not
use lawyers to get some assurance of their rights. They
rely on verbal agreements with their ex-wives and then
are very angry when these women do not hold to the
agreements. In line with this, the perpetrators
sometimes say that they snatch because they feel they
don't have the money or the power to go to court to
modify the custody or visitation arrangement.
6) From the mothers' perspective, fathers snatch when they
owe a great deal of back child support payments and
will not return the children until the mothers agree to
stop asking for money. The children are then used as a
weapon in blackmail regarding eliminating or reducing
child support payments. "If you don't stop asking for
money, you'll never see the child again".

7) Many perpetrators have a sense of righteous indignation
that "the system" could take their children away from
them and righteous indignation about legal and moral
guidelines. They may have a low sense of moral
development and not much respect for the law. These
people want to take things into their own hands. No
matter what anyone says, they have to have the last
word. The perpetrators may be people with little
conscience who are willful, strong, arrogant people
with a sense of righteousness about their behavior.
They have contempt for the custodial parent's morality
and frequently feel "in the right"—that is, the judge
made the wrong decision because "I'm the better
parent". They want people to believe it is a
justifiable child stealing.
There is also involved the issue of the moral
righteousness of grandparents who frequently insist on
retaining "ownership" of their grandchildren even after
a different custody award has been made. This issue of
the extended family of the perpetrator, particularly
the child's grandparents, is a fascinating one. The
extended families frequently put pressure on the
perpetrator to commit the snatch or they acquiesce in
order to maintain the stealing. Paternal grandmothers
may also want to exclude the mother in a sense of
competition with the mother. Men may also have very
hostile relationships with their mothers-in-law, and
act out of rage toward them.
8) If a woman is the perpetrator, it is usually a woman
who gave up the custody to pursue a career, or for
whatever reason, and then becomes extremely guilty
about the relinquishment of the children. The women
also feel that because they are the mother, they
deserve to have the children back. Female perpetrators
also feel stigmatized as women in losing custody. There
is some evidence also that mother perpetrators may have
experienced physical abuse by the husband during the
marriage. Many investigators familiar with child
stealing feel that women perpetrators are much more
disturbed psychologically than male perpetrators.
9) Alcoholism, physical abuse of the wife, violent temper,
violence, drug involvement and criminal activities seem
now to be involved with many of the perpetrators.
These also seem to be very impulsive people, who
dislike rules and regulations and have difficulty in
accepting responsibility. Child Find believes that 60%
of child stealers have criminal records. This cannot be
confirmed in any way.
10) Gill (1981) feels that the perpetrators have violent
tempers, are impulsive, and have a history of loss
(either death or divorce) in childhood. They are
emotionally uncommunicative, feel alienated and

discriminated against, and lack confidence in
themselves as a person. The men may feel threatened by
the wife's independence. There also is a scorn for the
children's needs and the use of children as chattel to
punish the adult victim.
Perpetrators in general appear to be immature, to have
a number of previous marriages and to be unable to form
personal commitments to a partner. They also show an
extreme jealousy of the ex-spouse as well as anxiety
about the ex spouse's new life (particularly remarriage
or a new liaison). They have difficulty with
contractual relationships and difficulty keeping jobs.
They frequently have "very big eyes and wild dreams",
which results in much moving around, chasing that
dream. They may be from broken homes themselves or
have cut off all contact with their family of origin.
There seem also to be earlier difficulties with other
children in other marriages—such as giving a child up
for adoption, having a vasectomy, or losing contact
with the child of another marriage.
11) What perpetrators call "love" and a desire to maintain
a full time relationship may well be guilt about not
having been involved earlier in close relationships
with their children. These men have sometimes
experienced a sense of denigration on the part of their
wives of their importance as a person to the child;
they then need to feel important as someone who is
"molding" the child's developing personality after the
snatch. In addition, many men have warm and close
attachments to the child and are so terrified of losing
that attachment that they steal their children,
forgetting in the process the child's best interests.
12) In California, at least, perpetrators frequently are
from another country, particularly from cultures that
believe that fathers own children. They may also-be
husbands of mothers who are extremely unyielding about
their beliefs that only mothers can raise children, or
are important to children, and who set up power
struggles about that issue.
13) Parents whose attorneys encourage child stealing as a
resolution of a custody dispute may also be the
perpetrators. This is a serious ethical issue for
attorneys which must be faced.
14) A crucial and as yet unanswered question is how many of
the female perpetrators are battered wives who have
legitimately had to take their children and run for
their safety. Currently, battered women are still
subject to, that is, not exempted from, persecution for
child stealing in forty six states.
15) Finally, there may be more positive motivations

involved, such as the removal of the child from a
seriously disturbed parent who has been granted
custody.
Next, what do we know now about the impact of the child stealing
on the child victims?
1) The loss they suffer at the time of the snatch is not
just the loss of the parent victim but the loss of
their whole community: home, school, friends, pets,
their familiar environment, etc. There is often severe
depression, resulting from the loss of the custodial
parent, friends and familiar surroundings. If they
return, the children must then suffer a second lossthat of the absconding parent who may be forbidden by
the frightened custodial parent to ever see the child
again, or the loss of the new community to which they
had adjusted.
The children become "emotional dishrags" because the
perpetrator tells the child that the parent victim
doesn't want them anymore, doesn't love them anymore,
that the parent victim is dead, or may be getting
married and doesn't want them around. The older
children (ages 8 or 9) are pressured more heavily by
the perpetrator to form a negative image of the parent
victim, probably to assure that the child will not
attempt to contact the parent victim. The older
children also suffer more guilt about not trying to
contact the parent victim and therefore the experience
seems more difficult for these older children than for
the children under the age of five.
The issue of trust is a major one-stolen children are
taught to be fearful of police, to be fearful of
returning home, because they might be put up for
adoption, or locked away forever if the police find
them.
The children are usually not well cared for; they move
frequently from town to town; food and shelter are
inconsistent and unpredictable, schooling is
inconsistent and erratic. Middle class children
frequently plunge into poverty and instability; they
live lives of deprivation and neglect and that in
itself is traumatic for the children. They frequently
live out of vans, living like vagabonds, being hungry
and dirty. Neglect and malnutrition are common.
Physical and sexual abuse are not uncommon. District
Attorney Robert Hutchins 6 believes that there is
evidence now that stolen children may be put into child
slavery rings, pornography rings, or putup for adoption
on the black market. Agopian (1982) suspects that a
large portion of stolen children who remain missing are
unloaded by the absconding parent and end up in foster
homes and institutions.

2) The act of parental kidnapping exacerbates many of the
problems the child is suffering as a consequence of the
marital separation and the divorce itself (loss of
stability, security, and trust) (Haller, 1982). These
symptoms are seen in child victims after their return:
excessive fearfulness, even of ordinary occurrences;
fear of going outside the house; being despondent,
lonely and mistrustful of other people and therefore
not being able to get close to them and alleviating the
loneliness; anger at either or both the parents; a
sense of helplessness since they are unable to control
what happens to them in their environment; night
terrors and nightmares. Children may cease growing
emotionally as well as socially and academically,
perhaps with regression in the younger children. There
may be an inability to trust adults, and severe
disruption in all adult relationships (Terr, 1982).
There is disruption in identity formation (Watson,
1975). A child whose life is unstable and unpredictable
cannot develop a stable and integrated personality
structure. Anger at the custodial parent for not
protecting him from being stolen, or anger at rescuing
him from the absconding parent if the "snatch" occurred
much earlier, is frequently a result (Edwards, 1981).
Children become withdrawn, silent, reclusive, fearful
of being stolen again, fearful of leaving the house,
fearful of being alone, and lack trust in their
parents. There is a realization that they have been
used as weapons in the battles between the parents and
the parents thus become suspect. 7 The children develop
severe phobias, particularly fears of being snatched
again and suffering another sudden loss (Terr, 1982).
Those children who suffer repeated counter-snatchings
are the most fearful of all.
There is a constant fear about a re-snatch,
particularly if the return is via a snatch; there is
restricted activity, and fear over a long period of
time which is fed into by the fear of the parent victim
after the return. Many children fear being killed, and
dream of being killed.
The children have difficulty in leaving home to do
normal developmental things, like going to overnight
camp, for fear that they will never see their parent
again. They sometimes fear riding in cars, even with
adults they know, because of their fear of being
kidnapped. Many lose trust in any adult, and have
difficulty in forming new attachments such as making
new friends.
In school they are unable to concentrate, since
frightening fantasies intrude on their cognitive
processes. They are also frequently found to be lying
and stealing. These children develop a sense of being

an "odd-ball", that something very shameful has
happened to them.
For the young children, there may be regression in
toilet training, speech, rebelliousness and clinging.
Regardless of age, these children seem to be filled
with anger about what their parents have done to them,
about the use the parents have made of them in their
struggles with each other. Very sadly, there is often
anger at the parent victim for not allowing the parent
perpetrator to have visitation, originally, or after
the stealing. The strain of not being able to talk
about the perpetrator after the return is very great.
These children worry about their future: if they marry
and have children, would their spouses steal the
children?
3) Attachments to perpetrators may be very strong, just as
they are in hostage and abuse situations. There
frequently is anger at the parent victim about not
being able to see the perpetrator anymore. This is a
particularly important issue since many of the children
develop very strong attachments to the perpetrators and
do not wish to be returned. This is also an issue for
the judges in the awarding of custody to the
perpetrator, at times an extremely difficult decision.
8There may be a desperate need to keep a good image of
the perpetrator as part of an idealization of the
parent; an eagerness to forgive the perpetrator that
goes directly opposite to what the parent victim
wishes.
Children carry with them their introjects—the physical
removal from a parent does not necessarily change their
identifications. The identifications with the parent
perpetrator are extremely important and remain with the
child; one frequently has the situation of negative
identification in which the child is returned and the
custodial parent begins to see the child act like the
parent perpetrator used to act, and becomes even
more,negative toward that child.
Disorders of attachment are most frequently seen, and
have the most disastrous future connotations.
Attachments to adults are shattered by the lack of
trust these children experience. The capacity to form
significant human relationships may be seen in
Winnicott's (1963) terms as the capacity for concern.
This capacity arises as the result of a transaction
between a child and a parent who has the ability to
give spontaneously the feeling of concern and
understanding of the needs of the child (Huntington,
1982). These children have experienced just the
opposite-a parent who does not care—and their future

relationships are compromised. They sometimes hunger in
an indiscriminate way for adult relationships outside
their family.
4) Guilt is an important issue also for the returned
children. There may be a strong bonding between the
abducted child and the perpetrator-seeing their
fathers in particular as a hero; the child and the
father collude in the appearance of being outlaws on
the run. The child has idolized the father and his
ability to flee the law and to exist outside
convention.
These children are extremely guilty when they return
and are very fearful of the reaction of the other
parent. They do not know who to believe, they are
bewildered and very fearful. They frequently don't
want to leave when they are picked up for the return.
These children are caught up in loyalty conflicts about
revealing information about the parent who stole them,
believing that that would be a betrayal. Steve Lawrence
from the Lip sett Organization says that the children at
the time of the return frequently think that they are
being arrested for possessing stolen toys. They are
afraid their mothers are going to give them hell for
not calling them after being away for so many months.
He also believes the children initially take total
responsibility for the child stealing, are very fearful
about the parent victim's problems because of what the
parent perpetrator has told them and what they need to
watch out for.
Many children have a sense that the stealing was their
fault and that it could have been avoided. They feel to
blame for both the stealing and for the divorce. Many
of the older children feel very guilty about not having
tried to contact the parent victim. Many have the sense
they have done something wrong, particularly about the
stories the perpetrators tell. And also very
importantly, being told they will be put in Juvenile
Hall or a foster home before they are returned. 9
5) Many of the children have a belief their victim parents
do not wane them to task about the experience—that
there is something very wrong and therefore they feel
guilty. They are also guilty about missing the
perpetrator and guilty about missing the perpetrator
and guilty about the amount of money the parent has
spent to get them back, guilty about not having tried
to call the parent victim. There frequently is a
maintenance of an identification with the perpetrator,
and this causes many problems within the family. There
is anxiety over the visitation with the parent
perpetrator after the stealing. There is much continued
visiting in some cases. These children feel it is not
possible to have a relationship with both parents, and

they are torn between them. It is not uncommon to see
total confusion when they are returned, particularly
with a sense of being returned to a stranger. The
Teunion is very happy for the parent victim, but the
child may be frightened and may not know or remember
the custodial parent. Steve Lawrence feels the children
have a need for help in figuring out how to relate to
the parent who stole them because they eventually end
up having contact with the child stealer again. The
relationships are never again the way they ought to be,
either with the perpetrator or the victim.
Children sometimes feel that the perpetrator should pay
the kids and the parent victim for the hardships that
they experienced, yet there is a great sadness about
needing a father, if the father is the perpetrator, and
not being able to have one. There is also anger at
Judges for imposing sentences on the parent
perpetrator, and anger at judges for not imposing
sentences on the perpetrator. Guilt is always with
these children. Being placed in protective custody, in
a dependency unit or a foster home compounds their idea
they have done something wrong.
6) Lowell Streicker, the director of the freedom
Counseling Center in Burlingame, brings up the issue of
a special group of child stealing victims whose parents
are involved in a religious organization, possibly a
cult. When these marriages break up the custodial
parent moves away with the child and the non-custodial
parent steals the child back into the cult and the
child is exposed to sexual and physical abuse as part
of the cult's idiosyncratic practices, and also exposed
because because of the high degree of pathology in the
parent perpetrator. Relatives will also get involved in
child stealing —the child is awarded to relatives and
one or both parents snatch the child back, with the
natural parents taking the child with them into the
cult and grandparents will hire someone to go to the
cult and steal the child, because they are afraid of
the damage occurring to the child (this is very
frequent). One parent may also perceive the other as
being the enemy of the true faith and that parent
conceives that the eternal salvation of the child
depends on "rescuing" the child from the parent who is
not in the religious group. Frequently, the cult orders
the child stealing parent to steal the child, and the
perpetrator is responding to pressure from that group.
The return of the child is complicated by the child's
experience in the cult group. These children appear to
be confused, disoriented, and in addition, seem to have
internalized some sense of the parent perpetrator's
paranoid fantasies about the evil doings of the outside
society.
7) In the future, the children feel distrustful of people,

have a hard time falling in love, hard time letting go,
and feel very vulnerable for many years. One must look
always at the very long term effects (one of our
interviewed victims had been stolen twenty-five years
before, and she said, "I have a feeling like I was lost
in time and space", because she moved so much and went
to so many different schools. She still does not feel
normal).
What do we know about siblings?
The child victim frequently has sibs who were not stolen and one
sees between them, after a child is returned, the great
difficulty in talking about what has happened. There is also a
great deal of guilt in the sib who was not snatched, over not
preventing the stealing of their sib. They frequently wonder why
the perpetrator did not take them. There also is the enormous
burden of psychological support that these sibs who were not
stolen bear for their parent victims. These sibs frequently have
a sense of losing both parents: the parent victim becomes so
involved in the search that they lose contact with their
remaining children.
The sibs of the child victim also have-difficulties in trusting
anyone. For example, one of our victim parents whose child has
never been returned commented that her son who was not stolen,
while watching a TV special on the Guyana massacre, said, "Jim
Jones is just like my father. You can't trust anybody". There
frequently is great difficulty in rebuilding sibling
relationships if the children were not snatched together.
What do we know about parent victims?
The consequences for the parent victim most often mentioned by
Gill (1981) and Agopian (1981) are severe depression upon losing
. one's child, rage at the perpetrating spouse, a sense of
helplessness at not knowing how to recover the child, a sense of
paralysis in one's life and an inability to cope with day-to-day
life and frustration at the courts and law enforcement agencies
for being given the run around. If the child is returned, the
parent lives in fear of another snatch. The financial burden
involved in a lengthy search can also be staggering. Many parents
hire private detectives. One parent mentioned by Elliott (1981)
was reputed to have spent nearly a quarter of a million dollars
unsuccessfully trying to retrieve her children. Parent victims
frequently have nightmares, especially about their child crying
out for help, trying to find the child and not being able to.
Many of the parent victims interviewed said that it is a worse
situation for a parent to have a child stolen than to know that a
child is dead. When a child is abducted, you grieve until the
child is returned, you never know what the child's fate is; it's
like a living hell, at least, when a child dies, that's the end
of it-you grieve and the mourning period is over. Mourning is
never complete, because there is no ending.
The fights between the parent victim and the perpetrator

continue, even after the return-the fight never settles.
There may be rage at the child for not calling home or writing,
then unbearable guilt experienced about that rage and the
perceived rejection of the victim in favor of the perpetrator.
Some parents are guilty about feelings that they have not tried
hard enough to get the child back and are afraid of the return,
particularly when the return occurs after a number of years. The
guilt about this is then transmitted to all the members of the
extended family—they should have known, they should have been
able to stop it, they should not be so helpless, and frequently
that guilt is then projected onto the child victim as anger
against the child.
There is depression, powerlessness, sense of helplessness and
numbness, as well as rage at people who say, "At least you know
your child is with its father and is therefore safe". There may
be enormous guilt over having excessively disciplined the child
in the past or having been nasty, and over not having taken the
spouse seriously when he threatened to steal the child. There is
continued yearning for the children, a sense of no longer being a
whole person without them. Many parents experience a loss of
self-esteem, and have thoughts of suicide immediately after the
children are snatched, and transient thoughts of suicide
repeatedly while the children are missing.
Enormous anger floods these parents, along with irrational guilt
that they did not prevent the snatch. There is also a feeling
that knowing a child is dead would be better than the unknown o f
"Where is my child?"
Depression, anxiety, sleeplessness, and sometimes increased
drinking develop. There is also a loss of friends because the
friends cannot tolerate the stress of the parents' continued
concern for locating the children; because friends also fear it
could also happen to them. Many parents experience a paralysis of
action, and a total sense of powerlessness.
There is an avoidance of counseling, for fear that going into
therapy would indicate that they were "crazy" and therefore
deserved the snatch. Along with this goes a further sense of
being victimized, if they are poor and cannot hire detectives to
help them. There is then a gradual development of an
identification as a victim—the sense of self developed around
being a parent victim. Frequently the extended families focus the
blame on the parent victim for "allowing" the child stealing to
happen, and further add to the sense of worthlessness. It is not
unusual to hear of guilt in terms of "What have I done wrong?"
and the feeling that some parents have that they deserve the
snatch because they were bad parents. The parent victims may also
believe that the children don't want to return and feel defeated,
embarrassed and cheated about this. Parents also believe that if
they had taken the threats seriously or if they had prepared the
child appropriately, this would never have happened. This fits
in completely with the children who are very angry with the
parents who "allowed" the snatch to occur. For both the parents

and the children there is a loss of a sense of security and
permanence.
After the children are returned, parents live in fear of a
resnatch. They also fear that the court will award custody to
the perpetrator after the return. When the children are
returned, parents sometimes have the feeling that the children
are fragile and therefore the parent does not use normal limit
setting, to the detriment of the child. Many parents try not to
think about the stealing and therefore do not let the children
talk about it. It becomes a family secret. The parents also
seriously restrict the child's activities. The parents transfer
their continual fear of a re-snatch onto the children and greatly
magnify the children's own fears.
When parents and children are reunited and start talking about
the stealing, other issues come up between the parent and child
that neither one can tolerate or deal with effectively. Many
parents don't want to hear about these issues; they just want to
focus in on the stealing, and sometimes the stealing may not be
as important as other parent-child issues that are going on.
What do we know about the impact on the new families?
One of the crucial issues which has not in any way been addressed
by the literature is the impact on the new family after a child
is returned. There is disruption of the new marriages which have
occurred, and the new spouse may become the "wicked stepparent"
just as it does in any remarriage, but with a particularly
violent feeling when a child is returned from a kidnapping. The
new spouse may not understand why the child simply does not like
them and cannot allow that step-parent into their lives. There is
also a change in the amount of time that the new spouses have for
each other which frequently disrupts the marriage. The child's
fear of being alone also disrupts the remainder of the family and
the family frequently has difficulty in setting limits with the
returned child. There is also a great difficulty in accepting the
child's anger about returning and sometimes wishing to be back
with the perpetrator. The family may also have difficulty in
accepting the child's sadness and bitterness about the loss of
the parent perpetrator and the loss of the life that the child
led with that parent. Also the child's anger that the resnatch
was all lies and deception may disrupt the family on return.
Adults cannot comprehend the child's "ingratitude" when they (the
adults) have spent so much money, time, emotional energy, etc.,
in trying to find the child. They also become very angry at the
child for wanting to see or return to the parent perpetrator.
There frequently is competition between the returned child, the
new spouse and the new children which threatens and frequently
disrupts totally the equilibrium of the new family. There is a
lack of recognition by the parent victims of the importance to
the child of the attachment to the parent perpetrator and they
demand either knowingly or unknowingly that the child be
eternally grateful for being returned when the child is
frequently very angry about it. They also fail to understand the
importance to the child of the other life that the child has been

leading with other friends, other schools and the like. The
parent victims hate the parent perpetrators and the children
frequently do not.
When there has been a remarriage, the marriage may go sour after
the return-of the child, when, for example, the new spouses feel
all the attention goes to the child, and nothing is available for
them. There are step-sib problems and half-sib problems. The
pain, jealousy and rage toward the children who would prefer
being with the perpetrator frequently gets out of hand and is
sometimes suppressed with symptom formation consequent in al]
members of the family. There is difficulty in reintegrating the
stolen children who have been gone for an appreciable length of
time, when there have been family changes after the original
stealing.'
What are our future needs?
We lack public awareness of the seriousness oF the problem of
child stealing: its extent or its devastating impact on the
children, adults and families involved. We lack adequate
responses on the part of law enforcement agencies, school systems
and the medical care delivery system.
We need appropriate, active, easily accessible preventive
measures and services to deal with the victims. These services
range from financial resources to aid parents in the recovery of
their children, and financial resources for post-recovery legal
and psychiatric fees, to parent support groups; to informational
sources; to hot lines and to counseling for children, adults and
entire family systems.
Sensitization of police, family law attorneys, district
attorneys, pediatricians, mental health personnel and school
personnel to the psychological, social, economic and family
impacts of child stealing is the most immediate need. From this
recognition hopefully will come more appropriate and available
services to deal with this new and virulent form of abuse of this
nation's children.
March 1984
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FOOT NOTES
1 Dr. Huntington is Director of Research and Evaluation, Center
for the Family in Transition, Corte Madera, California, and
is Project Director of the Child Stealing Project. This work
is supported by the James Irvine Foundation and the Morris
Stulsaft Foundation.
2 WMH Comment: Note the assumption that it is the father who
kidnaps the child.
3 WMH Note: Literally "parent of the county," refers traditionally
to the role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under
legal disability. Parens patriae originates form the English
common law where the King had a royal prerogative to act as a
guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants, idiots
and lunatics. In the United States, the parens patriae function
belongs with the states.
4 WMH Note: As of 21 Jan 1991 all states have enacted some form or
another of the UCCJA. It is not in effect in Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands. The PKPA, 28 USC 1738A is, however,
effective in these places.
5 WMH Note: 28 Dec 1980, the Feast of the Holy Innocents
6 WMH Note: This observation should be taken with some caution.
7 WMH Note: It is the editor's belief that parents come in
"matched pairs". Is this the child's way of saying the same
thing?
8 WMH Note: This is an example of "Public Policy" in favor or
eliminating kidnapping and the "Best Interests" of the
particular child. The editor's opinion is that Public Policy
should govern as to to otherwise rewards the kidnapper and
encourages others to do the same.
9 WMH Note: This, like it or not, may well happen. Often a
child is picked up by the authorities and held in custody
pending a court hearing. While the usual pattern is to pick up
the child early in the morning and then go directly to court,
it has happened, say when a flight is delayed, that court is
carried over for a day or two. During this time the child is
placed in the children's shelter.

